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ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  begins  by  considering  that  modem  medicine  as  a  profession  has  tremendous 
scope  for  both  good  and  ill,  and  as  an  enterprise  consumes  a  vast  amount  of  the  national 
wealth.  Against  this  background,  the  thesis  considers  how  and  why  medicine  is  regulated, 
and  what  the  effects  of  this  regulation  are.  The  study  aims  to  assess  the  regulation  of  the 
medical  profession  against  the  interests  of  the  state,  the  profession,  and  the  consumers  of 
health  care,  to  see  whether  the  regulatory  mechanisms  adopted  adequately  safeguard  the 
interests  of  all  parties  concerned  with  the  practice  of  medicine. 
The  methodology  chapter  spells  out  the  analytical  techniques  which  the  bulk  of  the  thesis 
utifises  and  delimits  the  scope  of  the  research  to  cover  only  bodies  having  a  legal  genesis 
and  which  are  universal  in  application.  A  series  of  "core  evaluation  criteria"  are  identified 
against  which  the  four  regulatory  mechanisms  are  assessed. 
Chapters  3  to  6  contain  the  bulk  of  the  actual  research  into  the  four  main  areas  of 
regulatory  endeavour  which  the  study  considers;  each  is  analysed  in  turn  in  terms  of  the 
purpose,  mechanism  and  effect  of  the  regulatory  machinery  being  considered  and  then 
assessed  against  the  core  evaluation  criteria. 
Finally,  the  conclusions  chapter  draws  together  the  different  threads  which  the  sector- 
specific  analyses  have  identified  as  being  points  of  concern,  and  the  system  as  a  whole  is 
evaluated  to  see  whether  the  interests  of  the  relevant  stakeholders  are  adequately 
safeguarded,  to  identify  any  regulatory  gaps  which  exist  in  the  present  system,  and  to 
point  out  the  direction  which  anyone  seeking  to  improve  the  system  should  consider. V 
UPDATE  ON  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS 
As  explained  in  Chapter  2,  this  Thesis  is  not  primarily  concerned  with  regulatory 
mechanisms  which  exist  purely  within  the  National  Health  Service  (NHS).  However,  a 
number  of  changes  within  the  NHS  have  the  potential  for  impacting  on  medical  regulation 
more  widely,  and  in  particular  on  the  conduct  of  civil  litigation  relating  to  medical 
malpractice. 
In  late  1997,  the  newly-elected  Labour  government  published  two  White  Papers'  on 
further  reform  of  the  NHS,  or,  to  be  more  specific,  on  abolishing  the  internal  market  which 
had  been  created  by  the  National  Health  Service  and  Community  Care  Act  1990.  In 
addition,  however,  another  key  point  in  the  White  Papers  was  a  new  emphasis  on  what  is 
known  as  "evidence-based  medicine"  or  EBM  for  short  (although  neither  expression  is 
used  in  the  Scottish  White  Paper)  with  a  view  on  avoidance  of  resources  being  diverted 
into  treatments  of  no  proven  efficacy2.  This  commitment  underlay  the  creation  of  a 
number  of  new  quangos  concerned  with  quality  of  care  -  the  National  Institute  of  Clinical 
Excellence,  the  Commission  for  Health  Improvement  (in  England  and  Wales;  see  sections 
19  to  22  of  the  Health  Act  1999),  a  Nursing  and  Midwifery  Practice  Development  Unit  and 
a  Scottish  Health  Technology  Assessment  Centre  (in  Scotland).  Clinical  governance  and 
medical  audit,  the  two  main  approaches  adopted  by  the  NHS  to  attempt  to  improve  quality 
of  care  and  treatment,  are  now  an  inextricable  part  of  the  NHS'  structure.  In  terms  of 
Section  18  of  the  Health  Act  1999, 
"it  is  the  duty  of  each  Health  Authority,  Primary  Care  Trust  and  NHS  trust  to  put 
and  keep  in  place  arrangements  for  the  purpose  of  monitoring  and  improving  the 
quality  of  health  care  which  it  provides  to  individuals. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  to  what  extent  this  new  explicit  statutory  duty  to  provide  quality 
control  mechanisms  accelerates  the  spread  of  medical  audit  and  related  discipline, 
although  a  number  of  bodies  have  been  established  in  the  NHS  with  a  view  to  improving 
standards.  It  is  not  intended  to  discuss  these  bodies  in  any  great  detail,  but  for 
completeness  they  should  be  mentioned.  The  bodies  are  geographically  limited,  and 
different  bodies  perform  broadly  comparable  tasks  in  Scotland  and  England. 
For  England  and  Wales,  the  two  main  bodies  responsible  for  quality  issues  in  the  NHS  are 
the  National  Institute  for  Clinical  Excellence  (NICE),  and  the  Commission  for  Health 
Improvement  (CHI).  NICE  was  set  up  as  a  Special  Health  Authority  for  England  and 
Wales  on  1  April  1999  with  the  role  of  providing  patients,  health  professionals  and  the 
public  with  authoritative  guidance  on  current  "best  practice"  covering  both  individual  health V1 
technologies  (including  medicines,  medical  devices,  diagnostic  techniques,  and 
procedures)  and  the  clinical  management  of  specific  conditionS.  4  CHI  was  established  in 
terms  of  the  Health  Act  1999,  and  started  operating  on  16t  April  2000.  It  has  a  role  which 
is  complementary  to  that  of  NICE,  being  principally  concerned  to  ensure  that  the  health 
service  bodies  which  it  reviews  are  complying  with  their  duties  under  Section  18  of  the  Act 
by  implementing  proper  systems  of  clinical  governance.  One  aspect  of  this  is  to  ensure 
that  the  health  service  bodies  which  it  inspects  are,  in  fact,  implementing  the  best  practice 
guidance  issued  by  NICE.  There  is  a  degree  of  overlap  in  some  areas  where  good  clinical 
practice  merges  into  good  operational  management.  The  clearest  example  of  this  is  in  the 
field  of  medical  audit  (considered  infra),  on  which  subject  NICE  and  CHI  have  issued  joint 
guidance  5.  NICE  and  CHI  are  currently  scheduled  to  be  merged  into  a  single 
organisation,  to  be  known  as  The  Commission  for  Healthcare  Audit  and  Inspection 
(CHAI).  6  It  has  been  suggested  that  CHAI  will  perform  a  more  explicitly  regulatory  role 
than  CHI  did,  to  its  detriment7 
. 
The  omission  of  the  word  "Improvement"  from  the  new 
body's  title  has  also  provoked  adverse  comment".  It  is  proposed  that  CHAI  will  also  have 
responsibility  for  the  private  sector  and  as  such  would  have  merited  full  analysis  in 
Chapter  5  had  it  been  operational  within  the  timescale  considered  by  this  Thesis. 
In  Scotland,  the  counterpart  of  CHI  is  the  Clinical  Standards  Board  for  Scotland  (CSBS). 
The  CSBS  was  established  as  a  special  Health  Board  in  April  1999.  The  Board's  system 
of  assuring  quality  and  accreditation  is  designed,  to  complement  the  duty  to  demonstrate 
proper  systems  of  clinical  governance  imposed  by  the  Health  Act  1999  section  51  (1).  The 
work  which  in  England  and  Wales  is  carded  out  by  NICE  is,  in  Scotland,  undertaken  by 
several  different  bodies  including  the  Clinical  Resource  and  Audit  Group  (CRAG),  the 
Scottish  Intercollegiate  Guidelines  Network  (SIGN),  and  the  Health  Technology  Board  for 
Scotland  (HTBS).  All  of  these  bodies  seek  to  provide  national  guidance  on  best  practice 
within  their  particular  areas  of  concern,  and  again  the  CSBS  system  of  audit  and 
inspection  pays  particular  attention  to  whether  other  parts  of  the  NHS  are  implementing 
the  guidelines  issued  by  these  bodies;  the  audits  carried  out  by  CSBS  are  also  intended  to 
complement  those  of  other  bodies  such  as  the  Scottish  Health  Advisory  Service  (SHAS), 
the  Mental  Welfare  Commission,  Audit  Scotland  and  the  work  of  professional  regulatory 
bodiee. 
Central  to  the  approach  of  these  quality  assurance  systems  is  what  is  referred  to  as 
medical  audit  ".  This  merits  some  mention  in  its  own  right  (as  it  is  not  exclusively 
concerned  with  the  NHS)  and  is  considered  below. 
In  1996,  an  article  published  in  the  British  Medical  Journal  included  a  list  of  no  less  than 
25  quality/management  initiatives  which  were  underway  in  the  NHS  at  that  timelo.  The Vil 
article  made  no  attempt  to  assess  the  value  of  these  initiatives  in  terms  of  improving 
standards,  but  noted  that  critics  of  the  health  care  quality  management  industry 
"...  questioned  the  extent  to  which  patients  have  benefited  from  the  up  to  El  billion 
spent  in  the  NHS  on  various  forms  of  audit,  service  standard  setting,  data 
monitoring,  and  other  types  of  quality  initiative  since  the  start  of  the  1990s.  "  " 
As  we  will  see  in  the  introduction  and  methodology  chapters,  it  is  important  that  regulatory 
mechanisms  take  due  account  of  the  resources  which  those  mechanisms  themselves  use 
up.  If,  as  suggested  above,  quality  control  systems  in  the  NHS  cost  one  billion  pounds 
from  1990  to  1996,  it  has  to  raise  questions  as  to  whether  or  not  appropriate  value  for 
money  tests  have  been  applied  to  all  (or  indeed  to  any)  of  these  initiatives,  or  to  the  more 
recent  statutory  extension  of  clinical  governance  across  the  NHS.  There  is  an  additional 
suggestion  that  even  with  this  level  of  expenditure,  the  quality  control  initiatives  do  not 
really  provide  anything  like  a  proper  assessment  of  how  good  the  NHS,  or  any  part  of  it, 
actually  is: 
"The  real  scandal  is...  the  fact  that  the  NHS  has  no  money  for  quality  assurance. 
At  present  audit  is  done  by  isolated  enthusiasts  on  the  backs  of  envelopes. 
'Scandals'  arise  because  a  doctor  tries  to  extract  a  few  figures  out  of  a  pile  of 
notes  for  a  research  project  and  discovers  something  that  doesn't  look  quite  right. 
Before  it  can  be  statistically  verified  by  someone  vaguely  numerate,  it  hits  the 
press.  "  12 
Medical  audit  is  still  a  relatively  recent  innovation  in  the  regulation  of  medicine  in  Britain, 
so  it  may  be  helpful  to  begin  with  some  definitions".  Thus, 
"Medical  audit  is  widely  used  as  shorthand  to  describe  all  or  part  of  the  complex 
process  of  measuring,  evaluating,  attempting  to  improve  and  monitoring  change  in 
the  quality  of  care  provided  by  doctors.  Some  advocates  of  audit  argue  that  it 
should  be  used  much  more  specifically  because  'medical  audit  is  a  precise  and 
scientific  term  descdbing  a  well-defined  and  6gorous  discipline.  '  They  see  audit  as 
a  specialised  part  of  quality  assurance,  refening  to  practitioners  themselves 
reviewing  the  care  they  provide,  usually  with  an  emphasis  on  its  technical  rather 
than  interpersonal  aspects,  and  with  the  aim  of  improving  its  quality.  ""' 
In  the  wider  sense,  then,  medical  audit  is  a  term  applied  to  any  of  a  range  of  methods  by 
which  the  actual  clinical  practice  of  physicians  is  scrutinised  by  other  parties.  As  will  be 
seen  in  subsequent  Chapters,  medical  audit  is  virtually  unique  in  penetrating  the  veil  of viii 
uclinical  autonomy"  which  seeks  to  exclude  clinical  practice  from  the  jurisdiction  of  most  of 
the  regulatory  machinery. 
Any  quality  assurance  mechanism  must  display  certain  essential  features  in  order  to 
function  properly.  These  are  that  the  mechanism  must  be  capable  of: 
1:  Specifying  the  concept  of  quality  which  is  to  be  assessed  and  assured; 
2:  Actually  setting  targets,  or  standards; 
3:  Measuring  current  practice:  and 
4:  Translating  these  results  into  practice.  15 
In  the  case  of  medical  audit,  the  desire  to  make  assessment  more  objective  led  to 
development  of  a  two-pronged  approach  based  on  criteria  and  standards'6.  "Criteria" 
indicates  the  things  to  be  measured,  by  which  quality  caq  be  assessed;  i.  e.  what  is  it  that 
the  doctor  actually  does  that  we  are  assessing?  "Standards"  represent  the  previously- 
agreed-upon  level  of  attainment  which  indicates  quality.  If  the  criteria  of  a  particular 
doctor  attain  the  requisite  standard,  then  we  can  say  that  the  doctor  has  achieved  quality 
in  his  or  her  treatment.  This,  of  course,  begs  the  question  of  what  happens  if  the  doctor 
fails  to  attain  the  standard  set,  which  leads  to  a  second  key  feature  of  medical  audit:  in 
order  that  it  should  result  in  improvement  in  (or  assurance  of)  the  quality  of  care,  medical 
audit  must  include  a  degree  of  feedback.  This  has  been  characterised  by  ShaW'7  as  the 
U  cycle  of  audit",  as  shown  below: 
SETSTANDARDS 
OBSERVE  PRACTICE 




This  concept  of  a  "cycle  of  audit"  is  now  widely  accepted",  since  audit,  to  be  successful, 
umust  include  a  mechanism  for  implementing  change  where  problems  are  identified.  "'9 ix 
Medical  audit  became  contentious  because  its  systematic  introduction  into  the  NHS 
coincided  with  the  creation  of  the  "internal  market"  in  the  1990s,  and  audit  was  perceived 
as  being  part  of  a  government  agenda  aimed  at  reducing  the  power  of  the  medical 
profession.  The  troubled  history  of  medical  audit  in  the  UK  was  not  helped  by 
comparisons  with  developments  in  the  US,  where  medical  audit  had  evolved  into  a  system 
of  "utilisation  review"  by  which  health  insurers  sought  to  restrict  the  costs  of  the  medical 
treatment  ordered  by  physicianS20  . 
However,  while  we  might  have  expected  some 
professional  opposition  to  medical  audit  (for  the  simple  reason  that  audit  goes  right  to  the 
heart  of  medical  practice  in  that  it  scrutinises  the  clinical  activities  of  doctors),  in  fact  the 
professional  organisations,  and  most  notably  the  Royal  Colleges,  have  made  a  number  of 
pronouncements  strongly  in  favour  of  it  21. 
The  systematic  form  of  medical  audit  now  undertaken  in  Britain  requires  there  to  be  a 
baseline  standard  against  which  the  level  of  clinical  activity  observed  in  the  course  of  an 
audit  is  compared.  It  is  in  this  area  that  we  see  a  development  which  may  ultimately 
change  the  conduct  of  medical  malpractice  forever. 
In  "pure"  medical  audit,  the  information  gathered  firstly  in  the  course  of  establishing  the 
baseline,  and  secondly  in  comparing  a  particular  doctor's  activities  to  this  yardstick,  is 
gathered  to  enable  remedial  action  to  be  taken  in  the  event  of  a  shortfall  in  performance. 
However,  having  acquired  such  information,  there  are  a  number  of  alternative  uses  to 
which  it  can  be  put. 
The  most  obvious  use  is  to  introduce  some  form  of  resource  monitoring,  in  order  to 
prevent  treatment  not  deemed  adequate  as  a  way  of  saving  money.  Thus,  in  the  US,  a 
Utilisation  Review  nurse  routinely  has  to  be  consulted  before  treatment  under  the 
Medicare  and  Medicaid  programmes  is  authorised  22 
. 
This  obviously  goes  beyond  the 
realms  of  audit,  and  represents  a  considerable  reduction  in  clinical  freedom  of  a  type 
which  British  doctors  have  yet  to  experience.  Another  use  concerns  the  revalidation 
proposals  being  introduced  by  the  General  Medical  Council  (GMC),  considered  as  a 
postscript  to  Chapter  5.  Under  these  proposals,  participation  in  a  modified  form  of 
medical  audit  will  become  a  prerequisite  to  continued  registration  as  a  medical  practitioner 
by  the  GIVIC. 
One  particular  potential  use  of  medical  audit  which  most  advocates  of  medical  audit  are 
opposed  to  concerns  the  use  of  audit  results  in  the  course  of  litigation.  Medical  audit, 
even  in  its  purest  form,  provides  indicators  of  the  quality  of  medical  care.  This  gives  rise 
to  a  number  of  medico-legal  issues.  As  is  seen  in  the  chapter  discussing  litigation,  one  of 
the  most  significant  barriers  to  successfully  bringing  an  action  for  medical  negligence  is x 
that  the  plaintiff  or  pursuer  must  show  that  there  exists  an  accepted  course  of  treatment, 
which  the  doctor  negligently  departed  froM23 
. 
The  essential  problem  for  the  aggrieved 
patient  is  that  a  "wall  of  silence"  may  be  erected  by  doctors  unwilling  to  be  seen  criticising 
a  colleague,  and  so  he  or  she  may  find  it  impossible  establish  an  accepted  course  of 
treatment,  and  so  the  claim  will  generally  fail. 
The  significance  of  medical  audit  here  is  that,  under  the  auspices  of  the  appropriate  body, 
an  approved  standard  of  care  will  have  been  promulgated,  with  which  to  compare  audit 
criteria.  The  argument,  advanced  initially  by  John  EvanS24,  is  that  these  standards  could 
be  adduced  as  evidence  of  what  constituted  the  legally-acceptable  standard  of  care.  He 
notes  further  that,  in  a  legal  climate  increasingly  predisposed  to  the  notion  of  openness  of 
records  in  legal  proceedings,  the  documents  detailing  these  standards  are  unlikely  to  be 
immune  to  the  courts'  powers  of  discovery.  For  doctors,  this  is  a  double-edged  sword. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  simplifies  (in  theory)  at  least  one  part  of  the  bringing  of  a  successful 
malpractice  claim  against  doctors.  On  the  other,  it  raises  the  prospect  that  any  course  of 
treatment  carded  out  in  accordance  with  such  standards  is  almost  certainly  going  to  be 
deemed  non-negligent  by  a  court  -  particularly  given  the  courts'  reluctance  to  question 
accepted  medical  practice  25 
. 
Evans  postulated  this  theoretical  approach  in  1991,  when 
medical  audit  was  still  in  its  early  days  and  there  was  no  central  body  with  overall 
responsibility.  The  intervening  eleven  years  of  litigation  have  tended  to  prove  him  wrong 
inasmuch  as  the  reported  cases  of  medical  negligence  have  not  proceeded  on  the  basis 
of  either  the  medical  audit  findings  in  respect  of  a  particular  doctor,  nor  on  the  basis  of 
medical  audit  protocols  and  standards  against  which  that  doctor's  practice  was  or  could 
be  compared.  However,  since  1991  we  have  seen  a  change  in  the  regulatory  landscape 
through  the  creation  of  NICE  and  CHI.  In  essence,  we  now  have  a  government  agency 
with  a  specific  statutory  remit  for  setting  down  in  clear  and  unequivocal  terms  what  is  or  is 
not  to  be  regarded  as  good  medical  practice. 
The  prospect  of  medical  audit  findings  (as  opposed  to  the  protocols  underpinning  such 
audit)  being  used  as  evidence  in  court  proceedings  is  opposed  by  the  professional  bodies; 
the  Royal  College  of  Physicians  comments  that: 
"Confidentiality  is  a  prime  consideration.  The  identity  of  patients  discussed  should 
never  be  revealed  or  capable  of  being  traced,  both  to  protect  the  anonymity  of 
individual  patients  and  to  avoid  any  danger  of  documents  used  in  audit  being 
employed  in  legal  proceedings.  "" 
Certainly,  if  audit  were  conducted  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  any  connection  between  audit 
findings  and  a  particular  patient  genuinely  impossible  to  establish,  then  the  issue  becomes X1 
hypothetical.  In  practice,  however,  such  a  separation  cannot  be  created  because  at  least 
one  person  -  the  doctor  in  question  -  will  know  who  the  patient  is.  If  a  court  really  wanted 
access  to  medical  audit  records,  then  it  could  get  it  (barring  a  Contempt  of  Court  by  the 
doctor,  which  seems  unlikely,  or  else  by  the  doctor  denying,  and  being  believed  in  his 
denial,  that  the  patient's  case  has  never  been  the  subject  of  discussion.  Such  an 
approach  is  obviously  unsatisfactory  to  all  parties).  Increased  rights  of  access  to  files 
under  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998,  considered  in  Chapter  7  infra,  may  also  exacerbate 
this  problem. 
Whether  a  court  will  ever  order  such  disclosure  is  open  to  speculation.  There  are  two 
countervailing  pressures  here.  From  the  patient's  perspective,  medical  audit  findings  may 
constitute  valuable  evidence  in  support  of  his  claim,  and  it  would  be  unjust  to  deprive  him 
or  her  of  this  evidence.  This  is  all  the  more  true  if  it  were  the  case  that  compliance  with 
medical  audit  standards  were  a  complete  (or  near-complete)  defence  to  a  finding  of 
negligence.  In  effect,  the  doctor  would  be  in  a  no-lose  situation:  if  he  complied  with  the 
standards,  he  produces  the  records  and  is  exonerated;  if  he  did  not,  he  refuses  to  produce 
them  and  the  plaintiff  or  pursuer  must  rely  on  other  methods  to  infer  or  prove  negligence. 
Only  if  a  court  were  willing  to  infer  negligence  in  the  face  of  non-production  of  records 
would  this  not  be  the  case,  and  this  seems  unlikely  in  the  present  climate.  However,  it 
has  been  pointed  out  that  the  only  grounds  under  which  medical  audit  protocols  would  be 
immune  from  discovery  would  be  a  public  interest  defence  27 
, 
but  this  is  irrelevant  given 
that  NICE  routinely  publishes  its  protocols  and  seeks  to  give  them  the  widest  possible 
publiCity28  . 
Accordingly,  the  guidelines  produced  by  a  government  agency  tasked 
precisely  with  the  job  of  issuing  best  practice  are  in  the  public  domain  and  could 
accordingly  be  relied  on  in  proceedings  for  medical  litigation.  And  while  NICE  itself  has 
been  constituted  as  a  special  health  authority  and  is  accordingly  part  of  the  NHS  (and  so, 
in  accordance  with  the  methodology  of  this  Thesis  outwith  the  scope  of  the  detailed 
scrutiny  which  follows),  it  would  be  hard  to  argue  that  its  guidance  is  not  equally 
applicable  to  private  and  voluntary  health  care.  The  guidance  which  it  issues  could 
therefore  be  relied  on  in  any  proceedings,  including  those  against  private  health  care 
providers.  We  therefore  have  the  situation  where  an  NHS  regulator  exerts  a  wider 
influence  on  the  regulation  of  health  care  (through  the  medium  of  the  civil  courts). 
At  the  time  of  writing,  this  theoretical  possibility  does  not  seem  to  have  been  widely 
explored,  and  the  writer  has  been  unable  to  find  any  decided  cases  where  clinical 
guidance  of  the  type  just  described  (whether  published  by  NICE  or  by  any  of  the  other 
bodies  who  previously  promulgated  medical  audit  protocols)  has  been  led  in  evidence  in  a 
medical  negligence  case,  far  less  any  cases  where  such  evidence  was  decisive  for  the 
outcome  of  the  case.  At  this  time,  therefore,  the  influence  which  NICE  or  its  successor xii 
may  exert  on  civil  litigation  (and  through  such  litigation,  on  the  practice  of  medicine 
generally)  is  as  yet  hypothetical.  Should  such  a  development  occur,  however,  it  would 
represent  another  example  of  the  increased  regulation  of  the  medical  profession. xiii 
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Chapter  1:  Introduction: 
1:  Policv  backqround: 
In  June  1998,  the  then  Secretary  of  State  for  Health  for  England  and  Wales,  Frank 
Dobson,  announced  that  a  public  inquiry  would  be  held  into  the  management  of  the  care 
of  children  who  had  received  complex  cardiac  surgery  at  the  Bristol  Royal  Infirmary  from 
1984  to  1995  -  management  which  had  left  at  least  29  children  dead  and  resulted  in  the 
General  Medical  Council  taking  action  against  two  of  the  doctors  concerned'. 
In  January  2000,  British  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  announced  a  proposed  spending 
increase  for  the  UK's  National  Health  Service  ("NHS")  which  would  take  total  annual 
spending  on  the  NHS  to  some  E57  billion  2.  The  2002  budget  statement  proposed  taking 
the  annual  spending  level  to  E105.6  billion  by  2007-8  3.  This  figure  does  not  even  include 
the  sums  spent  on  private  health  care  in  the  UK,  or  money  spent  on  health  care  by 
British  citizens  elsewhere  in  the  world. 
In  February  2000,  Dr.  Harold  Shipman,  a  general  practitioner  working  for  the  NHS,  was 
convicted  of  the  murder  of  fifteen  of  his  patients,  amidst  fears  that  he  may  have 
4 
murdered  as  many  as  297  people  over  thirty  years'  practice 
5  And  on  a  single  day  in  England,  nearly  700,000  people  visited  their  doctor.  This  was  a 
typical  day. 
These  examples  show  the  sheer  scale,  in  human  and  financial  terms,  of  the  modern 
medical  profession  and  its  related  professions  and  activities.  They  also  show  the 
potential  for  causing  great  harm  which  the  modern  practice  of  medicine  possesses. 
Against  this  background,  it  is  unsurprising  that  the  practice  of  medicine  is  regulated  -  by 
the  state,  by  bodies  set  up  by  the  state  for  this  purpose,  by  the  courts,  and  by  those  who 
practise  medicine  themselves.  Fellow  medical  professionals  can  reasonably  be 
expected  to  have  an  interest  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  profession's  generally  high 
public  esteem  and  reputation.  Patients  clearly  have  an  interest  in  knowing  that  those 
who  would  treat  them  are  properly  able  to  do  so.  The  professions  who  assist  doctors  are 
regulated  -  in  part  by  doctors.  The  drugs  and  other  treatments  which  represent  the  tools 
of  the  medical  trade  are  themselves  regulated  and  may  be  subject  to  resource 
shortages.  Those  who  claim  to  have  suffered  at  the  hands  of  doctors  may  seek  to  hold 
them  accountable,  or  at  least  seek  to  hold  them  liable  in  a  financial  reckoning.  Those 2 
who  pay  for  the  exercise  want  to  make  sure  that  their  money  is  being  well  spent. 
Ultimately,  all  these  factors  are  concemed  with  ensuring  that  the  medical  practice  which 
takes  place  is  "good"  medical  practice,  from  the  point  of  view  of  those  concerned. 
This  thesis  takes  as  its  starting  point  the  wide  range  of  bodies  and  interests  involved,  in 
varying  degrees  of  formality,  scope  and  compulsion,  in  regulating  the  practice  of 
medicine  in  Britain.  The  question  arises,  against  this  background,  as  to  how  well  these 
disparate  pressures  and  interests  can  co-exist.  It  is  that  question  which  this  thesis  seeks 
to  address  -  are  the  inherent  conflicts  of  interest  between  the  assorted  regulators,  and 
the  different  purposes  for  which  medical  practice  is  regulated,  so  great  as  to  make  a 
coherent  and  effective  approach  to  regulation  impossible?  It  seems  reasonable,  without 
going  into  any  detailed  scrutiny,  to  assume  that  different  mechanisms  for  regulating  how 
medicine  is  practised  will  have  different  objectives  in  mind.  It  is  only  a  little  beyond  this 
starting  point  to  consider  the  possibility  that  these  objectives  might  turn  out  to  be 
different,  and  only  a  little  beyond  that  to  consider  that  these  different  objectives  might  be 
mutually  incompatible.  This  thesis  is  intended  to  test  that  possibility. 
The  working  hypothesis  underpinning  this  thesis  is  as  follows: 
"Does  the  present  system  of  regulation  of  medical  practice  in  Great  Britain 
provide  adequate  safeguards  for  the  interests  of  patients,  doctors  and  the 
State?  " 
The  "medical  practice"  which  this  question  is  considering  is  discussed  next;  the  way  in 
which  this  thesis  seeks  to  answer  the  question  is  described  in  the  final  section  of  this 
Chapter. 
It  Scope  of  Research: 
In  seeking  to  answer  the  question  posed  by  this  working  hypothesis,  this  thesis  will 
conduct  what  in  many  respects  is  similar  to  the  technique  known  as  a  "SWOT"  analysis, 
i.  e.  it  will  consider  in  turn  the  strengths,  weaknesses,  opportunities  for  and  threats  to 
those  having  an  interest  in  the  system  of  medical  regulation  of  that  existing  system.  The 
nature  of  a  SWOT  analysis  is  that  it  is  a  tool  for  improvement,  and  ultimately  this  thesis 
hopes  to  be  able  to  provide  pointers  for  the  -policy-makers  who  are  able  to  institute 
changes  which  could  lead  to  improvements  in  the  system.  The  nature  of  the  study  is 
such  that  improvements  in  some  areas  may  have  to  be  bought  at  the  expense  of  others. 3 
Geographically,  the  study  is  restdcted  to  Scotland,  England  and  Wales.  At  various 
points,  reference  is  made  to  approaches  utilised  further  afield  -  either  as  an  aid  to 
assessing  how  a  currently  open  question  might  be  addressed  by  the  British  regulators,  or 
as  a  comparison  showing  how  else  a  particular  issue  could  be  approached.  Medicine  is 
an  international  discipline,  and  the  issues  raised  within  this  study  are  common  to  many 
(and  in  some  cases,  virtually  all)  parts  of  the  world.  Temporally,  the  study  starts  in 
prehistory  and  extends  in  the  main  to  June  2001.  At  this  point,  however,  the  devolution 
settlements  created  by  the  Scotland  Act  1998  (and,  to  a  lesser  extent  for  the  purposes  of 
this  Thesis,  by  the  Government  of  Wales  Act  1998)  had  begun  to  bed  in.  One 
consequence  of  devolution  is  that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  identify  a  consistent  UK-wide 
government  agenda  for  health,  as  had  been  possible  up  to  that  point.  The  introduction 
of  free  personal  care  for  the  elderly  in  Scotland  is  an  example  of  this  growing  trend 
towards  more  diversity.  A  small  amount  of  later  material  (up  to  September  2002)  has, 
however,  been  included  where  possible  and  relevant. 
The  precise  subject  matter  covered  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter; 
however,  in  general,  all  the  formal  mechanisms  whose  purpose  is  the  regulation  of 
medical  practice  in  this  country  are  considered,  together  with  some  of  the  less  formal 
ones  having  a  quantifiable  impact.  The  main  focus  of  the  study  is  the  regulation  of 
medical  practice  where  it  affects  the  adult  patient  having  full  mental  capacity.  That  said, 
it  also  considers  a  number  of  the  problems  inherent  in  medical  practice  as  it  affects  those 
not  enjoying  full  capacity,  and  the  mechanisms  which  seek  to  address  those  problems. 
The  mechanisms  included  in  the  study  are  those  which  regulate  the  entire  body  of 
medical  practice  as  a  whole.  However,  in  a  study  of  medical  regulation  in  Britain,  it  is 
important  to  note  the  distinction  between  medical  practice  taking  place  under  the 
auspices  of  the  NHS  (which  accounts  for  the  overwhelming  majority  of  medical  care 
which  takes  place  in  Britain)  and  medical  practice  taking  place  outwith  it,  in  private 
medical  practice.  The  NHS  itself  has  a  complex  set  of  regulatory  mechanisms,  although 
many  of  these  lack  the  properties  of  the  global  regulatory  systems  with  which  this  thesis 
is  particularly  concerned.  NHS-specific  mechanisms  clearly  have  limited  scope,  but 
given  the  sheer  scale  of  the  NHS  and  its  activfties,  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  these 
mechanisms  completely.  An  outline  of  the  key  NHS  regulatory  systems  is  therefore 
included  in  Chapter  3.  Quasi-medical  activities  such  as  dentistry,  optometry  and  nursing, 
as  well  as  the  various  forms  of  alternative  (or  complementary)  medicine  are  not 
examined  in  detail,  although  again  reference  is  made  to  these  areas  as  appropriate. 
Likewise,  the  practice  of  medicine  is  also  subject  to  a  number  of  peripheral  controls,  such 
as  those  on  the  availability  and  licensing  of  pharmaceuticals,  and  the  rules  governing 
liability  for  products  used  in  the  course  of  medical  treatment.  These  arguably  do  not 4 
have  the  regulation  of  medicine  as  their  principal  purpose,  and  are  not  discussed  in 
detail  as  a  result.  The  inclusion  of  other  mechanisms  which  also  do  not  have  medical 
regulation  as  an  explicit  objective  is  explained  in  Chapter  2. 
III:  Structure  of  thesis: 
The  structure  of  the  thesis  is,  to  a  large  extent,  determined  by  the  vadous  regulatory 
mechanisms  which  it  examines. 
Chapter  2  sets  out  the  methodology  underpinning  this  study.  It  examines  the  nature  of 
regulation  as  a  concept  and  provides  a  philosophical  background.  It  analyses  the 
different  approaches  to  the  concept  of  regulation  which  can  be  taken,  and,  against  this 
evaluation,  breaks  down  the  system  of  regulation  into  a  number  of  discrete  areas  which 
form  the  basis  of  later  chapters.  It  then  identifies  a  series  of  what  are  called  "core 
evaluation  criteria".  These  are  the  yardsticks  of  success  which  the  bulk  of  the  thesis 
measures  the  existing  system  against.  The  method  of  measuring  is  to  consider  each 
regulatory  mechanism  identified  in  terms  of  its  purpose,  its  mechanism,  and  its  effect. 
This  approach  is  explained  and  refined,  and  the  structure  of  the  later  chapters  is  mapped 
out.  These  later  chapter  will  apply  the  approach  in  question  to  the  regulatory 
mechanisms  being  evaluated. 
Chapters  3  through  to  6  are  the  substantive  studies  of  the  global  regulatory  mechanisms 
currently  extant.  They  follow  a  similar  structure  of  firstly  considering  the  purpose  of  the 
mechanism  (if  it  has  an  explicit  purpose  at  all);  secondly,  of  describing,  in  some  detail, 
what  the  mechanism  actually  is  and  how  it  works;  and  thirdly  the  actual  effects  which  the 
mechanism  has  in  practice.  Each  chapter  concludes  by  then  applying  the  analysis 
described  in  Chapter  2  to  the  mechanism  which  has  just  been  examined. 
Chapter  3  looks  at  the  criminal  law,  and  in  particular  the  relatively  limited  use  which  has 
been  made  of  the  criminal  law  as  a  regulatory  tool  in  this  area.  Criminal  law  is 
considered  first  because,  while  it  is  of  limited  (but  significant)  relevance  as  a  regulatory 
tool  in  its  own  right,  it  is  often  the  mechanism  used  to  ensure  that  people  and 
organisations  involved  in  the  health  care  system  subscribe  to  the  authority  of  other 
regulators. 
Chapter  4  moves  on  from  this  to  look  at  the  civil  law,  and  in  particular  how  the  civil  courts 
have  been  used  as  a  regulatory  tool  in  the  context  of  litigation  brought  against  those  who 
practise  or  are  responsible  for  the  practice  of  medicine.  The  legal  tests  applied  by  the 5 
courts  are  considered  in  some  detail,  and  the  chapter  also  proceeds  to  consider  some  of 
the  problems  inherent  in  using  civil  courts  as  a  regulatory  tool  at  all. 
Chapter  5  looks  at  the  statutory  regulatory  bodies,  i.  e.  those  bodies  established  or 
recognised  by  statute  who  have  a  role  in  regulating  the  practice  of  medicine.  The  main 
focus  is  on  the  General  Medical  Council,  but  a  number  of  other  bodies  exist  which  are 
also  considered,  albeit  not  in  detail. 
Chapter  6  considers  the  other  main  method  of  regulation  utilised  by  the  State  -  that  of 
direct  statutory  regulation.  This  covers  areas  where  Parliament  has  seen  fit  to  make 
direct  changes  to  the  law  so  as  to  alter  the  legal  footing  of  a  particular  form  of  treatment 
-  either  through  the  legalisation  of  what  was  previously  illegal,  or  the  criminalisation  of 
what  was  previously  legal.  Direct  statutory  regulation  may  also  be  used  to  vary  the  civil 
rights  of  the  respective  parties,  which  accounts  for  a  significant  proportion  of  this  chapter. 
In  Chapter  7,  we  revisit  the  core  evaluation  criteria  and  assess  how  the  system  as  a 
whole  fares  against  these  yardsticks  -  and  how  this  performance  could  be  improved  in 
each  area,  and  at  what  cost.  Chapter  7  provides  an  overview  of  the  existing  regulatory 
regime,  considered  in  terms  of  the  seven  evaluation  criteria  rather  than  in  terms  of 
structural  or  functional  distinctions.  It  then  goes  on  to  reach  some  conclusions  and 
provide  an  answer  to  the  working  hypothesis.  This  overview  considers  what  the  main 
problems  identified  are  and  touches  on  possible  ways  of  addressing  these  shortcomings. 
It  concludes  with  a  look  at  what  policy  initiatives  might  be  applied  (and  by  whom)  in  the 
field  of  medical  regulation  in  the  future. 6 
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Chapter  2:  Methodology 
1:  IntroducCion: 
In  Chapter  1,  a  working  hypothesis  was  posited,  namely  that  this  thesis  considers  whether 
the  present  system  of  regulation  provides  adequate  safeguards  for  those  concerned  in  the 
health  care  system.  This  question  is,  of  course,  open-ended,  and  as  such  it  is  necessary 
to  limit  the  scope  of  the  research  in  question. 
Any  discussion  of  the  mechanisms  for  regulation,  control,  accountability  and  dispute 
resolution  in  British  medical  practice  must  face  two  fundamental  difficulties:  firstly,  the 
complex  system  of  legal,  quasi-legal,  and  informal  controls  which  exist;  and  secondly,  the 
problems  inherent  in  attempting  to  control  any  professional  endeavour.  The  regulation  of 
the  medical  profession  displays  a  considerable  number  of  the  problems  inherent  in 
regulating  any  profession,  and  has  a  few  problems  which  are  unique. 
This  chapter  sets  out  how  these  problems  will  be  addressed,  and  attempts  to  delimit  the 
scope  of  the  research.  The  subject  area  is  vast,  incorporating  aspects  of  public  and 
private  law,  philosophy,  sociology,  political  science,  management,  and  legal  process. 
Most  of  these  aspects  have  individually  been  the  subject  of  a  considerable  body  of 
literature.  Consequently,  it  is  necessary  to  spend  some  time  clarifying  the  position  being 
adopted  and  the  approach  to  the  subject  being  taken. 
For  the  sake  of  clarity,  it  is  necessary  to  expand  somewhat  on  the  questions  which  this 
thesis  seeks  to  address.  The  intention  is  to  ask  whether  the  current  mechanisms 
regulating  British  medicine  are  an  adequate  way  of  safeguarding  the  rights  of  individuals 
and  society  as  a  whole,  or  whether  these  mechanisms  suffer  from  ineffectiveness  and 
conflicting  objectives.  Is  it  clear  what  purpose  these  regulatory  mechanisms  serve,  and 
are  these  purposes  fulfilled?  This  thesis  will  examine  the  proposition  that  as  currently 
constituted,  the  practice  of  medicine  in  the  UK  is  improperly  regulated,  since  the  extant 
controls  are  of  a  disparate  nature,  lack  coherence  and  co-ordination,  and  are  frequently 
mutually  contradictory  in  their  aims. 
A  number  of  assumptions  underlie  this  proposition,  and  this  chapter  explores  the  validity 
of  these  assumptions  and  the  philosophical  basis  of  the  study  as  well  as  establishing  the 
methodology  by  which  it  seeks  to  test  the  working  hypothesis.  The  nature  of  regulation  as 
a  concept  is  considered,  as  is  the  way  in  which  this  concept  can  best  be  applied  to  the 
bodies  currently  regulating  British  medical  practice. 8 
11:  The  nature  of  regulation: 
A:  What  is  "regulation"? 
As  noted  above,  a  wide  variety  of  disciplines  are  relevant  to  the  issue  of  regulating 
medicine.  Similarly,  we  shall  see  that  there  is  an  equally  wide  variety  of  ways  in  which  the 
concept  of  regulation  is  approached.  One  possible  reason  for  the  varied  nature  of  the 
control  mechanisms  is  that  the  entire  concept  raises  so  many  questions: 
Why  is  medicine  regulated  at  all? 
Why  is it  regulated  in  the  way  it  is? 
What  are  the  purposes,  mechanisms  and  effects  of  these  regulations? 
Can  these  aims  be  better  realised  by  other  mechanisms?  and 
What  do  we  mean  by  "regulation"  anyway? 
Many  of  these  questions  will  be  touched  upon  (if  not  necessarily  answered)  in  the  course 
of  this  work;  however,  they  are  raised  here  to  discuss  the  ways  in  which  questions  of  this 
nature  can  be  approached.  The  questions  also  contain  a  number  of  assumptions,  which 
should  also  be  considered.  In  posing  these  questions,  we  assume  that  the  questions  are, 
in  fact,  capable  of  being  answered  -  that  there  is  an  actual  motive  to  be  discerned,  that 
the  purposes,  mechanisms  and  effects  of  the  system  can  be  assessed  and  checked  for 
compatibility.  These  assumptions  will  be  tested  throughout  chapters  3  to  6.  It  is  possible 
that  not  every  aspect  of  the  system  is  capable  of  being  assessed  in  this  way,  and  it  may 
on  occasion  be  necessary  to  regard  certain  aspects  as  unknown.  This  is  not  in  itself  a 
problem  -  it  is  in  itself  of  interest,  and  a  valid  conclusion  for  a  study,  to  reveal  that 
regulatory  mechanisms  appear  to  have  been  created  for  no  discernible  reason,  or  that 
they  have  no  quantifiable  impact  on  what  happens  in  practice.  However,  the  present 
concern  is  not  with  what  answers  are  found,  but  rather  with  what  questions  a  researcher 
looking  at  the  regulation  of  an  activity  should  ask. 
Firstly,  what  does  this  thesis  understand  "regulation"  to  mean?  The  dictionary  definition  is 
not  very  helpful,  stating  that  "regulation"  means  "the  act  or  process  of  regulating"'.  The 
word  "regulating"  is,  in  turn,  defined  as  meaning: 
"to  adjust  (the  amount  of  heat,  sound  etc.  of  something)  as  required;  to  control 
to  bring  into  conformity  with  a  rule,  principal,  or  usage.  ip  2 9 
From  this,  it  would  appear  that  regulation  has  something  to  do  with  exercising  control  or 
making  adjustments  so  as  to  bring  something  into  line  with  a  rule.  The  dictionary 
definition  is  silent  on  the  nature  of  the  control  or  adjustment  and  the  source  of  the  rules  in 
question.  For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  it  is  considered  that  these  aspects  cannot  be 
ignored  -  we  have  to  know  about  the  rule-makers  as  well  as  the  rule-enforcers,  and  it  is 
clearly  necessary  to  look  at  the  nature  of  the  controls  or  mechanisms  for  adjusting 
behaviour. 
At  this  stage,  no  judgement  is  offered  on  who  the  regulators  should  be  -  all  those 
performing  general  regulatory  functions  will  be  considered  in  this  discussion.  However,  it 
is  necessary  to  consider  who  is  being  regulated.  This  thesis  is,  as  its  starting  point, 
looking  at  the  medical  profession  -  or,  put  shortly,  at  doctors.  It  will  be  necessary,  as  part 
of  the  definition  of  what  the  regulation  of  medical  practice  actually  means,  to  examine  the 
concept  of  medicine  as  a  profession,  since  in  large  measure  what  is  being  looked  at  is  the 
regulation  of  the  medical  profession.  The  concept  of  a  profession  carries  with  it  certain 
generally-recognised  prerequisites,  one  of  which  is  a  large  measure  of  self-regulation  and 
in  particular  control  of  entry  to  the  field  3.  Consequently,  professions  as  a  concept,  and  the 
particular  issue  of  seff-regulation  by  a  profession,  will  also  be  considered.  The  actual 
systems  of  self  regulation  currently  in  existence  are  considered  in  later  chapters.  The 
institutional  structures  within  which  medicine  is  practised,  in  particular  the  National  Health 
Service  ("NHS"),  are  considered  in  terms  of  setting  the  regulatory  background.  Given  the 
scale  of  NHS  activity  in  Britain,  it  would  be  impossible  to  ignore  NHS  mechanisms 
completely,  but  as  these  mechanisms  are  only  applicable  to  NHS  practice  (widespread 
though  that  may  be)  and  do  not  regulate  aft  medical  practice,  they  are  not  analysed  as 
part  of  the  overall  structure  of  this  thesis. 
It  may,  in  some  circumstances,  be  hard  to  separate  what  regulation  is  from  the  question 
of  what  it  is  intended  to  do.  Even  proceeding  on  the  basis  of  dictionary  definitions,  we  find 
that  regulation  involves  control  or  adjustment  in  line  with  rules  -  but  to  understand 
regulation,  we  need  to  know  which  objective  is  being  pursued,  and  to  what  end  practice  is 
being  controlled.  This  is  the  "purpose  11  of  regulation,  one  of  the  three  key  elements  to 
each  aspect  of  the  system  which  will  be  examined.  The  confusion  between  regulation  per 
se  and  its  purposes  is  well  illustrated  by  the  following  discussion  of  regulation  within  the 
context  of  the  (now  dismantled)  "Internal  market"  which  operated  within  the  NHS  from 
1991  to  1999: 
"What  is  the  aim  of  regulation  ? 
Regulation  is  one  of  the  tools  to  achieve  maximisation  of  the  health  of  the 
population  by  the  efficient  delivery  of  services  through  an  intemal  market.  Specific 10 
goals  for  regulation  will  include  the  protection  of  users  or  consumers,  the 
protection  of  the  taxpayer  and  the  support  of  the  internal  market...  One  of  the 
central  tasks  of  the  NHS  Management  Executive  is  to  'operationalise'  regulation 
and  to  use  it  as  one  tool  for  achieving  the  NHS  goals  of  effectiveness,  efficiency 
and  equity.  Regulation  is  not  costless.  It  may  have  perverse  incentives.  It  should 
only  be  undertaken  if  there  are  clear  benefits.  Regulation  is  not  a  substitute  for 
day-to-day  management,  nor  should  it  be  used  as  such.  Likewise,  regulation  is  not 
planning.  An  internal  market  may  require  as  much  planning  as  a  centralised 
system,  albeit  of  different  forms  and  possibly  involving  different  groups  of  actors. 
Regulation  is  not  a  substitute  for  decisions  that  have  long-term  consequences, 
such  as  the  planning  of  medical  manpower,  or  the  location  of  specialised  facilities. 
Regulation  of  particular  activities  may  have  similar  effects  to  planning-for 
example,  the  expansion  of  expensive  imaging  facilities  was  regulated  (belatedly) 
in  the  USA  and  this  affected  the  pattern  of  provision.  Similarly,  self  regulation  by 
the  professions  to  ensure  adequate  quality  will  affect  the  location  and  availability 
of  specialist  treatments.  Regulation  will  interact  with  management  and  planning. 
Occasionally,  regulation  may  be  required  when  either  is  deficient.  "4 
Clearly,  the  approach  adopted  in  this  passage  explicitly  adopts  a  series  of  goals  for  the 
regulation  being  discussed  therein,  and  the  nature  of  these  goals  is  inextricably  linked  to 
the  nature  of  the  regulation  in  question.  This  thesis  accepts  that  some  recognition  of  goal 
orientation  is  necessary  to  define  regulation;  however,  it  rejects  explicit  assumption  of 
policy  objectives  as  an  essential  element.  This  rejection  is  based  on  the  analysis  which 
follows,  whereby  regulation  is  found  to  perform  certain  functions.  None  of  these  functions 
requires  a  particular  policy  orientation  as  a  prerequisite,  although  some  policy  orientation 
is  generally  discernible.  However,  other  policy  orientations  are  equally  discernible, 
leading  to  the  conclusion  that  one  can  regulate  towards  different  policy  objectives  at  the 
same  time,  thus  leading  in  turn  to  the  further  conclusion  that  no  single  policy  need 
underlie  the  regulatory  machinery  as  a  whole.  Accordingly,  no  particular  policy  objectives 
are  identified  as  necessary  elements  of  the  regulatory  system,  beyond  the  policy  objective 
of  regulation  itself  (and  on  occasion  not  even  that).  Rowan-Robinson  et  al  have, 
however,  identified  some  of  the  policy  factors  which  tend  to  underpin  regulatory  efforts 
and  emphasise  the  necessity  of  regulation: 
"Regulation  is  necessary  to  safeguard  the  environment,  to  maintain  standards  of 
health  and  safety  and  to  protect  the  interests  of  customers,  consumers  and 
employees.  Thus,  whilst  steps  are  being  taken  to  slim  down  the  corpus  of 
regulation  and  to  focus  more  clearly  on  its  objectives,  there  seems  little  doubt  that 
a  substantial  volume  of  regulation  will  remain  a  feature  of  our  society.  "' 11 
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  "regulation"  is  defined  as  meaning  all  or  any  of  the 
follovAng  activities: 
"  The  setting  of  standards  of  medical  practice 
"  The  upholding  of  these  standards 
"  The  facilitation  of  medical  practice  in  accordance  with  these  standards 
"  The  provision  of  systems  to  allow  redress  for  those  who  suffer  due  to  a  failure  to 
adhere  to  these  standards 
*  The  provision  of  channels  to  permit  grievances  to  be  aired  and  disputes  resolved 
9  The  provision  of  systems  of  investigation  to  inquire  into  whether  standards  are 
being  adhered  to  or  not,  whether  across  the  board,  at  the  instigation  of  the 
particular  regulator  itself,  or  in  response  to  allegations  being  made/complaints 
received 
*  The  punishment  of  those  who  fail  to  adhere  to  the  standards,  and 
*  The  regulation  of  the  regulatory  system  itself  to  ensure  that  the  above  tasks  are 
being  carried  out. 
Following  on  from  this,  "regulator"  and  "regulators"  are  simply  references  to  those  bodies 
and  persons  who  fulfil  any  of  these  tasks  in  relation  to  medical  practice  -  whether  formally 
or  informally.  Ultimately,  it  can  refer  to  the  State  (in  its  broadest  meaning),  or  else  to  the 
general  public  or  the  "public  interest".  And  the  regulation  of  medical  practice  in  Britain 
which  the  working  hypothesis  refers  to  means  the  methods,  organisations,  persons  and 
rules  (both  legal  or  otherwise)  by  which  these  regulatory  tasks  are  accomplished,  or  at 
least  attempted. 
In  adopting  this  definition,  it  is  accepted  that  the  dividing  line  between  definitions  of 
regulation  and  policy  statements  regarding  what  to  do  with  the  regulatory  machinery  is  a 
thin  one,  and  that  some  of  the  tasks  outlined  above  are  at  least  arguably  on  the  Upolicy" 
side  of  the  line.  In  response,  it  is  argued  that  these  tasks  could  be  regarded  as  the  bare 
essentials  of  a  regulatory  system.  For  reasons  that  are  explained  below,  the  absence  of 
any  of  these  features  renders  a  regulatory  system  defective.  It  therefore  appears  to 
represent  an  acceptable  starting  point  (for  the  discussion  of  whether  the  regulatory 
system  is  working  properly)  to  utilise  the  minimum  definition  of  regulation  consistent  with 
meeting  the  requirements  of  a  regulatory  system. 
Much  of  what  follows  concerns  discussions  of  accountability  and  liability.  As  the  term  is 
used  in  this  thesis,  issues  of  liability  should  be  approached  from  the  perspective  of  the 
person  who  has  (or  claims  to  have)  suffered  some  form  of  adverse  consequence  as  a 12 
result  of  some  failure  in  regulated  standards.  Questions  of  liability  involve  attempts  to 
redress  the  adverse  consequences  suffered,  and  deciding  who  is  to  provide  the  redress  in 
question.  This  is  a  separate  question  from  that  of  accountability,  which  is  concerned  with 
identifying  the  person  or  agency  whose  action  or  inaction  resulted  in  the  breach  of 
standards.  What  happens  once  the  identity  is  known  is  dependent  on  the  regulatory 
mechanism  in  question.  It  may  not  involve  any  form  of  liability  to  the  person  who  suffered 
as  a  consequence  of  the  breach;  similarly,  financial  liability  falling  on  a  person  or 
organisation  does  not  necessarily  involve  anyone  being  held  accountable  (whether  to  the 
victim  or  anyone  else)  for  the  breach  in  question.  Overlaps  are  possible  but  not  essential. 
B:  The  science  of  regulation: 
Having  set  out  a  definition  of  regulation,  it  still  remains  to  consider  how  to  study  it.  A 
number  of  disciplines  have  considered  the  issue  of  regulation  of  particular  sectors  (and  of 
the  health  care  sector  in  particular),  and  approach  the  study  of  regulation  from  very 
different  perspectives. 
Thus,  one  could  adopt  a  sociological  standpoint,  and  study  the  regulation  of  medicine  as 
an  aspect  of  the  growth  of  organisational  bureaucracy  (in  the  sense  of  a  goal-oriented 
rational  organisation  acting  within  narrowly-defined  parameters)  which,  according  to  Max 
Weber6,  is  inevitable  in  Western  capitalistic  societies.  HugheS7  considers  that  NHS 
bureaucracy  has  arisen  primarily  as  a  method  of  resource  control.  While  this  may  be 
relevant  in  understanding  the  approach  which  NHS  mechanisms  have  adopted,  this  thesis 
is  concerned  with  the  global  regulation  of  medical  practice,  not  with  mechanisms  which 
apply  to  it  only  in  part.  The  NHS's  prevalent  position  as  supplier  of  medical  treatment  in 
the  UK  has  arguably  tended  to  confuse  the  approach  of  legislators  who  appear  on 
occasion  to  respond  to  an  identified  overall  regulatory  deficit  by  focussing  on  redressing 
the  problem  only  as  it  applies  to  the  NHS.  Thus,  while  Hughes'  and  Webers  approaches 
are  not  directly  relevant  in  analysing  the  overall  regulatory  landscape,  they  are  important 
inasmuch  as  they  help  to  explain  why  certain  systems  have  only  been  applied  to  the  NHS 
and  not  to  the  practice  of  medicine  as  a  whole. 
In  terms  of  a  Weberian  bureaucracy,  the  NHS  is  unusual  in  being  a  legally-created  edifice 
without  regulations,  merely  discretionary  powers  given  to  ministers  to  create  such 
regulation- 
It  -  an  explicit  recognition  of  the  medical  profession's  proper  jurisdiction  over  its  own 
work  activities,  and  of  its  powers  of  self-regulation.  However,  that  grant  of 
discretion  has  always  made  available  other  regulatory  mechanisms  that  may  limit 13 
professional  autonomy  quite  as  effectively  as  the  provisions  of  statute,  and  which 
are  now  being  called  upon  to  do  increasing  work.  ' 
The  issue  of  professional  self-regulation  which  Hughes  touches  upon  is  a  recurring  theme 
throughout  this  topic,  and  will  be  dealt  with  at  length  in  subsequent  chapters.  The 
sociological  critique  of  this  approach  has  been  provided  by  Lindblomg:  a  "rational  systems 
model"  (such  as  the  NHS,  but  the  critique  applies  equally  to  other  areas)  is  frequently 
guilty  of  "incrementalism",  meaning  it  tends  to  deal  with  its  problems  only  in  a  piecemeal, 
ad  hoc  fashion,  studies  only  a  limited  range  of  solutions,  and  adopts  solutions  which  are 
only  marginally  different  from  the  existing  arrangements.  In  the  wider  picture,  having  a 
number  of  different  agencies  responsible  for  decision-making  (as  appears  to  be  the 
situation  with  medicine)  can  lead  to  "disjointed  incrementalism",  resulting  in  an  absence  of 
overall  strategy.  Although  this  research  is  conducted  from  a  more  legalistic  viewpoint 
than  Lindblom's,  the  concept  of  "disjointed  incrementalism"  is  one  which  will  be  expanded 
on  in  later  chapters. 
Other  approaches  place  considerable  emphasis  on  the  effort  invested  in  a  given  problem 
by  decision-makers,  and  the  specific  options  which  they  have  at  their  disposal  when 
making  a  decision'o,  or  relate  decision-making  to  internal  power  struggles  or  external 
manoeuvring  between  corporate  rationalisers,  professional  monopolisers,  and  the 
community  population".  In  considering  the  validity  of  this  approach  to  the  present  study, 
it  is  important  to  keep  the  working  hypothesis  in  mind.  This  study  is  intended  to  consider 
the  effectiveness  of  the  current  system  of  regulation  against  a  series  of  predetermined 
criteria;  it  is  not  directly  concerned  with  the  science  of  policy  making,  of  which  these 
approaches  are  effectively  subsets  12 
. 
As  Lindblom  himself  later  acknowledged, 
"Policy-making  is...  a  complexly  inter-active  process  without  beginning  or  end.  "13 
Narrower  sociological  approaches  focus  on  the  nature  of  medicine  as  a  profession,  and 
consider  regulation  as  it  applies  to  such  a  monopolistic  construct,  balancing  the 
sometimes-contradictory  interests  of  the  state,  the  public,  and  members  of  the  profession 
itself.  The  functionality  of  the  medical  profession  is  the  object  of  study,  rather  than  the 
bureaucratic  structure  within  which  that  profession  finds  itself.  Ruescherneyer  14  considers 
how  professions  "strike  a  bargain"  with  society,  exchanging  competence  and  integrity  for 
freedom  from  outside  interference  and  competition,  substantial  remuneration  and  higher 
social  status.  He  draws  on  a  tradition  which  regards  professions  as  social  constructs 
worthy  of  study  in  themselves,  and  which  regards  medicine  either  as  an  unusual 
aberration  from  the  norm,  or  as  the  exemplar  against  which  other  professions  (or  would- 
be  professions)  are  measured.  Thus,  while  Rudolf  Klein  notes  that, 14 
U  medicine  provides  an  example  of  professional  power  in  an  extreme  -  and  in  some 
ways  unique  -  form  if  only  because  in  the  last  resort  it  deals  with  matters  of  life 
"15  and  death 
Downie  reminds  us  that, 
"it  is  important  to  stress  that  the  concept  of  a  profession  is  a  developing  one  and  a 
definition  must  not  become  solidified  around  the  characteristics  of  law  and 
medicine  ...  while  surgery  is  nowadays  considered  to  be  a  paradigm  of  a 
profession  it  was  not  always  thought  to  be  so.  "'ro 
The  problem  can  also  be  approached  from  the  opposite  direction,  that  of  the  patient  or 
potential  patient.  The  different  viewpoints  of  the  lawyer  and  the  philosopher  coincide  to 
focus  attention  on  the  ways  in  which  the  freedom  and  autonomy  of  the  individual  are 
protected  against  a  paternalistic  professional  monopoly  and  a  dispassionate  bureaucracy. 
The  philosophical  standpoint  of  this  study  is  considered  later,  but  for  present  purposes, 
suffice  to  say  that  the  stance  adopted  is  explicitly  pro-patient  autonomy.  As  Douzinas  and 
McVeigh  note, 
"it  is  hardly  possible  to  think  of  any  ethico-legal  discourse  concerning  medical 
practice  that  does  not,  at  some  stage,  come  to  be  thought  of  in  terms  of 
autonomy.  "" 
In  the  present  case,  emphasis  on  Kantian  notions  of  personal  autonomy"  leads  to  critical 
scrutiny  of  an  enterprise  wherein  that  autonomy  is,  by  the  very  nature  of  the  exercise, 
vulnerable.  Nor  should  the  scientific  foundations  of  modern  medicine  blind  us  to  the  need 
for  such  scrutiny;  as  McLean  observes, 
"No  discipline  and  no  individual  has,  or  should  have,  the  power  to  strip  others  of 
their  liberty  to  reach  out  for  their  aspirations  or  to  stake  their  legitimate  claims. 
The  danger  is  that  human  rights  take  second  place  to  the  paternalism  or 
monopolisation  of  one  group  substantially  because  they  can  claim  scientific 
reasoning  as  their  bedrock.  "9 
This  consideration  of  the  need  to  safeguard  autonomy  against  paternalism  leads  the 
philosopher,  and  through  him  the  private  lawyer,  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  the 
patient's  consent  to  procedures,  and  more  generally  to  have  a  greater  say  in  his  situation 
within  the  medical  enterprise  and  ensure  that  his  or  her  rights  as  an  individual  are 
respected.  This  is  a  more  immediate  form  of  participation  than  democratic  theory  requires 15 
him  or  her  to  have  in  the  setting  of  general  objectives  in  health  care,  which  is  again  within 
the  remit  of  the  political  scientist. 
The  public  lawyer  takes  a  wider  view  than  the  private  lawyer:  instead  of  asking  whether 
the  individual's  rights  have  been  breached  in  a  particular  case,  the  public  lawyer  instead 
asks  whether  mechanisms  exist,  and  have  been  followed,  which  will  protect  those  rights: 
"A  grievance  may  relate  to  a  broad  policy  or  to  a  particular  decision,  to  a  clinical  or 
administrative  matter,  and  the  actor  may  be  the  health  authority,  the  GP,  the 
hospital  doctor,  or  another.  The  NHS  has  an  equally  complex  system  of  both 
internal  and  external  channels  for  the  expression  of  grievances  involving,  for 
example,  hospitals,  district  health  authorities,  and  the  Secretary  of  State.  A  first 
task  for  the  public  lawyer  is  to  consider  whether  this  peculiarly  intricate  system  is 
co-ordinate  and  efficient  or  is  a  net  with  holes.  "20 
As  already  noted,  this  thesis  is  not  concerned  with  the  "intricate  system"  described  by 
Baldwin  in  the  above  passage.  However,  the  systems  described  in  Chapters  3  to  6  are 
equally  complex,  and  the  same  tasks  can  be  undertaken  in  relation  to  them.  Mechanisms 
for  resolving  disputes  between  patients  and  doctors  or  other  health  care  providers  are  an 
inherent  part  of  any  discussion  of  control  and  accountability: 
"From  the  point  of  view  of  a  public  lawyer,  complaints  and  their  handling  are  a 
fundamental  aspect  of  accountability;  part  of  a  belief  that  in  a  democratic  system 
there  must  be  an  opportunity  for  the  public  to  air  and  redress  their  grievances.  A 
lack  of  effective  avenues  for  complaints  is  in  itself  an  injustice.  It  has  already  been 
argued  that  in  the  modem  state  the  possibility  of  participating  in  decision-making 
through  the  usual  democratic  channels  has  been  undermined.  Complaints 
processing  may  help  to  alleviate  this  tendency  by  allowing  decisions  to  be 
challenged  and  investigated,  which  can  in  turn  provide  a  wider  base  of  information 
for  decision-ma  king.  Complaints  procedures  may  therefore  attain  a  degree  of 
indirect  consumer  involvement  in  policy  processes  as  well  as  contribute  to  a 
reputation  for  fair  dealing,  and  so  help  legitimise  health  policy  . 
"21 
Other  aspects  of  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  necessitate  their  study:  any  system  of 
control  requires  machinery  to  ensure  compliance,  and  these  mechanisms  are  one  of  the 
fundamental  ways  by  which  a  doctor  who  transgresses  some  of  the  codes  purportedly 
regulating  his  or  her  behaviour  is  brought  to  task.  As  will  be  shown  in  succeeding 
chapters,  a  large  number  of  the  regulatory  mechanisms  require  a  complaint  by  someone 
to  trigger  their  enforcement  powers,  and  this  "someone"  is  most  commonly  an  aggrieved 16 
patient.  As  Longley  notes  above,  the  right  to  complain  about  the  exercise  of  power  is 
perceived  as  a  fundamental  right  in  a  modem  democracy,  and  is  a  necessary  aspect  of 
making  those  who  exercise  that  control  accountable  for  their  actions.  Indeed,  this 
function  of  increasing  accountability  through  use  of  complaints  mechanisms  is  one  which 
is  stated  by  some  commentators  to  be  crucial  in  regaining  transparency  and  extending 
accountability  to  the  service  user  him-  or  herself  (as  opposed  to  accountability  to  a  third 
party  Y2 
. 
The  approaches  adopted  by  the  regulators  in  carrying  out  that  function  are 
considered  next. 
C:  Regulatory  strategies: 
How,  in  practice,  is  medicine  regulated?  The  detailed  mechanisms  are  discussed  in  the 
following  chapters,  but  it  is  appropriate  at  this  point  to  discuss  the  strategies  which  these 
bodies  apply.  These  strategies  have  in  themselves  been  the  subject  of  a  number  of 
cross-disciplinary  studies,  and  the  following  is  only  the  barest  outline  of  a  large  body  of 
work,  mostly  sociological  in  nature,  which  seeks  to  analyse  regulatory  strategy. 
In  discussing  regulatory  behaviour  a  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  the  two  principal 
strategies  of  compliance  and  deterrence: 
"The  principal  objective  of  a  compliance  law  enforcement  system  is  to  secure 
conformity  with  law  by  detecting  violations  of  law,  determining  who  is  responsible 
for  the  violation,  and  penalising  violators  to  deter  violators  in  the  future.  Whether 
or  not  one  seeks  to  redress  as  well  as  to  prevent  harm  is  an  important  condition 
affecting  choice  of  strategy...  . 
Deterrent  systems  arise  when  the  occurrence  of 
events  in  time  and  place  are  unpredictable,  and  where  their  causes  are  imperfectly 
understood  so  that  particular  preventive  action  cannot  be  taken 
...  . 
Compliance 
systems,  consequently,  are  often  associated  with  testing  and  licensing  systems, 
especially  ones  that  require  some  demonstration  that  conformity  exists  prior  to 
undertaking  a  particular  activity  that  could  cause  harm.  The  licence  itself  can  be 
seen  as  a  conditional  reward:  so  long  as  one  conforms,  one  is  licensed  to  be 
rewarded.  Control  of  medical  practice,  for  example,  opts  for  both  licensing 
practice  and  sanctioning  malpractice;  but  the  critical  sanction  is  the  withdrawal  of 
the  licence  to  practice  ... 
The  tort  doctrines  of  negligence  and  liability  for  harm 
rest  on  deterrence  strategies.  The  presumpbon  is  that  one  will  exercise  ordinary 
care  to  avoid  the  costs  of  being  found  liable.  Tort  doctrines  are  designed  to 
redress  injury  and  reduce  the  risk  of  injury.  "23 17 
It  seems  clear,  on  this  basis,  that  any  effective  attempt  at  social  regulation  must  have 
certain  prerequisites:  clearly-defined  goals,  a  mechanism  for  enforcing  them,  and  a 
properly  thought  out  strategy  both  to  govem  the  operation  of  the  mechanism  and,  in  part, 
to  determine  its  form.  It  should  also  incorporate  adequate  complaints  mechanisms, 
supervisory  systems  and  general  monitoring  in  order  to  assess  its  effectiveness  and 
provide  redress  for  its  failures.  As  Rowan-Robinson  et  a/  observe  in  the  course  of  their 
study  into  the  use  of  criminal  sanctions  as  a  regulatory  tool, 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  way  in  which  a  code  of  regulation  is  framed  can  have  a 
bearing  on  the  role  of  the  criminal  law  in  its  enforcement.  This  manifests  itself  in 
several  ways.  First  of  all,  the  point  at  which  anti-social  conduct  becomes  criminal 
varies  from  regulation  to  regulation.  Unlawful  conduct  may.  for  example,  be  a 
straightforward  matter  of  omission  or  commission...  Alternatively,  and  commonly, 
the  legislature  may  prescribe,  generally  by  statutory  instrument,  the  exact  level  of 
performance  which  must  be  attained  ( 
... 
)  or  which  must  not  be  exceeded  ( 
... 
). 
Such  precise  standards  give  clear  guidance  to  the  potential  deviant  population, 
they  make  detection  of  offences  relatively  straightforward  and  they  encourage 
uniformity  in  enforcement.  On  the  other  hand,  detailed  regulations  may  suffer  from 
multiplicity,  complexity  and,  on  occasion,  obsolescence.  And  they  give  rise  to 
M  over-inclusion"  (in  the  sense  that  an  offence  is  committed  whether  the  standard  is 
breached  by  an  infinitesimal  amount  or  by  a  large  amount)  and  "under-inclusion" 
(in  the  sense  that  by  specifying  exactly  what  is  required  and  what  is  not  permitted, 
there  is  a  risk  that  damaging  practices  or  products  may  be  left  unregulated). 
Because  of  the  inherent  defects  of  detailed  rules,  the  legislature  sometimes  opts 
for  imposing  standards  in  more  general  terms.  "Unwholesome,  "  ubest  practicable 
means,  "  "reasonable  care"  are  examples.  Such  general  standards  allow  for  a 
degree  of  flexibility  and  responsiveness;  their  use  discourages  routine  and 
mechanical  prosecution  and  allows  enforcement  officers  to  take  account  of  a 
variety  of  factors  in  deciding  whether  an  offence  has  been  committed;  they  also 
avoid  the  obvious  problems  of  over  and  under-inclusion  and  obsolescence  which 
beset  detailed  standards.  However,  the  use  of  general  standards  also  has 
disadvantages.  It  can  be  difficult  for  traders,  manufacturers,  employers,  etc.,  to 
know  with  certainty  whether  they  are  complying  with  the  law;  it  makes  enforcement 
problematic  and  there  is  scope  for  disagreement  about  whether  an  offence  has 
been  committed;  and  it  can  result  in  a  lack  of  uniformity  in  enforcement  practice. 
Rather  more  specific  standards  may  be  set  at  the  local  level  in  the  form  of 
conditions  attached  to  a  licence  or  certificate  of  one  sort  or  another...  The  ability  to 
tailor  conditions  to  the  requirements  of  individual  cases  confers  very  considerable 
discretion  upon  regulatory  agencies  in  determining  standards  of  conduct.  The 18 
advantage  of  this  mechanism  is  that,  more  than  any  other,  it  enables  standards  to 
reflect  local  circumstances  and  may  even  lead  to  a  "negotiated"  standard.  The 
disadvantage  is  that  an  infringement  does  not  bear  the  stamp  of  a  breach  of  a 
clear  legislative  standard...  The  third  way  in  which  the  framing  of  the  code  of 
regulation  may  bear  on  the  role  of  the  cdminal  law  is  through  the  provision  of 
alternative  sanctions... 
The  other  group  of  factors  which  bear  on  the  role  of  the  criminal  law  in  this  field  is 
what  we  describe  as  "operational  factors.  "  Our  research  confirms  the  findings  of 
other  research  into  discrete  codes  of  regulation  that  the  employment  of  the 
criminal  law  is  influenced  in  practice,  not  only  by  the  form  of  the  legislation,  but 
also  by  a  range  of  external  matters.  The  provision  in  a  code  of  regulation  for 
invoking  the  criminal  law  cannot,  it  seems,  be  viewed  in  isolation  but  must  be  seen 
as  one  part  of  a  complex  interactive  process.  There  are  numerous  such  factors 
including,  for  example,  the  perception  by  the  regulatory  agency  of  its  functions,  the 
level  and  nature  of  accountability  of  the  agency,  the  method  of  discovering  and 
detecting  offences,  the  nature  of  the  client  group  and  the  availability  of  alternative 
sanctions...  [T]he  weight  to  be  attached  to  any  one  of  these  factors  appears  to 
vary  not  just  from  code  to  code  but  from  case  to  case.  "  24 
Having  said  that,  at  least  one  recent  study  of  regulatory  strategy  (admittedly  in  the  rather 
different  context  of  the  regulation  of  private  landlords  who  commit  the  offence  of  unlawful 
eviction)  concludes  that 
"There  has  been  a  recognition  that  few  regulators  adopt  a  strategy  which  places 
criminal  sanctions  at  the  forefront.  11  25 
The  factors  identified  by  Rowan-Robinson  et  al  have,  nonetheless,  informed  the  choice  of 
evaluation  criteria  which  later  chapters  apply  to  the  existing  regulatory  system.  They  also 
inform  the  conclusions  drawn  latterly  when,  having  made  assessments  of  the  existing 
mechanisms  against  these  criteria,  alternative  approaches  are  considered.  It  will  only  be 
necessary  to  consider  alternatives  if  it  seems  at  that  stage  that  the  existing  arrangements 
appear  to  be  defective  or  inadequate  in  meeting  their  purposes,  or  if  those  purposes  are 
inadequately  expressed.  As  commentators  have  pointed  out, 
"As  various  topical  approaches  to  regulatory  reform  are  discussed,  it  is  important 
that  proposals  for  change  be  informed  by  an  understanding  of  the  way  regulatory 
bureaucracies  carry  out  the  essential  tasks  of  enforcement.  New  approaches 
should  reflect  knowledge  of  patterns  of  enforcement  common  to  many  problems  of 
regulation,  as  well  as  to  practices  unique  to  particular  tasks.  "26 19 
This  point  is,  it  is  submitted,  a  well-made  one,  and  proposals  for  change  which  are 
advocated  without  such  a  comparative  study  having  been  conducted  can  (for  that  reason 
alone)  be  regarded  as  flawed. 
The  analysis  concerning  regulatory  strategies  is  also  inextricably  related  to  the  question  of 
analysing  the  purposes  underlying  the  regulatory  machinery.  The  regulatory  machinery 
governing  any  particular  undertaking  can  be  broken  down  into  the  three  basic 
components  of  purpose,  mechanism,  and  effect;  this  is  explained  in  more  detail  below. 
Given  that  choice  of  regulatory  strategy  is  (or  should  be)  informed  by  the  purpose  of  the 
regulation  in  question,  properly  enunciated  purposes  appear  to  be  a  prerequisite  to 
effective  regulation.  If  one  is  at  the  stage  of  designing  a  regulatory  mechanism,  it  would 
appear  even  more  crucial  to  know  precisely  what  one  is  attempting  to  do.  It  is  also 
important  to  consider  whether  or  not  the  regulatory  mechanism  should  be  hierarchical  or 
not;  alternatives  to  hierarchical  approaches  include  enforced  self-regulation  and  tri- 
partism  (whereby  a  non  public  sector  organisation  is  permitted  to  undertake  regulatory 
taskS27.  ) 
Having  considered  the  approach  of  the  regulators  to  their  task,  the  next  section  considers 
the  philosophical  approach  of  this  thesis  to  its  own  task  of  evaluating  the  current  system. 
III:  Philosophical  backaround: 
As  stated  in  Chapter  1,  this  thesis  intends  to  examine  whether  or  not  the  existing  system 
for  regulating  health  care  in  Great  Britain  provides  adequate  safeguards  to  protect  the 
interests  of  patients,  doctors  and  the  State. 
At  this  stage,  it  is  necessary  to  expand  on  some  more  of  the  assumptions  which  are 
embodied  in  the  hypothesis,  and  more  specifically  some  of  the  value  judgements  which 
are  inherent  in  any  attempt  at  answering  the  question  posed.  The  first  question  is  what 
constitutes  an  "adequate"  safeguard.  This  point  is  considered  below  in  the  context  of  the 
evaluation  criteria. 
The  second,  and  in  many  ways  more  problematic  question,  concerns  what  "interests"  are 
(and  which  ones  should  be)  protected  by  the  system.  Patients  have  a  clear  interest  in 
receiving  the  best  possible  health  care  -  but  this  might  not  correspond  with  the  interests 
of  the  doctors  in  question  if,  for  instance,  best  possible  care  involved  the  doctors  having  to 
work  extremely  antisocial  hours;  and  it  might  not  correspond  with  the  state's  interest  in 
keeping  costs  down.  Conversely,  improving  doctors'  conditions  might  not  correspond  with 
patients'  expectations  of  service  or  the  state's  interest  in  improving  the  health  of  the 20 
nation.  It  may  also  conflict  with  the  interests  of  other  patients  (or  potential  patients)  if  the 
"best  possible"  care  in  question  is  tying  up  scarce  resources  resulting  in  those  other 
patients  having  to  wait  or  go  without.  Some  of  this  will  involve  conflicts  between  what 
might  generally  be  regarded  as  "legitimate"  interests. 
This  thesis  proceeds  by  accepting  that  not  all  interests  should  be  protected  within  the 
system.  The  proper  purpose  of  a  health  care  system  is,  it  is  submitted,  to  facilitate  the 
best  health  care  provision  possible  within  the  outside  context  factors  which  confine  that 
system.  In  an  ideal  world,  doctor  and  patient  would  fully  and  freely  co-operate,  being  in 
agreement  over  what  was  the  patient's  best  interests.  Indeed,  there  is  some  evidence  to 
suggest  that  active  collaboration  between  doctor  and  patient  has  certain  therapeutic,  to 
say  nothing  of  legal,  benefits2".  Once  leaving  Utopia,  however,  this  happy  picture  fades 
and  we  are  left  with  the  situation  of  having  to  deal  with  an  imperfect  situation.  The 
imperfections  are  varied.  Firstly,  medicine  is  in  itself  a  highly  inexact  science  29 
,  while 
there  are  also  variations  in  levels  of  knowledge  among  medical  practitioners  and 
variations  in  the  frequency  with  which  they  commit  errorS30  . 
And  those  practitioners  may 
well  have  a  system  of  working  which  fails,  either  in  specific  cases  or  as  a  policy,  to  pay 
attention  to  the  wishes  of  the  consumers  of  health  care,  the  patientS31  . 
There  is  always 
the  possibility  of  the  maverick  who  breaks  the  rules  and  who  must  be  taken  into  account 
when  considering  these  issues.  Finally,  there  is  an  argument  which  says  that  critical 
scrutiny  is  required  of  any  enterprise  wherein  the  individual  is,  by  the  very  nature  of  the 
exercise,  vulnerable.  The  philosophical  justification  for  this  has  been  put  as  follows  by 
Williamson: 
"Autonomy  comes  from  a  Greek  word  meaning  the  self,  one's  own,  by  oneself, 
self-determining...  What  we  call  autonomy  is  broadly  independence  and  self- 
determination.  Autonomy  in  a  narrower  sense  is  decision-ma  king.  An 
autonomous  decision  is  one  made  by  the  self.  It  is  presumed  to  be  made  in  the 
self's  interests,  since  no  one  can  know  what  those  interests  are  as  sensitively  as 
the  self  can.  The  decision  can  be  made  with  help  or  advice.  But  it  is  still  the 
self's.  The  opposite,  allowing  or  asking  another  person  to  make  the  decision,  is 
heteronomy.  Paradoxically,  heteronomy  can  be  an  autonomous  choice.  Belief  in 
the  other's  greater  knowledge  or  expertise;  or  indifference  to  the  decision;  or  a 
strategic  purpose  in  asking  or  agreeing  that  someone  else  make  the  decision,  are 
choices  of  that  sort.  Autonomy's  opposite  is dependency...  But  although  people's 
autonomy  in  the  wide  sense  of  being  able  to  function  as  an  active  agent  is 
reduced  by  sickness  or  accident,  their  ability  to  take  decisions  about  themselves  is 
not  necessarily  impaired.  (Provided  they  are  not  unconscious  or  demented.  ) 21 
Rather,  the  preoccupation  with  the  seff  that  goes  with  concern  or  anxiety  may 
enhance 
ft.  "  32 
It  follows  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  autonomy  is  an  important  concept  in  the 
health  care  system  we  are  discussing,  although  it  is  important  to  note  that  autonomy  is, 
itself,  a  complex  notion  and  that  there  are  variations  as  to  what  precisely  it  means.  These 
variations  are  worth  expanding  on,  and  have  been  summarised  as  follows: 
"There  are  three  main  forms  of  autonomy: 
1.  Deontological  autonomy. 
2.  Relativistic  autonomy. 
3.  Social  autonomy. 
The  first  of  these...  suggests  that  the  patient  has  the  right  to  decide  for  himself  or 
herself  between  various  therapeutic  strategies,  or  to  decide  if  he  or  she  wants 
treatment  at  all,  or  to  use  health  care  services  at  all.  Under  deontological 
autonomy,  we  are  free  to  act  responsibly  but  without  taking  into  account  our 
personal  inclinations  and  attitudes  as  individuals  as  to  whether  we  want  to  act  in 
this  way...  This  is  to  he  compared  with  the  second  form  of  autonomy  -  relativistic 
autonomy  -  in  which  each  individual  has  a  right  to  adopt  his  or  her  own 
preferences.  The  individual's  own  preferences  should  be  taken  into  account. 
Here,  as  compared  with  deontological  autonomy,  the  patient  has  the  choice  as  to 
whether  or  not  his  or  her  preferences  are  counted...  The  third  form,  social 
autonomy,  implies  a  rejection  of  individualism  (which  is  endorsed  by  both 
deontological  autonomy  and  relativistic  autonomy).  Values  are  common  -  they  are 
social  values.  Rights  and  obligations  are  acquired  in  social  contexts.  They 
determine  power  and  dependence  between  individuals.  And  this  form  of 
autonomy  in  turn  leads  to  the  notion  of  societies  having  a  responsibility  for  the 
weak.  "33 
It  can  be  seen  that,  in  the  first  passage,  Williamson  states  that  it  is  open  to  the  individual 
to  choose  to  allow  someone  else  to  make  a  decision  on  his  or  her  behalf;  it  can  be  seen 
from  the  second  passage  that  this  version  of  autonomy  is  classified  as  relativistic 
autonomy  if  it  is  accepted  that  relativistic  autonomy  encompasses  the  autonomous  wish  to 
delegate  the  decision  to  someone  else.  This  version  of  autonomy  is  not  in  accordance 
with  Kant's  classical  exposition  of  autonomy,  under  which  individuals  act  under  a  "moral 
imperative"  to  act  autonomously  (i.  e.  the  individual  is  morally  obliged  to  make  the  decision 
him-  or  herself)  -  this  is  closer  to  what  is  described  above  as  deontological  autonomy.  In 
this  paper,  references  to  "autonomy"  will  (unless  otherwise  stated)  be  references  to 
relativistic  autonomy. 22 
Williamson3'  refers  to  the  opposite  of  autonomy  as  being  dependency.  However,  in  most 
discussion  of  the  medical  field,  the  opposite  concept  discussed  is  seldom  dependency, 
but  rather  paternalism.  This  is  a  matter  of  focus  rather  than  of  definition,  since 
"patemalism"  refers  to  the  motivating  philosophy  of  the  agency  other  than  the  individual. 
Paternalism  is  defined  as 
"The  attitude  or  policy  of  a  government  or  other  authority  that  manages  the  affairs 
of  a  country,  company,  community,  etc.  in  the  manner  of  a  father,  especially  in 
usurping  individual  responsibility  and  the  liberty  of  choice.  "  35 
This  definition  does  not  make  particularly  explicit  one  of  the  key  points  about  paternalism 
as  it  relates  to  the  medical  sphere.  -  that  as  an  approach  to  medical  practice,  it  is  ethically 
defensible  from  the  doctor's  perspective,  and  complies  (in  general)  with  the  general 
medical  ethical  obligations  of  beneficence  (i.  e.  doing  good  for/to  patients)  and  non- 
maleficence  (i.  e.  not  doing  harm  to  patients).  Indeed,  one  of  the  key  points  about  medical 
paternalism  is  that  it  can  (on  occasion)  be  more  in  accordance  with  the  notion  of 
beneficence  than  respect  for  patient  autonomy.  The  patient  wants  to  follow  a  course 
which  is  medically  ill-advised.  Respect  for  autonomy  permits  the  patient  to  do  so; 
paternalism  on  the  part  of  those  responsible  for  their  care  might  mean  that  the  choice  is 
denied  that  patient,  and  the  course  preferred  by  the  doctors  presented  as  the  only 
available  option.  In  clinical  terms,  the  outcome  might  be  better.  In  philosophical  terms, 
we  have  used  that  patient  as  the  means  to  an  end,  not  as  an  end  in  him-  or  herself.  The 
doctor's  desire  to  reach  an  optimum  clinical  outcome  (typically  chosen  unilaterally  by  the 
doctor)  has  been  allowed  to  override  to  patient's  rights,  in  the  name  of  the  best  interests  of 
that  same  patient. 
This  thesis  takes  the  view  that  autonomy  is  important,  and  that  it  should  be  taken  into 
account  in  the  regulation  of  medical  practice.  This  point  is  picked  up  again  in  the 
discussion  of  the  evaluation  criteria  below.  However,  it  is  not  an  absolute  right,  and  other 
interests  also  have  to  be  taken  into  account.  In  the  course  of  regulating  medicine,  society 
acts  on  the  basis  of  a  number  of  different  purposes.  Precisely  what  these  other  purposes 
might  be  is  considered  below,  and  in  more  detail  in  Chapters  3  to  6-  there  are  a  variety  of 
motives  at  work.  This  thesis  takes  as  a  starting  point  the  proposition  that  regulation  of  the 
health  care  system  should  only  be  intended  to  facilitate  the  continued  operation  of  that 
system  in  accordance  with  the  rights  and  interests  which  should  be  protected.  This 
continued  operation  should  involve  facilitating  what  doctors  do  best  and  allowing  them  to 
practise  the  skills  they  have  acquired  at  great  trouble  and  expense,  within  the  limits  of  the 
protected  interests.  The  regulation  to  which  doctors  are  subject  should  not  be  of  such  a 
draconian  nature  as  actively  to  impede  the  proper  exercise  of  medicine,  nor  lead  to  the 23 
self-defeating  result  of  encouraging  legally  motivated  "defensive  medicine.  "  (Using  that 
term  to  mean  medical  care  which  is  only  being  given  with  a  view  to  avoid  legal  liability, 
and  which  would  not  otherwise  be  clinically  indicated.  )  It  should  involve  ways  of 
safeguarding  and  promoting  the  quality  of  the  health  care  being  provided,  both  as  an 
essential  element  of  the  system  itself,  and  as  a  way  of  safeguarding  the  patient's 
(protected)  interest  in  receiving  quality  care.  And  the  interests  of  other  citizens  and  the 
state  are  also  of  relevance  -  as  are  the  interests  of  doctors.  Regulation  is  defective  if  it 
prevents  doctors  from  practising  good  medicine  which  the  patient  wants.  Indeed,  this 
point  is  taken  as  being  axiomatic:  the  only  proper  purposes  of  medical  regulation  can  be 
to  ensure  that  doctors  are  able  freely  to  exercise  their  skills  and  talents,  while  the  patient 
has  a  right  to  such  care,  and  in  such  a  way  that  his  or  her  own  rights  are  not  subverted  in 
the  course  of  the  treatment. 
This  is  an  explicit  acceptance  of  the  moral  superiority  of  autonomy  over  paternalism,  and 
as  such  is  a  value  judgement.  As  with  any  value  judgement,  it  is  incapable  of  objective 
justification.  The  point  is  made  to  allow  those  who  agree  (or  disagree)  with  this  viewpoint 
to  be  able  to  identify  the  source  of  any  disagreement  with  the  conclusions  which  follow. 
IV:  Scope  of  the  regulatory  system: 
A:  Legal  and  non-legal  regulatory  mechanisms: 
The  scope  of  the  regulatory  mechanisms  which  will  be  looked  at  were  described  in  outline 
in  Chapter  1.  This  section  sets  out  why  the  regulatory  system  has  been  divided  (and  in 
some  respects,  why  it  has  been  delimited)  along  these  lines.  It  will  consider  why  the 
approaches  are  so  varied,  and  also  whether  this  is  a  logical  set  of  divisions  to  apply  to 
them.  It  is  not  a  division  found  in  any  official  description  of  what  happens  in  British 
medicine  today,  although  similar  divisions  are  used  in  many  textbooks  on  the  subject.  36 
In  addition  to  the  controls  which  are  the  subject  matter  of  chapters  3  to  6,  there  are  a 
number  of  other  controls  which  are  not  listed.  A  number  of  these  relate  to  the  various 
ways  in  which  general  health  policy  is  established.  In  general,  such  fundamental  policy 
issues  can  be  seen  as  the  arena  of  the  politician  or  political  scientist,  rather  than  the 
lawyer.  It  is  up  to  the  government  of  the  day  to  determine  priorities  for  health  care  - 
indeed,  to  decide  whether  to  regulate  medicine  at  all,  or  return  to  the  laissez-faire 
practices  of  pre-18  1h  century  medicine.  Parliament  may  act  or  not  in  response  to  the 
activities  of  pressure  groups  and  lobbyists,  as  a  consequence  of  advances  in  medicine 
(such  as  with  genetic  engineering),  changes  in  social  attitudes  (such  as  abortion),  or 
simply  because  of  the  interests  of  an  individual  MP.  The  law  has  a  role  to  play  here  too, 24 
although  the  issues  concern  the  public  rather  than  the  private  lawyer.  Constitutional  law 
creates  the  machinery  by  which  such  issues  may  be  legislated  on,  and  administrative  law 
has  a  role  in  ensuring  that  policy  decisions  are  adhered  to  and  delegated  authority  neither 
abused  nor  exceeded  (a  role  which  is  explored  in  Chapter  4).  In  general,  however,  these 
are  background  factors  which  are  also  outwith  the  scope  of  this  work.  They  are  important 
background  factors  to  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  in  a  sense,  they  create  the  canvas  on 
which  the  regulatory  machinery  is  painted. 
One  of  the  key  issues  to  decide  when  setting  these  limits  is  whether  to  have  regard  to  the 
formal  legal  status  of  a  mechanism  or  body,  and  if  so,  whether  this  legal  status  is  to  be 
conclusive  of  the  question  of  inclusion.  The  lawyer  studying  the  regulatory  framework  is 
confronted  with  a  confusing  mosaic  of  bodies  and  controls,  the  legal  validity  of  some  of 
which  is  perhaps  questionable.  Much  of  the  activity  which  superficially  passes  as 
regulatory  in  nature  stems  from  the  exercise  of  discretion  or  legally-delegated  authority. 
Even  the  centrality  of  the  law  to  this  picture  is  seen  as  debatable.  Thus,  Longley  observes 
that: 
"What  is  perhaps  under-emphasised  is  that  the  law  is  not  just,  as  described,  an 
instrument  for  achieving  goals  but  is  also  a  means  of  promoting  and  ensuring 
accountability  and  legitimacy  in  public  decision-making,  principles  which  are 
fundamental  to  our  ideas  of  democracy  and  citizenship.  "37 
In  contrast,  McVeigh  and  Wheeler  caution  us  that: 
"While  lawyers  might  find  it  gratifying  to  have  their  suspicions  confirmed,  that  law 
must  be  at  the  centre  of  any  discussion  of  responsibility  in  regulation,  few  others 
could  be  convinced  that  law  has  anything  other  than  a  peripheral  role  to  play  in  the 
regulation  of  health  and  medicine. 
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Harvey  Teff,  meanwhile,  suggests  that: 
"...  the  law  itself  cannot  effect  a  substantial  change  in  the  routine  behaviour  of 
doctors,  but  it  could  have  some  symbolic  impact  in  their  perception  of  what  is 
appropriate  in  relationships  with  patients. 
"39 
The  final  school  of  thought  on  the  subject  is  summed  up  by  McLean,  who  notes  the  gulf 
between  law's  possible  and  actual  role: 25 
"...  freedom  and  dignity  can  indeed  be  protected  against  the  unwitting  presumptions 
of  the  modem  gurus,  and...  the  best  protection  is  afforded  by  law  and  legal 
process...  Concepts  of  justice,  formal  and  distributive,  due  process  and  a  tradition 
of  respect  for  dghts  are  inherent  in  legal  systems  and  can  provide  a  framework 
within  which  complex  moral  matters  can  be  debated  and  perhaps  even  resolved. 
However,  a  significant  and  crucial  caveat  must  be  entered  here.  The  argument  is 
not  that  the  law  actually  does  this  -  rather  that  it  could.  "4" 
Ultimately,  however,  this  thesis  is  only  concerned  with  those  regulatory  mechanisms 
which  have  a  discernable  legal  genesis,  since  this  provides  a  delimitation  to  the 
mechanism  which  an  informal  regulator  lacks.  Inclusion  of  non-legal  regulatory  systems 
(although  "influences"  might  be  a  more  appropriate  description)  would  result  in  a 
completely  open-ended,  and  consequently  unworkable,  analysis. 
A  final  consideration  in  setting  the  limits  of  the  regulatory  systems  under  discussion  is 
universality  of  application.  This  thesis  is  concerned  purely  with  mechanisms  which  apply 
to  all  medical  practice  (at  least  in  theory,  since  not  every  doctor  will  undertake  practice  in 
a  field  subject  to  some  of  the  regulatory  mechanisms  discussed).  The  main  consequence 
of  this  approach  is  to  exclude  from  the  scope  of  the  study  mechanisms  which  have  been 
set  up  within  the  NHS,  a  point  considered  below  in  more  detail. 
B:  Main  mechanisms  excluded  from  study: 
Having  established  the  parameters  of  the  study,  it  is  fair  to  note  that  there  are  some 
exceptions  to  the  rule.  Some  of  these  exceptions  almost  deserve  to  be  included  because 
of  the  marked  effects  which  they  have  despite  their  lack  of  legal  formality  or  universality. 
However,  this  lack  of  formality  also  leads  to  difficulties  in  quantifying  or  assessing  the 
impact  which  these  exceptions  have,  and  so  while  they  are  mentioned  here,  they  are  not 
subjected  to  the  detailed  analysis  of  the  more  formal  mechanisms. 
The  most  important  of  these  influences  was  briefly  mentioned  above  -  that  of  professional 
self  regulation.  It  is  not  intended  here  to  rehearse  the  sociological  discussions  concerning 
what  is  and  is  not  a  profession.  However,  it  is  important  at  this  juncture  to  note  that  one  of 
the  hallmarks  of  a  profession  is  that  it  should  have  certain  forms  of  self  regulation 
entrusted  to  it  by  the  state.  In  the  case  of  the  UK,  the  "official"  aspect  of  professional  self 
regulation  is  carried  out  through  the  auspices  of  the  General  Medical  Council,  or  GIVIC. 
The  GIVIC  is  discussed  in  Chapter  5.  There  is,  however,  another  facet  of  self  regulation 
which,  falling  outwith  the  scope  of  the  formal  machinery,  is  not  included  in  the  substantive 
analysis.  This  relates  to  the  fact  that  there  is  rather  more  to  self-regulation  than  the 26 
U  official"  organs,  of  which  the  GIVIC  is  simply  the  most  obvious.  There  is  also  a  less  formal 
side  to  professional  self-regulation,  described  by  Rosenthal  as  follows: 
"The  process  of  'self-regulation'  has  both  formal  and  informal  manifestations.  The 
formal  mechanisms  are  easily  identified.  They  include  selection  for  admission  to 
medical  school,  systems  of  medical  education  and  testing,  registration  (licensure), 
speciality  credentialing  and  formal  disciplinary  activities.  These  are  relatively 
visible  organizations  and  processes  in  many  societies...  The  criteria  for  entrance 
to  medical  school  are  potentially  the  most  powerful  tools  for  effective  self- 
regulation  the  profession  has.  The  characteristics  of  those  admitted  to  medical 
education  are  a  key  basis  for  future  behaviour...  There  are  regulations  governing 
disciplinary  procedures  and  there  are  stated  codes  of  professional  behaviour  and 
etiquette.  The  GIVIC,  empowered  by  Parliament  to  carry  out  these  functions  but 
financed  and  controlled  by  the  profession,  is  a  prime  example  of  exclusively 
professional  self-discipline  and  regulation.  These  are  the  recognized  mechanisms 
of  professional  self-regulation...  Learning  and  maintaining  appropriate  collegial 
and  professional  behaviour  is  an  intrinsic  element  of  professional  self-regulation 
and  self-discipline.  The  inculcation  of  appropriate  norms  of  behaviour,  towards  a 
colleague  and  as  a  professional,  is  as  important  as  the  science  and  art  of 
medicine,  although  it  is  learned  through  a  socialization  process  rather  than 
classroom  lectures.  Through  the  behaviour  of  faculty,  doctors  on  the  wards,  the 
informal  exchange  of  experiences  and  observations,  and  the  formal  statements  of 
professional  organizations,  students  and  young  doctors  learn  what  is  expected  of 
them  as  professionals  and  colleagues.  Experienced  doctors  are  presumably 
reminded  of  these  norms  throughout  their  careers.  jj  41 
This  socialisation  process  appears  to  have  a  substantial  effect  on  how  doctors  act, 
according  to  Rosenthal  on  the  basis  of  extensive  confidential  interviews.  But  it  is  not,  in 
any  formal  way,  a  regulatory  mechanism.  Crucially,  in  terms  of  whether  to  include  it  in  the 
scope  of  this  thesis,  it  is  not  a  mechanism  which  is  in  any  realistic  way  subject  to  being 
adjusted  by  any  particular  group,  organisation  or  interest.  Whatever  the  strengths  or 
drawbacks  of  this  aspect  of  professional  self-regulation,  it  is  not  one  which  is  subject  to 
variation  at  anyone's  behest.  There  is,  according  to  the  methodology  being  followed,  no 
reason  to  include  such  unquantifiable  and  uncontrollable  factors  within  the  primary 
elements  of  the  regulatory  system  being  assessed. 
Another  major  omission  concerns  the  effect  on  the  practice  of  doctors  of  various  external 
influences.  This  includes  such  things  as  guidelines  given  by  professional  societies  and 
defence  organisations.  It  also  has  to  include  the  activities  of  pharmaceutical  companies  in 27 
attempting  to  persuade  doctors  to  prescribe  their  own  products,  often  done  in  the  guise  of 
education,  although  ongoing  moves  by  both  the  present  and  previous  governments  to 
restrict  doctors  to  a  small  list  of  generic  medicines  seem  likely  to  have  curtailed  much  of 
this  activity.  Doctors  complain  that  these  restrictions  infringe  on  their  clinical  freedom,  but 
as  Downie  notes: 
if  clinical  freedom  is  the  freedom  to  spend  other  people's  money  without  any 
audit  then  it  ought  to  be  curtailed.  A  profession  can  still  be  independent  within  the 
constraints  set  by  the  cashier. 
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The  single  largest  exclusion  concerns  NHS  internal  mechanisms  43 
. 
In  the  UK,  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  medical  practice  takes  place  under  the  aegis  of  the  NHS,  and  it 
would  therefore  arguably  have  been  appropriate  to  include  these  mechanisms.  They 
affect  (in  theory)  most  doctors  and  the  majority  of  clinical  activity.  However,  we  are 
assessing  the  overall  adequacy  of  the  regulatory  system.  A  regulatory  system  which 
depends  on  mechanisms  of  limited  applicability  and  scope  is,  almost  by  definition, 
deficient  in  that  it  fails  to  address  the  regulation  of  medical  practice  outwith  the  scope  of 
these  limited  mechanisms.  It  is,  however,  impossible  to  ignore  the  existence  of  the  NHS 
systems.  The  pervasive  nature  of  NHS  activity  has  influenced  the  activities  of  other 
regulators,  and  so  the  approach  of  these  other  regulators  to  NHS  practice  (in  particular, 
the  role  of  the  civil  courts)  is  included  within  the  main  body  of  the  study  where  appropriate. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  this  thesis  is  concerned  to  adopt  an  overarching  view  of  the 
regulatory  system  as  it  applies  to  medical  practice  as  a  whole.  For  this  reason,  a  number 
of  mechanisms  which  only  affect  highly  specialised  areas  of  medical  practice,  and  which 
would  otherwise  have  satisfied  the  inclusion  criteria,  have  been  omitted  from  the  detailed 
study  which  follows.  The  remits  of  these  mechanisms,  and  explanations  as  to  why  they 
are  not  included  in  the  main  body  of  the  thesis,  are  given  at  appropriate  points  infra. 
C:  The  regulatory  mechanisms  included: 
A  number  of  shaping  factors  have  already  been  discussed  which  influence  the  bodies 
included  in  this  section  (and  accordingly  included  in  chapters  3  to  6).  In  some  measure, 
the  bodies  included  are  the  mirror  of  those  excluded. 
Firstly,  the  definition  of  regulation  itself  serves  to  exclude  some  bodies,  such  as  those 
under  the  Vaccine  Damages  Payments  Act  1979:  mechanisms  which  do  not  carry  out 
any  regulatory  function  have  been  excluded.  As  a  corollary  to  this,  the  presumption  is  that 28 
any  body/mechanism  which,  at  first  appearance,  appears  to  satisfy  one  or  more  of  the 
eight  aspects  of  regulation  should  be  included. 
Secondly,  the  exclusion  of  non-legally  based  mechanisms  also  excludes  a  number  of 
informal  mechanisms.  This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  any  legally-based  mechanism 
should  be  included. 
Thirdly,  the  regulatory  bodies  included  should  all  enjoy  universal  jurisdiction.  The  main 
effect  of  this  is  to  exclude  NHS  bodies,  but  it  also  serves  to  exclude  other  regulatory 
bodies  which  only  apply  to  specific  fields,  such  as  the  Mental  Welfare  Commission  which 
is  concerned  purely  with  the  care  of  persons  subject  to  compulsory  mental  health 
detention.  The  corollary  to  this  exclusion  is  that  bodies  having  universal  jurisdiction 
should  be  included.  As  will  be  seen  in  Chapter  5,  only  one  body  (the  GMC)  actually 
satisfies  these  criteria. 
Fourthly,  regulatory  behaviour  can  be  based  on  compliance  models  or  deterrence  models. 
This  creates  a  presumption  that  bodies  seeking  to  impose  compliance  with  or  deterrence 
from  certain  types  of  behaviour  within  the  health  care  system  should  be  included. 
Each  of  these  can  be  regarded  as  a  filter  rather  than  as  an  admission  criterion;  in  other 
words,  only  those  organ  isations/systems/mechan  isms  which,  on  a  provisional  analysis, 
appeared  to  satisfy  all  four  criteria  have  been  included.  This  exercise  produced  a  list  of 
four  different  areas: 
Criminal  law 
Civil  litigation 
Regulatory  bodies,  and 
Direct  statutory  regulation 
The  division  of  the  categories  was  based  on  which  aspects  of  the  definition  of  regulation 
the  mechanism  in  question  appeared  to  seek  to  address.  For  ease  of  reference,  the 
activities  which  this  thesis  takes  as  failing  within  the  definition  of  "regulation"  are  as 
follows: 
1.  The  setting  of  standards  of  medical  practice 
2.  The  upholding  of  these  standards 
3.  The  facilitation  of  medical  practice  in  accordance  with  these  standards 29 
4.  The  provision  of  systems  to  allow  redress  for  those  who  suffer  due  to  a  failure  to 
adhere  to  these  standards 
5.  The  provision  of  channels  to  permit  grievances  to  be  aired  and  disputes  resolved 
6.  The  provision  of  systems  of  investigation  to  inquire  into  whether  standards  are  being 
adhered  to  or  not,  whether  across  the  board,  at  the  instigation  of  the  particular 
regulator  itself,  or  in  response  to  allegations  being  made/complaints  received 
7.  The  punishment  of  those  who  fail  to  adhere  to  the  standards,  and 
8.  The  regulation  of  the  regulatory  system  itself  to  ensure  that  the  above  tasks  are  being 
carried  out. 
As  will  be  seen,  there  is  a  considerable  degree  of  overlap  in  the  regulatory  activities  which 
the  various  aspects  of  the  system  undertake;  nonetheless,  this  approach  led  to  division  on 
the  following  grounds: 
Criminal  law  (which  essentially  refers  to  the  actions  of  the  criminal  courts)  has  as  a 
key  function  activity  7-  punishment.  It  has  ancillary  purposes  relating  to  setting 
and  upholding  standards,  and  arguably  provides  a  grievance  channel.  The 
investigative  machinery  is  outside  the  health  care  system,  although  it  is  capable  of 
responding  to  complaints  from  within. 
Civil  litigation  (here  referring  to  the  actions  of  the  civil  courts  in  adjudicating  on 
disputes  brought  before  them)  is  principally  concerned  with  activity  4-  redress  for 
those  who  suffer.  Like  the  criminal  law,  it  also  has  functions  relating  to  setting  and 
upholding  standards  and  providing  a  grievance  channel.  Certain  specialised  forms 
of  litigation  can  be  used  to  control  the  activities  of  the  system  as  a  whole  (or  of 
parts  of  it),  or  investigate  adherence  to  standards. 
Regulatory  bodies  have  activities  1  and  2  at  their  heart,  with  possibly  an  element 
of  activity  3,  facilitation  of  good  medical  practice.  Depending  on  the  regulatory 
body,  there  may  (in  theory)  be  virtually  any  or  all  of  activities  4  to  8  as  an  addition, 
or  ancillary,  to  the  standard  setting/upholding  activity.  None  of  the  bodies 
examined  paid  significant  attention  to  these  ancillary  activities. 
Direct  statutory  regulation  is  arguably  subsumed  within  the  other  categories,  since 
Parliament  can  only  make  things  actionable  in  either  the  civil  or  criminal  courts,  or 
set  up  a  specific  body  to  perform  the  policing  function  instead.  Its  inclusion  as  a 
separate  category  is  because  of  the  difference  in  actors  concerned.  Chapter  4 
considers  the  actions  of  the  criminal  courts,  although  these  actions  may  be  as  a 
result  of  particular  activity  being  made  criminal  by  Parliament.  The  distinction  is 
that  this  chapter  is  considering  areas  where  it  is  Parliament  which  has  laid  down 
the  parameters  of  the  conduct  in  question,  and  not  delegated  the  matter  to  the 30 
courts  (civil  or  criminal)  or  to  some  other  actor  such  as  a  regulatory  body.  There 
remains  a  considerable  overlap  between  this  chapter  and  others,  since  much  of 
the  direct  statutory  regulation  concerned  will  be  enforceable  in  the  courts  at  the 
behest  of  someone  alleging  a  failure  to  adhere  to  Parliament's  new  standards. 
The  crucial  point  is  that  Parliament  has  decided  to  take  matters  into  its  own  hands. 
This  can  relate  to  any  of  the  regulatory  activities  mentioned  above. 
As  can  be  seen,  some  activities  are  undertaken  by  more  than  one  regulatory  mechanism, 
and  some  mechanisms  (indeed  most,  if  not  all)  undertake  more  than  one  regulatory 
activity. 
In  parallel  with  the  overlap  in  regulatory  functions,  it  is  also  the  case  that  a  single  incident 
can  fall  within  the  jurisdiction  of  more  than  one  piece  of  regulatory  machinery.  Thus,  a 
particular  negligent  act  could  result  in  both  civil  liability  and  attract  the  attention  of  the 
GIVIC.  It  is  conceivable  (if  improbable)  that  a  single  incident  could  violate  the  rules  of  all  of 
these.  However,  the  importance  of  the  distinctions  lies  not  in  their  functional  differences, 
but  in  their  underlying  purposes.  Again,  there  is  a  degree  of  overlap  here:  litigation, 
statutory  regulatory  bodies  and  the  criminal  law  all  afford  the  public  protection  from,  and 
redress  against,  an  unqualified  person  professing  to  be  a  doctor.  Yet  one  can  still 
perceive  differences  in  the  form  and  degree  of  motive  for  doing  so;  the  criminal  law  seeks 
to  discourage  and  punish  such  a  dangerous  form  of  fraud;  the  GIVIC  (in  addition  to  wanting 
to  protect  the  public)  could  reasonably  also  be  expected  to  be  concerned  with  ensuring 
continued  public  confidence  in  its  members.  It  therefore  does  not  want  unqualified 
persons  besmirching  the  reputation  of  the  medical  profession.  The  civil  laws  major 
concern  in  such  a  case  is  to  provide  compensation  for  the  fraudster's  patients  if  and  when 
(as  is  likely)  something  goes  horribly  wrong.  Until  it  does  go  wrong,  and  a  complaint  is 
made,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  such  a  person  could  escape  the  authorities'  notice 
almost  indefinitely;  this  shows  the  importance  of  complaints  procedures.  Thus,  despite 
certain  superficial  similarities  in  motive,  there  are  quite  discernible  differences. 
V:  Purpose,  mechanism.  and  effect 
Throughout  this  thesis,  the  component  parts  of  the  regulatory  system  will  be  analysed  in 
terms  of  a  tripartite  division:  purpose,  mechanism,  and  effect. 
"Purpose"  indicates  the  motives,  explicit  or  otherwise,  which  provide  the  impetus  behind 
any  particular  regulatory  measure;  as  will  be  seen  in  later  chapters,  many  regulatory 
measures  may  not,  in  fact,  have  been  intended  as  such. 31 
"Mechanism"  is  the  actual  structure  through  which  the  actors  seek  to  give  effect  to  the 
measure,  however  informal  that  structure  happens  to  be  in  practice.  A  mechanism  could 
be  a  corporate  structure  set  up  by  primary  legislation  with  full-time  staff  and  impressive 
premises,  or  it  could  be  a  line  in  a  contract.  The  unifying  theme  is  that  the  mechanism  is 
intended  to  be  the  conduit  by  which  regulatory  purpose  is  (or  is  supposed  to  be)  turned 
into  regulatory  effect. 
"Effecr  covers  what  happens  as  a  consequence  of  the  measure;  this  may  or  may  not 
coincide  with  the  original  motive,  and  may  have  unexpected  consequences  or  'Iside- 
effects",  beyond  what  was  intended.  The  analysis  of  regulatory  effects  carries  a  number 
of  methodological  difficulties 
Each  of  these  will  be  looked  at  in  turn 
A:  Purpose: 
To  a  large  extent,  analysis  of  the  purposes  of  the  regulatory  mechanisms  involves 
identifying  which  of  the  regulatory  tasks  the  mechanism  is  intended  to  carry  out,  although 
it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  bare  bones  of  the  definition  in  this  respect.  The  purposes 
underlying  control  mechanisms  are  important  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
Firstly,  without  explicit  recognition  of  motive,  any  analysis  of  the  effectiveness  of  a 
measure  must  necessarily  be  deficient:  how  can  effectiveness  be  measured  except 
against  the  yardstick  of  what  was  intended?  This,  of  course,  also  requires  some 
knowledge  of  the  outcomes  of  the  process,  although  the  outcome  measurement  is 
principally  subsumed  in  considering  the  effects  of  regulatory  mechanisms. 
Secondly,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  working  hypothesis  described  in  Chapter  1,  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  whether  the  various  structures  are  at  odds  with  each  other  -  which 
again  requires  their  purposes  to  be  known,  although  it  also  presupposes  some  knowledge 
of  the  effects  of  these  measures. 
Thirdly,  in  determining  appropriate  regulatory  strategies  for  a  mechanism,  it  also  appears 
beneficial  to  have  explicit  purposes  to  inform  the  choice  of  strategy.  This  also  appears  to 
be  true  of  the  choice  of  regulatory  mechanism. 
The  analysis  of  underlying  purposes  behind  the  regulation  will  consider  possible  motives 
ranging  from  what  might  be  regarded  as  the  patently  obvious  to  what  must  be  conceded 
as  amounting  to  the  extremely  hypothetical.  In  general,  these  assorted  motives  fall  into 32 
five  families,  sometimes  overlapping,  sometimes  conflicting.  The  categories  are,  broadly, 
as  follows: 
A-  Public  policy  grounds  -  protecting  individuals,  the  public,  the  medical  profession, 
etc. 
B  -.  Ideologically  motivated  -  encouraging  equitable  access  to  medicine,  encouraging 
market  forces,  upholding  patient  autonomy,  etc. 
C:  Pena  Ily-motivated  -  punishing  wrongdoers,  and  having  them  seen  to  be  punished. 
D:  Financially  motivated  -  curtailing  rising  costs  of  health  care,  giving  financial 
redress  to  the  victims  of  mishaps,  allocating  costs  and  resources,  etc. 
E:  "Selfish"  motives  -  ensuring  professional  autonomy,  maintaining  the  medical 
monopoly,  reducing  doctors'  liability,  etc. 
There  is  also  the  fact  that  any  particular  initiative  can  have  a  multiplicity  of  underlying 
purposes,  not  all  (or  any)  of  which  will  have  been  openly  acknowledged.  To  take  an 
example  of  this,  the  changes  in  NHS  structures  which  resulted  from  the  National  Health 
Service  and  Community  Care  Act  1990  were  introduced  pdmarily  in  an  attempt  to  curtail 
the  rising  costs  of  health  care,  on  the  assumption  that  commercially  competitive  practices 
tend  to  make  more  efficient  use  of  resources  than  uncompetitive  ones44.  This  was  part  of 
a  global  trend  highlighted  by  Rosenthal  and  Frenkel: 
"Everywhere  countries  are  searching  for  strategies  to  slow  the  growth  rate  of 
health  care  budgets,  from  incentives  for  greater  productivity  and  effectiveness,  to 
stimulating  free-market  competitive 
dynaMiCS"45. 
Thus,  the  changes  can  be  seen  to  fall  into  Category  D  above,  i.  e.  they  were  financially 
motivated.  However,  the  actual  mechanism  adopted,  that  of  introducing  free-market 
concepts  into  an  area  previously  untouched  by  them,  clearly  has  ideological  overtones, 
and  therefore  also  falls  into  Category  B.  Such  multiplicity  of  motives  and  purposes  is,  as 
subsequent  chapters  will  show,  also  a  common  feature  of  attempts  to  regulate  this  field. 
While  the  example  relates  to  the  NHS,  it  is  also  true  elsewhere. 
The  lack  of  explicit  acknowledgement  of  purposes  underlying  certain  initiatives  gives  rise 
to  a  methodological  problem:  how  does  one  identify  the  purposes  underlying  a  regulatory 
mechanism  when  these  purposes  are  nowhere  expounded? 33 
To  an  extent,  this  question  is  answered  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  within  the  appropriate  sections 
of  chapters  4  to  7,  where  the  way  in  which  the  specific  purposes  for  the  mechanism  under 
discussion  was  identified  is  described.  Taken  more  generally,  however,  most 
mechanisms  will  be  seen  to  have  at  least  some  sort  of  "headline"  purpose,  although 
ascertaining  subsidiary  purposes  is  often  more  problematic.  Most  subsidiary  purposes 
considered  in  the  later  chapters  have  been  discovered  through  analysing  the  detailed 
mechanisms  themselves,  and  considering  what  the  mechanism  appears  to  be  trying  to  do. 
lt  is  accepted  that  this  can  create  a  certain  amount  of  self-fulfilling  prediction:  if  this  thesis 
analyses  how  well  a  regulatory  mechanism  achieves  its  purposes,  and  derives  those 
purposes  from  looking  at  what  the  mechanism  is  intending  to  do,  then  there  will  inevitably 
be  a  very  close  match  between  purpose  and  effect. 
This  point  is,  to  an  extent,  true  in  that  there  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  be  such  a 
match.  However,  it  also  misses  the  point  in  some  respects.  Ascertaining  purpose  from 
the  mechanism  does  not  necessarily  prejudge  the  issue  of  how  well  those  purposes  are, 
in  fact,  realised.  Secondly,  and  as  noted,  this  approach  is  only  required  in  terms  of 
subsidiary  purposes.  There  is,  in  general,  a  supervening  explicit  purpose,  and  this  explicit 
purpose  will  (one  might  suppose)  have  influenced  the  structure  of  the  mechanism  more 
than  an  implicit  purpose.  Accordingly,  the  match  between  unclear  intentions  or  purposes 
which  have  been  deduced,  and  the  identifiable  effects  of  these  subsidiary  purposes  might 
not  be  so  close  after  all. 
The  law  is  no  stranger  to  such  a  process  of  inferring  motive  from  observable  action.  As 
will  be  seen  in  Chapter  4,  the  main  part  of  the  criminal  law  requires  the  existence  of  a 
criminal  state  of  mind,  or  mens  rea,  before  conduct  which  is  subject  to  criminal  sanctions 
will  result  in  the  courts  actually  holding  a  person  guilty  of  the  crime.  However,  it  is  a 
relatively  rare  occurrence  to  have  direct  evidence  as  to  whether  an  accused  person 
intended  to  commit  a  crime  or  not,  and  the  courts  proceed  in  the  main  by  inferring  their 
motive  from  their  observed  actions.  Similar  rules  pertain  in  areas  of  social  security  law 
which  aim  to  curtail  perceived  abuses  by  limiting  means-tested  benefit  entitlement  for 
people  who  have  deliberately  reduced  their  capital  so  as  to  qualify  for  the  benefit  in 
question  46 
. 
It  is  again  extremely  rare  to  have  any  direct  evidence  that  the  deprivation  of 
capital  which  occurred  was  for  purposes  of  securing  benefit  as  opposed  to  any  other 
reason,  and  so  again  those  responsible  for  decision-making  within  this  field  must  draw 
inferences  from  the  observable  facts.  The  significance  of  this  is  that  if  the  law  considers  it 
can  legitimately  draw  inferences  in  this  way,  then  (it  is  submitted),  it  is  equally  legitimate 
for  a  study  such  as  the  present  one  to  do  likewise. 34 
B:  Mechanism: 
"Mechanism",  as  noted  above,  means  whatever  means  have  been  adopted  to  turn 
purposes  into  effects.  It  also  refers  to  mechanisms  which  have  simply  evolved  or 
developed  in  response  to  a  changing  situation,  without  there  necessarily  being  any 
deliberate  policy  designed  to  do  so.  This  can  arise  as  a  result  of  the  disjointed 
incrementalism  discussed  earlier.  Clearly  the  purposes  of  such  mechanisms  are  by 
definition  more  difficult  to  identify. 
In  terms  of  the  nature  of  the  study  of  mechanisms,  these  form  the  bulk  of  the  material  in 
chapters  3  to  6.  The  disparate  nature  of  the  mechanisms  in  question  makes  it  extremely 
difficult  to  adhere  to  any  form  of  template  in  conducting  these  studies;  but  the  general 
pattern  followed  is  to  start  off  by  considering,  in  more  detail  than  in  this  chapter,  the 
precise  scope  of  the  mechanism  being  discussed.  As  is  seen,  some  regulatory 
mechanisms  contain  overlaps  with  each  other  which  unavoidably  remain  despite  the 
delimitations  outlined  above  between  the  different  mechanisms.  There  are  also 
interactions  between  the  different  mechanisms  which  are,  in  general,  outlined  at  the 
outset  of  each  chapter.  Other  areas  of  overlap  or  interaction  are  explained  in  the  body  of 
the  chapter,  if  doing  so  fits  the  internal  structure  of  the  chapter  in  question  more  logically. 
The  next  step  is  to  explain  the  genesis  of  the  mechanism  in  question,  explore  its  more 
obvious  manifestations,  and  then  proceed  to  look  in  more  detail  at  the  aspects  of  the 
mechanism  which  appear  to  have  the  most  significant  impact  on  medical  practice,  or 
which  appear  to  be  attempting  to  exert  such  an  influence. 
The  genesis  looked  at  is,  in  terms  of  those  bodies  established  by  law,  to  consider  the 
foundation  statutes  and  regulations,  followed  by  internal  policy  documents  or  rules  of 
procedure  or  equivalent.  The  analysis  proceeds  to  see  how  these  "black  letter  law"  rules 
are,  in  fact,  applied  by  the  mechanism;  the  de  facto  exercise  of  (or  failure  to  exercise)  a 
theoretical  power  is,  for  purposes  of  this  thesis,  of  more  significance  than  the  theoretical 
position.  A  policy  of  non-interference,  where  such  is  discovered,  is  of  significance  in  its 
own  right,  since  there  is  an  extant  regulatory  mechanism  which  appears  to  be 
systematically  unused.  This,  however,  is  not  the  same  as  being  of  no  effect.  A 
mechanism  may  not  have  to  do  anything  because  of  the  possibility  that  the  very  existence 
of  the  mechanism  provides  sufficient  deterrent  value  to  achieve  the  desired  objectives 
without  any  further  activity  being  required.  This  element  is  more  properly  covered  by 
consideration  of  effect,  however. 35 
C:  Effect 
In  many  respects,  the  analysis  or  consideration  of  the  effects  of  the  regulatory  bodies 
discussed  generates  the  most  problematic  methodological  issues. 
In  theory,  practical  effects  would  require  major  empirical  studies  to  assess,  and  even  such 
studies  would  be  highly  difficult  due  to  the  inherent  difficulty  in  isolating  the  effect  of  one 
particular  element  in  what  is  a  highly  complex,  multi-dimensional  arena.  Some  might 
question  whether  such  an  analysis  could  even  be  carried  out  at  all. 
This  thesis  is  not  based  on  any  original  empirical  work,  but  instead  utilises  the  empirical 
studies  already  published  by  other  researchers.  The  existing  work  is  not  wholly 
comprehensive  across  the  range  of  mechanisms  studied,  however,  and  some  of  the 
discussion  of  effect  is  conjectural.  Is  conjectural  assessment  of  the  effects  of  the 
regulators  sufficient?  It  is  submitted  that,  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  it  is  sufficient.  To 
reconsider  the  working  hypothesis  again,  it  is  intended  to  determine  whether  the  existing 
regulatory  system  as  a  whole  provides  adequate  safeguards  for  the  interests  of  those 
involved.  In  terms  of  answering  this  question,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some  knowledge  of 
what  the  existing  system  actually  does;  it  is  not,  it  is  submitted,  necessary  to  be  able  to 
pinpoint  and  quantify  every  aspect  of  every  mechanism  within  that  existing  system.  This 
thesis  looks  at  the  system  as  a  whole,  and  at  the  internal  conflicts  within  that  system.  It  Is 
consistent  with  this  approach  to  take  a  relatively  "broad  brush"  approach  to  what  the 
effects  of  each  component  are,  and  in  the  absence  of  published  empirical  studies  it  is  also 
consistent  to  make  an  educated  guess,  against  a  detailed  background  of  how  the 
mechanism  functions,  as  to  the  effects  of  that  mechanism.  Where  the  effects  of  a 
mechanism  are  being  estimated  in  this  way,  specific  attention  is  drawn  to  the  fact.  In 
terms  of  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  at  the  end  of  this  thesis,  it  seems  that  one 
incontrovertible  conclusion  will  be  that  there  has  been  insufficient  study  of  how  well  the 
(time-  and  resource-consuming)  regulatory  mechanisms  which  already  exist  actually  fulfil 
their  designated  or  assumed  functions. 
The  effects  of  regulatory  activity  which  will  be  considered  are  all  the  consequences  (so  far 
as  can  be  ascertained)  of  the  activity.  This  covers  not  only  the  success  (or  lack  thereof)  of 
the  activity  in  achieving  its  purposes,  ostensible  or  otherwise;  it  also  covers  unexpected  or 
unintended  consequences  of  the  activity  -  consequences  which  could  be  described  as 
Uregulatory  side-effects  ".  This  is  of  significance  because  part  of  the  root  cause  of  any 
disjointed  incrementalism  discovered  within  the  regulatory  framework  may  be  as  a  result 
of  unforeseen  consequences  of  regulatory  activity  elsewhere  in  the  system,  rather  than  of 
failure  on  the  part  of  an  instant  decision  maker  to  take  account  of  the  bigger  picture.  A  full 36 
consideration  of  regulatory  effect  is  therefore  necessary  to  assist  in  identifying  the 
underlying  causes  of  any  regulatory  failure  which  is  detected  in  the  following  chapters. 
The  main  reason  for  considering  effect,  however,  is  to  enable  the  working  hypothesis 
posited  in  Chapter  1  to  be  tested.  An  "adequate"  safeguard  can  only,  by  definition,  be  one 
which  has  the  desired  regulatory  effect.  It  is  this  regulatory  effect  which  those  establishing 
mechanisms  are  trying  to  achieve  -  the  mechanism  itself  is  merely  a  means  to  an  end.  It 
is  also  necessary  to  consider  effect  in  ascertaining  whether  the  identified  regulatory 
purposes  are,  in  fact,  being  achieved. 
However,  consideration  of  the  putpose-mechanism-effect  division  does  not,  in  isolation, 
provide  sufficient  tools  to  enable  the  hypothesis  to  be  fully  tested.  Identifying  purposes, 
examining  the  mechanisms  put  in  place  to  carry  out  those  purposes,  and  measuring  the 
effect  of  those  mechanisms,  still  does  not  answer  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
regulatory  system  is  "adequate"  in  carrying  out  its  tasks.  The  issues  arising  from  this  are 
considered  next. 
VI:  The  core  evaluation  criteria: 
To  reconsider  the  working  hypothesis  of  this  thesis,  it  is  concerned  with  the  adequacy  of 
the  safeguards  provided  by  the  existing  medical  regulatory  system  in  Britain.  The  extent 
of  the  system  under  consideration,  and  the  interests  to  be  safeguarded,  have  already 
been  considered.  The  question  then  follows  on  from  this:  how  does  one  determine  what 
constitutes  an  "adequate  safeguard"? 
Part  of  the  problem  is  that  different  users  will  have  different  perceptions  of  what  health 
policy  is  supposed  to  be  about,  and  consequently  different  views  as  to  what  norms 
regulatory  systems  should  be  aiming  to  secure  compliance  with.  This  point  is  highlighted 
in  the  follovAng  passage: 
"...  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  performance  of  the  NHS  from  different 
perspectives:  using  different  currencies  of  evaluation  leads  to  different  figures  at 
the  end  of  the  balance  sheet.  But  this  is  inevitable:  as  evaluation  stems  from 
different  values,  different  people  Will  use  different  exchange  rates  between  the 
different  currencies  of  evaluation. 
'If  the  aim  of  the  NHS  is  defined  to  be  to  eradicate  disease  and  disability, 
then  it  is  self-evidently  a  failure;  if,  however,  its  role  is  defined  as  being  to 
minimise  human  suffering,  then  it  can  be  reckoned  as  being  a  reasonable 
success  story.  If  the  aim  is  defined  to  be  to  limit  public  expenditure,  the 37 
NHS  is  a  triumphant  success  story  when  measured  against  other  health 
care  systems  in  the  Western  world;  ff,  in  contrast,  the  aim  is  defined  to  be 
to  maximise  the  total  supply  of  health  care,  the  NHSs  performance  is 
distinctly  less  impressive.  If  the  aim  is  defined  to  be  to  ration  scarce 
resources  in  an  equitable  fashion,  then  the  NHS  is  at  least  a  comparative 
success;  if  the  aim  is  defined  to  be  to  achieve  responsiveness  to  consumer 
demands,  then  the  NHS  fails  to  meet  it.  ' 
There  can,  then,  be  no  definitive  evaluation  of  the  NHS.  This  makes  it  vital  that  the 
criteria  of  evaluation  are  specified  clearly.  ty  47 
Again,  what  is  true  of  attempts  to  evaluate  regulation  within  the  NHS  is  equally  applicable 
to  evaluations  of  non  NHS  bodies.  In  establishing  the  adequacy  of  the  existing  regulatory 
system  there  is  a  preliminary  point  to  dispose  of:  is  it  a  necessary  starting  point  to 
establish  some  idea  of  what  regulation  should  be  about?  The  discussion  above 
concerning  the  nature  of  regulation  asked  whether  it  was  necessary,  for  the  purposes  of 
that  definition,  to  identify  regulatory  goals.  The  question  was  answered  in  the  negative  in 
that  context.  In  the  present  context,  goal  identification  or  the  assumption  of  a  specific 
policy  orientation  is  only  necessary  as  a  prerequisite  to  the  next  logical  step  of  asking 
whether  the  mechanism  in  question  has,  in  practice,  achieved  the  desired  policy  outcome 
to  any  measurable  extent.  This  leads  us  directly  to  the  first  of  our  evaluation  criteria.  In 
addition,  in  the  foregoing  discussion  certain  aspects  which  were  deemed  worthy  of 
reflection  in  the  evaluation  criteria  were  identified.  Others  arise  as  an  inevitable 
consequence  of  the  definition  of  regulation  which  has  been  adopted. 
In  defining  regulation,  eight  different  regulatory  activities  were  identified.  As  seen  above, 
not  all  regulatory  mechanisms  will  perform  all  of  the  different  activities.  However,  it  is 
submitted  that  whichever  activity  the  mechanism  in  question  is  undertaking,  the  starting 
point  for  evaluating  how  well  it  safeguards  the  protected  interests  is  to  ask  how  well  the 
mechanism  fulfils  the  regulatory  activity  which  it  seeks  to  undertake.  Thus,  the  first 
evaluation  criterion  is  effectiveness.  In  measuring  this  aspect,  each  part  of  the  regulatory 
machinery  will  be  assessed  so  as  to  ascertain  the  regulatory  functions  which  it  carries  out, 
and  then  the  effects  of  that  mechanism  analysed  to  provide  an  assessment  of  whether 
and  how  well  the  purposes  have  been  met. 
Secondly,  the  discussion  of  philosophical  aspects  of  medical  treatment  above  explicitly 
accepted  patient  autonomy  as  being  worthy  of  protection  and  enhancement.  The  second 
evaluation  criterion  is  therefore  respect  for  patient  autonomy.  This  aspect  will  be 
assessed  by  considering  whether  the  regulatory  mechanism  in  question  has  (a)  a  system 
designed  to  evaluate  what  the  vOshes  of  the  pabents  affected  actually  are,  (b)  whether 38 
these  wishes  are,  in  fact,  respected,  and  (c)  whether  any  non-observation  of  patient 
wishes  has  a  valid  and  reasonable  objective  justification. 
Third,  in  considering  which  interests  should  be  protected,  it  was  stated  that  regulation 
should  not  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  interfere  with  the  practice  of  medicine  where  that 
practice  accorded  due  respect  to  the  rights  of  those  involved.  This  leads  to  the  third 
evaluation  criterion,  which  is  avoidance  of  undue  interference  with  good  medical  practice. 
The  definition  of  "good"  medical  practice  requires  some  expansion.  For  the  purposes  of 
this  thesis,  "good  medical  practice"  means  medical  activity  which  is  demonstrably  of 
clinical  benefit  to  the  patient,  and  which  is  the  course  of  treatment  which,  if  the  patient 
could  be  brought  up  to  the  level  of  knowledge  concerning  potential  risks,  benefits, 
alternatives  and  inherent  uncertainties  as  the  doctor  treating  him  or  her  (or  alternatively,  of 
a  "reasonable"  doctor),  the  patient  would  have  chosen  for  him-  or  herself.  The  point 
concerning  a  reasonable  doctor  is  included  to  cover  the  situation  where  the  doctor,  for 
whatever  reason,  is  proposing  a  course  of  action  which  the  responsible  bulk  of  medical 
opinion  disapproves  of.  It  can  be  seen  from  this  that  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis, 
medical  practice  is  taken  as  a  desirable  activity.  This  is  the  explicit  assumption  of  another 
value  judgement,  since  other  opinions  exist  as  to  the  desirability  of  medical  practice. 
However,  this  thesis  does  not  align  itself  with  Ivan  Illich's  proposition  that  the  practice  of 
medicine  has  become  a  social  problem  in  itself.  415 
Fourth,  it  should  be  recalled  that  resources  are  finite  within  the  health  care  system  -  and 
that  regulatory  mechanisms  are  one  of  the  demands  made  on  these  finite  resources. 
Based  on  the  analysis  of  which  interests  should  be  safeguarded,  it  seems  safe  to 
conclude  that  those  concerned  (patients,  doctors,  the  state)  would  rather  resources  were 
utilised  in  providing  medical  treatment  rather  than  being  tied  up  unnecessarily  in 
regulatory  mechanisms.  At  what  stage  regulatory  mechanisms  become  "unnecessary"  in 
terms  of  their  utilisation  of  resources  is  another  value  judgement.  However,  it  is  not  (it  is 
submitted)  objectionable  to  state  as  a  proposition  that  if  the  same  regulatory  activities  can 
be  achieved  with  fewer  resources,  this  is  preferable  to  using  more  resources  to  achieve 
the  same  end.  On  this  basis,  the  fourth  criterion  is  that  of  efficiency.  In  stating  this,  it  is 
also  to  be  noted  that  "efficiency"  as  a  concept  is  subject  to  a  variety  of  interpretations, 
although  limitations  of  space  preclude  a  full  discussion  of  the  issues.  For  present 
purposes,  this  thesis  adheres  to  the  definition  of  "productive  efficiency"  provided  by 
Bartlett  and  Le  Grand  49  This  definition  allows  measures  of  quality  to  be  taken  into 
account  when  assessing  efficiency,  and  does  not  necessarily  equate  "most  efficient"  with 
I[  cheapest". 39 
The  remaining  evaluation  criteria  are  not  ones  which  arise  as  a  result  of  the  definitions 
and  values  explicitly  assumed  thus  far.  Instead,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  extraneous 
sources  and  consider  what  has  been  regarded  as  an  important  feature  of  a  regulatory 
system  by  other  commentators  or  in  other  contexts. 
The  starting  point  here  was  provided  by  a  study  conducted  by  the  Association  of 
Community  Health  Councils  for  England  and  Wales  (ACHCEW50).  ACHCEW  has  listed 
five  criteria  for  complaints  handling:  visibility,  accountability,  accessibility,  impartiality  and 
fairness,  and  effectiveness  and  speed.  51  While  ACHCEW  intended  this  list  to  be  applied 
to  NHS  complaints  procedures,  they  provide  a  useful  starting  point  for  consideration  of 
what  other  elements  an  "adequate"  regulatory  system  should  possess. 
The  major  point  of  consideration  for  the  remaining  criteria  is,  however,  found  by  casting  a 
net  far  wider.  In  Chapter  6,  one  of  the  areas  of  direct  statutory  regulation  considered  in 
detail  is  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998.  This  Act  "gives  further  effect  to"  parts  of  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  including  Article  6:  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  While 
it  may  seem  incongruous  to  consider  fair  trial  safeguards  as  providing  applicable 
safeguards  for  the  overall  regulatory  system  affecting  British  medical  practice, 
consideration  of  the  text  of  Article  6,  and  the  relevant  jurisprudence  of  the  European  Court 
and  Commission  of  Human  Rights  on  its  meaning,  may  suggest  otherwise. 
Article  6(1)  states  that: 
Ul.  In  the  determination  of  his  civil  rights  and  obligations  or  of  any  criminal 
charge  against  him,  everyone  is  entitled  to  a  fair  and  public  hearing  within  a 
reasonable  time  by  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal  established  by  law. 
Judgement  shall  be  pronounced  publicly  but  the  press  and  public  may  be  excluded 
from  all  or  part  of  the  trial  in  the  interest  of  morals,  public  order  or  national  security 
in  a  democratic  society,  where  the  interests  of  juveniles  or  the  protection  of  the 
private  life  of  the  parties  so  require,  or  to  the  extent  strictly  necessary  in  the 
opinion  of  the  court  in  special  circumstances  where  publicity  would  prejudice  the 
interests  of  justice.  "52 
The  relevance  here  is  in  understanding  the  definition  of  the  phrase  "determination  of  his 
civil  rights  and  obligations.  "  This  expression  is  analysed  fully  in  Chapter  6,  but  for  present 
purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  it  extends  far  beyond  the  scope  of  what  the  word 
"trial"  is  commonly  taken  to  mean  in  the  legal  systems  of  the  UK,  and  arguably  far  beyond 
its  meaning  in  the  English  language  53 
- 
Access  to  health  care  may  or  may  not  be  a  civil 
right  which  enjoys  the  protections  of  Article  6(l),  but  coercive  measures  aimed  at  those 40 
working  within  the  health  care  sphere  almost  certainly  are,  and  so  are  (or  will  be)  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Article. 
These  provisions  can  be  broken  down  into  a  number  of  categories,  and  it  is  possible  to 
see  a  degree  of  overlap  with  the  ACHCEW  criteria  listed  above.  Thus,  to  take  certain 
elements  of  Article  6(1)  in  turn: 
"...  everyone  is  entitled  to...  "  -  this  aspect  corresponds  to  ACHCEW's  criterion  of 
accessibility,  there  being  little  point  in  having  regulatory  mechanisms  if  those  they 
are  intended  to  benefit  cannot  in  reality  utilise  them; 
a  fair  and  public  heafing...,  "-  this  corresponds  to  ACHCEVVs  faimess; 
within  a  reasonable  time...  "  -  this  corresponds  to  ACHCEWs  speed; 
... 
by  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal...  "  -  this  corresponds  to  ACHCEW's 
category  of  impartiality, 
U 
...  estabfished  by  law.  "  This  has  no  direct  counterpart  with  ACHCEW's  list. 
However,  depending  on  how  the  tribunal  is  established,  this  may  bring  with  it  a 
degree  of  accountability.  Establishment  by  law  may  also  be  a  factor  in  ensuring 
that  the  tribunal  is  effective,  which  has  already  been  identified  as  one  of  the 
evaluation  criteria  being  used  in  this  thesis. 
"Judgement  shall  be  pronounced  publicly...  "  -  this  corresponds  (at  least  in  part) 
with  ACHCEWs  criterion  of  visibility. 
In  terms  of  the  ACHCEW  list,  there  are  no  direct  counterparts  in  Article  6(1)  with  the 
elements  of  accountability  and  effectiveness.  Since  the  category  of  effectiveness  has 
already  been  identified  for  inclusion,  discussion  of  this  lack  of  overlap  can  be  kept  to  a 
minimum.  The  principal  reason  for  Article  6  being  silent  on  the  issue  of  effectiveness  is 
that  the  issue  of  effective  remedies  for  violations  of  Convention  rights  is  to  be  found  in 
Article  13  of  the  Convention,  not  Article  6  54.  The  nature  of  the  Convention  is  that  the 
Convention  itself,  together  with  its  enforcement  organs,  provides  the  mechanism  for 
holding  those  making  decisions  covered  by  the  safeguards  afforded  by  Article  6 
accountable  for  their  decisions.  Indeed,  the  whole  point  of  the  Convention  is  to  allow 
national  governments  to  be  held  accountable  for  their  actions  and  inactions  before  an 41 
international  tribunal,  and  to  be  so  held  at  the  behest  of  individuals  (including  their  own 
citizens)  rather  than  at  the  behest  of  other  states. 
It  can  therefore  be  seen  that  accountability  is  an  important  concept  in  international  human 
rights  law.  Accountability  to  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in  Strasbourg  is  a 
notional  form  of  accountability,  but  it  is  also  a  very  distant  one.  Only  the  UK  government 
can  be  taken  to  task  there,  not  necessarily  the  part  of  the  state  apparatus  which  the 
citizen  genuinely  has  a  grievance  with.  The  logic  is  that  the  state  ultimately  has 
responsibility  for  the  ordering  of  its  internal  affairs,  and  should  therefore  accept 
responsibility  for  those  whom  it  has  allowed  to  escape  domestic  accountability.  While  the 
logic  of  this  may  be  impeccable  from  the  perspective  of  the  international  jurist,  there  are  a 
number  of  problems  from  a  domestic  perspective.  The  state  may  ultimately  be 
responsible  for  the  situation  which  has  arisen  (although  this  presumes  an  omnipotent 
state,  which  is  clearly  not  the  case),  but  this  theory  shields  those  whose  actions  are  being 
complained  about  from  direct  scrutiny. 
Accountability  has  a  number  of  facets  directly  related  to  the  definition  of  regulation. 
Grievance  systems,  systems  of  investigation  into  non-adherence  with  standards, 
punishment,  and  (potentially)  systems  for  redressing  suffering  may  all  require  those  who 
are  responsible  for  a  particular  situation  to  be  identified  and,  if  necessary,  required  to 
explain  themselves.  Given  the  importance  of  this  in  international  law,  its  inclusion  in 
ACHCEVVs  list,  and  its  necessary  functions  within  the  regulatory  tasks,  our  next 
evaluation  criterion  is,  therefore,  accountabdo. 
As  a  prerequisite  to  this  accountability,  it  is  necessary  that  the  person  wishing  to  hold 
someone  accountable  should  know  about  the  system,  and  be  able  to  make  use  of  ft.  The 
next  evaluation  criterion  is  therefore  visibility.  Notions  of  openness  and  transparency  in 
decision-making  are,  it  is  submitted,  increasingly  perceived  as  important  factors  in 
establishing  the  legitimacy  of  a  body  or  organisation  in  the  public  eye,  and  the  visibility 
criterion  is  included  expressly  to  reflect  these  values.  Beyond  the  intrinsic  value  which  this 
inclusion  attributes  to  openness  and  transparency,  however,  there  is  also  a  potential 
practical  aspect  to  the  visibility  of  an  organisation:  if  no-one  knows  about  a  mechanism, 
then  they  will  be  unable  to  utilise  whatever  the  mechanism  does,  and  the  protections 
offered  by  it  may  (unless  the  mechanism  functions  perfectly  in  all  cases  without  external 
stimulus)  become  illusory  as  a  result.  The  visibility  of  a  mechanism  can  also  have 
implications  for  the  effectiveness  of  a  system,  since  any  deterrent  effect  which  something 
has  will  also  be  lost  if  no-one  knows  about  it.  Visibility  is  taken  as  a  separate  criterion 
from  the  other  aspects  of  Article  6(1)  considered  below  because,  for  the  reasons  just 
mentioned,  it  is  considered  that  the  visibility  requirement  of  a  regulatory  mechanism  in 42 
carrying  out  a  variety  of  the  regulatory  tasks  (setting/upholding  standards,  grievance 
channels/dispute  resolution)  go  far  beyond  the  "open  court"  provisions  of  Article  6,  which 
were  designed  to  guard  against  covert  governance  and  secret  decision-making  by  the 
executive  55 
. 
The  final  criterion  is  an  amalgamation  of  most  of  the  remaining  elements  of  Article  6(1) 
together  with  the  rest  of  ACHCEWs  list.  This  criterion  can  be  described  as  overafi 
faimess,  and  incorporates  within  it  the  various  aspects  of  accessibility  (since  if  one  side  is 
denied  access  to  a  mechanism,  this  is  unfair  to  that  side),  together  with  the  right  to  a  fair 
hearing  by  an  impartial  arbiter  within  a  reasonable  timescale. 
The  use  which  will  be  made  of  these  seven  criteria  is  considered  in  the  next,  final,  section. 
VII:  Summary: 
This  chapter  has  attempted  to  set  out  the  limits  of  this  study,  the  methodology  by  which 
the  study  is  undertaken,  and  the  key  concepts,  definitions  and  values  which  underlie  the 
study.  A  series  of  benchmarks  have  been  established  by  which  the  existing  system  will 
be  evaluated.  This  concluding  section  explains  to  what  use  these  evaluations  will  be  put. 
Four  substantive  chapters  of  this  thesis  will  subject  the  existing  regulatory  machinery  to 
detailed  scrutiny.  This  scrutiny  will  analyse  in  turn  the  purpose,  mechanism  and  effect  of 
each  of  these  four  component  parts  of  the  system,  and  measure  how  well  that  mechanism 
and  its  apparent  effects  compare  to  the  seven  core  evaluation  criteria  described  above. 
Thus,  each  of  these  four  chapters  has  a  concluding  section  summarising  the  purpose, 
mechanism  and  effect  of  the  regulatory  machinery  being  considered,  and  continues  to 
have  seven  sections  analysing  and  summarising  how  well  it  fares  on  each  individual 
evaluation  criterion.  This  provides  a  measurement  of  the  success  or  otherwise  of  that 
particular  aspect  of  the  system  in  meeting  its  own  goals.  Each  of  these  chapters  also  has 
a  section  summarising  the  regulatory  tasks  which  the  mechanism  in  question  fulfils,  either 
in  whole  or  in  part  and  whether  by  design  or  inadvertence. 
In  order  to  assess  the  adequacy  or  otherwise  of  the  regulatory  system  as  a  whole, 
however,  a  slightly  different  approach  is  required.  The  overall  success  of  the  system 
involves  more  than  the  sum  total  of  the  successes  and  failures  of  the  component  parts  of 
the  system,  since  this  would  firstly  fail  to  identify  any  failures  in  coverage,  secondly  fail  to 
identify  any  unnecessary  duplication  of  effort  between  different  parts  of  the  system,  and 
thirdly  fail  to  highlight  any  conflicting  pressures  within  the  system.  The  consequence  of 43 
this  is  that  merely  looking  at  the  sum  of  the  parts  would  fail  to  answer  the  working 
hypothesis  spelled  out  in  Chapter  1. 
Accordingly,  Chapter  7  revisits  the  definition  of  regulation,  and  examines  in  turn  each  of 
the  regulatory  tasks  identified  above.  The  regulatory  tasks  are  cross-referenced  as  to  the 
effectiveness  of  those  parts  of  the  system  identified  as  having  a  role  in  that  regulatory 
task.  In  this  way,  a  comprehensive  picture  is  built  up  in  Chapter  7  as  to  how  well  each 
task  is being  performed  by  the  existing  system.  If  the  regulatory  tasks  identified  above  are 
sufficiently  comprehensive  in  their  scope  (and  it  is  submitted  that  they  are),  then  this 
cross-sectional  analysis  should  succeed  in  identifying  the  problematic  areas  where  there 
is  either  unnecessary  duplication  of  regulatory  tasks,  or  where  there  is  a  regulatory  gap. 
The  analysis  will  not,  it  is  conceded,  identify  conflicting  pressures;  nor  will  it  provide  any 
tools  for  policy-makers  as  to  how  improvements  could  be  made. 
The  second  half  of  the  concluding  analysis  therefore  revisits  the  core  evaluation  criteria 
and  measures  how  each  criterion  is  matched  by  the  system  overall,  and  revisits  what 
proposals  were  canvassed  in  earlier  chapters  which  would  enhance  each  particular 
criterion  (and  at  what  cost,  if  any,  to  the  other  evaluation  criteria).  Thus,  a  comprehensive 
picture  will  be  built  up  showing  which  criteria  the  current  system  scores  well  on,  which  it 
scores  badly  on,  and  how  any  particular  aspect  could  be  enhanced.  This,  ultimately,  is 
the  mechanism  which  is  used  to  answer  the  original  working  hypothesis.  This  thesis  sets 
out  to  analyse  the  adequacy  of  the  safeguards  incorporated  into  the  existing  regulatory 
system.  An  adequate  system  of  regulation  is  taken  to  be  one  which  does  two  things: 
firstly,  it  must  have  mechanisms  in  place  which  carry  out  all  the  regulatory  functions 
identified  in  this  chapter.  Secondly,  the  mechanisms  it  possesses  must  satisfy  all  the 
evaluation  criteria  in  the  course  of  carrying  out  their  regulatory  functions.  Chapter  7  draws 
together  the  two  main  strands  of  summary,  and  concludes  on  that  basis  as  to  whether  the 
question  asked  should  be  answered  in  the  positive  or  the  negative.  On  the  assumption 
that  not  everything  looked  at  will  prove  to  be  perfect,  the  thesis  will  finally  touch  on  some 
of  the  proposed  variations  which  would  have  the  most  marked  influence  in  terms  of 
enhancing  the  system's  performance  by  improving  its  assessment  relative  to  certain 
criteria  without  significant  adverse  impact  on  others. 44 
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Chapter  3:  Criminal  Law 
1:  Introduction: 
This  Chapter  represents  the  first  of  the  substantive  chapters  of  the  thesis  in  that  it  seeks 
to  analyse  a  specific  regulatory  mechanism  in  detail,  in  terms  of  the 
91  purpose/mechanism/  effect"  division,  and  against  the  seven  core  evaluation  criteria 
identified  in  Chapter  2.  The  mechanism  in  question  is  that  of  the  cdminal  law. 
This  Chapter  will  set  out  the  scope  of  the  criminal  law,  or  at  least  those  parts  of  it  which 
are  considered  as  a  regulatory  mechanism,  and  outline  briefly  the  main  rules  of  the 
criminal  law  which  affect  the  practice  of  medicine.  This  chapter  will  briefly  describe  how 
the  criminal  law  has  been  deployed  to  enforce  the  medical  monopoly  mentioned  in 
Chapter  2,  and  also  the  way  in  which  that  same  law  has  been  used  to  ring-fence  the 
scope  of  acceptable  medical  practice.  In  this  context,  the  use  of  the  criminal  law  as  a 
regulatory  tool  represents  the  most  extreme  step  which  a  modern  liberal  democracy  can 
take:  criminalisation  of  conduct  can  legitimately  be  regarded  as  representing  the 
application  of  "coercion  through  monopoly  of  the  means  of  violence"'  which  the  state, 
representing  the  sovereign  power,  enjoys  over  those  within  its  jurisdiction  2.  Finally,  and 
in  common  with  the  analyses  of  other  mechanisms  which  follow,  this  chapter  will 
consider  whether  the  current  mechanisms  regulating  British  medicine  are  an  adequate 
way  to  safeguard  the  rights  of  individuals  and  society  as  a  whole,  or  whether  these 
mechanisms  suffer  from  ineffectiveness  and  conflicting  objectives. 
Ultimately,  it  is  possible  to  regard  the  criminal  law  as  the  foundation  of  all  medical 
regulation.  Subsequent  chapters  will  describe  the  various  regulatory  systems  which 
impact  on  the  practice  of  medicine  in  the  UK,  but  it  is  the  criminal  law  which  ensures  that 
those  who  practice  medicine  are  registered  by  the  State,  and  it  is  on  this  registration  that 
much  of  what  follows  in  successive  chapters  ultimately  depends.  Professional  self- 
regulation,  for  instance,  can  only  have  any  meaningful  effect  if  those  to  be  regulated  are 
members  of  that  profession.  Similarly,  litigation  against  a  doctor  is  only  likely  to  be 
worthwhile  if  the  doctor  either  has  substantial  assets  of  his  own,  or  else  has  an 
institutional  employer  or  insurer  who  can  meet  the  claims  against  him.  The  unqualified 
practitioner  is  precluded  from  working  for  institutional  employers,  and  unlikely  to  have 
insurance,  save  by  deliberate  misrepresentation  of  his  status  (which  would,  in  any  case, 
have  the  effect  of  rendering  the  policy  ineffective  3)  ;  he  is  probably  also  more  likely  to 
actually  harm  his  patients;  and  accordingly  it  is  against  such  unqualified  persons  that 
criminal  sanctions  are  deployed. 48 
However,  it  is  also  quite  Possible  for  registered  medical  practitioners  to  fall  foul  of  the 
criminal  law  in  the  course  of  their  duties,  and  this  chapter  also  considers  this.  And  of 
course,  doctors  (like  everyone  else)  may  commit  crimes  entirely  outwith  the  scope  of 
their  professional  practice.  Such  convictions  may  well  attract  the  attention  of  the  GIVIC's 
disciplinary  machinery,  but  this  is  properly  looked  at  as  regulation  by  the  GIVIC  and  not  by 
the  criminal  law  per  se;  such  instances  are  discussed  in  Chapter  6.  Accordingly,  this 
chapter  makes  no  attempt  to  summarise  the  whole  body  of  the  criminal  laws  of  Scotland 
and  England  4  as  they  apply  to  the  general  public  as  well  as  to  doctors. 
ll:  The  scope  of  the  criminal  law: 
A:  Defining  criminal  law: 
In  discussing  the  criminal  law  as  applicable  to  medical  practice  and  the  regulation  of 
medicine,  it  is  probably  worth  noting  at  the  outset  that  this  is,  in  general,  the  specific 
application  of  a  body  of  rules  of  general  applicability  to  the  medical  sphere,  and  that 
there  is  no  specific  criminal  code  for  medical  matters.  The  dictum  of  Devlin  J  in  his 
address  to  the  jury  in  Rv  Adamsý  has  never  been  challenged  as  an  accurate  statement 
of  the  law  in  this  respect: 
"[There  is]  not  any  special  defence  for  medical  men;  A  is  not  because  doctors  are 
put  into  any  category  different  from  other  citizens  for  this  purpose.  The  law  is  the 
same  for  all...  " 
Having  thus  established  there  is  no  specific  body  a  criminal  law  to  consider,  however,  it 
is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  to  consider  exactly  what  the  criminal  law 
actually  is  that  we  are  discussing.  This  preliminary  point  is,  perhaps  surprisingly,  not  so 
easy  to  dispose  of  as  might  be  imagined:  criminal  law  is  not  a  concept  admitting  of  an 
easy  definition.  Thus,  as  Gordon  notes, 
"The  terms  'crime'  and  'criminal  law'  are  well  known  but  it  is  not  easy  to  give  a 
comprehensive  definition  of  them,  or  to  state  clearly  the  difference  between 
criminal  and  civil  law.  " 
Gordon's  own  definition  is  somewhat  circular,  stating  that  the  criminal  law  is 
"That  branch  of  the  law  which  deals  with  acts,  attempts  and  omissions  of  which 
the  state  may  take  cognisance  by  prosecution  in  the  criminal  courts.  , 49 
although  he  concedes  that  any  definition  of  criminal  law  as  the  subject  matter  of  criminal 
procedure  is  not  wholly  satisfactory,  but  inevitable  given  that  it  is  the  existence  of  an 
offence  within  the  criminal  law,  and  no  other  factor,  which  gives  any  act  the  property  of 
being  a  crime.  8  Glanville  Williams  too  concedes  the  apparent  circularity  of  his  definition 
that 
"A  crime  (or  offence)  is  a  legal  wrong  that  can  be  followed  by  criminal 
proceedings  which  may  result  in  punishment.  " 
but  gets  out  of  it  by  pointing  out  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  define  criminal  procedure 
without  ever  having  to  resort  to  any  definition  of  crime.  As  to  what  types  of  acts  will 
actually  (or  at  least  potentially)  result  in  criminal  proceedings,  both  writers  concede  that 
the  only  answer  to  this  is  to  study  substantive  criminal  law  to  see  what  actions  either  the 
legislature  or  the  courts  have  felt  sufficiently  strongly  about  to  actually  classify  as  a 
crime.  'O  The  question  of  why  lawmakers  decide  to  do  this  is  (at  least  on  a  superficial 
level)  somewhat  easier  to  answer,  and  for  the  present  purposes  may  actually  provide  a 
more  useful  answer  to  the  question  of  what  a  crime  actually  is: 
'The  criminal  law  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  question  whether  wrongdoers 
are  to  be  punished  (or  compulsorily  treated).  "" 
The  foregoing  analyses  attempt  to  explain  and  define  the  domestic  legal  classification  of 
a  particular  matter  as  being  criminal  in  nature,  rather  than  civil  or  administrative  (or, 
indeed,  as  conduct  requiring  no  legal  recognition  and  having  no  legal  consequences 
whatsoever).  A  broader  approach  to  the  question  can  be  taken  instead.  It  is  possible  to 
define  criminal  charges  not  by  reference  to  the  procedure  adopted,  but  instead  by  the 
impact  or  potential  impact  of  the  proceedings  on  the  person  against  whom  they  are 
directed.  This  is  the  approach  adopted  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in 
deciding  whether  the  safeguards  of  Article  6  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights  are  applicable  to  a  particular  set  of  proceedingS12  . 
Finally,  Alldridge  advocates  a 
refreshingly  simple  approach  to  the  question:  "A  command  backed  by  a  sanction  is  the 
dominant  model  for  the  imposition  of  duties  by  the  criminal  law.  03 
B:  The  mechanisms  of  criminal  procedure: 
We  have  considered  some  of  the  approaches  adopted  to  answering  what  criminal  law 
actually  is.  It  is  now  necessary  to  consider  what  the  mechanism  adopted  to  give  effect  to 
the  criminal  law  consists  of.  For  purposes  of  this  thesis,  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider 50 
more  than  the  barest  outline  of  criminal  procedure,  since  for  present  purposes  it  is  of 
more  significance  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  activities  deemed  to  be  criminal  or  not, 
rather  than  the  procedure  by  which  an  accused  person  is  determined  to  have  committed 
the  crime  in  question  or  not.  This  area  would  only  be  of  regulatory  significance  if  the 
procedural  rules  were  such  as  to  render  successful  prosecution  impossible  (or  nearly  so) 
in  practice,  since  the  protections  afforded  by  the  criminal  law  would  therefore  be 
rendered  illusory.  Accordingly,  topics  such  as  the  rules  of  evidence  for  criminal  trials, 
and  the  rules  of  court  surrounding  the  conduct  of  criminal  trials,  will  not  be  considered. 
For  someone  to  end  up  being  processed  by  the  criminal  law  and  its  mechanisms,  it  is 
first  necessary  for  the  crime  in  question  to  be  reported.  The  criminal  courts  in  the  UK  are 
all  adversarial  in  nature,  meaning  that  the  judiciary  play  no  part  in  the  investigation  of 
crime  (unlike  most  mainland  European  jurisdictions,  which  regularly  feature  investigating 
magistrates).  The  courts  are  therefore  dependent  on  external  agencies  to  recover 
evidence  of  the  crime,  and  on  external  agencies  (not,  in  general,  the  same  agencies  any 
more)  to  bring  that  evidence  before  the  court.  The  investigating  agency  for  most  crimes 
is  the  police.  While  the  police  in  Britain  are  institutionally  separate  from  the  court 
system,  it  is  convenient  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  to  regard  them  as  the  internal 
investigatory  system  of  the  criminal  law.  This  allows  police  investigation  to  be  regarded 
as  failing  within  the  scope  of  this  chapter,  in  a  way  which  is  conceptually  different  from 
how  other  regulatory  bodies  might  uncover  evidence  of  criminal  activity  in  the  course  of 
other  regulatory  investigations  or  monitoring. 
The  principle  mechanism  of  the  criminal  law  is  that  if  a  person  is  accused  of  committing  a 
criminal  offence  (the  subject  of  what  particular  acts  or  omissions  are  deemed  to  be 
criminal  is  considered  infra),  they  may  be  prosecuted.  Prosecution  in  Scotland  is  only  by 
the  Crown,  represented  by  the  Lord  Advocate  and  local  procurators-fiscal.  14  In  England 
and  Wales,  there  has  been  a  historical  trend  (accelerating  more  recently)  away  from 
individual  prosecution  to  a  model  more  closely  resembling  the  Scottish  situation.  Thus, 
while  at  the  beginning  of  the  1  91h  century  some  80%  of  prosecutions  were  brought  by 
victims  of  crime,  the  gradual  introduction  of  police  forces  resulted  (over  a  long  period)  in 
those  police  forces  taking  on  the  role  of  prosecutor  in  the  majority  of  cases.  15 
Nowadays,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  prosecutions  are  brought  by  the  state.  State 
prosecutions  are  handled  by  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service  (CPS),  substantially 
replacing  the  police.  Numerous  other  public  authorities  also  have  the  power  to 
prosecute  for  breach  of  the  law  which  the  body  in  question  is  charged  with  regulating. 
In  addition,  there  still  remains  the  established  tradition  of  private  prosecutions  by  private 51 
individuals,  although  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service  now  has  the  statutory  power  to  take 
over  any  private  prosecution". 
Assuming  that  prosecution  proceeds,  and  the  alleged  offender  is  not  instead  "diverted" 
from  prosecution  by  one  of  a  growing  number  of  non-court-based  disposals  of  conduct 
17 
which  is  capable  of  being  prosecuted  , 
then  ultimately  the  case  will  come  before  a 
criminal  court.  The  court  structures  are  different  in  Scotland  as  opposed  to  England  and 
Wales,  but  both  jurisdictions  have  a  defined  hierarchy  of  criminal  courts,  hearing 
increasingly  serious  allegations  and  enjoying  increasingly  extensive  powers  of 
sentencing  the  accused  in  the  event  of  a  guilty  verdict.  Lower  courts  typically  consist  of 
a  judge  only  (who  may  or  may  not  be  legally  qualified,  and  who  may  sit  as  part  of  a 
panel),  whereas  higher  courts  tend  to  have  a  legally-qualified  judge  advising  a  jury  of 
laypersons  who  are  responsible  for  determining  disputed  questions  of  fact,  and 
ultimately  for  passing  a  verdict  of  guilty  or  not  guifty".  Appeals  (principally  on  points  of 
law)  lie  to  appellate  courts,  and  a  conviction  can  be  overturned  if  new  evidence  emerges 
suggesting  that  a  miscarriage  of  justice  has  occurred.  Both  jurisdictions  have 
established  bodies  to  examine  allegations  of  such  miscarriages  of  justice,  and  if  satisfied 
that  one  may  have  occurred,  to  refer  the  matter  to  a  court  for  review.  The  rule  against 
"double  jeopardy"  means,  however,  that  the  converse  does  not  apply:  in  general,  once  a 
person  has  been  through  a  trial  for  an  alleged  offence  but  not  convicted  at  the  end  of  the 
trial,  they  cannot  be  tried  for  the  same  offence  again.  Retrials  are  a  possibility  if  a 
conviction  is  overturned,  and  may  result  in  a  fresh  conviction. 
The  accused  person  enjoys  the  presumption  of  innocence,  and  the  onus  of  proving  that 
an  offence  has  been  committed  lies  on  the  prosecution.  For  a  conviction  to  be  passed,  it 
is  necessary  for  the  prosecution  to  prove  the  case  "beyond  reasonable  doubt".  This  is  a 
higher  standard  than  is  necessary  for  civil  cases  of  the  type  discussed  in  Chapter  4, 
infra,  which  depend  (in  general)  on  a  finding  on  the  balance  of  probabilities. 
If,  at  the  end  of  the  trial,  the  accused  person  is  found  guilty  of  the  offence  in  question, 
they  are  then  sentenced'9.  Sentence  is  determined  by  the  judge,  not  the  jury  (if  there  is 
a  jury).  Commonly  a  "plea  in  mitigation"  will  be  submitted  by  the  accused  or  his/her 
lawyer,  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  the  court  to  impose  a  lesser  sentence.  Prosecutors 
rarely  make  an  equivalent  submission  to  the  court;  the  prosecutor  has  already  been  able 
to  influence  the  sentencing  options  through  the  choice  of  which  court  to  institute 
proceedings  in.  In  rare  circumstances,  the  prosecutor  may  disagree  with  statements 
made  in  mitigation  (which,  by  definition,  may  not  include  any  statement  inconsistent  with 
the  accused  having  committed  the  offence  in  question,  since  there  has  already  been  a 52 
guilty  verdict  or  plea).  In  such  cases,  a  proof  in  mitigation  may  then  take  place  before 
sentence  is  passed. 
Sentences  vary  in  severity  from  absolute  discharge  (which  does  not  even  count  as  a 
criminal  conviction)  or  admonition  up  to  a  sentence  of  life  imprisonment  (although  this 
does  not  actually  mean  that  the  person  convicted  is  supposed  to  spend  the  rest  of  their 
life  in  prison,  as  the  name  might  suggest).  Previously,  the  most  severe  sentence  was 
capital  punishment,  now  effectively  abolished  for  all  offenceS20.  Other  sentences  of 
yesteryear,  such  as  corporal  punishment  or  transportation  (itself  introduced  as  an 
alternative  to  capital  punishmene)  have  also  been  abolished  or  fallen  into  desuetude. 
In  between  life  imprisonment  and  absolute  discharge,  in  terms  of  severity,  are  sentences 
of  financial  penalty  (or  "fines")  which  tend  to  be  used  at  the  lower  end  of  the  spectrum. 
However,  very  large  fines  can  be  used  in  regulatory  areas  such  as  pollution  control  or 
health  and  safety  at  work  where  the  offenders  are  likely  to  be  corporate  bodies. 
Confiscation  orders,  designed  to  deprive  certain  offenders  (most  notably  drug  smugglers 
and  dealers)  of  the  proceeds  of  their  criminal  activity,  are  a  specialised  form  of  financial 
penalty.  For  individuals  (as  opposed  to  corporate  bodies),  imprisonment  usually  exists 
as  an  alternative  to  payment  of  the  fine.  There  are  custodial  sentences  of  less  than  life, 
which  can  include  being  released  on  licence  or  parole,  and  alternatives  to  custody  such 
as  probation  or  community  service.  A  range  of  treatment  orders  can  be  made  in  respect 
of  drug  addicts  and  persons  suffering  from  psychiatric  disorders.  Certain  offences  may 
result  in  the  person  convicted  being  entered  on  the  sex  offenders'  register,  which 
imposes  duties  to  notify  the  police  of  your  whereabouts  after  release  from  prison  (the  UK 
being  highly  unusual  in  not  requiring  its  inhabitants  to  tell  the  state  authorities  where  they 
live  at  any  given  time  22).  Other  offences  may  result  in  an  entry  being  made  in  the  child 
protection  register,  which  will  automatically  trigger  social  work/social  services  intervention 
in  the  family.  Finally,  in  relation  to  certain  regulatory  offences  committed  by  persons 
carrying  out  an  activity  under  some  form  of  registration  or  permit,  the  criminal 
proceedings  may  withdraw  or  restrict  the  licence  or  permit.  The  most  common  form  of 
this  is  seen  under  Road  Traffic  legislation,  where  conviction  for  motoring  offences  may 
also  result  in  the  licence  holder  being  disqualified  from  driving  for  a  period  of  time.  This 
approach  is  also  used  in  other  areas  such  as  being  a  company  director  or  the  holder  of  a 
landfill  site  operator's  licence  under  the  Waste  Management  Licensing  Regulations.  In 
such  areas,  the  criminal  courts  are  themselves  acting  as  a  direct  regulatory  body,  by 
restricting  the  ability  of  the  person  convicted  to  carry  out  the  regulated  activity.  For 
purposes  of  this  thesis,  however,  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  approach  has  not  been 
adopted  in  relation  to  medical  practice.  No  criminal  court  in  the  UK  has  power  to  strike 
someone  off  the  register  of  medical  practitioners. 53 
This  is  not  to  understate  the  importance  of  criminal  convictions.  As  noted  above, 
criminal  conviction  requires  a  far  stricter  standard  of  proof  than  civil  proceedings,  and  for 
that  reason  a  criminal  conviction  will  constitute  almost  irrefutable  evidence  in  any  other 
proceedings.  Thus,  it  is  almost  impossible,  following  conviction,  to  argue  in  other 
proceedings  that  you  did  not  do  the  thing  you  were  convicted  of.  This  can  make  the 
outcome  of  those  other  proceedings  extremely  predictable,  if  they  depend  principally  on 
findings  of  fact.  This  would  apply  to  matters  such  as  a  professional  misconduct  headng 
before  the  GIVIC,  or  a  civil  claim  for  damages  following  negligent  surgery.  What  the 
subsequent  regulatory  body,  civil  court  or  whatever  actually  does  with  these  facts  is, 
however,  another  matter  and  is  considered  in  later  chapters. 
The  foregoing  discussion  provides  the  briefest  of  outlines  of  what  the  system  of  criminal 
law  consists  of  and  what  it  does;  we  consider  next  why  it  does  so. 
III:  The  purpose  of  criminal  law: 
There  is  a  problem  in  identifying  a  "purpose"  to  criminal  law  which  is  intrinsically  linked  to 
the  difficulty  in  defining  the  nature  of  criminal  law  discussed  supra.  It  is  this:  in  essence, 
the  classical  approach  to  defining  criminal  law  utilised  by  British  commentators  (taking 
the  comments  by  Gordon  and  Glanville  Williams  supra  as  reasonably  typical  of  this 
school  of  thought)  is  to  define  criminal  law  by  reference  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  criminal 
courts.  This  means  that  something  is  a  crime  because  it  is  conduct  of  which  the  criminal 
courts  can  take  cognisance  and  pass  appropriate  sentences.  However,  it  says  nothing 
about  the  content  of  that  law,  and  to  revert  to  the  basic  principles  outlined  in  Chapter  2,  it 
is  only  by  reference  to  content  that  we  are  able  to  ascertain  purpose.  The  circularity  of 
this  approach  is  occasionally  acknowledged  by  commentators: 
"We  conceive  criminal  law  very  broadly  as  one  way  in  which  a  society  -  in  this 
case  that  of  England  and  Wales  -  both  defines  or  constructs,  and  responds  to, 
'deviance'.  Immediately  a  problem  arises.  If  we  understand  deviance  to  mean 
behaviour  which  departs  from  social  norms  recognised  by  criminal  law,  the  notion 
is  circular:  criminal  law  claims  to  respond  to  deviance,  yet  deviance  (for  the 
purposes  of  criminal  law)  can  only  be  defined  by  looking  to  criminal  law  itself. 
Evidently,  we  have  to  look  outside  criminal  law  to  get  any  grip  on  its  nature  and 
significance.  11  23 
The  traditional  academic  approach  to  the  study  of  criminal  law  has  been  described  as 
the  "doctrinal  approach",  and  its  key  tenets  have  been  described  as  follows- 54 
"Doctrinal  criminal  law  consists  of  a  set  of  ideas  about  responsibility  together  with 
a  conception  of  the  proper  scope  of  the  c6minal  law.  It  also  includes  a  method, 
differentiating  the  results  of  actual  or  posited  cases,  for  its  elaboration...  Cdminal 
law,  unlike  any  other  area  of  legal  discourse,  was  isolated  from  any  question 
about  what  happened  next...  [T]he  purpose  of  the  system  (in  terms  of  what  was 
to  be  achieved  by  the  infliction  of  punishment)  was  pretty  much  irrelevant.  n  24 
Clearly,  such  an  approach  has  little  to  commend  itself  to  this  aspect  of  this  thesis, 
although  the  analytical  tools  of  doctrinal  legal  analysis  are  utilised  in  other  aspects. 
A  slightly  different  approach  to  the  subject  is  taken  by  one  of  the  leading  authors  of 
textbooks  on  English  criminal  law,  Professor  Sir  John  Smith  (whose  textbook  structures 
fit  almost  exactly  the  model  for  doctrinal  criminal  law).  In  the  opening  passage  of  one  of 
the  standard  works  on  the  subject,  the  purpose  of  criminal  law  is  expressed  in  the 
following  terms: 
"The  criminal  law  is  no  more  an  end  in  itself  than  the  law  of  procedure  and 
evidence  through  which  it  is  enforced.  Our  criminal  law  has  grown  up  over  many 
centuries  and  the  purposes  of  those  who  have  framed  it,  and  of  those  who  have 
enforced  it,  have  undoubtedly  been  many  and  various.  Consequently,  it  is  not 
easy  to  state  confidently  what  are  the  aims  of  the  criminal  law  at  the  present  day. 
The  authors  of  a  completely  new  code  of  criminal  law  are,  however,  in  a  position 
to  state  their  objectives  at  the  outset.  'The  general  purposes  of  the  provisions 
governing  the  definition  of  offenses'  in  the  American  Law  Institute's  Model  Penal 
Code  might  be  taken  as  a  statement  of  the  proper  objectives  of  the  substantive 
law  of  crime  in  a  modem  legal  system.  The  purposes  are: 
'(a)to  forbid  and  prevent  conduct  that  unjustifiably  and  inexcusably  inflicts  or 
threatens  substantial  harm  to  individual  or  public  interests; 
(b)  to  subject  to  public  control  persons  whose  conduct  indicates  that  they  are 
disposed  to  commit  crimes; 
(c)  to  safeguard  conduct  that  is  without  fault  from  condemnation  as  criminal; 
(d)  to  give  fair  waming  of  the  nature  of  the  conduct  declared  to  be  an  offense; 
(e)  to  differentiate  on  reasonable  grounds  between  serious  and  minor 
offenses 
s  "25 
There  are  a  number  of  points  here  which  deserve  particular  note.  Firstly,  the  criminal 
law  in  isolation  is  simply  a  theoretical  intellectual  construction.  Without  enforcement  and 55 
application,  it  is  deprived  of  meaning  or  effect.  Criminalisation  of  particular  conduct  is 
manifestly  not  the  same  as  preventing  that  conduct  from  occurring26.  It  is  merely  stating 
that  if  someone  commits  the  prohibited  act  (or  whatever),  and  is  found  out  by  or  reported 
to  someone  capable  of  prosecuting  them  in  the  criminal  courts,  that  they  might  then 
actually  be  so  prosecuted.  If  found  guilty  they  might  then  face  some  sort  of  penal  or 
financial  sanction,  i.  e.  be  sentenced.  The  sanction  might  be  sufficiently  inconvenient  or 
unpleasant  to  discomfit  the  person  in  question  beyond  whatever  they  gained  from 
committing  the  prohibited  act.  This  account,  be  it  noted,  contains  a  large  number  of 
conditional  elements.  However,  they  are  conditional  in  any  crime,  and  not  particular  to 
medical  regulation. 
The  second  point  to  note  is  this:  it  is  obvious  from  the  passage  that  Professor  Smith 
clearly  considers  that  the  criminal  law  does  not,  in  fact,  possess  one  single  overarching 
purpose.  Instead,  it  seems  that  different  people  have  had  different  purposes  in  mind  at 
different  times.  Given  Smith's  distinction  between  those  who  frame  the  criminal  law  (i.  e. 
legislators  and  judges)  and  those  who  enforce  it  (i.  e.  the  police,  prosecution  services, 
assorted  regulatory  bodies,  judges  again)  it  would  seem  quite  conceivable  that  they 
actually  have  distinct  motives  within  the  same  time  frame.  This,  potentially,  could  result 
at  best  in  disjointed  incrementalism  in  the  development  and  application  of  the  criminal 
law.  At  worst  it  could  result  in  internal  contradictions  and  conflict  within  the  system. 
Even  within  this  short  and  concise  descdption  of  what  a  criminal  legal  system  shouid  do, 
there  are  also  some  intemal  stresses,  if  not  outdght  contradictions.  Purpose  (b)  is  stated 
to  be  that  of  subjecting  to  public  control  persons  whose  conduct  indicates  that  they  are 
disposed  to  commit  crimes.  Purpose  (c)  is  to  safeguard  conduct  that  is  without  fault  from 
condemnation  as  cdminal.  Yet  there  is  a  difficulty  if  we  consider  the  person  whose  track 
record  indicates  that  he  or  she  may  well  be  likely  to  commit  cdmes  -  or  perhaps,  at  some 
stage,  we  will  be  able  to  detect  a  genetic  predisposition  to  cdminal  activity.  To  what 
extent  are  preventive  measures  of  a  coercive  nature  to  be  allowed?  The  more  coercive 
the  measure  is  -  the  more  akin,  perhaps,  to  the  sort  of  measures  which  the  European 
Court  would  tend  to  classify  as  "criminal"  for  the  purposes  of  the  safeguards  of  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  -  then  the  more  acute  this  tension  becomes. 
These  criticisms  are,  ultimately,  quibbling  with  the  detail.  On  a  larger  scale,  one  might 
observe  that  none  of  the  avowed  purposes  given  involves  the  punishment  of 
wrongdoers.  This,  it  might  be  noted,  represents  an  application  of  the  theory  of 
regulatory  strategy  selection  described  in  Chapter  2  supra  as  it  applies  to  the  criminal 
sphere.  In  the  context  of  this  thesis  we  have  already  outlined  in  general  terms  some  of 56 
the  purposes  to  which  medical  regulation  is  directed,  so  what  Smith  describes  is,  for  our 
purposes,  effectively  a  sub-set  of  regulatory  purposes.  All  the  purposes  listed  in  the 
above  passage  at  least  theoretically  have  a  place  in  the  regulation  of  medical  practice. 
In  attempting  to  answer  the  question  of  what  criminal  law  is  actually  trying  to  do,  one 
might  look  to  certain  theories  of  jurisprudence.  Different  jurisprudential  schools  of 
thought  arrive  at  different  conclusions,  none  of  which  provides  a  completely  satisfactory 
explanation  (unsatisfactory  inasmuch  as  other  writers  active  in  the  same  field  construct 
and  defend  competing  and  often  conflicting  theories  of  their  own).  The  main  contenders 
in  this  debate  are  summarised  by  Lacey,  Wells  and  Meure  27 
,  who  conclude  that  none  of 
the  main  jurisprudential  theories  provides  a  wholly  satisfactory  account  of  the  purposes 
of  criminal  law.  In  particular,  none  is  capable  of  explaining  its  purposes  without 
reference  to  wider  historical  and  societal  pressures.  As  Alldridge  notes, 
"in  attempting  to  understand  criminal  law  not  as  a  timeless  set  of  examples  on 
which  to  work  out  the  implications  of  positions  in  moral  philosophy  but  as  a 
complex  set  of  social  phenomena,  comparative  and  historical  considerations  are 
enormously  significant.  "  28 
This,  unfortunately,  leaves  us  with  a  gap  when  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  criminal 
law  in  meeting  its  purpose,  when  that  purpose  is  so  poorly  defined.  There  is  also,  as 
was  noted  in  passing,  the  incredible  difficufty  in  displaying  empirically  what  effect 
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criminal  law  actually  has  in  reducing  the  incidence  of  the  conduct  which  is  criminalised  . 
We  are  therefore  forced  to  revisit  the  regulatory  tasks  outlined  in  Chapter  2  supra,  which 
can  be  summarised  as  setting  and  upholding  standards  of  medical  practice,  the 
facilitation  of  medical  practice  in  accordance  with  these  standards,  provision  of  systems 
for  redress,  investigation  and  the  airing  of  grievances,  the  punishment  of  those  who  fail 
to  adhere  to  the  standards,  and  the  regulation  of  the  regulatory  system  itself  to  ensure 
that  the  above  tasks  are  being  carried  out. 
The  discussion  of  the  purposes  of  criminal  law,  while  inconclusive  in  determining  a 
single,  overarching  purpose,  is  still  sufficient  to  allow  us  to  say,  with  some  confidence, 
which  of  the  regulatory  tasks  it  undertakes.  We  will  see  that  the  criminal  law's  purposes, 
in  this  context,  include  the  setting  of  the  very  minimum  standard  of  medical  practice 
necessary  to  avoid  the  treatment  being  criminally  negligent.  It  appears  that  the  law's 
functions  here  are  unlikely  to  include  upholding  these  minimum  standards,  save 
inadvertently  (inadvertently  because  the  doctor  must  previously  breach  a  different 
regulatory  mechanism's  standards  before  coming  to  the  attention  of  the  criminal  law.  ) 57 
The  role  of  criminal  law  in  this  situation  can  only  be  to  provide  leverage  to  a  different 
mechanism,  and  it  is  not  performing  a  separate  function  in  these  instances.  Since  other 
mechanisms  impose  higher  standards  of  care  than  the  criminal  law,  it  is  not  proposed  to 
analyse  the  criminal  law's  functions  in  setting  and  upholding  standards  of  care. 
Criminal  law  does  nothing  to  facilitate  medical  practice,  with  the  minor  exception  (minor 
in  theory,  very  real  to  those  affected)  of  applying  criminal  sanctions  against  individuals 
who  threaten  medical  staff  with  violence  or  commit  violent  offences  against  them.  This  is 
treated  as  part  of  the  general  legal/constitutional  background  for  purposes  of  this  thesis. 
The  only  redress  mechanism  within  the  criminal  law  is  the  possibility  of  a  criminal  court 
making  a  compensation  order  against  someone  convicted  of  a  crime.  However,  this  is 
very  much  a  peripheral  activity  for  the  criminal  justice  system,  and  cannot  be  regarded 
as  its  principal  function  given  the  existence  of  the  parallel  system  of  civil  courts  (largely 
staffed  by  the  same  personnel)  with  compensation  as  a  predominant  purpose; 
accordingly,  this  chapter  will  not  concentrate  on  the  effectiveness  of  criminal  law  as  a 
mechanism  for  providing  redress  for  victims  (although  this  was  historically  one  of  the 
original  functions  of  the  criminal  law  at  the  time  when  the  distinction  between  civil  and 
criminal  law  was  relatively  undeveloped). 
Does  criminal  law  exist  to  provide  a  grievance  channel  for  victims?  As  will  be  seen 
below,  there  is  a  growing  "victim's  rights"  movement  within  the  UK  and  beyond  arguing 
for  enhanced  status  for  victims  of  crime  within  the  system.  At  a  commonsense  level,  the 
person  who  makes  a  formal  complaint  to  the  police  about  something  can  reasonably  be 
regarded  as  having  a  grievance  against  the  alleged  perpetrator  which  they  want 
something  done  about  . 
For  this  reason,  criminal  law  will  be  assessed  for  its 
effectiveness  as  a  grievance  mechanism3o. 
Does  criminal  law  provide  an  investigatory  system  into  whether  standards  are  being 
adhered  to?  The  answer  here  would  appear  to  be  a  qualified  "yes".  As  was  noted 
above,  many  of  the  functions  of  the  criminal  law  can  only  be  achieved  by  reference  to 
the  system  of  penal  sanctions,  the  execution  of  which  is  by  bodies  technically  outwith  the 
formal  court  system  which  applies  the  law.  Similarly,  the  criminal  law  can  only  function 
by  reference  to  an  external  system  of  investigating  and  reporting  agencies  -  most 
notably,  though  not  exclusively,  the  police.  In  Chapter  2,  it  was  noted  that  these 
investigatory  mechanisms  lay  outwith  the  medical  sphere.  However,  the  necessary 
existence  of  these  reporting  agencies  as  adjuncts  to  the  mechanism  of  the  criminal  law 
means  that  they  can  reasonably  be  analysed  within  the  context  of  the  cdminal  law, 58 
although  they  will  necessarily  be  assigned  a  relatively  minor  role  given  this  externality.  A 
caveat  also  requires  to  be  entered  here.  The  effectiveness  of  bodies  designed  to 
investigate  and  report  breaches  of  the  criminal  law  can,  for  present  purposes,  only  really 
be  measured  by  their  success  or  otherwise  in  bringing  successful  prosecutions.  If  there 
is  an  allegation  of  criminality  then  in  general  all  other  regulatory  mechanisms  are  put  on 
hold  pending  the  outcome  of  the  criminal  investigation  and  any  ensuing  prosecution  and 
trial.  There  are  reasons  for  this,  principally  connected  to  the  sub  judice  rule  whereby  it 
may  be  a  punishable  contempt  of  court  to  publish  anything  suggesting  that  a  person 
accused  of  a  crime  is  guilty.  The  person  accused  will  also  (understandably)  be  unwilling 
to  cooperate  with  other  investigations  into  what  has  happened  if  such  cooperation  could 
result  in  the  discovery  of  evidence  which  might  be  unfavourable  come  the  trial. 
Criminal  law  manifestly  sets  out  to  punish  those  who  fail  to  meet  its  standards  even  if,  as 
we  have  seen,  its  reasons  for  doing  so  may  occasionally  be  unclear. 
Finally,  there  comes  regulation  of  the  regulatory  system.  Criminal  law  is  only  concerned 
with  other  regulatory  systems  if  there  is  criminal  conduct  within  those  other  parts  -  for 
instance,  pedury  before  a  GIVIC  hearing,  or  gross  dereliction  of  duty  by  a  public  officer. 
While  such  safeguards  may  help  ensure  the  efficacy  of  the  other  regulatory  tools,  it  is 
also  significant  that  criminal  law  involvement  would  only  ever  be  precipitated  by  a  breach 
of  the  rules  of  the  other  regulatory  mechanism.  Criminal  law  is  being  utilised  to 
underscore  the  effectiveness  of  other  regulatory  mechanisms,  not  providing  a  regulatory 
tool  in  its  own  right.  Its  sanctions  are  aimed  at  those  being  regulated  rather  than  the 
regulators,  so  the  functions  of  the  criminal  law  in  ensuring  compliance  with  other 
regulatory  mechanisms  will  not  be  considered  here.  However,  the  point  is  far  from 
academic  in  application,  and  the  question  of  whether  or  not  a  regulatory  mechanism  has 
criminal  sanctions  behind  it  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  impact  on  its  effectiveness, 
or  at  least  its  perceived  legitimacy  or  seriousness.  It  can  also  impact  on  the  choice  of 
regulatory  strategy3l. 
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  consider  those  forms  of  conduct  which  may  attract 
criminal  proceedings.  The  general  criminal  law  is  considered  before  the  specific  rules  on 
medical  procedures. 59 
IV:  Criminal  law  as  applied  to  doctors:, 
A:  Assault  and  related  offences: 
1:  Introduction, 
It  might  be  thought  odd  by  some  to  consider  the  law  of  assault  as  being  of  particular 
relevance  to  the  medical  profession,  which,  by  and  large,  is  composed  of  upstanding  and 
respected  members  of  society,  and  not  of  habitual  crimina  IS32 
. 
But  medical  practice  is 
almost  invariably  an  invasive  procedure  (with  the  possible  exception  of  psychiatric 
treatment33).  In  this  context,  one  immediately  thinks  of  surgery  as  the  most  clearly 
invasive;  but  any  touching  of  another  person  may  potentially  be  an  assault,  and  even  an 
unwanted  kiss  could  found  proceedingS34  . 
The  substantive  laws  of  Scotland  and 
England  diverge  widely  on  the  exact  elements  of  assault;  and  while  it  is  possible  to 
define  the  law  of  Scotland  in  the  sentence  "any  attack  upon  the  person  of  another  is  an 
assa  Ultvv35  (subject  to  the  caveat  of  then  having  to  define  "attack",  and  going  on  to  explain 
the  myriad  aggravations,  mitigations  and  defences  Scots  law  recognises),  any  discussion 
of  the  English  law  inevitably  gets  bogged  down  in  a  discussion  regarding  the  distinction 
between  assault  and  battery,  and  the  overlap  with  and  distinction  from  a  number  of  other 
offences  such  as  affray  or  under  the  (not  always  logical)  provisions  of  the  Offences 
Against  the  Person  Act  1861,  and  in  particular  Sections  20  or  47  36 
. 
Consequently  it  is  not  intended  to  give  an  exhaustive  treatise  on  the  laws  of  Scotland 
and  England  which  regulate  the  issue  of  violence  and  threats  between  individuals. 
Instead,  this  section  will  concentrate  on  those  principles,  common  to  both  systems,  by 
which  the  general  rules  are  ameliorated  in  the  case  of  medical  treatment.  The  word 
"assault"  is  used  throughout  to  indicate  a  crime  occasioned  by  actual  or  anticipated 
physical  contact  between  people;  it  is  not  used  in  any  technical  sense,  and  most  of  what 
this  section  refers  to  as  an  "assault"  would  in  reality  constitute  a  battery  in  English  law  37  ; 
the  Scottish  term  "assault"  covers  situations  which  would  be  battery  in  England,  as  well 
as  assault  itself  and  various  statutory  offences. 
The  purpose  of  these  offences  was  usefully  summarised  by  Robert  Goff  LJ: 
"The  fundamental  principle,  plain  and  incontestable,  is  that  every  person's  body  is 
inviolate.  It  has  long  been  established  that  any  touching  of  another  person, 
however  slight,  may  amount  to  a  battery.  So  Holt  CJ  held  in  1704  that  "the  least 
touching  of  another  in  anger  is  a  battery"...  The  breadth  of  the  principle  reflects 60 
the  fundamental  nature  of  the  interest  so  protected;  as  Blackstone  wrote  in  his 
Commentaries,  'the  law  cannot  draw  the  line  between  different  degrees  of 
violence,  and  therefore  totally  prohibits  the  first  and  lowest  stage  of  it;  every 
man's  person  being  sacred,  and  no  other  having  a  right  to  meddle  with  it,  in  any 
the  slightest  manner.  "  The  effect  is  that  everybody  is  protected  not  only  against 
physical  injury  but  against  any  form  of  physical  molestation.  vo  38 
It  is  now  clear  that  legitimate  medical  treatment  does  not  constitute  criminal  assault  or 
any  of  the  related  offences,  but  the  exact  way  in  which  the  law  justified  such  intervention 
has  been  the  subject  of  some  debate  39 
. 
Partly  this  is  because  doctors  are  not  generally 
prosecuted  for  treating  patients,  so  the  rule  or  principle  whereby  they  were  not 
committing  the  crime  of  assault  had  to  be  drawn  by  analogy  or  inference  from  statements 
made  in  other  contexts,  i.  e.  either  from  assault  charges  based  on  non-medical  grounds, 
or  from  civil  judgements. 
2:  Basic  elements  of  criminality:  Actus  reus  and  mens  rea: 
To  start  with  basics,  all  crimes  must  involve  elements  of  mens  rea  and  actus  reus4o:  as  it 
is  usually  put,  actus  non  facit  reum  nisi  mens  sit  rea  4'.  Those  seeking  to  justify  the 
legality  of  medical  treatment  must  therefore  negate  the  presence  of  one  or  both  of  these 
elements,  or  else  advocate  a  specific  exception  to  the  general  rule  in  the  nature  of  a 
defence  to  the  charge  or  a  departure  from  the  generality.  Of  course,  the  three  elements 
(actus  reus,  mens  rea,  lack  of  stateable  defence)  are  interrelated;  and  since  each  can 
provide  a  potential  way  out  of  criminalising  medicine,  a  few  points  will  be  made  on  this. 
Thus,  Williams  notes  that 
of  when  a  crime  requires  mens  rea,  an  actus  cannot  be  legally  reus  (in  the  sense 
of  involving  criminal  responsibility)  unless  there  is  mens  rea.  Therefore  it  may 
appear  self-contradictory  to  say  'There  is  an  actus  reus  but  no  mens  rea  i to  42 
but  ultimately  adopts  the  same  solution  to  that  reached  by  Gordon: 
"...  it  is  possible  and  convenient  to  treat  the  lack  of  mens  rea  as  different  from  any 
other  'defeasing'  factor.  The  term  'actus  reus'  can  then  be  used  for  situations 
which  would  be  criminal  were  they  accompanied  by  mens  rea;  a  term  is 
necessary  for  all  the  objective  or  external  ingredients  of  a  crime,  and  'actus  reus' 
is  the  obvious  one  to  use.  it  43 61 
Similarly,  the  exact  classification  of  recognised  defences  to  criminal  charges  is  also  hard 
to  pin  down  analytically: 
"Actus  reus  includes,  in  the  terminology  here  suggested,  not  merely  the  whole 
objective  situation  that  has  to  be  proved  by  the  prosecution,  but  also  the  absence 
of  any  ground  of  justification  or  excuse...  (though  not  including  matters  of  excuse 
depending  on  absence  of  mens  fea  ).  "  44 
The  point  being  that  actus  reus,  being  a  criminal 
aC145,  cannot  logically  occur  except  in 
the  presence  of  mens  r-ea  and  the  absence  of  a  defence.  Such  an  analysis  may  be 
logically  impeccable,  but  does  create  semantic  difficulties: 
"There  is  however  something  to  be  said  for  having  terms  to  describe  the  particular 
elements  of  a  crime  without  thereby  invoking  all  the  possible  defences.  If  the 
Latin  expressions  are  regarded  merely  as  technical  terms  which  do  not  in 
themselves  necessarily  import  guilt,  the  difficulty  of  so  using  them  disappears. 
Professor  Lanham  has  said, 
'As  a  matter  of  analysis  we  can  think  of  a  crime  as  being  made  up  of  three 
ingredients,  actus  reus,  mens  rea  and  (a  negative  element)  absence  of  a 
valid  defence.  ' 
According  to  that  view  a  person  may  commit  an  actus  reus  with  mens  rea  but  not 
be  guilty  of  the  crime  in  question  because  of  the  existence  of  a  defence.  ,  46 
Notwithstanding  the  adoption  of  this  approach,  the  particular  offences  relating  to  assault 
present  certain  analytical  difficulties.  For  instance,  judicial  utterings  defining  the  various 
offences  seldom  draw  such  distinctions  (which  are  legally  irrelevant  so  long  as  all  the 
elements  are  present). 
However,  if  we  approach  the  concept  of  actus  reus  as  a  discreet  element,  standing  alone 
from  the  presence  or  absence  of  mens  rea,  it  becomes  relatively  easy  to  define  the  actus 
reus  of  assault  charges,  at  least  for  the  present  purposes.  It  is  the  touching  of  another 
person,  or,  here,  the  touching  of  a  patient  by  a  doctor.  (Questions  of  evil  intent  or  of 
things  being  done  "in  anger"  will  be  discussed  as  forming  part  of  the  mens  rea  of  the 
charge.  )  Clearly,  in  virtually  all  medical  examinations  and  treatment,  we  have  the  first  leg 
of  a  criminal  charge:  the  doctor  has  "touched"  the  patient,  which  satisfies  the  actus  reus 
for  assault.  However,  it  would  also  equally  be  possible  to  define  "touching"  as  meaning 
"any  touching  outwith  a  medical  context";  if  we  do  this,  then  even  actus  reus  would  be 
absent.  In  the  event,  the  courts  were  felt  for  some  time  to  have  applied  a  very  broad 62 
limitation  to  the  concept  of  actus  reus  (in  this  case,  for  battery)  in  a  way  which  actually 
included  medical  treatment  within  the  exception;  the  passage  in  question  also  moves 
between  a  number  of  the  categories,  and  neatly  displays  some  of  the  analytical 
difficulties: 
11 
...  nobody  can  complain  of  the  jostling  which  is  inevitable  from  his  presence  in,  for 
example,  a  supermarket,  an  underground  station  or  a  busy  street;  nor  can  a 
person  who  attends  a  party  complain  if  his  hand  is  seized  in  fdendship,  or  even  if 
his  back  is  (within  reason)  slapped...  Although  such  cases  are  regarded  as  cases 
of  implied  consent,  it  is  more  common  nowadays  to  treat  them  as  falling  within  a 
general  exception  embracing  all  physical  contact  which  is  generally  acceptable  in 
the  ordinary  conduct  of  daily  life.  vi  47 
Medical  treatment,  so  the  argument  ran,  amounted  to  such  "physical  contact  which  is 
generally  acceptable  in  the  ordinary  conduct  of  daily  life",  and  consequently  did  not 
constitute  the  actus  reus  for  battery.  This  was  the  conclusion  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in 
Wilson  v  Pringle  48  which,  it  might  be  thought,  was  doing  violence  to  the  whole  concept  of 
"touching"  for  the  sake  of  judicial  pragmatism.  As  it  turned  out,  Lord  Goff  got  a  chance  to 
overrule  this  interpretation  of  his  remarks,  holding  that 
"Medical  treatment,  even  treatment  for  minor  ailments,  does  not  fall  within  that 
category  of  events  [i.  e.  contact  in  the  ordinary  conduct  of  daily  life]"4" 
So  the  limitation  of  the  scope  of  actus  reus  given  in  Wilson  v  Pringle  does  not  provide  the 
explanation  as  to  why  medical  treatment  does  not  amount  to  the  crime  of  assault. 
In  any  event,  it  might  be  thought  that  mens  rea,  or  at  least  the  absence  of  it  on  the  part 
of  a  doctor,  would  provide  a  much  more  promising  line  of  reasoning.  If  the  touching 
need  be  "in  anger'l  or  "hostile,  "  then  a  doctor  need  have  nothing  to  fear.  The  leading 
case  in  Scotland  held  that  the  essence  of  assault  was  "touching"  with  evil  intention  to 
injure  50  ;  and  one  would  seriously  doubt  if  any  reputable  doctor  acting  in  the  proper 
exercise  of  providing  medical  care  could  ever  be  convicted  on  such  a  basiS.  5'  As  far  as 
English  law  is  concerned,  there  has  been  a  move  away  from  the  requirement  to  prove  or 
display  hostility.  Thus,  in  Collins  v  Wilcock 
'We  observe  that,  although  in  the  past  it  has  sometimes  been  stated  that  a 
battery  is  only  committed  where  the  action  is  'angry,  or  revengeful,  or  rude,  or 
insolent'  (see  Hawk  PC  c62  s2),  we  think  that  nowadays  it  is  more  realistic,  and 63 
indeed  more  accurate,  to  state  the  broad  underlying  principle"  [that  every 
person's  body  is  inviolate]  "subject  to  the  broad  exception"  [that  contacts  as  a 
result  of  ordinary  daily  life  are  not  criminal].  52 
Hostile  intent  was  considered  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  who  stated  that  the  WPC  in  Collins 
touched  the  woman  deliberately,  but  without  an  intention  to  do  more  than 
restrain  her  temporarily.  Nevertheless,  she  [the  police  officer]  was  acting 
unlawfully  and  in  that  way  she  was  acting  with  hostility.  v,  53 
This  appears  to  create  the  somewhat  circular  argument  that  hostility  is  a  necessary 
ingredient  to  battery,  but  that  this  requirement  is  satisfied  by  the  unlawfulness  of  the  act. 
So  if  you  act  prima  facie  unlawfully  by  committing  the  actus  reus  of  battery,  then  the 
mens  rea,  or  at  least  that  part  of  it  requiring  hostility,  will  be  inferred  or  implied  by  the 
very  unlawfulness  of  the  act  in  question.  This  could  be  seen  as  moving  towards  a  form 
of  strict  liability,  which  the  courts  probably  did  not  intend  to  do.  The  decision  is  also 
somewhat  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  statement  of  Lord  Lane  CJ  that 
"'The  mental  element  necessary  to  constitute  guilt  [of  assault]  is  the  intent  to  apply 
unlawful  force  to  the  victim.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  mental  element  can  be 
substantiated  by  simply  showing  an  intent  to  apply  force  and  no  more.  "  -54 
which  view  was  approved  by  the  Privy 
CounCi155 
. 
But  the  Court  of  Appeal's  views  in 
Wilson  v  Pringle  were  approved  by  the  House  of  Lords.  Lord  Jauncey  of  Tullichettle 
stated  that 
"if  the  appellant's  activities  in  relation  to  the  receivers  were  unlawful  they  were 
also  hostile  and  a  necessary  ingredient  of  assault  was  present.  it  56 
In  most  circumstances,  the  House  of  Lords'  view  (being  that  of  the  superior  court)  has  to 
be  preferred  57 
. 
So  it  seems  that  in  determining  the  mens  rea  of  assault,  it  is  necessary  to 
look  beyond  both  the  intention  to  inflict  the  force,  and  the  lack  of  hostile  motivation 
behind  this  intention.  And  since  neither  mens  rea  nor  actus  reus  provide  an  adequate 
answer  in  themselves  as  to  the  lawfulness  of  a  course  of  action,  it  is  necessary  to  look  at 
the  third  limb,  i.  e.  either  some  general  exception  to  the  rules  concerning  criminality,  or 
else  a  specific  pleadable  defence. 64 
3:  Basic  elements  of  criminali!  y:  consent  and  other  defences: 
In  the  first  case,  it  is  common  in  most  medical  practice  for  the  doctor  to  seek  the  consent 
of  the  patient  prior  to  treating  him  or  her*58.  Is  this  consent  a  valid  defence  to  criminal 
charges  being  laid  against  the  doctor? 
To  answer  this,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  extent  to  which  the  law  accepts  the 
consent  of  a  victim  as  a  defence  to  the  charge  of  assault  or  battery.  In  Scotland,  the 
situation  has  never  been  satisfactorily  resolved,  even  in  the  general  situation.  59  The 
Scottish  courts  have  rejected  the  distinction  which  English  law  effectively  imposes 
between  what  may  and  may  not  validly  be  consented-to:  in  Scotland,  any  intention  to  do 
bodily  harm  vitiates  consent"O,  whereas,  as  will  be  seen  below,  English  law  distinguishes 
between  the  degree  of  harm  intended  or  probable".  The  Court  of  Appeal's  refinement  of 
these  principles,  subsequently  approved  by  the  House  of  LordS62 
,  appears  to  move 
closer  to  the  Scottish  position: 
"...  It  is  not  in  the  public  interest  that  people  should  try  to  cause,  or  should  cause, 
each  other  bodily  harm  for  no  good  reason.  Minor  struggles  are  another  matter... 
[I]t  is  an  assault  if  actual  bodily  harm  is  intended  and/or  caused.  This  means  that 
most  fights  will  be  unlawful  regardless  of  consent.  ot  63 
Many  of  the  cases  involving  consensual  wounding  related  to  sadomasochistic  practices. 
In  general,  these  were  homosexual  activities,  provoking  a  comment  by  Alldridge  that 
"  moral  evaluations  of  the  behaviour  in  question"  have  been  a  factor  in  the  law's 
development".  This  led  to  the  criminalisation  of  consensual  wounding,  affirmed  by  the 
House  of  Lords  in  Rv  Brown65  being  challenged  (unsuccessfully)  before  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights". 
The  ultimate  rationale  behind  the  final  conclusion  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Rv  Brown 
supra,  whereby  medical  treatment  was  singled  out  for  particular  mention,  seems  to  be 
that  as  medical  procedures  are  not  intended  to  harm,  the  general  rule  (consent  is  no 
defence  to  assault)  is disapplied.  In  that  case,  the  Court  held  that: 
"Nothing  which  we  have  said  is  intended  to  cast  doubt  upon  the  accepted  legality 
of...  reasonable  surgical  interference...  These  apparent  exceptions  can  be 
justified  as  ...  needed  in  the  public  interest.  1#67 65 
Thus,  the  law  seems  to  be  that  medical  treatment  fulfils  all  the  criteria  for  the  crime  of 
assault;  but  rather  than  try  to  twist  the  definitions  of  those  elements  of  the  crime  in  such 
a  way  as  to  exclude  medical  treatment  (which  would  inevitably  involve  doing  some 
violence  to  those  general  principles),  the  judges  have  instead  adopted  a  pragmatic 
approach  of  saying,  in  effect,  "medicine  is  not  a  crime  however  much  it  might  look  like 
one  on  the  criteria  we  have  established.  "  Indeed,  Gordon  explicitly  accepts  that  this  is 
68 
the  case 
It  is  still  necessary  to  look  at  all  the  elements  of  the  crime  in  deciding  the  lawfulness  of  a 
course  of  treatment,  since  it  is  clear  from  the  above  discussion  that  a  doctor  would  still 
commit  an  offence  if  he  operated  without  consent  (where  consent  can  be  given),  or  if  he 
acted  maliciously  or  went  beyond  the  bounds  of  "reasonable  surgical  interference  , 69 
- 
The  courts  have  held  that  the  justification  for  medical  treatment  is  that  of  necessity,  not 
consent,  the  treatment  being  in  the  best  interests  of  the  individual  and  also  in  the  public 
70  interest 
. 
But  the  defence  of  necessity  is  limited  in  its  scope".  If  medical  treatment  is  justified  by 
necessity  rather  than  consent  of  the  patient,  does  this  mean  that  it  is  lawful  in  the 
absence  of  consent?  There  are  two  situations  to  consider  here.  The  first  is  where  the 
patient  is  unable  to  consent  -  whether  through  unconsciousness,  youth,  or  mental 
incapacity.  In  a  case  relating  to  mental  incapacity,  the  House  of  Lords  held  that 
treatment  in  such  cases  is  lawful  if  in  the  best  interests  of  the  patient,  it  then  being 
covered  by  the  defence  of  necessity72.  Such  a  conclusion  is  easy  to  defend  on 
humanitarian  grounds;  as  Lord  Brandon  said  in  that  case, 
"The  common  law  would  be  seriously  defective  if  it  failed  to  provide  a  solution 
created  by  the  problem  created  by  such  inability  to  consent...  In  my  opinion,  the 
solution  to  the  problem  which  the  common  law  provides  is  that  a  doctor  can 
lawfully  operate  on,  or  give  other  treatment  to,  adult  patients  who  are  incapable, 
for  one  reason  or  another,  of  consenting  to  his  doing  so,  provided  that  the 
operation  or  other  treatment  is  in  the  best  interests  of  such  patients.  "  73 
A  more  problematic  case  arises  when  the  patient  is  competent  to  give  consent,  but  fails 
or  refuses  to  do  so.  In  certain  circumstances  (such  as  rolling  up  your  sleeve  and  holding 
your  arm  out  towards  a  syringe-wielding  doctor)  consent  will  be  implied  or  inferred  from 
the  patient's  actions;  in  such  a  case,  there  is  effectively  a  real  consent,  albeit 
unspoken  74 
. 
However,  such  a  situation  has  to  be  regarded  as  somewhat  exceptional, 
and  the  law  in  general  is  slow  to  accept  the  notion  of  implied  or  inferred  consent.  A 66 
different  question  arises  when  the  patient  refuses  to  consent,  or  fails  to  give  consent  in 
circumstances  where  consent  cannot  be  inferred.  Is  the  defence  of  necessity  sufficient, 
on  paternalistic  grounds,  to  justify  medical  intervention  which  a  competent  adult  patient 
refuses  to  consent  to?  The  Court  of  Appeal  said  that,  in  general,  it  was  not: 
"An  adult  patient  who...  suffers  from  no  incapacity  has  an  absolute  right  to  choose 
whether  to  consent  to  medical  treatment,  to  refuse  it,  or  to  choose  one  rather  than 
another  of  the  treatments  being  offered...  The  fact  that...  no  medical  treatment  of 
an  adult  patient  of  full  capacity  can  be  undertaken  without  his  consent,  creates  a 
situation  in  which  the  absence  of  consent  has  much  the  same  effect  as  a 
refusal.  v75 
This  principle  was  recently  reaffirmed  by  the  Dame  Butler-Sloss  P  in  the  highly  publicised 
case  of  Bv  An  NHS  Hospital  TruSt76 
. 
From  all  this,  it  seems  that  the  criminal  law 
safeguards  the  doctor  who  gets  the  consent  of  his  patient.  But  does  the  criminal  law 
similarly  protect  the  patient  whose  refusal  to  consent  will  harm  someone  else?  In  spite  of 
the  language  of  Re  T  which  spoke  of  unequivocal  rights,  Butler-Sloss  U  (as  she  then 
was),  referring  to  a  Canadian  case,  agreed  with  the  principles  set  out  therein  which 
"excluded  from  consideration  the  interest  of  the  state  in  protecting  innocent  third 
parties...  w,  77 
Seizing  on  this  loophole,  and  on  similar  restrictions  noted  in  Re  T  by  Lord  Donaldson 
MR,  the  former  President  of  the  Family  Division,  Sir  Stephen  Brown,  authorised  a 
hospital  to  carry  out  an  emergency  Caesarean  section  on  a  non-consenting  pregnant 
woman  which  was  necessary  to  save  her  life,  and  that  of  her  unborn  child  M.  This  was  an 
emergency  application  in  which  time  constraints  left  neither  the  court,  nor  Counsel 
arguing  the  case,  much  time  to  canvass  the  authorities  on  maternal-foetal  conflict  of 
intereSt79.  It  is  not  intended  to  enter  that  debate  here,  since  only  the  final  outcome  (that 
doctors  could  legitimately  treat  such  a  patient)  is  of  importance  in  regulating  medical 
practice;  but  it  certainly  leaves  a  gaping  hole  in  the  laws  of  assault  which  are  intended  to 
secure  freedom  from  unwanted  bodily  interference.  As  was  said  of  the  decision, 
"It  has  massive  implications  for  the  status  of  women  in  regarding  them  as  chattels 
and  ambulatory  wombs.  It  is  so  potentially  intrusive  as  to  reduce  women  back  to 
the  status  of  slaves.  it  80 
This  subject  is  revisited  in  Chapter  4  infra. 67 
4:  Sex-cha 
-qe 
werations  and  cosmetic  surqe 
In  some  respects,  these  are  subject  to  the  same  legal  difficulties  as  beset  live  organ 
transplants,  only  without  the  benefit  of  such  clear-cut  societal  approbation  to  justify  their 
legitimacy.  However,  the  case  of  Corbett  v  Corbetel  appears  to  accept  the  legitimacy  of 
sex-change  operations,  and  they  are  now  available  on  the  NHS.  Similarly,  the  practice 
of  cosmetic  surgery  is  now  so  well-established  that  it  seems  highly  unlikely  that  a  judge 
would  declare  A  to  be  criminal  now,  particularly  since  it  confers  a  benefit  on  the  patient, 
albeit  a  social  and  not  strictly  medical  one  82 
. 
The  Law  Commission  was  certainly  of  the 
view  that  such  operations  were  lega,  83 
. 
This  view  was  reached  notwithstanding  the  case 
of  Bravery  v  Braver3ý  4  where  Lord  Denning  expressed  the  view  that  such  operations 
were  illegal  in  spite  of  the  man's  consent;  this  decision  has  never  been  overruled, 
although  clearly  it  is  no  longer  good  law.  Family  planning  (including  sterilisation)  has 
been  available  on  the  NHS  since  1967"5.  The  only  major  restriction  is  that  the  courts 
would  probably  baulk  at  the  prospect  of  a  deliberate  (consensual)  mutilation",  and 
Parliament  has  specifically  outlawed  one  form  of  thiS87. 
B:  The  law  of  homicide: 
Homicide  is  relevant  here  in  a  very  specific  way.  It  is  intended  to  discuss  the  laws  of 
homicide  only  insofar  as  they  affect  medical  practice  in  the  following  ways:  the  liability  of 
doctors  for  the  death  of  patients  in  the  normal  course  of  treatment,  the  role  of  doctors  as 
regards  the  selective  non-treatment  of  neonates,  and  the  situation  where  "life-support" 
machines  may  be  turned  off,  or where  terminally-ill  patients  are  allowed  to  die  or  assisted 
in  dying. 
1:  The  basic  law  of  homicide: 
As  with  assault,  or  perhaps  even  more  so,  there  is  a  huge  divergence  between  Scots 
and  English  law  on  the  subject  of  homicide.  For  instance,  Scots  law  is  still  found  in  the 
common  law  principles  of  Institutional  writers  and  decided  cases,  whereas  English  law 
has  seen  considerable  statutory  development;  the  former  rule  of  English  law  that  death 
must  follow  within  a  year  and  a  day  of  the  injury  being  inflicted  on  the  ViCtiM88  is  unknown 
in  Scots  law.  However,  some  general  principles  are  common  to  both  systems,  and  this 
section  will  focus  on  these  general  principles  rather  than  the  more  technical  discussions 
of  causation,  foreseeability  etc.  which  can  bedevil  discussions  of  this  topic. 
Homicide  is  the  killing  of  another  human  being,  and  is  not  necessarily  a  crime8g.  Criminal 68 
homicide  is  split  into  two  categories:  murder  is  the  more  serious,  the  lesser  type  being 
called  culpable  homicide  or  manslaughter".  The  distinction  was  formerly  important 
because  while  murder  was  a  capital  offence,  manslaughter  and  culpable  homicide  were 
not.  Since  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty9l,  the  distinction  is  perhaps  of  less 
importance,  although  murder  still  carries  a  mandatory  sentence  of  life  imprisonment, 
whereas  the  sentence  for  the  other  charges  is  a  matter  for  judicial  discretion,  from 
absolute  discharge  to  life  imprisonment. 
Murder,  at  its  most  basic,  has  been  defined  as 
11 
...  when  a  man...  unlawfully  killeth...  any  reasonable  creature  in  rerum  natura 
under  the  king's  peace,  with  malice  foresought,  either  expressed  by  the  party  or 
implied  by  law,  so  as  the  party  wounded,  or  hurt  etc.  die  of  the  wound,  or  hurt, 
etc.  within  a  year  and  a  day  after  the  same.  "9' 
This,  of  course,  is  an  English  definition,  and  many  of  its  elements  are  inapplicable  in 
Scotland,  where  the  crime  is  perfected  by  committing  an  act  which  kills  and  was  meant  to 
M193 
,  although  in  both  countries  it  is  accepted  that  a  certain  degree  of  recklessness  as  to 
the  probable  consequences  of  an  act  is  sufficient  mens  rea  for  murder  94 
. 
Culpable  homicide  and  manslaughter  are  both  complex,  multi-faceted  offences  in 
application.  The  crimes  consists  of  the  same  actus  reus  as  for  murder  (i.  e.  killing  another 
human  being).  The  distinction  lies  in  the  fact  that  for  culpable  homicide  or  manslaughter, 
there  is  either  the  absence  of  one  of  the  necessary  elements  of  murder,  or  the  presence 
of  some  mitigating  factor  or  excuse.  The  main  differences  between  the  crimes  in  the  two 
countdes  stems  from  the  differing  requirements  of  mens  rea  for  murder;  much  of  what  is 
technically  murder  in  Scots  law  constitutes  manslaughter  in  England  because  of  lack  of 
evidence  as  to  specific  intent  or  malice  aforethought.  The  practical  differences  are 
smaller  than  might  be  imagined  due  to  Crown  Office  practice  95  whereby  a  number  of 
offences  are  charged  as  culpable  homicide  notwithstanding  the  letter  of  the  law;  these 
include  a  number  of  situations  covered  by  statute  in  England  such  as  infanticide  96  or 
suicide  paCtS97.  Conversely,  the  Homicide  Act  1957  introduced  a  number  of  mitigating 
factors  which  serve  to  reduce  murder  to  manslaughter  in  circumstances  which  Scots  law 
had  long  recognised  at  common  law,  particularly  diminished  responsibility  98  and 
provocation99.  However,  the  defence  of  voluntary  intoxication,  which  has  been  the 
subject  of  English  judicial  expansion  (or  "merciful  relaxation")  in  the  last  century  or  twoloo 
has  faced  a  major  judicial  restriction  in  Scotland  in  recent  years'01.  There  are  in  addition 
a  number  of  statutory  offences  involving  homicide,  such  as  causing  death  by  reckless 69 
(now  dangerous)  driving  102 
. 
These  offences  are  of  a  disparate  nature  and  will  only  be 
considered  as  necessary  in  the  follovving  discussion. 
2:  Liabilily  for__the  death  of  a  patient: 
If  a  patient  dies  in  the  course  of  treatment,  the  first  question  to  be  asked  is  the  purely 
factual  one  of  cause  of  death.  If  the  cause  of  death  was  something  other  than  natural 
causes,  then  a  murder  investigation  may  be  undertaken;  and  even  if  natural  causes  were 
the  proximate  cause  of  death,  the  issue  of  inadequate  treatment  or  care  may  still  arise. 
If  a  doctor  deliberately  kills  a  patient,  this  is  murder  as  described  above;  the  special 
arguments  which  apply  in  the  case  of  neonates  and  the  terminally  ill  are  discussed  infra. 
One  subtlety  of  the  law  as  regards  "deliberate  killing"  should  be  mentioned  at  this  point: 
in  terms  of  the  general  principles  outlined  above,  the  actus  reus  of  homicide  consists  of 
acts  (or,  rarely,  omissions)  causing  the  death  of  another  person.  "Causing"  death 
includes  accelerating  it;  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
"Since  we  are  all  fated  to  die  at  some  time,  every  instance  of  killing  is  an  instance 
of  accelerating  death.  ov 
103 
As  far  as  doctors  are  concerned,  in  this  area  they  benefit  from  the  application  of  the 
ancient  theological  concept  known  as  the  doctrine  of  double  effect'04.  Very  broadly,  this 
states  that  if  an  act  has  two  consequences  -  one  good,  one  bad  -  then  it  is  permissible  to 
suffer  the  bad  consequence  in  order  to  attain  the  good  objective.  While  this  may  look 
like  saying  "the  ends  justify  the  means",  it  has  been  accepted  as  legitimising  giving 
terminal  patients  pain-relieving  but  inadvertently  life-shortening  medication'  05 
. 
The  case 
06  which  recognised  the  doctrine  of  double  effect,  Rv  Adams' 
, 
is  best  known  nowadays 
for  that  legal  decision;  but  at  the  time,  the  case  was  notorious  -  principally  because  Dr 
Adams  was  mentioned  in  the  wills  of  132  of  the  patients  to  whom  he  administered 
palliative  care  or  helped  "ease  the  passing";  this  led  many  contemporary  observers  to 
think  Dr  Adams  had,  in  fact,  murdered  his  patients  and  had  "got  away  with  it"107 
. 
The 
subject  of  deliberate  murder  of  a  patient  is  considered  below  in  the  context  of  the  effects 
of  the  criminal  law.  The  principal  discussion  here  is  in  relation  to  doctors  who  act  within 
the  confines  of  acceptable  medical  activity,  or  attempt  to.  To  what  extent  is  the  doctor 
liable  if  the  patient  dies  as  a  result  of  inadequate  care,  or  as  a  result  of  mischance  in  the 
course  of  a  legitimate  course  of  treatment? 
Discussion  of  this  point  involves  entering  the  debate  on  causation  and  the  criminal  law. 70 
In  essence,  medical  treatment  of  a  condition  will  not  act  as  a  novus  actus  interveniens 
which  breaks  the  causal  link  between  the  cause  of  a  condition  (for  example  an  assault 
on  someone  who  is  rushed  to  casualty  but  dies  in  spite  of  the  treatment  given)  and  its 
ultimate  consequence,  the  death  of  that  patient'08.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  doctoes 
inability  to  save  the  victim's  life  neither  exculpates  the  original  assailant  from  liability  for 
murder  (or  equivalent)'  09,110  nor  renders  the  doctor  himself  liable  for  it  -  assuming  that  the 
treatment  is  not  defective.  If  the  treatment  is  defective  in  some  way,  then  there  might  be 
a  civil  action  against  the  doctor"';  but  this  in  itself  will  not  necessarily  break  the  causal 
chain  between  assault  and  death,  nor  necessarily  expose  the  doctor  to  prosecution. 
For  the  doctor  to  be  liable  himself,  he  must  not  just  be  guilty  of  negligence  judged  by  the 
civil  standard:  he  must  satisfy  the  criteria  outlined  above  for  the  offences  of  homicide"2 
- 
As  far  as  the  original  assailant  is  concerned,  the  possibility  of  negligent  treatment  of  the 
victim  is  reasonably  foreseeable,  and  he  must  therefore  accept  the  consequences  of  this 
13 
should  it  materialisel  . 
Only  if  the  treatment  is  so  extremely  wrong  as  to  constitute  an 
independent  cause  of  death  does  it  amount  to  a  novus  actus  interveniensI14 
. 
But  this  in 
itself  does  not  mean  the  doctor  is  liable  for  homicide,  since  legally  the  effect  of  a  novus 
actus  is  to  break  the  causal  chain,  not  to  put  a  new  accused  at  the  end  of  it.  The 
intervening  treatment  could  be  of  such  a  novel  or  risky  nature  as  to  constitute  a  novus 
15 
actus  without  ever  being  criminally  reckless  or  negligent'  . 
It  is  worth  noting  that  refusal 
by  the  victim  to  accept  medical  treatment  is  not  a  novus  actus'16,  but  it  is  submitted  that 
unjustified  failure  on  the  part  of  a  casualty  unit  to  offer  treatment  would  be. 
As  far  as  the  doctors  liability  for  homicide  in  the  event  of  non-treatment  is  concerned,  the 
laws  of  Scotland  and  England  only  impose  criminal  liability  for  omissions  where  the 
person  is  under  a  legal  duty  to  act'  17 
. 
The  question  of  a  duty  on  doctors  to  treat  is 
discussed  in  Chapter  4;  there  is  very  little  by  way  of  a  general  obligation  on  doctors  to 
treat  passers-by,  and  so  failure  to  treat  such  a  person  would  not  amount  to  homicide 
(although  the  GIVIC  could  be  expected  to  take  a  dim  view  of  the  matter).  As  regards  an 
existing  patient,  there  clearly  is  a  duty  to  treat,  and  on  general  principles  a  sufficiently 
culpable  failure  to  give  treatment  could  amount  to  criminal  homicide.  In  the  more 
extreme  situation  of  abandonment  in  mid-surgery"",  the  liability  of  the  surgeon  for  his 
omissions  would  be  compounded  by  the  doctrine  of  liability  for  failure  to  avert  a  danger 
which  have  yourself  created'19.  The  highly  confused  area  of  discontinuing  life-support 
measures  raises  a  number  of  specific  complexities  which  are  considered  below. 
Finally,  there  is  the  possibility  that  the  patient  dies  simply  because  of  the  negligence  or 
recklessness  of  the  attendant  physician.  The  law  of  involuntary  manslaughter  was 71 
restated  by  the  House  of  Lords:  to  be  convicted  of  manslaughter  as  a  result  of  medical 
negligence,  it  is  necessary  for  the  prosecution  to  prove 
1.  the  existence  of  a  duty  to  the  victim  (not  usually  a  problem  in  medical  cases,  but 
recall  that  there  is  no  duty  on  a  doctor  to  treat  anyone  who  is  not  a  patient  12  ); 
2.  breach  of  the  duty  causing  death  (an  evidential  matter  informed  by  the  civil 
standard  of  breach  of  duty  of  care);  and 
gross  negligence  which  the  jury  consider  justifies  a  criminal  conviction.  121 
In  essence,  then,  a  doctor  will  only  face  prosecution  following  the  death  of  a  patient: 
(a)  if  he  fails  to  treat  them  at  all,  in  circumstances  where  he  clearly  owed  the  patient  a 
duty  of  care,  and  where  the  consequences  of  this  failure  are  reasonably  foreseeable; 
(b)  where,  having  undertaken  to  treat  a  patient,  he  discontinues  that  treatment  without 
having  made  suitable  arrangements  for  their  care; 
(c)  where  his  treatment  is  defective  to  the  extent  that,  as  a  matter  of  factual  causation, 
the  defective  treatment  and  not  the  underlying  illness  or  injury  is  the  cause  of  death, 
and  that  in  causing  the  death  the  doctor  had  been  guilty  of  gross  negligence  justifying 
a  criminal  conviction;  or 
(d)  where  the  doctor  intended  to  kill  the  patient.  It  is  this  last  possibility  that  will  now  be 
considered. 
3:  Intentional  killing  of  neonates  and  the  terminally  ill: 
Murder  by  doctors  is  rare  but,  as  the  Shipman  case  demonstrated,  it  does  happen  on 
occasion.  Deliberately  killing  someone  outwith  the  clinical  setting  is,  as  noted  above, 
likely  (in  the  absence  of  a  defence  such  as  insanity)  to  constitute  murder  whether  the 
person  doing  the  killing  be  a  doctor  or  not.  Causing  death  by  gross  negligence  is 
perhaps  more  common,  although  it  is  an  incidence  only  measurable  in  terms  of  the  level 
of  prosecution  activity  and  concomitant  rate  of  conviction: 
"Manslaughter  prosecutions  against  doctors  were  once  unheard  of.  Between 
1925  and  1989  there  were  no  successful  prosecutions.  But  in  1990  three 
doctors,  all  anaesthetists,  were  charged  -  and  two  were  convicted.  We  can  only 
speculate  on  the  reasons  for  this  sudden  activity...  [M]anslaughter  prosecutions 
are  still  rare,  and  successful  ones  rarer.  But  police  investigation  into  healthcare 
has  become  more  common.  "  122 72 
It  is  when  the  killing  occurs  with  a  clinical  justification  that  complications  arise;  this  most 
commonly  occurs  in  relation  to  neonates  and  those  suffering  from  a  terminal  illness. 
This  is  one  of  the  most  emotive  areas  of  medical  practice,  and  one  in  which  medical 
practice  and  the  criminal  law  come  most  sharply  into  conflict.  The  ethical  issues  which  it 
generates  have  been  the  subject  of  a  large  body  of  literature,  and  it  is  not  intended  to  go 
into  these  issues  here'23.  The  following  discussion  will  accordingly  make  a  number  of 
controversial  points  without  necessarily  addressing  all  the  issues  and  complexities 
surrounding  them;  this  is  in  the  interests  of  brevity,  since  a  full  discussion  would  merit  a 
thesis  in  its  own  right,  and  would  in  any  case  add  little  to  our  understanding  of  the 
regulatory  role  of  the  criminal  law. 
As  noted  above,  Rv  AdaMS124  held  that  it  was  not  criminal  to  shorten  a  patient's  life  in 
order  to  alleviate  suffering;  this  has  been  the  legal  mainstay  justifying  palliative  care  ever 
since.  The  main  problem,  however,  arises  in  relation  to  patients  who  could  be  kept  alive 
by  medical  intervention,  but  where  the  doctors  stay  their  hand.  Typically,  this  arises  in 
two  cases,  that  of  defective  neonates  (which  is  taken  here  to  mean  neonates  born  alive 
but  who  suffer  from  such  major  abnormalities  as  would  have  permitted  their  abortion  up 
to  the  moment  of  birth),  and  the  terminally  ill  adult  patient,  who  may  or  may  not  be 
competent  to  make  decisions  regarding  treatment  (or  even  conscious).  Ethically  it  is 
possible  to  distinguish  them  since  the  adult  may  have  previously  expressed  a 
preference,  and  also  has  a  set  of  value  systems  and  beliefs  on  which  to  base  a 
"substituted  judgement"  which  the  neonate  lacks  125  ;  but  the  law  makes  no  such 
distinctions  except  where  a  person  specifically  refuses  further  lifesaving  treatment.  If  the 
patient  does  so,  not  only  will  the  doctor  not  be  exposed  to  criminal  sanctions,  but  it  is  his 
duty  to  discontinue  the  treatment.  126 
The  law  in  this  area  was  clarified  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  the  case  of  Anthony  Bland  127: 
if  a  patient  is  brain-stem  dead,  they  are  legally  dead  and  no  liability  follows  for 
discontinuing  treatment.  If  they  are  in  a  persistent  vegetative  state,  (or  by  implication 
suffering  some  other  long-term  debilitating  mental  illness  of  sufficient  gravity)  then  the 
doctor  is  entitled  (following  application  to  the  court  128)  to  withhold  treatment.  Bland  is  an 
extremely  complex  case,  and  while  its  importance  cannot  be  overstated,  most  of  the 
intricacies  of  the  arguments  in  the  House  of  Lords  are  not  of  immediate  relevance; 
consequently,  it  will  not  be  discussed  in  detail  at  this  point.  What  it  makes  clear  is  that, 
while  euthanasia  (in  the  sense  of  "mercy-killing',  whether  voluntary  or  otherwise)  is  not 
129  legal  in  this  country  , 
there  are  certain  circumstances  under  which  a  doctor  is  no  longer 
required  to  prolong  a  patient's  life.  Bland  also  resolved  a  long-running  medico-legal 73 
debate  over  whether  stopping  life-prolonging  treatment  amounted  to  an  act  or  an 
omission  130 
, 




Conversely,  there  are  still  situations  where  a  doctor,  even  one  acting  in  accordance  with 
accepted  medical  practice,  can  face  criminal  prosecution.  Thus  in  the  celebrated  case  of 
Rv  ArthU?  32  a  consultant  paediatrician,  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  -mother  of  a 
baby  with  Down's  syndrome,  prescribed  dihydrocodeine  and  "nursing  care  only"  for  the 
baby,  which  thereafter  died.  Dr  Arthur  was  tried  for  murder  (reduced  to  attempted 
murder  on  evidential  grounds),  and  only  acquitted  by  the  jury  after  a  very  favourable 
summing-up  by  Farquharson  J.,  which  is  highly  dubious  in  that  it  did  not  address  the 
issue  of  homicide  by  omission  when  under  a  legal  duty.  In  any  case,  it  is  now  open  to 
doctors,  parents  or  local  authorities  to  petition  the  courts  for  permission  to  withhold 




And  while  the  ethics  of  these  cases  continue  to  be  debated,  from  the 
doctor's  point  of  view  all  he  need  know  is  that  if  he  wants  to  avoid  prosecution,  he  should 
135 
get  a  court  order  first.  Nor  has  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  changed  this  position 
4:  Euthanasia  and  assisted  suicide: 
The  final  aspect  of  the  law  of  homicide  focuses  more  on  the  patient  than  on  the  doctor, 
and  concerns  the  issue  of  euthanasia.  As  was  seen  above  in  the  general  discussion,  the 
law  in  the  UK'36  does  not  recognise  euthanasia.  If  the  person  has  not  consented  to 
having  their  life  shortened,  what  is  happening  will  be  murder  (or  culpable 
homicide/manslaughter).  If  they  have  consented,  it  will  still  be  necessary  to  justify  the 
palliative  care  in  terms  of  the  doctrine  of  double  effect  to  avoid  committing  murder,  since 
consent  in  itself  is  not  a  defence  to  a  charge  of  murder  137 
. 
In  terms  of  the  Suicide  Act 
1961,  it  is  an  offence  to  aid,  abet,  counsel  or  procure  suicide  138 
. 
Thus,  the  doctor  who 
gives  a  patient  drugs  to  enable  that  patient  to  commit  suicide  commits  an  offence, 
although  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  it  could  be  difficult  to  prove  that  the  doctor  gave  the 
drugs  intending  the  patient  to  take  an  overdose  139 
. 
However,  the  law  here  accepts  a 
distinction  between  committing  suicide  which,  while  no  longer  itself  a  criminal  offence,  is 
generally  not  regarded  as  a  legitimate  course  of  action,  and  refusing  treatment.  An  adult 
of  full  mental  capacity  has  the  absolute  dght  to  refuse  medical  treatment,  even  if  the 
result  of  this  refusal  is  inevitably  death  140 
. 
Accordingly,  in  these  circumstances  not  only 
does  the  doctor  not  commit  an  offence  if  he  or  she  discontinues  treatment,  but  an 
offence  may  be  commifted  if  the  treatment  is  in  fact  continued  141 
. 74 
C:  Other  offences  committed  in  the  medical  sphere: 
The  discussion  thus  far  has  focused  principally  on  the  law  relating  to  personal  physical 
integrity  as  that  aspect  of  autonomy  is  protected  (albeit  inadvertently)  by  the  criminal 
laws  of  Scotland,  England  and  Wales.  Clearly,  there  are  other  offences  which  doctors 
can,  and  on  occasion  do,  commit  under  the  guise  of  medical  practice.  These  other 
offences  (such  as  improper  sexual  contact  with  a  patient  who  is  under  anaesthesia,  or 
done  in  the  guise  of  medical  examination)  differ  from  the  discussions  of  assault  and 
homicide  because  there  is  no  professional  justification  for  the  commission  of  this  latter 
group  of  offences.  The  fact  that  the  offence  is  committed  by  a  doctor  is,  far  from  being 
an  exculpatory  factor,  more  likely  to  be  seen  as  an  aggravating  factor  because  there  will 
often  be  an  element  of  breach  of  trust  involved.  As  these  offences  are  beyond  the 
proper  scope  of  medical  practice,  and  are  typically  committed  covertly  rather  than  within 
the  accepted  framework  of  the  law,  it  is  not  intended  to  analyse  any  of  these  peripheral 
offences  in  detail. 
The  scope  of  "peripheral"  offences  which  can  be  committed  under  the  guise  of  proper 
medical  practice  is  theoretically  limitless.  The  doctor  making  house  visits  might  well  pilfer 
from  a  patient;  but  a  discussion  of  the  laws  of  theft  would  add  little  to  our  understanding 
of  how  medicine  is  regulated.  Suffice  to  say,  for  present  purposes,  that  the  general  law 
of  the  land  will  not  excuse  a  crime  because  the  person  committing  the  act  in  question  is  a 
doctor  -  unless  the  act  in  question  is  regarded  as  failing  within  the  proper  sphere  of 
medical  activity.  If  it  is  within  this  sphere,  conviction  is  unlikely.  If  not,  conviction  may 
follow. 
One  particular  form  of  criminal  conduct  within  the  medical  sphere  which  has  come  to  the 
awareness  of  the  general  public  recently  is  in  relation  to  fraud.  This  falls  into  two 
separate  categories:  "classical"  fraud  involving  the  fraudulent  claiming,  taking  or 
retaining  of  money  which  you  are  not  entitled  to,  and  a  more  specifically  medical  form  of 
fraud,  research  fraud.  Financial  fraud  is  estimated  to  have  cost  the  NHS  approximately 
two  billion  pounds  recently,  and  research  fraud  has  been  described  as  "endemic"  in  both 
the  UK  and  US142 
. 
For  present  purposes,  fraud  with  the  intention  of  securing  financial 
benefit  for  yourself,  or  which  is  to  the  detriment  of  someone  else  143  is  a  criminal  offence. 
Research  fraud,  unless  intended  for  example  to  defraud  a  sponsor  into  providing  more 
funds,  is  not  a  criminal  offence'44. 
Finally,  one  particularly  acrimonious  debate  concerned  whether  doctors  could  prescribe 
contraceptives,  or  give  advice  and  counselling  on  contraception,  to  persons  (almost 75 
invariably  girls)  under  the  age  of  16.  It  is  a  criminal  offence  to  have  intercourse  with 
someone  under  the  age  of  16  145 
,  and  so  there  was  the  possibility  that  a  doctor  who  gave 
contraceptives  could  be  regarded  as  having  incited  the  commission  of  an  offence  (i.  e. 
unlawful  sexual  intercourse),  or  having  aided  and  abetted  in  its  commission.  The  issue 
146 
was  ultimately  resolved  in  the  civil  courts  in  favour  of  the  legality  of  such  prescribing 
V:  Statutory  Restrictions  on  Medical  Procedures: 
By  way  of  clarification,  this  section  is  perhaps  best  understood  as  describing  restrictions 
on  certain  activities  of  a  medical  or  quasi-medical  nature  so  that  in  general  they  may  only 
lawfully  be  carried  out  by  a  registered  medical  practitioner;  this  underpins  the  point  made 
above  that  the  criminal  law  is  used  principally  to  ensure  that  individuals  are  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  appropriate  licensing  authority,  the  GIVIC.  As  such,  it  could  equally 
have  been  headed  "Restrictions  which  statute  imposes  on  everyone  who  isn't  a 
registered  medical  practitioner.  "  The  restrictions  which  statute  places  on  registered 
medical  practitioners  are  discussed  in  Chapter  5  infra. 
A:  Unqualified  Practice: 
Historically,  the  allopathic  medical  profession  (practitioners  of  what  is  now  referred  to  as 
biomedicine,  i.  e.  conventional  medicine  as  opposed  to  alternative  or  complementary 
medicine)  secured  its  leading  position  among  various  branches  of  healers  through  the 
Medical  Act  1858;  this  prevented  unqualified  persons  from  holding  themselves  out  as 
doctors,  if  not  actually  from  practising  the  healing  arts. 
Presently  this  monopoly  is  enforced  through  the  provisions  of  Part  VI  of  the  Medical  Act 
1983  147 
. 
The  specific  privileges  granted  to  registered  medical  practitioners  are  listed  in 
Sections  46  (power  to  recover  medical  fees),  47  (exclusive  right  to  be  employed  as  a 
medical  practitioner  by  state  and  all  other  non-voluntary  establishments)  and  48 
(certificates  only  valid  if  signed  by  a  fully-registered  practitioner).  These  privileges  are 
identical  to  those  granted  to  the  medical  profession  in  1858.  The  criminal  "teeth" 
safeguarding  these  provisions  are  to  be  found  in  Section  49,  which  provides  that  anyone 
holding  him-  or  herself  out  as  a  registered  medical  practitioner  but  who  is  not  so 
registered  commits  an  offence  and  is  liable  on  conviction  to  a  fine  not  exceeding  level  5 
on  the  standard  scale  (currently  E5000)14'.  While  this  fine  may  be  relatively  small 
compared  to  what  a  bogus  practitioner  might  hope  to  earn,  the  fact  that  he  or  she  is 
unable  to  recover  any  fees  charged,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  he  or  she  will  be  held 
149  liable  by  the  civil  courts  as  though  fully  qualified  ,  must  serve  as  a  powerful  disincentive 76 
to  would-be  quacks.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  unlike  vets'50,  who  enjoy  a 
professional  monopoly  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  doctors  are  not  uniquely  entitled  to 
practise  medical  arts;  their  monopoly  is  in  reality  perhaps  better  described  as  "brand 
protection.  " 
However,  there  are  certain  other  privileges  conferred  by  the  status  of  registered  medical 
practitioner.  Thus,  only  a  registered  doctor  can  prescribe  Prescription  Only  Medicines  1  51 
, 
and  doctors  are  immune  from  most  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Medicines  Act 
1968.  That  Act  does,  however,  make  considerable  use  of  criminal  sanctions  to  regulate 
this  area  of  medical  activity: 
"It  is  evident  that,  while  the  Act  defines  a  number  of  offences,  all  of  which  may 
come  within  the  ambit  of  the  lawyer,  very  few  of  these  involve  directly  the  doctor 
-  indeed  they  are  specifically  excluded  from  the  majority  of  the  provisions.  "  152 
Only  a  registered  medical  practitioner  may  remove  tissue  from  dead  body  '53,  which 
includes  conducting  post-mortem  examinations.  Lastly,  it  is  only  a  registered  medical 
practitioner  who  is  allowed  to  sign  any  of  a  large  number  of  official  certificates,  most  of 
which  relate  to  the  medical  condition  of  the  person  to  whom  the  certificate  relates  1  54.  In 
these  cases,  the  point  of  having  a  doctor  sign  the  certificate  is  obvious;  and  where 
doctors  are  allowed  to  sign  non-medical  certificates,  it  has  been  suggested  that  it  is  the 
criminal  fraud  inherent  in  falsely  certifying  something,  and  the  professional 
consequences  of  such  a  conviction,  that  justify  doctors  being  granted  these  privileges: 
'Which  is  why,  for  example,  a  doctor's  signature  is  accepted  as  a  good 
supporting  guarantee  on  a  passport  application  form.  It's  not  because  doctors 
are  regarded  as  sea-green  incorruptibles,  but  because  they  stand  to  lose  so 
much  if  caught  out  in  a  misdemeanour.  11155 
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  criminal  law,  the  importance  of  these  restrictions  on 
certification  largely  affects  non-doctors,  who  will  generally  commit  some  form  of  criminal 
fraud  or  forgery,  or  violate  the  statute  under  which  the  certificate  is  required  if  they  sign 
such  a  certificate,  in  addition  to  possible  prosecution  under  the  Medical  Act  for  holding 
themselves  out  as  being  registered  practitioners.  From  the  doctor's  perspective,  this 
merely  underscores  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  they  remain  on  the  Register  at  all 
times  they  are  practising  medicine. 77 
B:  Certification  of  death: 
Two  certificates  in  particular  are  of  medico-legal  significance.  The  first  concerns  the  law 
of  abortion,  discussed  in  the  next  section;  the  other  involves  the  certification  of  death. 
156  157 
The  Scottish  procedure  in  this  area  is  markedly  different  from  that  found  in  England 
15 
largely  due  to  the  absence  of  the  office  of  Coroner  in  Scotland 
." 
In  either  country,  the 
process  requires  a  medical  certificate  of  death,  which  only  a  registered  medical 
practitioner  may  issue;  and  in  England  and  Wales  the  attending  doctor  is  under  a 
statutory  duty  to  issue  it. 
The  criminal  law's  involvement  is  that  depending  on  the  cause  of  death  certified  by  the 
doctor,  there  may  or  may  not  follow  investigation  by  the  Coroner  or  at  the  behest  of  the 
Procurator  Fiscal,  possibly  resulting  in  a  murder  inquiry.  Doctors  are  therefore  entrusted 
with  a  role  at  the  heart  of  the  criminal  justice  system,  although  in  this  case  it  is  on  the 
side  of  the  prosecuting  authorities,  rather  than  as  their  targets.  However,  this  particular 
aspect  of  the  system  falls  down  if  it  is  the  doctor  certifying  the  death  who  has  himself 
killed  the  person  in  question  (as  with  Harold  Shipman).  This  area  of  the  law  is  currently 
under  active  review  with  the  objective  of  closing  this  loophole  and  preventing  any 
repetition. 
C:  Abortion: 
Abortion  is  considered  in  this  section  because,  while  the  common  law  crime  of  abortion  in 
Scotland  159  and  the  offences  under  Sections  58  and  59  of  the  Offences  Against  the 
Person  Act  1861  (as  amended)  in  England  and  Wales  apply  to  anyone,  it  is  only  the 
registered  medical  practitioner  who  has  a  legal  defence  under  the  Abortion  Act  1967. 
It  is  not  intended  here  to  go  into  the  complexities  of  the  abortion  debate,  which  raises 
some  of  the  most  problematic  and  contentious  issues  in  the  entire  medico-legal  field,  and 
generates  the  most  impassioned  and  embittered  debate'60.  For  the  present  purposes, 
what  is  important  is  the  outcome  of  this  debate  as  displayed  by  the  law  which  has 
emerged  as  a  "compromise  in  a  debate  where  there  is  no  consensus.  061 
The  actual  offence  of  abortion  was  to  carry  out  any  of  a  number  of  acts  done  with  a  view 
to  procuring  a  pregnant  woman  to  miscarry.  Thus,  in  Scots  law  it  was  stated  that  it  is  a 
crime  to  "cause  or  procure  abortion  whether  by  drugs  or  by  instruments  or  violence  062  ;  in 
England,  the  offence  was  defined  in  Sections  58  and  59  of  the  Offences  Against  the 78 
Person  Act  1861.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  law  of  Scotland  required  that  the  woman  be 
pregnant  at  the  time;  it  was  not,  at  common  law,  illegal  to  attempt  to  cause  the 
miscarriage  of  a  woman  who  was  not  pregnant'63  . 
This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
specific  rule  of  Sections  58  and  59.  Another  divergence  between  Scots  and  English  law 
in  this  field  concerns  the  culpability  of  the  pregnant  woman  herself:  Section  58  of  the 
1861  Act  states  that 
"Every  woman,  being  with  child,  who  with  intent  to  procure  her  own  miscarriage, 
shall  unlawfully  administer  to  herself  any  poison  or  other  noxious  thing,  or  shall 
unlawfully  use  any  instrument  whatsoever  with  like  intent...  shall  be  guilty  of  an 
offence.  " 
In  contrast,  the  case  law  in  Scotland,  although  unclear,  appears  to  point  to  a  general  rule 
that  the  pregnant  woman  herself  can  be  art  and  part  guilty  164  in  the  crime  of  abortion  or 
attempted  abortion  committed  by  another  person  (as  in  England  165);  but  there  are  no 
66 
modern  cases  in  which  the  woman  has  been  convicted  of  an  independent  offence' 
67  Most  commentators  are  of  the  opinion  that  such  a  charge  is  theoretically  competent' 
The  lack  of  reported  cases  is  due  firstly  to  the  fact  that  conviction  of  a  third  party 
abortionist  is  in  practice  only  possible  with  the  cooperation  of  the  woman,  and  secondly 
to  a  relatively  liberal  Crown  Office  prosecution  policy  (which  can  have  a  significant  impact 
68  169 
on  Scottish  criminal  practice'  ).  Indeed,  referring  to  the  case  of  Rv  Boume  which 
clarified  the  legality  of  therapeutic  abortion  in  England,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
"...  it  is  doubtful  if  Mr  Bourne  would  have  achieved  his  object  of  clarifying  the  issue 
had  he  performed  a  'test'  abortion  in  Scotland  because  the  authorities  would  not 
have  prosecuted  him.  "  170 
It  is  important  to  note  that  both  the  1861  Act  and  the  common  law  of  Scotland  were  silent 
on  the  question  of  therapeutic  abortion.  The  decriminalisation  of  such  procedures  was 
introduced  in  England  and  Wales  by  the  Infant  Life  Preservation  Act  1929,  which 
provided  that  there  was  an  exception  to  criminal  liability  for  abortions  performed  "in  good 
faith  and  for  the  purpose  only  of  preserving  the  life  of  the  mother.  "  The  extent  to  which 
this  permitted  abortion  was  clarified  by  the  case  law,  most  dramatically  Rv  Boume.  Mr 
Bourne,  an  eminent  gynaecologist,  performed  an  abortion  on  a  14  year-old  who  was 
pregnant  as  a  result  of  multiple  rape,  then  announced  the  fact  to  the  authorities.  He  was 
tried  and  acquitted  following  what  is  generally  regarded  as  a  favourable  address  to  the 
jury  by  Macnaghten  J,  who  stated  that 79 
'The  unborn  child  in  the  womb  must  not  be  destroyed  unless  the  destruction  of 
that  child  is  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  yet  more  precious  life  of  the 
mother.  "  171 
The  1929  Act  was  primarily  concerned  with  closing  a  perceived  loophole  whereby  it  was 
felt  that  the  1861  Act  did  not  prevent  the  child  being  killed  in  the  process  of  birth'  72  ;  but  it 
also  introduced  a  presumption  that  any  foetus  of  28  weeks'  development  was  viable,  i.  e. 
capable  of  independent  existence  173 
. 
The  upshot  of  this  was  that  therapeutic  abortion 
was  only  possible  up  to  the  28th  week  -  in  England  and  Wales.  The  first  official 
legalisation  of  abortion  at  all  in  Scotland  came  with  the  Abortion  Act  1967,  but  even  once 
this  came  into  effect,  the  non-applicability  of  the  1929  Act  meant  that  there  was 
technically  no  time  limit  at  all  to  therapeutic  abortion  in  Scotland  until  1990,  when  the 
Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  1990  was  passed. 
The  1967  Act  extends  to  both  Scotland  and  England,  and  effectively  replaces  the 
previous  case  law:  Section  5  specifically  states  that  "anything  done  to  procure  the 
miscarriage  of  a  woman  is  unlawfully  done  unless  authorised  by  Section  1  of  the  Act.  Is 
Section  1  of  the  Act  states  that  no  offence  is  committed  if  the  abortion  is  carried  out  by  a 
registered  medical  practitioner  and  two  such  practitioners  are  of  the  opinion  either  that 
continuing  the  pregnancy  would  entail  risk  to  the  life  of  the  woman,  or  risk  causing 
physical  or  mental  injury  to  the  woman  or  any  existing  children,  or  else  that  there  is  a 
substantial  risk  that  the  child  if  born  would  be  seriously  handicapped.  The  section  further 
provides  that  the  doctors  may  take  into  account  the  woman's  actual  or  reasonably 
174 
foreseeable  environment  , 
that  the  actual  abortion  must  be  carried  out  in  an  NHS 
hospital  or  other  place  approved  by  the  Health  Minister  or  Secretary  of  State  175 
,  except 
that  in  an  emergency  it  may  be  carried  out  anywhere  and  on  the  basis  of  a  single 
doctor's  opinion  176 
. 
The  Act  further  provides  that  persons  having  a  conscientious 
objection  to  abortion  are  not  obliged  to  participate  in  treatment  authorised  by  the  Act,  but 
subject  to  the  proviso  that  the  conscientious  objection  clause  does  not  apply  in 
emergency  situations  177 
. 
This  clause  has  been  held  not  to  apply  to  persons  who  do  not 
actually  participate  in  the  treatment  terminating  the  pregnancy,  e.  g.  to  a  secretary  whose 
job  included  typing  abortion  referral  letters  1713 
. 
However,  the  general  immunity  conferred 
by  the  Act,  while  it  is  restricted  to  registered  medical  practitioners,  has  been  held  to 
include  other  members  of  the  health  care  team  acting  under  the  instructions  of  such  a 
practitioner  and  in  conformity  with  accepted  medical  practice  179.  The  "morning-after  pill" 
(emergency  contraception  taken  after  intercourse)  has  been  held  not  to  be  an 80 
abortificant'80.  Lastly,  there  are  reporting  obligations  imposed  on  doctors  carrying  out 
abortions;  it  is  a  criminal  offence  to  fail  to  comply  with  these'8' 
Only  one  doctor  has  been  successfully  convicted  under  the  1967  Act 
182; 
in  that  case,  the 
doctor  had  not  actually  examined  the  patient.  At  the  trial,  no  mention  was  made  of  the 




doctors  who  approve  abortion  on  demand  point  to  the  fact  that,  particularly  in  the  first 
184  trimester,  abortion  is  always  safer  than  continuing  the  pregnancy  to  term 
It  is  also  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  it  is  ultimately  doctors,  and  not  the  pregnant 
women,  who  decide  whether  or  not  to  permit  abortion  to  take  place.  Similarly,  the  law 
does  not  grant  the  father  any  rights  to  object  to  the  proposed  abortion'  85 
. 
The  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  has  also  been  deployed  in  this  context,  albeit  without 
success  on  the  part  of  the  applicants.  Thus,  the  former  European  Commission  on 
Human  Rights'  86  left  open  whether  or  not  the  protections  afforded  by  Article  2  of  the 
Convention  extend  to  foetuses'  87 
,  and  the  European  Court  has  yet  to  rule  on  the  subject. 
The  High  Court  in  England  has  recently  refused  an  attempt  to  use  Article  2  of  the 
1811  Convention  to  prevent  an  abortion  from  taking  place 
The  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  1990  brought  about  a  number  of  changes 
to  abortion  law.  Firstly,  the  time  limit  for  abortion  (i.  e.  the  point  at  which  a  foetus  is 
presumed  to  be  viable)  was  reduced  from  28  weeks  to  24  weeks"9;  again,  it  should  be 
noted  that  in  Scotland,  this  was  the  first  introduction  of  any  time  limit.  However,  there 
were  three  exceptions  to  this  rule,  i.  e.  abortion  can  be  carried  out  right  up  to  the  moment 
of  birth  in  cases  where  it  is  necessary  to  prevent  grave  permanent  injury  to  the  health  of 
the  mother,  or  where  continuing  the  pregnancy  would  threaten  her  life;  it  also  applies  in 
cases  where  there  is  a  substantial  risk  that  the  child,  if  bom,  would  suffer  from  "such 
physical  or  mental  abnormalities  as  to  be  seriously  handicapped"  -  which  is  the  same 
wording  as  one  of  the  grounds  under  the  1967  Act.  It  is  in  such  cases  that  the  question 
of  liability  for  death  after  birth  arises.  The  1990  Act  also  clarified  the  legality  of  selective 
reduction  of  pregnancies,  which  may  have  been  illegal  under  the  1967  Act  (as  there  was 
a  prima  facie  case  of  criminal  foeticide,  but  no  termination  of  pregnancy  entitling  the 
doctor  to  the  protection  of  the  1967  Act).  Lastly,  the  1990  Act  extensively  regulates  the 
areas  of  infertility  treatment  and  embryo  research;  and  while  there  are  criminal  penalties 
attaching  to  violations  of  these  rules,  these  rules  fall  under  the  auspices  of  the  Human 
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Authority  and  are  considered  in  Chapter  5. 81 
D:  Organ  Transplantation: 
As  noted  above,  one  of  the  privileges  (in  the  legal  sense  of  the  word)  of  being  a 
registered  medical  practitioner  is  that  you  are  entitled  to  remove  tissue  from  a  dead 
body'90.  However,  the  law  regulating  this  is  exceedingly  unclear;  for  instance,  it  has 
been  pointed  out  that  there  is  no  clear  definition  of  who  the  person  "lawfully  in 
possession"  of  a  dead  body  actually  is,  this  being  the  only  person  who  can  authorise 
tissue  removal'91.  Such  authorisation  may  only  be  given  by  that  person  either  where  the 
deceased  consented  to  the  particular  use  during  their  life,  or  where  the  person  lawfully  in 
possession  has  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  deceased  or  their  surviving  spouse  or  any 
relative  objected  or  had  expressed  any  objections"'. 
193  There  are  no  clear  sanctions  for  breaching  the  terms  of  the  Human  Tissue  Act  1961 
although  these  do  seem  to  include  criminal  conviction'  94 
. 
The  former  controversy 
surrounding  the  use  of  "beating  heart"  donors  appears  to  have  largely  subsided,  and  the 
courts  have  accepted  that  brain-stem  death  is  legally  death  1"5 
. 
The  main  legal  obligation 
imposed  on  doctors  removing  tissue  is  to  verify  by  personal  examination  that  the  body  is 
actually  dead'96,  and,  if  the  hospital  is  lawfully  in  possession  of  the  body,  to  make  "such 
reasonable  enquiry  as  is  practicable"  to  discover  if  the  deceased  or  his  surviving  spouse 
or  relatives  have  or  had  any  objections  to  the  body  so  being  used  197 
. 
As  noted  earlier, 
recent  adverse  publicity  surrounding  the  discovery  of  wholesale  "organ  harvesting"  by 
clinicians  in  a  number  of  children's  hospitals  on  the  basis  allegedly  defective  or  non- 
existent  parental  consent  (or  "authorisation",  consent  being  an  inappropriate  term  in  the 
absence  of  full  information  having  to  be  provided  to  the  authorising  individual  and  lack  of 
any  benefit  to  the  deceased  198)  means  that  this  area  of  law  is  also  under  active  scrutiny 
at  the  moment'99.  One  of  the  key  recommendations  of  the  Scottish  review  is  that  the 
Human  Tissue  Act  1961,  which  is  supposed  to  regulate  this  area,  is  in  urgent  need  of 
repeal  or  substantial  revision  200 
. 
Accordingly  it  is  not  intended  to  go  into  the  subject  in 
more  detail. 
Different  criteria  are  involved  when  tissue  intended  for  transplant  is  removed  from  living 
donors.  As  regards  regenerating  tissue,  most  commonly  blood,  there  is  little  problem:  the 
donor  soon  regenerates  the  lost  blood  and  is  back  to  normal.  As  regards  non- 
regenerative  organs,  only  the  kidneys  are  suitable  for  transplant  from  a  live  donor,  and 
this  discussion  will  focus  specifically  on  the  criminal  aspects  of  this  procedure.  Removal 
of  any  other  major  organ  would  result  in  the  death  of  the  donor,  and  the  consent  of  the 
victim  is  no  defence  to  a  murder  charge  201 
. 82 
The  common  law,  unsurprisingly,  has  historically  had  very  little  to  say  on  the  issue  of  live 
donor  transplantation,  since  the  procedure  has  only  been  possible  since  1954 
- 
As  has 
been  seen,  the  common  law  has  only  very  slowly  produced  any  consistent  legal  rationale 
to  medical  practice  generally,  and  these  difficulties  are  exacerbated  in  the  case  of 
donating  an  organ.  Any  justification  of  surgical  intervention  based  on  the  benefits  which 
it  is  intended  to  confer  on  the  patient  is  arguably  inapplicable  to  organ  donation.  The 
main  legal  difficulty  centres  on  the  crime  of  mayhem,  or  maim,  since  consent  was  never 
a  defence  to  this  charge  202.  Maim  was  an  offence  in  English  IaW203  whereby  the  King 
was  deprived  of  a  fighting  man  by  the  loss  of  any  of  a  variety  of  parts  of  that  man's  body. 
These  are  described  by  Skegg204,  who  doubts  whether  organ  donation  would  qualify;  in 
any  case,  the  offence  is  probably  obsolete  205 
. 
However,  even  allowing  that  such 
operations  are  legal  at  common  law,  there  are  now  additional  statutory  controls  on  this. 
The  Human  Organ  Transplants  Act  1989  was  passed  in  the  aftermath  of  a  "kidneys-for- 
sale"  scandal.  In  essence,  the  Act  makes  it  a  criminal  offence  to  trade  in  human 
organS206,  makes  it  an  offence  to  transplant  organs  from  any  person  into  someone  who 
is  not  either  closely  genetically  related  to  the  donor207  or,  in  the  absence  of  such 




There  is  considerable  uncertainty  over  the  use  of  child  organ 
donors  in  this  countrY209. 
Finally,  there  is  the  subject  of  xenotransplantation,  i.  e.  the  use  of  non-human  organs  in 
humans.  This  is  presently  unregulated  by  formal  law,  but  the  government  has  set  up  an 
expert  group  to  consider  the  issues  and  decide  whether  legislation  is  required  and  if  so, 
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what  form  it  should  take 
VI:  The  effects  of  the  criminal  law: 
This  section  will  seek  to  assess,  in  necessarily  general  terms,  the  effects  of  the  criminal 
law  in  achieving  its  assigned  regulatory  functions,  viz.  providing  a  channel  for 
grievances,  a  mechanism  to  investigate  allegations  of  failure  to  adhere  to  agreed 
standards,  the  punishment  of  those  who  are  deemed  to  have  failed  so  to  adhere,  and 
regulation  of  the  regulatory  bureaucracies  themselves.  As  was  noted  supra  in 
discussing  the  purpose  of  the  criminal  law, 
empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  reductive  effects  of  criminal  processes 
(although  extraordinarily  hard  to  assess)  are  meagre,  and  casts  doubt  on  the 
validity  of  characterising  criminal  law  primarily  in  instrumental  terms.  "  "' 83 
Clear  distinctions  between  the  perceived  effects  of  the  criminal  law,  and  the  reasons  for 
the  law  in  question  (particularly  when  a  long-standing  rule  is  changed)  intended  by  the 
legislators,  can  be  seen  throughout  history.  Thus  Anglo-Saxon  juries  tempered  the 
severity  of  new  Norman  offenceS212  ,a  practice  continued  through  the  centuries  to  the 
213  later  18th  century  with  particular  focus  on  the  punishments  of  death  or  transportation 
The  death  penalty  makes  a  useful  subject  to  consider  the  effects  of  a  particular  measure 
of  the  criminal  law,  and  to  highlight  some  of  the  reasons  why  these  are  hard  to  assess. 
Commenting  on  the  Parliamentary  debates  in  1982  concerning  a  proposed  re- 
introduction  of  the  death  penalty  for  certain  crimes,  Sorrell  points  out  that  the  statistical 
evidence  deployed  by  proponents  of  capital  punishment  represented  at  best  very  weak 
evidence  of  the  deterrent  effect  of  that  sanction  214;  other  commentators  go  further  and 
cite  international  studies  indicating  that  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  is  more  commonly 
followed  by  a  decrease  in  homicide  rateS215. 
Just  because  deterrence  theory  fails  to  provide  an  adequate  justification  for  capital 
punishment  is  not  to  say  that  it  should  be  abolished;  we  may  wish  to  keep  it  for  purely 
retributive  purposes,  for  instance.  However,  for  present  purposes  what  this  example 
shows  is  that  when  looking  at  this  reasonably  narrow  point  of  focus,  there  is  no 
consensus  on  what  will  happen  if  we  choose  option  (a)  rather  than  option  (b).  The 
situation  is  very  narrow,  consisting  of  what  happens  to  a  person  convicted  of  the  specific 
offence  of  murder,  and  where  the  debate  is  a  binary  one  of  death  versus  life 
imprisonment216.  If  consensus  is  unachievable,  and  conclusive  empirical  evidence 
unavailable,  in  this  one  narrow  question,  then  it  would  seem  that  we  can  reasonably 
conclude  that  there  is  no  single  answer  as  to  how  effective  the  criminal  law  is  in 
achieving  its  assigned  purposes.  The  analysis  which  follows  is  therefore  a  subjective 
one,  informed  by  the  analysis  of  the  mechanisms  of  the  criminal  law  given  above. 
The  effects  of  the  criminal  law  in  terms  of  medical  regulation  can  reasonably  be 
assessed  by  looking  at  three  "target"  groups  in  terms  of  the  different  aspects  of 
regulatory  task  being  undertaken.  These  groups  are  the  regulated  themselves  (i.  e. 
doctors),  the  regulators  (i.  e.  those  operating  other  parts  of  the  regulatory  bureaucracy), 
and  those  who  stand  to  benefit  from  the  regulation,  (i.  e.  the  general  public  as  being 
actual  or  potential  patients  of  the  doctors.  ) 84 
A:  Effects  on  doctors: 
The  criminal  law's  involvement  with  doctors  typically  arises  within  four  discrete  areas: 
*  Where  the  doctor's  offence  is  clandestine  and  committed  under  the  guise  of  medical 
treatment; 
*  Where  the  doctor  (perhaps,  though  not  necessarily,  supported  by  a  body  of  opinion 
within  the  profession)  regards  his/her  conduct  as  acceptable  but  which  the  law  does 
not  accept  as  lawful; 
*  Where  the  offence  arises  because  medical  activity  has  gone  wrong;  and 
Where  the  offence  is  not  connected  to  the  fact  that  the  offender  happens  to  be  a 
doctor. 
Each  of  these  separate  areas  will  now  be  considered,  with  the  exception  of  the  last.  If 
an  offence  is  not  connected  to  the  fact  that  it  happens  to  be  a  doctor  who  has  committed 
it,  this  is  not  really  connected  to  the  regulation  of  medicine  and  is  therefore  outwith  the 
scope  of  this  thesis. 
1:  Clandestine  offences: 
The  case  of  Harold  Shipman  exemplified  the  ability  of  doctors  to  commit  serial  offences 
under  the  guise  of  their  proper  professional  activities,  at  the  same  time  as  showing  up  a 
major  deficiency  in  the  laws  concerning  death  certification.  In  considering  whether  the 
criminal  law  has  a  regulatory  function  in  respect  of  such  types  of  incidence,  the  Shipman 
case  will  be  used  as  a  running  example  simply  because  it  is  recent,  well-known,  and  has 
provoked  a  significant  degree  of  commentary  over  what  went  wrong  and  what  lessons 
can  be  learned.  Nor  is  Shipman's  case  a  completely  unique  one;  at  least  one 
commentator  has  observed  that: 
"...  medicine  has  arguably  thrown  up  more  serial  killers  than  all  the  other 
professions  put  together,  with  nursing  a  close  second...  [flhere  are  enough 
recorded  instances  of  multiple  murders  by  doctors  (real  or  bogus)  to  make  at 
least  a  prima  facie  case  that  the  profession  attracts  some  people  with  a 
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pathological  interest  in  the  power  of  life  and  death 
. 
To  recap:  Shipman  was  a  general  practitioner  practising  single-handed  in  Hyde,  near 
Manchester.  He  was  convicted  on  31  January  2000  of  fifteen  counts  of  murder.  All  his 
victims  were  elderly  patients  of  his,  murdered  by  injection  with  diamorphine  in  the  course 85 
of  other  treatment.  There  was  no  possible  clinical  justification  for  the  injections.  He  also 
falsified  patient  records  and  incorrectly  completed  death  certificates  in  an  attempt  to 
conceal  his  crimes.  While  convicted  on  fifteen  counts  of  murder,  there  were  (and  are) 
suspicions  that  he  killed  a  far  higher  number.  A  Department  of  Health  audit  suggested 
that  the  correct  figure  was  likely  to  be  236  murderS218. 
Firstly,  how  was  Shipman  caught?  The  daughter  of  one  of  his  victims  became 
suspicious  of  the  fact  that  her  mother  had  changed  her  will  in  favour  of  Dr  Shipman 
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shortly  before  her  death 
. 
It  was  this  which  triggered  the  police  investigation,  not  the 
massively  high  mortality  figures  for  Dr  Shipman's  patients  which  were  only  revealed  by  a 
clinical  audit  conducted  after  his  conviction220.  In  attracting  police  attention  through 
benefiting  from  the  will  of  a  deceased  patient,  Shipman  was  following  the  path  of  Dr 
Adams  over  thirty  years  previously:  it  was  financial  concerns,  not  patient  mortality 
figures,  which  resulted  in  Dr  Adams  being  investigated  and  prosecuted  in  1957  221 
. 
The 
criminal  law  clearly  provided  a  channel  for  the  suspicious  daughter  to  channel  her 
suspicions  into,  but  the  investigatory  mechanisms  of  the  criminal  legal  system  had  been 
unable  to  identify  any  of  the  previous  235  (or  297  222)  suspicious  deaths.  The  decision 
not  to  prosecute  Shipman  for  any  further  offenceS223  meant  that  for  the  relatives  of  his 
supposed  other  victims,  the  official  inquiry  into  the  incident  will  be  the  only  channel 
available  for  them  to  discover  what  happened.  The  inquiry  itself  generated  litigation,  the 
original  decision  to  hold  a  private  inquiry  being  overturned  on  judicial  review,  and  the 
Health  Secretary  ultimately  opting  for  a  full  judicial  inquiry  under  the  chairmanship  of  a 
224 
High  Court  judge 
Secondly,  what  has  happened  to  Shipman?  In  the  first  instance  he  was  sentenced  to 
life  imprisonment  with  the  unusual  recommendation  by  the  trial  judge  that  he  spend  the 
rest  of  his  life  behind  bars.  In  this  context,  one  can  detect  elements  of  retribution  as  well 
as  protection  of  the  public.  The  GIVIC  then  moved  quickly  to  strike  Shipman  off  the 
register  of  registered  medical  practitioners,  although  he  is  clearly  unable  to  practise 
medicine  from  inside  prison  and  consequently  not  in  a  position  to  commit  any  further 
offences  of  the  type  he  was  convicted  of. 
Whether  the  sentence  following  conviction  is  greater  (in  terms  of  impact  on  the  doctor) 
than  the  actions  of  the  other  regulators  in  response  to  the  conviction  is dependent  on  the 
severity  of  the  offence.  Here,  life  imprisonment  with  a  recommendation  of  never  being 
released  is  the  most  severe  sanction  available  to  the  state,  and  is  clearly  more 
significant  than  any  other  sanction  which  flows  from  the  conviction  (principally,  as  here, 
this  will  mean  being  "struck  off"  by  the  GIVIC).  For  less  heinous  offences,  this  may  not  be 86 
the  case.  Even  a  murderer,  in  normal  circumstances,  can  reasonably  expect  to  be 
released  from  prison  at  some  stage.  A  white-collar  criminal  with  no  previous  convictions 
can  reasonably  hope  to  avoid  a  custodial  sentence  at  all.  In  such  circumstances,  while 
the  criminal  law  has  provided  the  system  for  punishment  of  the  criminal,  the  ongoing 
protection  of  the  public  is  only  partially  served  by  this  mechanism.  The  public  protection 
function  in  such  cases  is  that,  while  the  existence  of  possible  conviction  and  sentence 
has  manifestly  failed  to  deter  the  individual  from  committing  the  offence  in  the  first  place, 
it  may  serve  to  deter  them  from  doing  it  again.  The  theory  is  underpinned  by  the  fact 
that  detection  and  conviction  are,  for  that  person,  now  more  than  a  theoretical  possibility. 
Furthermore,  detection  is  more  likely  because,  having  a  track  record,  they  are  more  likely 
to  come  under  scrutiny  and  if  they  are,  in  fact,  convicted  again  the  court  will  take  the 
previous  conviction  into  account  and  tend  to  impose  a  more  severe  sentence.  Whether 
these  suppositions  are  correct  is,  as  noted  above,  unknown  and  virtually  unknowable. 
And  whether  these  prospects  represent  more  of  a  deterrent  than  the  possibility  of  being 
struck  off/sued/dismissed  from  your  job  or  post  is,  for  precisely  the  same  reasons,  also 
unknown. 
One  thing  that  did  come  out  of  the  Shipman  case  is  that  the  criminal  law  is  a  very  good 
mechanism  for  getting  at  the  root  of  a  problem,  but  only  if  one  is  able  to  provoke  it  into 
responding  at  all.  Earlier  concerns  about  Shipman  saw  him  subjected  to  the  scrutiny  of 
the  GIVIC,  and  administrative  scrutiny  by  the  local  health  authority,  neither  of  which 
unearthed  what  was  happening.  Only  the  full  murder  investigation  did  this,  and  that  was 
only  provoked  by  Shipman's  inept  attempts  to  forge  a  will.  Earlier  complaints  to  the 
police  and  other  authorities  went  largely  unheeded.  In  terms  of  the  law's  response  to  the 
clandestine  medical  offender,  this  means  that  in  practical  terms  someone  else  really  has 
to  spot  that  something  is  amiss. 
2:  Offences  where  professional  conduct  is  reqarded  as  unlawful: 
This  category  of  offence  can  occur  where  there  is  a  time  lag  between  the  offences  being 
created  or  recognised,  and  a  medical  procedure  being  devised  which  runs  counter  to  the 
rules  of  the  criminal  law.  Sterilisation  given  above  is  an  example  of  this  -  Lord 
Denning's  dictum  in  Bravery  v  Braver/25  has  never  been  overruled,  and  the  doctor 
carrying  out  male  sterilisation  for  contraceptive  reasons  commits  an  offence.  The 
criminal  law  in  this  area  is  clearly  lagging  well  behind  developments  in  medicine,  and  in 
society  generally. 87 
A  more  common  occurrence  of  this  type  of  offence  arises  in  areas  which  may  be  emotive 
and  where  the  lack  of  any  societal  consensus  has  made  legislating  difficult.  The  trial  of 
Dr  Arthur  exemplifies  this  type  of  "offence  ",  as  did  the  trial  of  Dr  Bourne.  Both  doctors 
were  acquitted,  which  might  be  indicative  of  the  fact  that  if  what  is  done  enjoys  a  degree 
of  professional  support  then  juries  are  more  prepared  to  accept  this  than  the  formal  rule- 
makers.  Modem  juries  are,  in  this  respect,  following  in  the  ancient  tradition  of  selectively 
disapplying  formal  rules  which  they  regard  as  being  too  severe  in  the  circumstances. 
The  law  technically  does  not  countenance  or  permit  euthanasia,  but  arguably  a  jury 
recognises  what  is  happening  and  refuses  to  label  the  doctor  as  murderer  in  those 
circumstances.  In  retaining  the  jury  for  such  situations,  the  criminal  law  builds  in  a 
system  allowing  flexibility  in  application  where  adherence  to  the  strict  rules  would 
produce  what  many  would  regard  as  an  injustice.  Prosecutorial  discretion  can  achieve 
the  same  end.  It  is  also  probably  a  reflection  that  offences  failing  into  this  category  are 
controversial,  and  tend  to  relate  to  subjects  such  as  abortion  and  euthanasia  where 
there  is  no  consensus  in  society.  The  acts  of  juries  in  acquitting  in  such  cases  may,  as 
much  as  anything  else,  be  a  reflection  of  the  fact  that  criminal  courts  are  not,  nowadays, 
generally  regarded  as  the  best  place  to  debate  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  social  policy  or 
comparative  ethics.  The  trial  of  Dr  COX226  (who  injected  a  patient  with  a  lethal  dose  of 
potassium  chloride)  does  not  quite  fit  this  pattern,  since  he  was  convicted  of  attempted 
murder.  What  distinguished  Dr  Coxs  actions  from  those  of  Doctors  Adams  and  Bourne 
was  that  there  was  no  recognised  therapeutic  value  in  injecting  potassium  chloride  and 
therefore  no  scope  for  the  principle  of  double  effect  referred  to  previously.  In  the  event, 
Dr.  Cox  still  received  a  very  lenient  reaction  from  both  the  criminal  court  and  the  other 
regulatorS227. 
3:  Offences  caused  by  medical  practice  going  wrong: 
As  was  seen  above,  the  criminal  law's  involvement  in  this  type  of  offence  typically  arises 
where  a  patient  has  died  as  a  result  of  alleged  incompetence  on  the  part  of  the  doctor;  it 
could  equally  apply  in  cases  of  non-fatal  injury. 
As  to  the  test  applied  before  there  is  criminal  involvement,  we  have  seen  that  as  a 
preliminary  the  courts  will  inquire  as  to  whether  what  was  done  was  in  accordance  with  a 
body  of  professional  opinion,  Le.  apply  the  civil  test  of  quality.  Only  if  the  action  in 
question  fails  the  civil  test,  and  is  unsupported  by  any  such  body  of  opinion,  Ml  the  court 
inquire  further  to  see  if  the  failure  in  standards  was  so  bad  as  to  merit  criminal  sanction. 88 
Given  that  the  prosecuting  authorities  only  appear  to  prosecute  where  there  has  been 
loss  of  life,  and  that  the  ensuing  prosecution  is  therefore  typically  for  manslaughter,  the 
effects  of  conviction  are  always  going  to  be  quite  severe.  Even  if  the  sentence  is  light 
(as  it  typically  is  in  cases  of  medical  manslaughter),  the  trials  typically  generate  a  large 
amount  of  publicity  and,  as  with  convictions  for  clandestine  offences,  are  likely  to  invoke 
a  response  from  other  regulators.  Again,  this  other  response  might  ultimately  have  a 
more  marked  impact  on  the  doctor  than  the  criminal  sentence,  but  it  is  again  the  trigger 
of  criminal  prosecution  which  has  provoked  the  response. 
The  distinction  between  criminal  law  tests  and  civil  tests  for  the  same  malpractice  is  that 
criminal  law,  while  taking  the  civil  standard  as  a  starting  point,  goes  on  to  consider 
whether  what  has  happened  is  deserving  of  criminal  punishment.  In  this  context, 
therefore,  the  criminal  law  is  setting  the  minimum  standard  of  medical  treatment  -  the 
ground  level  below  which  it  is  not  merely  actionable  but  criminal  to  go. 
B:  Effects  on  other  regulators: 
Arguably  one  of  the  main  uses  of  the  criminal  law  in  the  field  of  medical  regulation  has 
been  to  create  offences  in  relation  to  other  regulatory  bodies.  As  we  have  seen,  it  is  an 
offence  to  carry  out  a  range  of  activities  (including  holding  yourself  out  as  a  physician) 
unless  you  are  a  properly-registered  medical  practitioner.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the 
criminal  law  is  used  to  underpin  the  jurisdiction  of  other  regulators  (principally,  of  course, 
the  GIVIC).  From  this  perspective,  the  effect  on  the  other  regulators  is  that  they  can  say 
"submit  to  our  jurisdiction  or  face  the  wrath  of  the  criminal  courts".  Whether  and  to  what 
extent  this  affects  the  effectiveness  of  that  other  mechanism  is  considered  in  the 
analysis  of  those  other  mechanisms. 
There  are,  in  fact,  very  few  parts  of  the  criminal  law  directly  impacting  on  the  functions  of 
other  regulators  acting  in  their  capacity  as  regulators.  Possibly  the  only  really  relevant 
provision  is  the  ancient  offence  of  wilful  neglect  of 
dUtY228 
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The  offence  has  been 
defined  as  follows: 
'...  a  public  officer,  who  neglects  his  duty,  violates  an  obligation  undertaken  to 
the  Sovereign  and  is  punishable  for  that  act  as  for  an  offence...  "229 
The  practical  application  of  this  is  that  someone  entrusted  with  a  regulatory  function 
could,  if  they  wilfully  fail  to  carry  out  that  function,  be  guilty  of  an  offence.  So  far  as  the 
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so  charged.  Accordingly,  it  would  appear  that  the  criminal  law  has  very  little  to  say  about 
the  activities  of  regulators. 
C:  Effects  on  patients  and  the  public: 
If  nothing  else,  the  criminal  law  is  the  final  resort  for  those  who  have  serious  concerns. 
The  problem  is  in  getting  those  concerns  taken  seriously  by  those  having  responsibility 
for  carrying  out  investigations  and  bringing  prosecutions. 
A  successful  prosecution  is  generally  welcomed  by  the  victims,  although  this  may  be 
tempered  by  unhappiness  at  what  may  be  seen  as  a  lenient  sentence.  If  the  case 
results  in  additional  official  action  aimed  at  preventing  a  recurrence,  this  too  is  likely  to 
be  welcomed. 
The  problem  is  that  the  system  disempowers  the  victim.  Someone  raises  a  concern  with 
the  authorities  (usually  the  police).  However,  if  the  police  fail  to  take  these  concerns 
seriously,  there  is  little  more  the  individual  can  do.  In  the  absence  of  official 
investigation,  private  prosecution  of  a  doctor  is  wholly  impractical.  The  prosecution 
similarly  follows  its  own  agenda,  and  victims  are  notoriously  poorly  served  by  the  criminal 
justice  systeM230.  In  essence,  the  system  treats  the  victim  of  crime  simply  as  a  potential 
witness  and  source  of  a  complaint,  with  no  status  beyond  that.  There  is  no  right  to  be 
consulted  by  investigating  or  prosecuting  authorities,  no  right  to  address  the  court  (or 
indeed  even  be  told  of  the  trial,  if  you  aren't  needed  as  a  witness),  and  no  right  to  be  told 
when  the  person  who  committed  the  offence  is  being  released  from  prison. 
However,  society  in  general  is  better  served  than  the  individual  victim.  Trials  receive 
publicity,  and  society  discovers  that  the  doctor  who  transgresses  is  duly  discovered  and 
punished.  To  what  extent  the  protection  afforded  by  the  criminal  law  is  illusory  requires 
better  data  concerning  clinical  outcomes  than  the  system  currently  generates.  Unless 
we  routinely  measure  how  good  or  bad  a  doctor  is,  we  cannot  be  sure  whether  or  not 
crimes  are  being  committed.  Whether  the  resources  such  measurement  and  monitoring 
would  take  are  regarded  as  worthwhile  will  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  doctors 
committing  crimes  are  regarded  as  aberrations  or  as  an  ongoing  and  real  possibility;  and 
even  answering  that  question  requires  more  monitoring  than  currently  takes  place. 
Whatever  the  result  of  the  debate  over  enhanced  scrutiny  of  doctors,  it  does  seem  to  be 
the  case  that  the  monitoring  system  will  not  be  a  part  of  the  criminal  justice  system,  but 
that  the  criminal  law  will  remain  to  punish  transgressions  that  the  other  mechanisms 
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VII:  Summary  and  conclusions 
A:  Purpose: 
There  are  a  number  of  purposes  apparent  in  the  analysis  of  the  criminal  law,  failing 
generally  into  the  categories  of  public  protection  and  punishment.  Criminal  law  attempts 
to  carry  out  a  number  of  functions,  viz.  providing  a  channel  for  grievances,  an 
investigatory  system,  the  regulation  of  other  regulators,  and,  in  part,  the  seffing  and 
upholding  of  standards.  The  main  function  of  the  criminal  law,  however,  remains  that  of 
punishing  wrongdoers  and  having  them  seen  to  be  punished.  The  particular  reasons  for 
the  infliction  of  this  punishment  are  as  mixed  and  variable  for  punishing  the  miscreant 
doctor  as  they  are  for  punishing  any  other  criminal  -  which  is  to  say  a  complex  and 
seldom  articulated  combination  of  deterrent,  protective  and  retributive  motives. 
B:  Mechanism: 
The  criminal  law  relies  almost  entirely  on  external  reporting  before  it  takes  cognisance  of 
alleged  criminal  acts  (taking  the  police  as  being  an  integral  part  of  the  criminal  justice 
system  for  this  purpose).  A  decision  is  then  taken  on  whether  to  prosecute  (and  if  so,  in 
which  court  and  on  which  charges).  The  trial  then  follows  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
applicable  to  crime  in  general,  and  under  the  terms  of  the  general  criminal  law.  This  can 
cause  conceptual  difficulties  in  some  cases.  Ultimately  a  verdict  is  reached;  if  the  verdict 
is  guilty,  the  stricter  evidential  rules  mean  that  the  conviction  will  be  almost  irrefutable 
evidence  of  the  facts  to  which  it  relates  for  all  other  purposes.  The  doctor  convicted  is 
then  sentenced;  in  a  conviction  for  any  charge  apart  from  murder,  this  sentence  is 
effectively  at  the  discretion  of  the  judge  as  restricted  by  the  terms  of  the  statute  creating 
the  offence  (if  a  statutory  offence)  and  the  powers  of  the  particular  court. 
C:  Effect: 
The  effects  of  the  mechanisms  we  have  outlined  are,  by  their  very  nature,  hard  to 
quantify.  If  the  deterrent  effects  of  the  criminal  law  were  perfectly  realised,  we  would 
presumably  have  no  crime.  But  it  is  very  hard,  analytically,  to  separate  this  phenomenon 
from  what  would  happen  instead  if  we  had  a  complete  failure  in  the  investigatory 
functions  of  the  criminal  law.  It  is  hard  to  say  what  is  the  absence  of  crime  as  opposed 
to  the  failure  to  detect  ft.  Certainly,  few  doctors  seem  to  be  convicted  of  serious  crime, 
although  a  disproportionate  number  of  serial  killers  appear  to  involved  in  the  medical 
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Conversely,  the  fact  that  doctors  are,  on  occasion,  convicted  in  the  courts  is  evidence 
pointing  to  the  fact  that  aspects  of  the  system  work,  and  are  seen  to  work.  Ultimately, 
the  biggest  single  effect  of  the  rare,  high  profile  medical  prosecution  may  well  be  to 
reinforce  how  unusual  such  prosecutions  are.  The  reasons  for  this  rarity  cannot,  as  we 
have  said,  be  identified  without  a  lot  more  information  on  what  actually  happens  in  the 
course  of  medical  treatment. 
D:  Comparison  with  Core  Evaluation  Criteria: 
In  Chapters  1  and  2,  we  identified  seven  core  criteria  against  which  each  segment  of  the 
medical  regulatory  framework  would  be  measured.  The  criminal  law  will  now  be 
assessed  against  each  of  the  evaluation  criteria  in  turn. 
1:  Visibilfty: 
The  purposes  for  which  the  criminal  law  exists  are  generally  highly  visible  in  terms  of 
legislative  or  judicial  declarations  about  this  or  that;  what  is  less  clear  is  how  these 
actually  translate  into  practice.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  different  parts  of  the 
system  appear  to  proceed  on  the  basis  of  different  motives. 
The  mechanisms  of  the  criminal  law  are  highly  visible.  The  substantive  content  of  the 
criminal  law  is  also  visible,  if  somewhat  opaque  to  the  non-specialist  and  difficult  for  the 
layperson  to  access.  The  nature  of  the  decision-making  bodies  and  officials  and  criteria 
for  decision-making  within  these  mechanisms,  particularly  on  issues  such  as  decisions  to 
prosecute,  are  however  almost  impossible  to  analyse  and  question.  Some  aspects, 
such  as  jury  deliberations,  are  expressly  protected  so  as  to  retain  secrecy  in  terms  of 
why  a  particular  decision  was  reached.  (Judicial  decisions,  in  contrast,  are  at  least 
generally  capable  of  being  appealed,  and  judges  are  generally  expected  to  provide 
reasons). 
The  effects  of  the  criminal  law  are  highly  visible  in  many  respects,  and  completely 
invisible  in  others.  Criminal  trials  being  conducted  in  public  are,  of  course,  very  visible  - 
but  virtually  everything  prior  to  the  trial  is  kept  a  secret.  The  existence  of  contempt  of 
court  rules,  although  intended  to  ensure  the  fairness  of  the  ensuing  criminal  trial  and 
prevent  prejudice,  can  have  the  effect  of  stifling  discussion  of  the  wider  issues  until  the 
trial  is  concluded.  In  general,  however,  the  effects  of  the  criminal  law  are  probably  best 
seen  by  their  absence  than  their  presence.  No  crime  may  look  identical  to  unidentified 
crime,  but  most  people  would,  it  is  submitted,  prefer  to  have  no  crime  than  to  have  lots 92 
of  crime  being  detected  and  punished.  It  is,  however,  true  that  at  present  we  do  not 
know  which  situation  we  are  in,  and  in  this  context  the  investigatory  systems  can  be 
cdticised. 
Overall,  the  criminal  law  is  considered  to  be  acceptable  in  terms  of  visibility,  although 
there  is  scope  for  improvement  in  terms  of  the  openness  of  investigating  and 
prosecuting  authorities. 
2:  Accountability: 
There  are  differences  in  the  degree  of  accountability  of  those  who  operate  the  existing 
system,  some  of  which  are  inescapable  due  to  the  nature  of  the  system 
At  the  highest  level,  responsibility  for  the  passing  of  criminalising  (or  decriminalising) 
legislation  lies  with  Parliament,  which  is  accountable  to  the  general  public  through  the 
normal  mechanism  of  the  ballot  box.  "Law  and  order"  is  a  staple  election  debate, 
although  this  typically  relates  more  to  the  numbers  of  police  on  the  beat  and  whether 
crime  figures  are  rising  or  falling  than  to  the  particular  terms  of  criminal  legislation.  In 
Chapter  2  it  was  suggested  that  the  theory  of  parliamentary  scrutiny  led  to  an  illusory 
system  of  oversight,  and  nothing  in  the  debate  over  the  criminal  law  gives  cause  to 
detract  from  that  conclusion. 
The  prosecuting  and  investigating  authorities  are,  in  general,  only  subject  to 
administrative  control  from  within  their  own  departments,  although  the  recent  removal  of 
blanket  immunity  for  negligent  investigation  of  crime  231  might  improve  accountability  in 
time. 
The  judges  who  make  many  of  the  key  decisions  in  the  criminal  law  are,  by  definition, 
not  accountable  for  their  decisions.  In  the  particular  sphere  of  judicial  independence, 
this  is  unsurprising  since  a  judge  accountable  for  his  or  her  decisions  is  unlikely  to  be 
classed  as  impartial.  This  is  not  to  say  there  should  be  no  redress  against  judges  who 
reach  unpopular  and/or  perverse  decisions.  In  the  UK,  this  is  provided  for  by  means  of 
recourse  to  the  appellate  courts,  with  review  commissions  and  the  possibility  of 
Executive  pardon  as  the  long-stop  guarantors  of  the  rights  of  the  accused.  The  rights  of 
victims  are  not  similarly  protected,  although  it  is  accepted  that  any  move  in  the  direction 
of  victims'  rights  can  impact  adversely  on  the  accused  and  that  a  difficult  balancing 
exercise  is  required.  While  criticism  can  be  levelled  at  individual  judges,  it  is  difficult  to 
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recognising  that  improvements  are  possible,  it  is  concluded  that  the  judicial  aspects  of 
the  system  are  adequately  (if  poorly)  accountable;  however,  the  other  aspects  of  the 
system  are  regarded  as  being  deficient  in  this  respect. 
3:  Overall  Fairness: 
As  explained  in  Chapter  2,  the  category  of  overall  fairness  incorporates  a  number  of 
aspects  including  impartiality,  accessibility,  and  speed  of  decision-making.  In  relation  to 
the  criminal  law,  all  these  issues  arise. 
Firstly,  the  courts  are  generally  taken  to  be  the  epitome  of  impartial  decision  making. 
Whether  one  agrees  with  that  assertion  or  not,  it  is  true  that  the  courts  are  institutionally 
designed  so  as  to  be  as  impartial  as  any  piece  of  state  apparatus  can  be.  They  are 
therefore  deemed  to  satisfy  the  "impartiality"  limb  of  this  criterion. 
As  regards  accessibility,  there  is  the  possible  difficulty  Of  getting  the  authorities  to 
respond  to  allegations  or  complaints.  Any  failure  in  terms  of  accessibility  is,  however,  as 
result  of  the  failure  in  accountability  within  that  part  of  the  system,  so  no  criticism  is 
made  under  this  heading. 
In  terms  of  speed,  there  are  time  limits  within  which  prosecutions  must  be  brought.  For 
common  law  offences  with  no  formal  time  limit,  the  incorporation  of  Article  6  of  the 
European  Convention  means  that  all  trials  must  be  brought  within  a  reasonable  time. 
There  is  therefore  no  problem  under  this  heading  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  accused, 
although  prolonged  investigations  may  be  distressing  for  victims  and  complainers. 
Overall,  however,  the  system  seems  adequate  in  respect  of  the  applicable  timescales. 
In  terms  of  fairness  generally,  persons  who  face  criminal  prosecution  enjoy  all  the 
safeguards  found  in  Article  6,  and  any  remaining  unfairness  within  the  system  is  unlikely 
to  survive  the  inception  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  for  long.  However,  we  have 
already  considered  the  lack  of  rights  enjoyed  by  victims  and  complainers,  who  could  well 
argue  that  the  system  is  unfairly  weighted  against  them.  Ultimately,  this  is  a  policy 
decision  involving  balancing  competing  rights.  While  recognising  that  much  could  be 
done  to  improve  the  status  of  victims  within  the  criminal  justice  system  (and  in  particular, 
there  appears  to  be  no  good  reason  for  not  implementing  measures  having  no  adverse 
effect  on  the  accused,  such  as  court  date  notification)  these  measures  are  peripheral  to 
the  central  functions  of  the  criminal  law.  Accordingly,  the  criminal  law  is  deemed  to 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  overall  fairness. OA 
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4:  Effectiveness: 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  practical  effects  of  the  criminal  law  are,  in  some 
respects,  unquantifiable.  This  section  is  therefore  concerned  only  with  the  quantifiable 
effects.  From  what  we  can  observe,  does  the  criminal  law  do  what  it  sets  out  to 
achieve? 
The  answer  here  would  appear  to  be  yes:  the  c6minal  law  has  mechanisms  in  place  to 
describe  what  is  or  is  not  acceptable  conduct,  how  to  determine  if  someone  has 
committed  unacceptable  conduct  if  they  dispute  the  allegation,  and  a  system  of  means 
of  disposal  aimed  at  punishing  the  criminal  and  deterring  him/her  and  others  from  any 
future  wrongdoing.  While  the  deterrent  goal  in  particular  is  imperfectly  realised,  the 
other  aspects  manifestly  perform  their  assigned  functions.  Crimes  are  reported, 
evidence  gathered  and  presented  in  court,  verdicts  passed  and  sentences  handed 
down.  Whether  this  activity  reduces  the  incidence  of  crime  in  the  medical  sphere  is  a 
different  question,  as  is  the  question  of  whether  the  investigatory  systems  could  do  more 
to  discover  crime.  However,  the  criminal  law,  as  noted  above,  sets  the  minimum 
threshold  for  acceptable  standards  of  medical  practice.  There  would,  it  is  submitted,  be 
a  need  for  this  standard  even  if  no  medical  crime  ever  actually  took  place.  While  the 
content  of  the  standard  laid  down  may  be  hard  for  the  non-specialist  to  ascertain,  the 
standard  is  there  and  can  be  discovered.  In  general,  therefore,  it  is  considered  that  the 
criminal  law  is  sufficiently  effective. 
5:  Efficiengy: 
Criminal  courts  are  expensive.  Harold  Shipman's  tdal  lasted  four  months,  requidng  the 
presence  of  judge,  jury,  court  officials,  solicitors  and  counsel  for  both  prosecution  and 
defence,  police,  witnesses  and  relatives  of  the  deceased  to  be  present  for  that  time. 
The  costs  of  such  trials  easily  run  into  millions  of  pounds. 
Are  courts  efficient?  The  organisation  of  criminal  courts  is  centred  on  judicial  time  on  the 
bench,  which  can  lead  to  inefficiencies:  huge  amounts  of  lawyer  and  witness  time  can 
be  wasted  waiting  for  a  judge  to  become  available.  This  stems  from  the  court  officials' 
experience  in  estimating  that  a  certain  proportion  of  both  criminal  trials  and  civil  proofs 
will  not  proceed  due  to  last  minute  settlements  or  plea  bargains,  or  the  failure  of  a  key 
party  or  witness  to  appear.  With  this  knowledge  behind  them,  the  court  lists  are  drawn 
up  featuring  far  more  cases  than  the  available  judges  can  possibly  hear.  It  is  when  the 
estimate  as  to  non-proceeding  matters  is  not  right  that  delays  occur.  While  a  system 95 
which  would  always  prefer  parties  to  sort  matters  out  by  themselves  will  inevitably  have 
a  degree  of  slack  being  generated,  the  system  of  over-subscribing  the  court  lists  does 
not  seem  to  be  the  best  response  to  this.  Judicial  time  on  the  bench  may  be  maximised, 
but  this  is  at  the  expense  of  the  far  greater  number  of  people  whose  time  is  not  used 
efficiently.  It  is  therefore  concluded  that  the  criminal  law  is  not  efficient. 
6-.  Avoidance  of  undue  influence  with  good  medical  practice: 
It  is  necessary  to  subdivide  this  category  somewhat,  to  reflect  the  different  ways  in  which 
doctors  come  into  the  realm  of  the  criminal  law. 
Firstly,  where  the  doctor's  offence  is  clandestine  and  committed  under  the  guise  of 
medical  treatment,  it  would  seem  unarguable  that  the  functions  of  the  criminal  law  do  not 
interfere  with  good  medical  practice.  It  may  be  that  future  steps  intended  to  prevent 
clandestine  offending  by  doctors  turn  out  to  be  so  intrusive  or  time-consuming  as  to 
interfere  with  good  medical  practice,  but  no-one  appears  to  have  suggested  that  that  is 
the  case  at  present. 
Secondly,  where  the  offence  arises  because  medical  activity  has  gone  wrong,  again  i 
seems  unarguable  that  there  should  be  a  standard  below  which  it  is  criminal  to  continue 
acting,  and  vVithin  the  definition  of  good  medical  practice  given  in  Chapter  2,  nothing  in 
the  criminal  laws  response  to  this  form  of  conduct  appears  objectionable. 
Thirdly,  we  have  the  category  of  offence  which  is  committed  (or  at  least  prosecuted) 
because  while  the  conduct  of  the  doctor  is  supported  by  a  body  of  opinion  within  the 
medical  profession  (or  by  a  body  of  public  opinion),  it  is  not  conduct  currently  recognised 
as  being  lawful.  Does  the  criminal  law  serve  to  interfere  vOth  good  medical  practice  in 
this  category?  To  answer  this,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  definition  adopted  in 
Chapter  2:  "good  medical  practice"  means  medical  activity  which  is  demonstrably  of 
clinical  benefit  to  the  patient,  and  which  is  the  course  of  treatment  which,  if  the  patient 
could  be  brought  up  to  the  level  of  knowledge  concerning  that  treatment  as  the  doctor 
treating  him  or  her  (or  alternatively,  of  a  "reasonable"  doctor),  the  patient  would  have 
chosen  for  him-  or  herself.  Whether  the  criminal  law's  involvement  in  the  areas  we  are 
currently  considering  violates  that  principle  will  depend  on  the  specifics  of  the 
intervention  in  question.  Thus,  if  we  consider  whether  a  non-lifesaving  abortion  can  be 
preformed  on  a  14  year-old  rape  victim,  the  relative  complication  rates  of  continued 
pregnancy  and  childbirth  versus  medically-performed  abortion  point  clearly  in  favour  of 
abortion  (assuming,  of  course,  that  that  is  what  the  patient  wants);  and  a  criminal  law 96 
preventing  this  from  happening  is  in  conflict  with  this  principle.  Other  examples  are 
perhaps  less  clear;  the  non-treatment  of  a  severely  handicapped  neonate,  for  instance, 
is  now  supposed  to  be  based  on  the  best  interests  of  the  child  (recognising  that  this  is  a 
difficult  test  to  apply  for  a  neonate)  and  if  property  applied  actually  incorporates  all  the 
substantive  elements  of  good  medical  practice.  The  criminal  law,  in  adopting  this  test, 
thus  avoids  interfering  with  good  medical  practice  as  here  defined.  Consensual  non 
therapeubc  injury  is  currently  illegal,  but  none  of  the  reported  cases  appear  to  involve 
medical  practitioners.  One  can  only  speculate  as  to  how  the  criminal  courts  would 
respond  to  the  doctor,  reported  recently  in  the  media,  who  agreed  to  amputate  the 
healthy  limb  of  a  person  suffering  from  a  mental  disorder  which  caused  them  to  want  the 
limb  removed;  ultimately,  the  doctor  was  not  prosecuted.  On  general  principles,  a 
criminal  offence  would  be  committed  unless  the  procedure  could  be  shown  to  be  of 
benefit  to  the  patient  -  presumably  psychological  benefit,  as  it  was  plainly  of  physical 
disbenefit.  (On  a  separate  aspect,  one  might  also  question  the  person's  mental  capacity 
to  give  a  valid  consent  in  these  circumstances;  capacity  is  considered  in  Chapter  4  infra.  ) 
Following  this,  the  activity  would  be  illegal  if  of  no  benefit  (but  would  also  then  fall  outwith 
our  definition  of  good  medical  practice),  and  legal  if  it  were  of  benefit  (which  would  also 
mean  it  fell  into  our  definition).  Accordingly,  it  appears  that  again  there  is  no  undue 
interference  with  good  medical  practice.  This  is  subject  to  the  caveat  that  while  these 
examples  all  satisfy  this  evaluation  criterion,  it  is  a  very  case-specific  area  and  the 
criminalisation  of  other  procedures  could  violate  this  principle. 
7:  Respect  for  patient  autonom 
As  we  have  seen,  the  criminal  law  of  assault  is  the  main  way  in  which  the  laws  of  the  UK 
uphold  the  principle  of  physical  autonomy.  However,  closer  scrutiny  of  the  substantive 
and  procedural  rules  of  the  criminal  law  requires  a  certain  amount  of  backtracking  from 
this  starting  point.  Thus,  the  concept  of  criminalising  "victimless"  crimes,  such  as 
consensual  sadomasochistic  practices,  is  putting  an  imposed  societal  norm  above  the 
individual's  autonomy.  The  investigative  machinery  underpinning  the  criminal  law  is  also 
capable  of  carrying  out  intrusive  surveillance  and  searches,  seriously  impacting  on  both 
the  physical  integrity  and  also  the  informational  autonoMY232  of  those  affected233. 
In  terms  of  patients  as  victims  of  crime,  as  noted  above  the  system  substantially 
disempowers,  the  victim,  and  this  is  also  showing  a  clear  disregard  of  respect  for  patient 
autonomy. 97 
Accordingly,  this  section  concludes  that  while  ostensibly  protecting  patient  autonomy 
through  the  substantive  criminal  law,  the  criminal  law  provides  inadequate  safeguards 
for  autonomy  as  a  result  of  defects  and  shortcomings  in  its  procedural  side. 
E:  Conclusions: 
The  criminal  law  appears  to  have  a  role  in  medical  regulation  which  is  at  once  peripheral 
and  crucial.  It  is  peripheral  insofar  as  there  is  no  body  of  specifically  medical  criminal 
law,  and  the  criminal  law's  involvement  in  medical  regulation  involves  the  application 
(sometimes  in  a  very  strained  way)  of  rules  of  general  applicability.  It  is  central  because 
in  the  final  measure  it  is  the  criminal  law  which  defines  the  bedrock  standard  of  medical 
care,  and  which  punishes  the  most  severe  examples  of  breaches  by  medical 
professionals  of  the  rules  which  govem  their  conduct. 
The  activities  of  the  criminal  law  in  carrying  out  these  tasks  are  highly  visible,  although 
there  is  much  which  is  decided  behind  the  scenes  and  is  not  subject  to  public  scrutiny, 
and  the  contents  of  the  law  are  hard  to  ascertain  in  some  areas.  While  the  possibility  of 
making  an  allegation  of  criminal  conduct  is  open  to  anyone,  what  then  happens  is 
outwith  the  individual's  control  and  cannot  be  challenged  effectively.  The  system  places 
no  particular  importance  on  victims  as  anything  other  than  potential  witnesses.  While 
the  court  system  itself  is  scrupulously  fair  to  the  person  accused,  there  are  certain 
aspects  of  the  system  which  could  be  improved  from  a  victim  perspective  without 
impacting  on  that  fairness  in  any  way.  The  court  system  itself  does  get  the  job  done, 
and  is  therefore  effective,  although  it  seems  to  be  extremely  inefficient  in  how  it  goes 
about  achieving  these  functions. 
In  substantive  terms,  the  criminal  law  does  not,  in  general,  interfere  with  good  medical 
practice,  although  both  substantive  and  procedural  rules  can  overrule  individual 
autonomy  in  some  ways  -  despite  a  fundamental  starting  point  of  respecting  that  same 
autonomy.  The  courts  themselves  are,  in  practical  terms,  unaccountable  although  there 
is  an  inherent  conflict  here  between  accountability  and  the  independence  and 
impartiality  required  of  decision-makers.  Arguably  the  pendulum  has  swung  too  far  in 
the  direction  of  structural  independence  resulting  in  too  little  accountability. 
Earlier  in  the  chapter,  we  identified  the  regulatory  tasks  undertaken  by  the  criminal  law 
as  being  the  provision  of  channels  to  permit  grievances  to  be  aired  and  disputes 
resolved,  elements  of  setting  (and  upholding)  standards  of  medical  practice,  the 
provision  of  systems  of  investigation  to  inquire  into  whether  standards  are  being  adhered 98 
to  or  not,  and  (most  obviously)  the  punishment  of  those  who  fail  to  adhere  to  the 
standards.  Closer  scrutiny  indicates  that  the  criminal  law  does  not  appear  to  play  a 
significant  part  in  policing  the  rest  of  the  regulatory  system,  although  it  is  used  to 
underpin  those  other  parts.  While  achieving  these  goals  tolerably  well,  there  is  scope  for 
improvement. 
Firstly,  the  standing  of  victims  could  easily  be  improved,  in  accordance  with  our  notions 
of  respect  for  autonomy.  Some  moves  in  this  area  (such  as  having  victim  impact 
statements)  could  conceivably  have  an  adverse  impact  on  the  accused,  but  others  such 
as  simple  notification  of  court  dates  would  not.  Improving  the  way  in  which  courts 
operate  so  as  to  minimise  the  amount  of  time  wasted  by  everyone  involved  would 
benefit  everybody,  but  it  might  actually  be  necessary  to  spend  more  to  achieve  the 
desired  efficiency  savings  (recalling  that  "most  efficient"  does  not  necessarily  equate  to 
"cheapest"). 
The  accountability  of  many  of  those  involved  is  inadequate  and  decisions  by  prosecutors 
and  investigators  are  both  hidden  and  hard  to  challenge.  Whether  freedom  of 
information  laws  will  change  this  is  as  yet  uncertain,  but  the  exemptions  in  both  the 
UK  234  and  the  Scottish  235  legislation  would  be  permissive  of  allowing  a  culture  of  secrecy 
in  these  organisations  to  continue.  These  measures  are  considered  further  in  Chapter 
6.  Judicial  accountability  is  another  problem  area,  but  it  may  be  that  this  aspect  is 
irreconcilable  with  fairness  to  the  accused. 
Finally,  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  in  European  jurisprudence  that  criminal  laws  should 
be 
"...  formulated  with  sufficient  precision  to  enable  any  person  to  foresee  to  a 
reasonable  degree  the  consequences  of  his  acts.  ji 
236 
As  was  seen  above,  particularly  in  relation  to  those  activities  defensible  in  medical  terms 
but  which  nonetheless  resulted  in  prosecution,  there  is  a  degree  of  uncertainty  within  the 
existing  criminal  law.  It  may  be  that  codification  of  the  criminal  law  is  a  better  way  to 
ensure  that  the  content  of  the  criminal  law  is  more  easily  accessible  to  those  who  are 
bound  by  its  terms. 99 
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Chapter  4:  Civil  Law: 
lntroducfion 
This  chapter  will  analyse  the  functions  of  civil  litigation  as  a  regulatory  tool.  It  seeks  to 
determine  what  effect  the  existence  of  litigation  has  on  medical  activity,  and  what  role 
litigation  has  in  solving  disputes  between  doctors  and  patients.  It  does  not  seek  to 
provide  a  comprehensive  study  of  medical  law  as  shown  by  litigation;  which  would 
merely  duplicate  work  done  by  others.  Detailed  analysis  of  the  medico-legal  and 
bioethical  issues  underlying  the  bulk  of  the  litigation  has  no  direct  bearing  on  the 
regulation  of  medicine  as  it  stands  and  therefore  lies  outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
This  chapter  is  restricted  to  analysing  the  content  of  medical  case  law  which  directly 
regulates  how  medicine  is  practised,  or  which  substantially  affects  the  relationship 
between  doctor  and  patient. 
In  terms  of  scope,  this  chapter  only  considers  civil  litigation,  i.  e.  the  law  regulating, 
"Civil  wrongs,  which  lead  not  to  a  criminal  prosecution  but  to  civil  proceedings 
for  damages  or  other  private  redress...  [A]II  legal  proceedings  that  are  not 
criminal  are  civil.  Civil  proceedings  are  the  residual  class.  "  1 
As  we  will  see,  civil  litigation  encompasses  both  traditional  "private"  law  actions,  as  well 
as  "public"  law  forms  of  action.  These  public  law  forms  of  action  may  occasionally  be 
used  for  essentially  private  purposes,  and  vice  versa;  this  is  discussed  later.  This 
chapter  focuses  almost  exclusively  on  common  law  rights  and  liabilities,  direct  statutory 
regulation  being  considered  in  Chapter  6.  However,  breach  of  statutory  duty  and  rights 
arising  from,  or  curtailed  by,  specific  statutes  are  considered  within  this  chapter  where 
appropriate. 
Lastly,  while  the  justiciability  of  the  other  regulatory  mechanisms  studied  is  considered  at 
greater  length  within  the  chapters  discussing  those  mechanisms,  it  is  also  discussed 
here  in  the  context  of  analysing  litigation's  role  in  performing  the  regulatory  task  of 
ensuring  that  other  parts  of  the  regulatory  system  are  functioning  properly. 
11:  The  Basic  Functions  of  Litiqation: 
A:  Background: Litigation  has  been  defined  as: 
"1:  The  act  or  process  of  bringing  a  lawsuit; 
2:  To  engage  in  legal  proceedings.  "2 
ill 
The  twofold  distinction  here  is  important.  A  lawsuit  can  be  seen  as  a  contest  between 
two  (or  more)  parties  in  dispute,  whereas  legal  proceedings  do  not  necessarily  require  an 
adversary.  As  will  be  seen,  both  forms  have  played  a  role  in  regulating  medicine.  But 
what  is  important  are  the  words  "law"  and  "legal".  Litigation  necessarily  entails  recourse 
to  an  adjudicator  who  will  apply  a  specific  set  of  rules  to  the  problem  presented. 
Precisely  what  the  rules  are,  and  who  makes  and  applies  them  will  vary  with  time  and 
place. 
Litigation  originally  entailed  petitioning  the  king  (or  equivalent)  for  a  remedy  not  open  to 
the  ordinary  individual.  A  consistent  feature  of  the  development  of  legal  systems  is  the 
successive  appropriation  of  remedies  against  perceived  wrongs  away  from  the 
individual,  and  granting  them  instead  to  the  state  as  represented  by  its  courts.  Referring 
specifically  to  the  situation  in  early  Rome,  Thomas  noted  that: 
".  Jt  is  fairly  clear  that  the  original  mode  of  redressing  grievances  was  self- 
help.  Naturally,  with  the  slightest  degree  of  political  development,  such 
redress  becomes  undesirable;  hence,  the  parties  agree  to  submit  their 
problem  for  decision  to  a  third  person,  the  state  -  initially  through  the  king  - 
merely  seeing  in  the  first  place  that  here  is  such  a  dispute  needing  to  be 
resolved.  Of  course,  it  became  established  that  parties  must  resort  to 
n3  litigation  rather  than  indulge  in  self-help... 
Thus,  the  earliest  Roman  legislation,  the  Twelve  Tables,  (c.  450  BC)  allowed  an  armed 
thief  caught  red-handed  to  be  killed  by  his  "victim.  "  However,  later  legislation  and  judicial 
decisions  successively  reduced  the  scope  of  this  power,  which  ultimately  became  the 
right  to  demand  a  monetary  penalty  from  the  thief.  At  the  same  time  as  remedies 
available  to  individuals  were  restricted,  so  too  the  laws  applied  by  the  decision-makers 
became  more  formalised  and  complex.  In  Rome,  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  rules 
(itself  largely  a  product  of  increased  commercial  activity)  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  a 
class  of  jurists.  These  jurists  were  not,  on  the  whole,  judges,  but  merely  advised  the 
judges  on  points  of  law: 112 
"...  the  emperors'  role  came  clearly  to  be  that  of  the  chief  magistrate,  and  as 
they  acquired  a  jurisdiction  both  at  first  instance  and  on  appeal,  they  too 
called  on  the  legal  expertise  of  the  jurists,  and  included  such  men  in  their 
councils.  "4 
Much  of  what  is  now  regarded  as  a  matter  for  the  civil  courts  was,  therefore,  originally 
criminal  in  nature.  While  Roman  civil  law  (at  least  for  personal  injuries)  never  shook  off 
its  roots,  both  Scots  and  English  law  have  developed  considerably5.  It  is,  however, 
interesting  to  note  two  developments  which  have  (re)created  a  degree  of  overlap  in 
recent  years.  Firstly,  the  Criminal  Injuries  Compensation  Scheme,  established  in  1964 
by  Crown  prerogative,  makes  ex  gratia  payments  to  the  victims  of  violent  crime. 
Secondly,  the  Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act  1980  Part  IV6(in  Scotland)  and  the  Powers 
of  the  Criminal  Courts  Act  1973  (in  England)  allow  criminal  courts  to  make  compensation 
orders  to  the  victims  of  violent  crime,  payable  by  the  offender.  Any  subsequent  civil 
claim,  or  payment  under  the  compensation  scheme,  will  be  reduced  by  the  amount  of 
the  order7. 
In  the  modem  context,  then,  what  are  the  purposes  of  litigation?  Williams  and  Hepple 
summarise  them  as  follows: 
1:  To  give  the  plaintiff  what  the  defendant  has  promised  him,  or  at  least  to 
give  him  damages  for  not  getting  what  the  defendant  has  promised. 
2:  To  compensate  for  harm,  or  to  prevent  the  continuance  or  repetition  of 
harm. 
3:  To  restore  to  a  person  what  another  has  unjustly  obtained  at  his  expense. 
4:  To  punish  for  wrongs  and  to  deter  from  wrongdoing. 
5:  To  decide  the  rights  of  the  parties. 
6:  To  decide  or  alter  a  person's  status.  " 
From  a  Scottish  perspective,  Walker  notes  that  "Civil  proceedings  are  undertaken  to 
obtain  a  civil  remedy"  "  and  then  lists  ten  types  of  civil  remedy  competent  in  the  Scottish 
courts.  Elsewhere,  he  expands  on  this  by  stating  that 
"A  claim  for  a  remedy  implies  the  existence  of  a  prior  legal  right,  and 
infringement  thereof,  or  a  prior  legal  duty  and  non-implementation  thereof.  fv  10 
Of  the  remedies  which  can  be  claimed,  we  shall  see  that  an  action  for  monetary 
compensation,  or  damages,  is  generally  the  most  important  in  the  medico-legal  sphere". 113 
The  civil  law  we  are  considering  is  not  an  undivided  whole,  but  can  usefully  be  broken 
into  a  number  of  distinct  categories.  This,  public  law  broadly  speaking  regulates  the 
relationship  between  the  citizen  and  the  state,  and,  in  a  more  general  sense,  regulates 
the  structure  of  the  state  itself  (although  this  is  more  usually  thought  of  as  constitutional 
law).  Private  law  regulates  the  affairs  of  citizens  inter  se.  Both  branches  are  of 
relevance  to  the  medical  setting:  doctors  and  patients,  as  individuals,  have  private  law 
duties  to,  and  rights  against,  each  other,  enforceable  by  the  courts.  The  NHS,  under 
which  most  treatment  takes  place,  is  susceptible  to  public  law  remedies  which  may  be  of 
value  to  the  individual  patient.  As  will  be  seen  below,  it  is  possible  to  use  public  law 
procedures  to  redress  (or  at  least  address)  private  law  issues,  and  vice  versa.  This 
overlap  has  led  Kennedy  and  Grubb  to  assert  that, 
"Medical  law  does  not  respect  the  traditional  compartments  with  which 
lawyers  have  become  familiar,  such  as  torts,  contracts,  criminal  law,  family 
law  and  public  law.  Instead,  medical  law  cuts  across  all  of  these  subjects  and 
today  must  be  regarded  as  a  subject  in  its  own  right.  "  12 
They  subsequently  refine  their  position  by  stating  that: 
"There  are  common  issues  which  permeate  all  the  problems  which  arise  [in 
medical  law]:  respect  for  autonomy,  consent,  truth-telling,  confidentiality, 
respect  for  personhood  and  persons,  respect  for  dignity  and  respect  for 
justice...  Until  these  common  themes  are  recognised  and  reflected  in  legal 
thinking  and  analysis,  a  coherent  approach  to  the  emerging  problems  in 
medical  law  will  be  difficult...  The  unifying  legal  theme  is,  to  us,  that  of  human 
rights.  In  our  view,  therefore,  medical  law  is  a  subset  of  human  rights  law.  "  13 
The  Kennedy-Grubb  conceptual  approach  may  provide  a  new  dimension  for  analysis  of 
future  case  law,  but  its  value  in  an  analysis  of  the  current  law  is  restricted  to  providing  a 
critique  of  the  extent  to  which  the  law  effectively  upholds  or  neglects  the  rights  which  the 
idea  of  'human  rights'  would  tend  to  presuppose.  For  purposes  of  the  present  analysis, 
therefore,  a  more  traditional  approach  to  classification  is  adopted. 
This  approach  involves  deriving  the  present  rules  regarding  medical  practice  from  more 
general  rules  of  common  law  (particularly  Scots  common  law),  although  it  should  be 
noted  that  present-day  medical  law  has  also  been  affected  by  a  number  of  statutes 
amending  the  common  law  position.  The  majority  of  cases  which  make  up  "British" 
medical  law  have  been  decided  by  English  courts,  applying  English  law.  There  is, 114 
however,  considerable  inter-reliance  between  the  two  jurisdictions  on  this  subject,  and 
this  thesis  proceeds  on  the  basis  that  it  is  fair  to  assimilate  them  into  one  more  generally- 
applicable  whole.  Where  substantial  (as  opposed  to  procedural)  differences  exist,  these 
are  generally  explained,  or  at  least  referred  to;  otherwise,  the  law  as  described  can  be 
regarded  as  applying  equally  to  both  systems,  irrespective  of  the  historical  origins  and 
legal  reasoning  behind  the  decisions  actually  reached. 
B:  Types  of  action: 
A  multitude  of  types  of  action  exist.  These  range  from  actions  seeking  to  enforce 
commercial  contracts  to  actions  aimed  at  ending  a  marriage.  This  thesis  is  principally 
only  concerned  with  a  small  number  of  these  types. 
The  most  important  is  the  action  for  personal  injury,  whereby  the  person  claiming  to  have 
been  injured  alleges  that  the  injury  was  caused  by  someone  else.  The  personal  injury 
action  is  essentially  a  call  to  the  court  to  agree  with  the  claimant  that  someone  else  was 
to  blame,  and  to  order  that  other  person  to  make  up  for  the  injury  caused.  The  person 
claiming  is  variously  known  as  the  claimant  (as  under  the  new  English  Civil  Procedure 
Rules),  the  plaintiff  (under  the  older  English  rules  and  still  in  various  Commonwealth 
countries),  pursuer  (in  Scotland),  applicant  or  petitioner  (in  certain  specialised 
applications  to  the  court).  The  person  against  whom  the  claim  is  made  is  the 
respondent,  defendant,  or  defender.  If  there  is  an  appeal,  the  names  change  (usually  to 
appellant  and  respondent,  or,  in  Scotland,  to  reclaimer  and  respondent).  Personal  injury 
actions  are  based  on  the  law  of  tort  or  delict  (also  known  as  reparation).  These  areas  of 
the  law  are  wider  than  just  physical  injury,  however,  and  encompass  more  generally  the 
notion  of  having  suffered  a  legal  wrong  which  can  include  damage  to  property  or  hurt  to 
your  reputation.  Even  the  law  of  reparation  can  be  seen  as  a  sub-set  of  the  wider  law  of 
obligations:  reparation  covers  obligations  adsing  by  force  of  law,  whereas  other 
branches  deal  with  obligations  entered  into  voluntarily.  The  law  of  contract  (which 
occasionally  appears  in  the  medical  sphere)  is  one  such  area. 
The  second  main  type  of  action  we  are  concerned  with  is  the  declaratory  action  whereby 
application  is  made  to  the  court  seeking  advance  clarification  from  the  courts  as  to  the 
legality  of  a  proposed  course  of  action.  Declaratory  actions  are  something  of  an 
exception  to  the  rule  that  the  courts  are  only  interested  in  resolving  real  disputes,  not 
theoretical  ones  or  academic  points.  Declaratory  actions  sometimes  face  the  difficulty 
that  there  is  no-one  actively  opposing  the  action.  The  courts  typically  adjudicate 
between  competing  parties,  and  prefer  to  have  both  sides  of  the  argument  put  to  them. 115 
In  a  large  number  of  these  actions  there  is  therefore  an  appearance  by  a  government- 
appointed  legal  officer  (such  as  the  Lord  Advocate  or  Official  Solicitor)  who  is  appointed 
to  resist  the  application  and  provide  an  adversary. 
The  third  type  of  action  is  the  action  for  judicial  review.  The  nature  of  judicial  review  as  a 
theoretical  construct,  and  its  place  as  a  necessary  component  of  constitutional  law,  was 
described  by  Lord  Fraser  in  Brown  v  Hamilton  District  Counciý4.  It  is  a  legal  action 
which,  in  general,  can  only  be  raised  against  a  public  sector  body  such  as  central  or 
local  government.  Judicial  review  is  the  public  law  process  whereby  the  courts  scrutinise 
the  activities  of  quasi-judicial  and  administrative  bodies  to  ensure  that  these  bodies 
adhere  to  the  precepts  of  "natural  law"  and  do  not  exceed  or  abuse  their  jurisdiction.  In 
15  England  judicial  review  is  only  competent  in  the  High  Court 
. 
In  Scotland,  judicial  review 
may  only  be  sought  in  the  Court  of  Session 
16 
and  is  based  on  the  Court's  inherent  power 
17  to  supervise  the  activities  of  inferior  courts,  tribunals,  and  administrative  bodies 
C:  Regulatory  functions: 
Before  moving  off  consideration  of  the  purposes  of  litigation  it  is  worth  noting  that  the 
descriptions  just  given  are  from  the  perspective  of  academic  commentators.  The  judges 
themselves  occasionally  express  views  as  to  their  own  perception  of  their  task;  thus, 
Thorpe  U  once  described  the  court's  role  in  declaring  the  legality  or  otherwise  of 
proposed  courses  of  treatment  for  people  lacking  capacity  as  follows: 
"One  of  the  important  functions  of  the  judge  is  to  instil  into  the  situation  certainty 
and  finality  which  the  family  may  well  have  difficulty  in  adjusting  to  but  which  they 
can  at  least  accept  as  the  judgment  of  the  appointed  impartial  authority.  Equally 
it  is  the  function  of  the  judge  to  protect  the  medical  professionals  from  the  threat 
of  criminal  or  civil  proceedings  as  a  consequence  of  the  exercise  of  their  best 
endeavours.  "  "' 
The  description  of  medical  litigation  which  follows  attempts  to  describe  the  law  as 
currently  understood,  but  it  is  an  evolving  discipline.  Predicting  the  outcome  of  the  very 
small  minority  of  disputes  which  actually  find  their  way  to  the  civil  courts  is  notoriously 
difficult. 
Having  seen  what  the  different  types  of  action  of  relevance  to  medical  regulation  are,  it 
is  necessary  to  consider  what  regulatory  tasks  these  actions  may  be  attempting  to  fulfil. 116 
The  answer  to  this  question  varies  somewhat  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  action  in 
question,  but  a  number  of  points  of  general  application  can  be  discerned. 
Firstly,  the  personal  injury  action:  this  can  be  seen  to  provide  elements  of  most  of  the 
regulatory  tasks  identified  in  Chapter  2.  The  personal  injury  action  has,  in  the  medical 
sphere,  come  to  be  a  means  of  seeking  and  providing  compensation  where  the  medical 
treatment  in  question  has  fallen  below  the  acceptable  standard  (how  "acceptable"  is 
defined  is  considered  infra).  Thus,  while  the  principle  objective  is  the  provision  of  a 
system  of  redress  for  those  who  suffer  due  to  a  failure  to  adhere  to  acceptable 
standards,  the  nature  of  the  action  brings  with  it  a  number  of  peripheral  functions. 
Firstly,  there  is  clearly  an  element  of  setting  and  upholding  standards,  since  these 
standards  provide  the  yardstick  for  compensation  claims.  Secondly,  the  adversarial 
fault-based  nature  of  civil  litigation  means  that  it  is for  the  person  seeking  compensation 
to  prove  that  someone  is  at  fault.  This  means  civil  litigation  incorporates  mechanisms  to 
facilitate  the  acquisition  and  leading  of  evidence  intended  to  prove  or  disprove  the 
allegations,  which  can  be  seen  as  the  provision  of  a  system  of  investigation  into  whether 
standards  are  being  adhered  to.  The  act  of  bringing  civil  court  proceedings  can  itself  be 
seen  as  the  airing  of  a  grievance  by  the  plaintiff  or  pursuer,  and  the  award  of  damages 
against  the  party  found  to  be  at  fault  could  be  seen  as  punishing  them  for  their  failure  to 
adhere  to  standards. 
Not  all  of  these  are  applicable  to  the  declaratory  action.  In  situations  where  this  is  used, 
the  courts  are  often  being  asked  to  set  the  applicable  standards  by  laying  down  the  law 
in  an  area  of  uncertainty,  so  clearly  such  actions  have  a  role  in  setting  standards.  As  we 
see  from  the  words  of  Thorpe  U  quoted  supra,  a  perceived  function  of  declaratory 
actions  is  to  protect  doctors  from  civil  or  criminal  sanction,  so  there  is  an  element  of 
facilitating  medical  practice  here.  The  types  of  issue  lending  themselves  to  declaratory 
actions  are  not  usually  alleging  a  breach  or  failure  by  anyone,  so  unlike  personal  injury 
actions  the  grievance,  redress,  investigation  and  punishment  aspects  are  absent. 
However,  inasmuch  as  a  declaration  of  illegality  may  be  sought  that  something  done  by 
a  public  sector  body  with  regulatory  functions,  the  declaratory  action  has  some  role  in 
regulating  the  regulatory  system. 
In  general,  however,  the  task  of  regulating  the  regulatory  system  is  addressed  by  the 
judicial  review  action.  As  we  have  seen,  this  action  is  conceived  entirely  to  ensure  that 
persons  or  bodies  entrusted  with  statutory  functions  (or  the  equivalent)  both  fulfil  the 
tasks  entrusted  to  them  and,  insofar  as  they  are  vested  with  discretionary  powers,  to 
ensure  that  they  exercise  that  discretion  reasonably.  This  clearly  fulfils  the  final 117 
regulatory  task  of  regulating  the  regulators:  indeed,  this  is  the  principle  aim  of  judicial 
review.  Peripheral  to  this,  however,  are  the  provision  of  a  grievance  channel  and  system 
of  investigation  into  whether  standards  are  being  adhered  to. 
, 
111:  Procedural  rules  and  remedies: 
A:  Civil  court  procedure 
1:  Adiectival  law: 
There  are  two  main  types  of  law,  known  as  substantive  and  adjectival.  Substantive  law 
is  the  law  governing  the  imposition  of  rights  and  duties,  and  of  defining  crimes.  Most  of 
the  law  referred  to  in  this  thesis  falls  into  the  category  of  substantive  law.  Substantive 
law  originates  in  Acts  of  Parliament  (including,  nowadays,  Acts  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament  so  far  as  within  the  devolved  competence  of  that  body'),  delegated 
legislation  made  under  the  provisions  of  an  Act  of  Parliament  (such  as  statutory 
instruments  or  local  bye-laws),  legislation  made  by  the  institutions  of  the  European 
Union,  and  the  common  law  i.  e.  law  given  effect  to  by  the  courts  but  which  has  no 
discernible  genesis  in  any  of  the  other  sources.  The  common  law  is  often  referred  to  as 
"judge-made  law"  because  the  only  readily-identifiable  source  is  in  the  decisions  of  the 
courts  giving  effect  to  it.  However,  in  constitutional  theory  the  judges  merely  declare 
what  the  common  law  has  always  been,  and  are  not  supposed  to  invent  new  law.  The 
upshot  of  this  is  that  a  judicial  declaration  of  the  law,  contrary  to  previous  understanding 
of  what  the  law  had  been,  is  retrospective  in  effecl:  20  unless  this  presumption  is  reversed 
21  by  statute 
The  second  category,  adjectival  law,  is  purely  concerned  with  mechanisms  whereby 
rights  and  duties  created  by  substantive  law  may  be  vindicated  and  enforced.  As  such, 
it  is  concerned  with  issues  of  who  is  entitled  to  bring  proceedings  before  a  court,  how 
they  get  an  unwilling  opponent  to  appear,  the  way  in  which  cases  are  argued  before  the 
court,  the  rules  of  evidence  applied  to  what  each  side  is  trying  to  prove  (including  rules 
on  the  acquisition  and  retention  of  evidence,  and  the  citing  of  witnesses),  the  remedies 
which  the  court  is  able  to  grant  both  during  and  at  the  conclusion  of  a  case,  and  the 
mechanism  by  which  those  remedies  are  enforced.  The  following  sections  describe 
such  parts  of  the  adjectival  law  of  Scotland,  England  and  Wales  as  are  necessary  to 
understand  the  regulatory  functions  of  the  courts.  It  is  not  intended  to  describe 
procedural  rules  and  remedies  in  any  detail,  partly  on  grounds  of  space,  partly  because 118 
for  Present  purposes  it  is  only  the  practical  upshot  of  these  rules  which  affects  how 
medicine  is  regulated. 
Court  procedure  is  one  of  those  areas  where  Scots  and  English  law  part  company.  To 
complicate  life  further,  each  of  the  different  courts  within  each  judsdiction  has  its  own 
procedural  rules.  Sheriff  Court  procedure  is  not  the  same  as  Court  of  Session 
procedure,  nor  is  High  Court  procedure  the  same  as  County  Court.  Different  procedural 
streams  within  courts  also  exist,  the  difference  being  either  in  terms  of  the  value  of  the 
claim  (as  with  the  Small  Claims  procedures  which  exist  in  both  judsdictions)  or  by 
reference  to  the  type  of  action  being  raised  (such  as  the  distinct  procedure  for  judicial 
review  which  each  jurisdiction  has). 
2:  Prescription  and  limitation: 
The  rules  concerning  prescription  are  substantive  since  they  are  concerned  with  the 
creation  of  new  legal  rights  or  the  extinguishment  of  pre-existing  legal  rights,  whereas 
the  rules  on  limitation  are  adjectival  since  they  concern  whether  a  particular  right  or  claim 
can  be  enforced  by  court  action.  In  practical  terms,  the  two  approaches  have  virtually 
indistinguishable  effects  and  can  be  treated  together.  The  principal  statutes  are  the 
Limitation  Act  1980  for  England  and  Wales  (hereafter  "the  1980  Acr)  and  the 
Prescription  and  Limitation  (Scotland)  Act  1973  for  Scotland  ("the  1973  Act"). 
The  rules  on  prescription  and  limitation  themselves  fall  into  two  categories,  positive  and 
negative.  Positive  prescription  is  a  method  by  which  a  legal  right  or  entitlement  becomes 
fortified  by  the  passage  of  time.  This  may  be  at  the  expense  of  the  rights  of  someone 
else,  and  may  overlap  with  negative  prescription.  Negative  prescription  is  concerned 
with  the  loss  of  a  legal  right  either  through  the  simple  passage  of  time,  or  as  a  result  of 
non-assertion  of  the  right  for  a  particular  time.  The  overlap  can  be  seen  in  situations  of 
adverse  possession  of  real  property  (e.  g.  a  house)  by  someone  having  an  imperfect 
legal  title.  In  Scotland,  this  is  viewed  as  a  matter  of  positive  prescription  whereby  an 
imperfect  title  coupled  with  possession  for  the  appropriate  period  22  creates  a  new 
positive  legal  right  to  the  property  which  cannot  be  defeated  by  the  person  previously 
having  a  good  legal  title,  that  other  title  being  in  practice  extinguished.  In  England,  the 
question  of  adverse  possession  is  instead  approached  from  the  perspective  of  limitation 
of  the  right  of  the  owner  to  recover  possession,  and  accordingly  pays  as  much  attention 
to  the  dealings  between  owner  and  occupier  as  to  the  periods  of  time  which  have 
passed  in  deciding  whether  the  owners  power  to  recover  possession  has  been  lost. 119 
For  purposes  of  this  thesis,  we  are  concerned  pdncipally  with  limitation  and  negative 
prescription  as  they  relate  to  the  ability  of  victims  of  breaches  of  legal  duties  (whether 
duties  of  care,  contractual  duties  or  duties  under  public  law)  to  raise  legal  proceedings  in 
respect  of  those  breaches.  In  essence,  the  most  important  thing  is  to  note  the  existence 
of  these  time  lim-its  rather  than  to  embark  on  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  different 
periods  which  apply.  Only  the  headline  periods  applicable  will  be  discussed. 
Firstly,  most  actions  of  reparation,  including  actions  for  breach  of  contract,  the  applicable 
23  limitation  period  is  five  years  in  Scotland 
. 
In  England,  the  period  is  six  years  for 
general  actions  for  tort  and  simple  contraCtS24.  In  terms  of  an  action  for  personal  injury, 
the  applicable  limitation  period  is  three  years25.  In  general,  the  limitation  period  runs 
from  the  point  when  the  injury  was  inflicted,  which,  in  the  case  of  a  continuing  injurious 
act,  means  the  point  when  the  action  ceased.  However,  an  exception  to  the  rule  applies 
where  the  victim  of  the  harm  was  unaware  of  the  damage  and  could  not  have  become 
aware  even  if  acting  with  reasonable  diligence.  In  such  cases,  the  three  year  period  only 
starts  to  run  when  the  person  becomes  aware,  or  could  reasonably  have  become  aware, 
of  the  injury  or  negligence  giving  rise  to  it26 
. 
The  period  can  be  extended  if  it  is  equitable 
to  do  S027  , 
but  if  a  person  is  legally-advised,  failure  to  observe  the  relevant  limitation 
periods  will  generally  result  in  an  action  against  the  solicitor  for  professional  negligence 
21B 
than  an  extension  of  the  limitation  period  . 
In  both  countries,  the  limitation  period  is 
suspended  while  the  victim  of  the  injury  is  under  suffering  from  lack  of  mental  capacity  29 
. 
The  practical  effects  of  this  rule  have  become  substantially  less  since  legal  aid  rules 
(discussed  infra)  were  amended  in  1990  to  allow  parents  to  raise  actions  on  behalf  of 
their  child  but  without  the  parental  income  being  taken  into  account30.  There  is 
accordingly  no  financial  disincentive  for  parents  to  seek  redress  on  behalf  of  their 
children  at  the  earliest  opportunity.  Lastly,  while  it  is  possible  to  add  a  new  defender  in 
the  course  of  litigation,  the  claim  against  a  new  defender  may  be  time-barred  31 
. 
3:  Adversarial  proceedings: 
There  are,  in  essence,  two  main  types  of  judicial  proceedings:  inquisitorial,  and 
adversarial.  In  an  inquisitorial  system,  the  court  itself  has  a  major  role  in  gathering 
evidence,  questioning  witnesses,  and  determining  the  direction  the  proceedings  will  go  in 
and  how  they  will  progress.  It  is  characterised  by  the  use  of  "investigating  magistrates" 
as  are  common  in  continental  European  legal  systems.  In  contrast,  adversarial  systems 
are  more  akin  to  a  contest  between  the  two  parties.  The  adversarial  approach  was 
described  by  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Thomson  as  follows: 120 
"it  is  upon  the  basis  of  two  carefully  selected  versions  that  the  judge  is  finally 
called  upon  to  adjudicate.  He  cannot  make  investigations  on  his  own  behalf;  he 
cannot  call  witnesses;  his  undoubted  right  to  question  witnesses  who  are  put  in 
the  box  has  to  be  exercised  with  caution...  [L]itigation  is  in  essence  a  trial  of  skill 
between  opposing  parties  conducted  under  recognised  rules,  and  the  prize  is  the 
judge's  decision...  Like  referees  at  boxing  contests  they  see  that  the  rules  are 
kept  and  count  the  points. 
"  32 
In  Britain,  both  the  civil  and  criminal  courts  proceed  on  the  basis  of  adversarial 
proceedings.  This  means  it  is  incumbent  on  the  claimant  firstly  to  place  before  the  court 
sufficient  evidence  to  persuade  the  judge  that,  on  the  balance  of  probabilities,  the 
claimant's  version  of  events  is  correct,  and  secondly  to  ensure  that  the  legal  formulation 
of  the  claim  is  such  that,  having  persuaded  the  judge  as  to  the  facts,  the  claimant  is 
entitled  in  law  to  the  remedy  sought.  The  opposing  party,  meanwhile,  is  similarly  trying 
to  place  evidence  before  the  court  supporting  their  own  version  of  events  (or  at  the  very 
least,  casting  doubt  on  the  claimant's  version)  and  will  be  making  legal  submissions  to 
the  effect  that  what  is  being  argued  is  legally  irrelevant  or  insufficient  to  justify  the 
remedy  sought. 
Disputes  in  the  court  essentially  boil  down  to  four  general  types: 
Disputes  as  to  primary  factual  issues; 
Disputes  as  to  causal  connections  between  primary  facts  and  the  effects  of 
them/inferences  which  can  be  drawn  from  them; 
9  Legal  arguments  about  the  nature  of  the  rights  and  duties  in  question;  and 
o  Disputes  (both  factual  and  legal)  as  to  the  extent  of  the  remedy  which  the  court 
will  grant  at  the  conclusion  of  the  case. 
In  civil  proceedings,  it  is  necessary  for  the  claimant  to  prove  their  case  on  the  balance  of 
probabilities  -  that  the  judge  is  (or  sometimes,  the  jury  are)  satisfied  that  the  claimant's 
version  of  events  is  more  likely  to  be  true  than  the  one  put  forward  by  the  defender.  This 
is  a  far  less  exacting  test  than  that  imposed  by  the  criminal  law,  which  applies  the  test  of 
proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt. 
The  model  just  described  assumes  a  single  claimant  and  a  single  defender.  However,  it 
is  possible  for  more  than  person  to  initiate  proceedings,  for  example  where  a  large  group 
of  people  allege  having  been  injured  by  a  drug.  It  is  possible  to  sue  a  number  of 
different  parties,  e.  g.  you  may  wish  to  sue  the  architects,  project  managers,  surveyors, 
building  company  and  any  subcontractors  involved  in  the  construction  of  a  defective 121 
building.  It  is  possible  to  bring  an  action  on  behalf  of  someone  else  -  most  commonly, 
actions  by  parents  on  behalf  of  their  children.  A  defender  alleging  that  the  breach  of 
duty  was  committed  by  someone  else  who  isn't  presently  being  sued  may  bring  that 
other  party  in  as  a  second  defender.  And  in  some  circumstances,  a  person  with  a 
particular  interest  in  proceedings  but  who  isn't  a  party  to  the  action  may  seek  to 
intervene  and  become  a  third  party  to  the  action.  To  further  complicate  matters,  it  is 
possible  for  appeals  to  be  conjoined  (heard  together)  if  they  raise  the  same  point  of  law. 
And  it  is  also  possible  to  sue  someone  other  than  the  person  who  breached  their  legal 
duties,  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  vicarious  liability  (considered  infra),  or  for 
someone  to  step  into  the  defenders  shoes  in  place  of  the  defender.  This  latter 
procedure  is  known  as  the  principle  of  subrogation,  and  applies  where  the  damages 
which  the  court  might  award  at  the  end  of  the  day  are  to  be  bome  by  an  insurer  rather 
than  by  the  original  defender. 
4:  The  law  of  evidence: 
It  is  not  intended  to  rehearse  the  laws  of  either  Scotland  or  England  relating  to  the 
admissibility  of  evidence  or  the  forms  which  that  evidence  may  take.  Previously  the 
rules  of  evidence  were  highly  formalistic  in  nature  and  riddled  with  peculiarities  and 
exceptions  to  the  general  rules  on  admissibility.  For  present  purposes,  it  is  sufficient  to 
note  two  propositions:  firstly,  if  evidence  is  relevant  to  the  matter  in  dispute  in  the  case, 
it  will  be  held  to  be  admissible  in  court  largely  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  it.  Thus, 
hearsay  evidence  was  formerly  inadmissible,  but  is  now  generally  admissible  (if  still  not 
very  persuasive).  The  second  proposition  is  that  if  evidence  is  admissible,  it  is  also 
compellable. 
Compellable  evidence  is  evidence  which  you  are  entitled  to  have  the  court's  backing  in 
the  acquisition  of.  If  this  is  the  evidence  of  a  witness,  you  will  be  able  to  cite  the  witness 
formally  to  appear  in  court,  put  them  in  the  witness  box  and  be  swom  in,  and  require 
them  to  answer  the  questions  put  to  them.  Civil  proceedings  have  no  equivalent  to  the 
rule  against  self-incrimination  applied  in  the  cdminal  courts.  Failure  to  comply  with  these 
court-sanctioned  requests  runs  the  dsk  of  being  held  to  be  contempt  of  court,  which  can 
potentially  result  in  arrest  and  incarceration.  There  are  only  a  handful  of  exceptions  to 
the  general  rule.  Thus,  communications  between  lawyer  and  client  are  pdvileged  and 
neither  can  be  compelled  to  disclose  the  content  of  the  communication  between  them. 
The  privilege  has  been  held  to  extend  to  documents  produced  by  post-accident  intemal 
investigations  where  these  have  been  conducted  at  least  in  part  with  a  view  to  potential 
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Similar  rules  apply  to  physical  evidence  such  as  documents:  if  one  party  alleges  that 
documents  which  would  tend  to  support  his  or  her  case  are  in  the  possession  of  the 
other  party  or  someone  not  a  party  to  the  action  at  aII34,  they  can  seek  an  order  from  the 
court  under  the  Administration  of  Justice  Act  1972  35  or  the  Supreme  Court  Act  198136 
requiring  the  person  holding  the  document  to  produce  it  to  the  court.  It  is  necessary  to 
specify  the  documents  sought,  not  least  because  failure  to  comply  with  an  order  is 
punishable  as  contempt  of  court  and  on  general  pdnciples  it  is  deemed  unfair  to  punish 
someone  for  failure  to  comply  with  an  unclear  requirement.  So-called  "fishing" 
diligences,  attempting  to  recover  any  related  documents  in  the  hope  that  they  reveal 
something  of  use  to  your  case,  are  frowned  on  by  the  courtS37. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  procedure  under  the  Administration  of  Justice  Act 
1972/Supreme  Court  Act  1981  is  in  addition  to  any  other  powers  entitling  a  person  to 
recover  documents,  such  as  the  right  to  make  a  subject  access  request  under  the  Data 
38  Protection  Act  1998 
. 
Some  of  these  other  routes  give  access  to  the  entire  file,  and  so 
are  of  interest  to  potential  litigants  because  ufishing"  requests  are  permitted.  These 
other  avenues  may  therefore  be  used  at  the  pre-litigation  stage  as  an  inexpensive  way 
of  deciding  whether  there  is  sufficient  material  to  justify  raising  an  action.  So  far  as 
relevant  to  medical  regulation,  some  of  these  other  routes  are  considered  in  Chapter  6. 
Witnesses  appearing  in  civil  cases  are  either  put  on  oath  or  required  to  affirm  as  to  the 
truth  of  the  answers  they  will  give.  Deliberately  lying  under  oath  is  pedury,  a  serious 
criminal  offence  generally  regarded  as  meriting  a  custodial  sentence.  To  encourage 
candour,  all  statements  made  in  the  witness  box  are  privileged  to  the  extent  that  the 
witness  cannot  be  sued  for  defamation  or  slander  in  connection  with  what  is  said  in 
court,  a  protection  extending  to  fair  reporting  of  what  is  said  in  court. 
The  evidence  from  witnesses  falls  into  two  distinct  types:  witnesses  as  to  facts,  and 
expert  witnesses.  A  witness  to  facts  can  properly  only  be  asked  about  what  they  did  or 
did  not  see/hear/do,  and  is  not  entitled  to  voice  opinions  or  be  asked  hypothetical 
questions.  Most  claimants  will  be  witnesses  to  the  fact  of  their  own  alleged  loss  or  injury. 
Expert  witnesses  are  in  a  different  position.  The  function  of  an  expert  witness  is  to 
provide  a  specialist  opinion  to  the  court  on  an  area  of  expertise  which  the  judge  (always 
a  lawyer  by  training)  lacks  sufficient  knowledge  of  to  be  able  to  adjudicate  on.  As  such, 
the  expert  witness  is  the  servant  of  the  court,  not  of  the  party  citing  him  to  appear.  He  or 
she  is  therefore  required  to  give  a  professional  best  opinion  on  a  point  put  to  him  or  her, 123 
even  if  the  answer  is  detrimental  to  the  case  of  his  or  her  client.  In  medical  cases,  expert 
medical  witnesses  are  ubiquitous.  Indeed,  since  very  often  the  person  being  sued  is  a 
doctor,  there  is  the  possibility  that  the  defender  may  also  be  an  expert  witness  in  his  or 
her  own  field,  although  it  is  clearly  harder  for  such  a  witness  to  bring  the  requisite 
impartiality  to  the  witness  box3g.  Under  the  new  (English)  Civil  Procedure  Rules,  there  is 
provision  for  the  appointment  of  joint  experts.  However,  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  cases  considered  infra  were  brought  under  procedural  rules  requiring  each  party  to 
adduce  their  own  expert  evidence,  and  many  of  the  cases  boiled  down  to  what  could  be 
described  as  a  battle  of  experts  . 
40  The  judge's  role  is  to  choose  between  the  versions 
placed  before  him,  and  is  not  to  create  his  own  theory  of  events  which  neither  set  of 
experts  contended  for4.  However,  no  judge  is  bound  to  follow  expert  evidence,  even  if 
unopposed,  if  that  expert  evidence  flies  in  the  face  of  common  sense  or  contains  internal 
contradictions.  Otherwise,  it  is  the  judge's  job  to  weigh  up  the  evidence  of  an  expert 
witness  in  the  same  way  as  the  judge  must  weigh  up  the  evidence  of  a  witness  to  the 
facts. 
The  evidential  onus  is  normally  placed  on  the  person  averring  the  existence  of  a 
particular  set  of  facts  or  circumstances  to  prove  them.  In  general,  this  will  place  the  onus 
on  the  pursuer  or  applicant  rather  than  the  defender.  Exceptions  to  this  generality  are 
that  if  the  defender  seeks  to  rely  on  a  particular  defence,  the  onus  will  be  on  him  or  her 
to  prove  the  defence.  A  quasi-exception  to  the  rule  arises  under  the  maxim  res  ipsa 
loquitur,  namely  that  things  speak  for  themselves:  this  arises  where  a  set  of 
circumstances  so  obviously  points  to  negligence  on  the  part  of  someone  that  in  effect 
the  evidential  onus  shifts  to  them  to  disprove  the  negligence;  this  is  discussed  in  more 
detail  infra. 
Once  the  judge  has  heard  all  the  evidence,  and  seen  all  the  documentary  and  real 
evidence  placed  before  him  or  her,  he  or  she  then  makes  findings  in  fact  as  he  or  she 
finds  them  proved,  and  issues  a  decision  based  on  the  application  of  the  relevant  legal 
rules  (as  the  judge  finds  them  to  be)  to  these  facts.  (In  jury  trials,  this  decision  is  for  the 
jury  having  heard  the  judge  address  them  on  the  legal  tests  to  be  applied,  but  the 
principle  is  theoretically  the  same).  And  on  the  basis  of  this  decision,  the  remedy  or 
remedies  sought  by  one  or  more  parties  may  then  be  granted. 
B:  Remedies  in  the  civil  courts 
In  medical  cases,  the  action  is  usually  brought  in  the  superior  courts  (High  Court  or  Court 
of  Session),  and  there  is  seldom  an  issue  as  to  the  competence  of  the  court  to  grant  the 124 
remedy  in  question.  However,  the  lower  courts  and  some  of  the  different  court 
procedures  which  exist  have  limits  on  the  remedies  available.  The  most  obvious 
limitation  is  in  relation  to  the  level  of  damages  which  can  be  awarded;  thus,  a  small 
claims  action  is  restricted  to  a  maximum  value  of  E750.  The  threshold  on  damages  in 
the  lower  courts  is  probably  the  single  biggest  factor  in  pushing  medical  actions  into  the 
superior  courts,  but  there  are  also  procedural  rules  which  make  the  complex  subject 
matter  usually  raised  in  medical  cases  more  suited  to  these  fora  than  to  the  lower  courts. 
Due  to  the  importance  of  the  subject,  damages  awards  are  considered  next,  then  the 
other  remedies  which  may  be  granted. 
.1- 
Awards  of  damages: 
The  award  of  damages  is  usually  the  most  obvious  outcome  of  a  medical  case, 
particularly  a  medical  negligence  action.  Newspaper  headlines  are  frequently  full  of 
stories  of  people  being  awarded  six  and  seven  figure  sums  following  some  medical 
mishap.  At  the  most  basic  level,  an  award  of  damages  is  where  the  court  orders  one  or 
more  defenders  in  the  action  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  to  one  or  more  pursuers  as 
compensation  for  the  loss  or  injury  suffered  by  the  successful  party/parties. 
To  start  with,  not  all  injuries  suffered  will  result  in  an  award  of  damages.  Failure  to 
display  existence  of  a  legal  duty  or  to  link  the  breach  with  the  loss  or  injury  will  render 
damages  irrecoverable.  There  is  also  a  category  of  actions  where  damages  are  deemed 
irrecoverable  as  a  matter  of  public  policy,  although  the  precise  scope  of  this  category 
(indeed,  its  continued  existence  at  all)  is  open  to  question  42 
. 
Further  restrictions  on  the 
ability  to  recover  damages  exist  in  the  distinct  but  related  doctrines  of  contributory 
negligence  and  volenti  non  fit  inidtia.  These  are  both  related  in  the  pursuer  being  in 
some  way  also  responsible  for  the  loss  in  question.  The  contributory  negligence  doctrine 
is  just  that  -  that  the  negligence  of  the  victim  was  also  a  factor  in  the  circumstances 
which  led  to  the  loss.  The  most  common  example  in  the  courts  nowadays  is  where  the 
victim  of  a  road  traffic  accident  was  not  wearing  a  seat  belt  at  the  time,  meaning  they 
suffered  more  serious  injuries  than  they  would  have  otherwise43  . 
Historically, 
contributory  negligence  was  a  complete  defence  to  an  action,  an  excessively  harsh  rule 
which  was  met  with  an  accordingly  distorted  judicial  interpretation  seeking  to  ameliorate 
this  harshness".  The  harshness  of  the  rule  was  reversed  by  statute:  in  terms  of  the 
Law  Reform  (Contributory  Negligence)  Act  1945,  section  1(1),  damages  are  instead 
reduced  on  a  pro  rata  basis;  in  other  words,  if  you  are  held  60%  to  blame  for  the 
accident,  then  the  damages  which  you  recover  will  fall  to  be  reduced  by  60%.  In  cases 
resulting  in  death,  where  the  person  dies  partly  as  the  result  of  his  or  her  own  fault  and 125 
partly  of  the  fault  of  any  other  person,  the  damages  recoverable  by  dependants  may  be 
reduced  according  to  the  share  of  the  deceased  in  the  responsibility  for  the  fatal 
occurrence  45 
. 
Unlike  contributory  negligence,  the  principle  expressed  in  the  maxim  volenti  non  fit  iniuria 
has  not  been  the  subject  of  statutory  alteration.  The  expression  signifies  that  in  the 
circumstances,  the  pursuer  is  deemed  to  have  accepted  the  risk  of  the  injury  which  has 
happened,  and  is  therefore  precluded  from  recovering  damages  for  this  injury.  The 
classic  instance  of  volenti  arises  in  the  course  of  participants  in  sports,  who  are  deemed 
to  accept  the  risks  inherent  in  the  sport  (so  far  as  permitted  by  the  rules),  but  it  has  also 
been  extended  to  spectatorS46.  In  the  medical  context,  it  is  important  to  realise  that  a 
plea  of  volenti  requires  more  than  showing  that  the  person  injured  accepted  the  risk  of 
injury: 
"The  question  raised  by  a  plea  of  volenti  non  fit  injuria  is  not  whether  the  injured 
party  consented  to  run  the  risk  of  being  hurt,  but  whether  the  injured  party 
consented  to  run  that  risk  at  his  own  expense  so  that  he  and  not  the  party 
alleged  to  be  negligent  should  bear  the  loss  in  the  event  of  injury.  In  other  words, 
the  consent  that  is  relevant  is  not  consent  to  the  risk  of  injury  but  consent  to  the 
lack  of  reasonable  care  that  may  produce  that  risk.  "  47 
Finally,  the  law  of  damages  states  that  the  victim  of  a  legal  injury  is  under  a  duty  to 
minimise  the  loss.  In  effect,  the  law  will  not  allow  you  to  stand  back,  let  events  take  their 
course  and  then  expect  to  recover  damages  for  losses  which,  had  you  taken  appropriate 
steps  after  the  injury  happened,  you  would  not  have  suffered. 
, 
2-  Quantification  of  damages: 
For  some  legal  actions,  quantification  is  easy.  If  someone  damages  your  Gar,  you  will  be 
able  to  recover  the  costs  of  repair  and  (possibly)  the  costs  of  a  temporary  replacement 
vehicle.  These  issues  are  easy  to  quantify,  in  the  form  of  the  garage  and  hire  car 
company  bills  (and  subject  to  the  rule  on  mitigation).  But  in  medical  cases,  the  injury 
suffered  is,  in  general,  a  personal  injury.  What  cost  a  broken  arm?  Or  being  left 
incapable  of  having  children?  Or  being  left  permanently  brain  damaged? 
The  theory  behind  damages  awards  is  that,  so  far  as  possible,  the  claimant  is  left  in  the 
position  he  or  she  would  have  been  in  but  for  the  legal  injury,  although  there  are  some 
limitations  on  this  theory  (such  as  the  recent  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  that  you 126 
cannot  recover  the  specific  costs  of  surrogacy  treatment  even  though  you  have  been 
negligently  rendered  infertile48).  Damages  can  cover  both  patrimonial  (i.  e.  financially- 
quantifiable)  loss,  and  also  compensation  for  pain,  injury  and  other  non-patrimonial  loss. 
There  is  no  theoretical  role  in  the  UK  for  a  punitive  function  in  punishing  the  person  who 
is  in  breach  of  their  legal  duties,  and  as  a  general  role  punitive  damages  (damages 
awards  explicitly  going  beyond  the  terms  of  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  just 
compensation  for  the  harm  suffered)  are  not  available  in  either  Scotland  or  England. 
(Punitive  damages  exist  in  US  jurisdictions  where  they  are  routinely  used  to  enhance  the 
plaintiffs  negotiating  position  relative  to  the  physician  as  malpractice  insurance  does  not 
cover  punitive  damageS49).  In  terms  of  personal  injury,  there  are  three  general  headings: 
pain  and  suffering,  loss  of  faculties  and  amenities,  and  shortened  expectation  of  life5'0. 
As  to  how  one  assesses  these  things,  patrimonial  loss  is  the  easier  of  the  two.  If  you 
require  expensive  care  following  the  accident,  the  costs  of  this  will  be  recoverable,  as 
are  any  wages  you  lose  as  a  result  of  the  accident.  This  can  amount  to  a  huge  sum  for 
someone  rendered  permanently  incapable  of  pursuing  a  previously  highly-paid  career5'. 
The  courts,  in  such  cases,  are  required  to  make  decisions  concerning  lost  future 
potential,  which  can  be  itself  akin  to  crystal  ball  gazing:  would  the  pursuer,  but  for  the 
debilitating  accident,  have  got  that  promotion?  The  approach  has  been  clarified  by  the 
Court  of  Appeal,  which  was  called  on  to  assess  how  likely  the  plaintiff  was  to  become 
world  kick-boxing  champion  52 
. 
For  non-patrimonial  loss,  quantification  effectively  comes  down  to  a  judicial  tariff  which, 
through  the  medium  of  awards  made  in  previous  cases,  allows  one  to  specify  what  the 
loss  of  an  arm  is  worth  -  because  the  courts  have  said,  in  previous  cases,  that  it  is  worth 
Ex.  Proper  quantification  of  loss  is  something  of  an  arcane  science,  although  a  number 
of  specialist  works  exist  which  are  intended  to  simplify  the  practitioners  job  53 
. 
As  a 
general  rule,  damages  in  England  tend  to  be  somewhat  higher  than  those  in  Scotland. 
Even  there,  damages  for  pain  and  suffering  tend  to  be  less  than  patrimonial  loss, 
particularly  when  compared  to  long  term  loss  of  wages  and  care  costs.  In  the  case  of 
death,  no  payments  for  pain  and  suffering  prior  to  death  can  be  recovered,  although  the 
next  of  kin  may  recover  damages  for  loss  of  society  and  loss  of  support.  It  can  therefore 
be  seen  that,  in  purely  financial  terms,  death  of  a  patient  is  less  expensive  than 
permanent  injury  to  one.  Damages  elsewhere,  most  notably  in  the  jurisdictions  of  the 
United  States,  tend  to  be  very  significantly  higher  again  (and  may  also  admit  of 
exemplary  or  punit-ive  damages).  This  gives  potential  pursuers  an  incentive  to  "forum- 
shop"  so  as  to  ground  the  claim  in  a  higher-awarding  jurisdiction.  The  rules  covering 127 
choice  of  judsdiction  are  found  in  the  discipline  of  Private  International  Law,  and  are 
outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
One  particular  area  of  note  concerns  the  claimant  whose  prognosis  is  uncertain  and  may 
deteriorate  in  future.  The  traditional  approach  to  damages  involved  a  once  and  for  all 
assessment  of  loss  at  the  end  of  the  trial.  If  it  were  more  likely  than  not  that  you  would 
suffer  from  the  complication  later  in  life,  you  could  recover  in  full  on  the  basis  that  the 
complication  would  occur.  If  it  did  not,  in  fact,  occur,  you  were  over-compensated. 
Conversely,  if  it  were  less  than  a  fifty  per  cent  risk  you  could  not  recover,  and  if  the 
complication  manifested  then  you  were  unable  to  come  back  for  more  damages  and 
were  left  under-compensated.  This  was  felt  to  be  unfair  both  to  pursuers  and  defenders, 
and  the  rules  were  changed  by  statute.  In  terms  of  the  Administration  of  Justice  Act 
1982-547  it  is  now  possible  to  seek  provisionat  damages  where  there  is  a  risk  that  the 
pursuer  will  at  some  point  in  the  future  develop  a  serious  disease  or  suffer  a  serious 
deterioration.  If  the  risk  is  realised  in  future,  the  pursuer  is  free  to  re-apply  to  the  court 
for  a  further  tranche  of  damages.  In  practice,  the  section  has  predominantly  been  used 
for  the  most  serious  (but  less  than  likely)  potential  complications,  such  as  the 
development  of  asbestos-related  mesotheliorna,  or  development  of  epilepsy  following 
certain  head  injuries.  The  courts  have  been  reluctant  to  use  this  power  for  complications 
which,  on  the  evidence,  are  more  likely  to  manifest  than  not,  such  complications  still 
being  assumed  to  happen  and  enjoying  full  compensation  after  tria,  65. 
Structured  settlements  are  a  separate  concept,  and  are  effectively  done  by  agreement 
between  the  defender  and  pursuer.  Under  a  structured  settlement,  payments  are 
staggered  over  a  long  period.  This  typically  happens  where  the  injury  has  resulted  in  the 
pursuer  requiring  long  term,  ongoing  care.  While  voluntary  in  nature,  structured 
settlements  were  placed  on  a  statutory  footing  by  the  Finance  Acts  1995  and  1996 
(which  exempt  payments  under  a  structured  settlement  from  liability  for  Income  Tax)  and 
the  Damages  Act  1996  Section  6,  which  allows  central  government  to  guarantee 
payments  under  a  structured  settlement  made  by  NHS  bodies.  NHS  Guidance 
recommends  consideration  of  structured  settlements  in  any  case  where  damages  are 
likely  to  exceed  E250,000-56,  a  threshold  which  tends  to  restrict  their  use  to  cases  of 
57 
obstetric  accidents  at  birth 
. 
In  essence,  the  pursuer  is  awarded  a  certain  annual  sum 
for  life  instead  of  a  lump  sum.  Either  the  defending  body  self-funds  the  payments,  in 
which  case  it  carries  the  financial  risk  of  the  pursuer  living  longer  than  anticipated  (but 
also  benefits  if  the  pursuer  dies  sooner  than  expected),  or  else  it  purchases  an  annuity 
on  the  financial  markets,  in  which  case  the  risk  is  passed  on  to  the  annuity  provider58. 128 
In  assessing  damages,  notice  should  be  taken  of  Section  2(4)  of  the  Law  Reform 
(Personal  Injuries)  Act  1948,  which  provides  that  the  existence  of  (free)  NHS  facilities  is 
to  be  disregarded  in  awarding  damages.  Thus,  the  fact  that  the  victim  vOll  be  treated 
free  of  cost  on  the  NHS  is  irrelevant  and  does  not  preclude  a  claim  for  private  medical 
costs.  Conversely,  however,  Section  5  of  the  Administration  of  Justice  Act  1982 
provides  that  savings  made  by  being  maintained  in  hospital  are  relevant  to  lost  earnings 
claims. 
Finally,  the  are  certain  peculiarities  relating  to  the  damages  which  can  be  awarded  for 
specific  types  of  action.  For  convenience,  these  are  noted  in  the  discussions  of  the 
types  of  actions  infta. 
3:  Other  remedies: 
This  section  will  restrict  itself  to  discussing  remedies  of  relevance  to  the  medico-legal 
field.  As  we  have  seen,  the  most  important  remedy  is  the  award  of  damages  but  other 
remedies  can  be  and  are  sought  in  medical  litigation. 
Firstly,  there  is  the  remedy  of  interdict  or  injunction.  This  is  a  remedy  whereby  the  court 
prohibits  someone  from  doing  the  specified  action.  If  the  person  interdicted  proceeds 
with  the  prohibited  act  after  the  court  order  has  been  duly  served  on  them,  they  commit  a 
contempt  of  court  and,  if  an  individual,  can  reasonably  expect  a  custodial  punishment. 
Interdict  or  injunction  may  be  sought  as  an  interim  measure  and  is  often  used  to  secure 
the  status  quo  pending  the  substantive  outcome  of  a  legal  dispute.  Interim  orders  are 
granted  on  the  basis  of  "balance  of  convenience".  They  may  be  granted  ex  parte  (i.  e. 
without  the  person  you  are  seeking  the  order  against  being  notified  of  the  hearing  in 
advance,  and  without  their  being  present  or  represented  in  court).  However,  it  is 
possible  to  lodge  a  caveat  in  court,  the  effect  of  which  is  that  you  must  be  given  the 
opportunity  to  be  heard  before  the  order  is  granted.  Most  public  authorities  maintain 
permanent  caveats  as  a  matter  of  course.  An  interim  injunction  or  interdict  may  be 
recalled,  modified  or  made  permanent  following  the  outcome  of  the  contested 
proceedings. 
Interdicts  or  injunctions  are  negative  in  the  sense  that  they  can  only  be  used  to  prevent 
something  or  prevent  it  continuing.  It  is  not  competent  to  use  these  orders  to  force 
someone  to  take  positive  steps.  If  you  want  the  court  to  order  someone  to  do 
something,  the  correct  remedy  to  seek  is  that  of  mandamus  or  specific  implement.  Both 
of  these  are  discretionary  remedies  in  that  they  are  not  available  as  of  right  (as  most 129 
remedies  are);  even  if  you  prove  everything  you  have  set  out  to  prove,  the  court  retains 
a  discretion  whether  or  not  to  grant  the  remedy.  The  courts  will  not,  for  instance,  order 
anyone  to  comply  with  a  contract  of  employment  as  this  is  incompatible  with  the  abolition 
of  forced  labour.  As  with  interdict  or  injunction,  failure  to  comply  with  the  court's  order 
once  it  has  been  duly  served  constitutes  a  contempt  of  court.  Interdict  and  interim 
interdict  may  not  be  sought  against  the  Crown'59. 
If  the  legality  of  something  is  in  question,  the  remedy  most  often  sought  is  that  of 
declarator  or  declaration.  In  essence,  the  court  announces  that  something  (such  as  a 
proposed  course  of  action  or  a  policy)  is  or  is  not  lawful.  Declarators  are  also  used  in 
other  areas  to  do  such  thing  as  declare  that  someone  who  has  been  missing  for  a  long 
time  is dead,  or  to  clarify  the  status  of  someone. 
Finally,  a  few  other  remedies  exist  which  are  occasionally  found  useful  in  the  medical 
field.  Thus,  gaps  in  the  Scots  law  relating  to  incapacity  (prior  to  the  Adults  with 
Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000)  were  plugged  by  resurrecting  the  ancient  remedy  of 
appointing  a  tutor-dative.  Similar  defects  in  English  law  following  the  inadvertent 
abolition  of  the  parens  patriae  jurisdiction  were  overcome  by  the  discovery  of  an 
"inherent  jurisdiction"  of  the  court  to  achieve  much  the  same  end  (i.  e.  the  power  to  make 
declarations  as  to  the  legality  of  proposed  medical  interventions  on  people  who  are 
incapable  of  giving  or  withholding  consent  themselves).  Exceptional  equitable  remedies 
such  as  this  are  unpredictable  but  occasionally  useful.  In  Scots  law,  if  all  else  fails  it  is 
possible  to  petition  the  Court  of  Session  for  that  court  to  invoke  the  Nobile  OfficiuO", 
which  may  occasionally  be  utilised  to  provide  an  exceptional  remedy6'. 
4:  Costs  and  expenses: 
I-Rigation  is  not  cheap.  It  costs  approximately  E1,500  per  hour  to  conduct  a  proof 
hearing  in  the  Court  of  Session 
62 
. 
According  to  figures  published  in  1978,  only  some  30- 
63 
40%  of  medical  negligence  claims  actually  succeed  . 
More  recent  figures  suggest  a 
figure  of  around  25%  to  30%64,  while  a  (1998)  statement  by  the  Government  puts  the 
figure  at  only  17%65 
. 
Few  private  individuals  have  the  resources  to  fund  legal  action  on 
the  scale  required  in  the  medical  sphere,  particularly  given  the  low  success  rate.  The 
general  rule  in  adversarial  proceedings  is  that  the  winner  must  pay  the  expenses  of  the 
loser.  Thus,  the  prospective  litigant  is  looking  not  just  at  their  own  costs,  but  also  at 
those  of  their  opponent  over  which  they  have  no  control.  There  are  controls  over 
excessive  legal  expenditure  in  the  form  of  taxation  -  legal  expenses  and  outlays  cannot 
be  recovered  through  the  court  system  until  the  accounts  have  been  inspected  and 130 
approved  ("taxed")  by  the  independent  Accountant  of  Court.  However,  that  will  not  stop 
the  bill  being  extremely  high,  just  indicate  that  it  is  reasonable  in  being  so  high.  In 
England  and  Wales,  excessive  costs  can  be  controlled  by  means  of  a  wasted  costs 
hearing". 
The  costs  of  litigation  would  constitute  an  absolute  barrier  to  justice  for  most  people  (and 
accordingly  result  in  litigation  failing  badly  on  the  overag  faimess  evaluation  criterion, 
which  incorporates  issues  of  accessibility.  The  main  solution  for  most  litigants  lies  in  the 
legal  aid  scheme.  Without  going  into  detaiIS67,  the  legal  aid  scheme  provides  a  number 
of  ways  in  which  public  funds  are  used  to  fund  legal  representation  (and  its  ancillaries, 
such  as  payment  for  expert  witnesses)  for  those  who  cannot  afford  it  themselves  and 
where  the  interests  of  justice  so  require.  Legal  Aid  is  therefore  both  means-tested  (i.  e. 
people  earning  more  than  the  threshold  level,  or  having  savings  above  a  certain  amount 
are  not  eligible)  and  subject  to  a  claim  satisfying  the  probabilis  causa  ("probable  cause") 
test.  The  financial  thresholds  are  such  that  around  60%  of  the  population  are  eligible  for 
legal  aid  for  civil  proceedings".  In  1998,  the  Legal  Aid  bill  for  medical  negligence  cases 
came  to  E27  million".  From  the  point  of  view  of  defenders,  one  of  the  most  significant 
aspects  of  the  scheme  is  that  it  reverses  the  normal  rules  on  expenses  following 
success.  If  someone  in  receipt  of  legal  aid  (typically  described  in  court  papers  as  "AB 
(assisted  person)")  successfully  sues  you,  then  you  have  to  pay  your  own  expenses  and 
reimburse  the  Legal  Aid  Board  for  their  contributions.  However,  if  you  successfully 
defend  the  claim  of  the  assisted  person,  then  while  you  do  not  have  to  pay  the  costs  of 
the  pursuer  or  Legal  Aid  Board,  you  do  not  get  to  recover  your  own  expenses  either  but 
must  simply  absorb  these.  Consequently,  it  is  not  cost-effective  to  defend  an  action 
raised  by  a  legally-aided  party  where  the  costs  of  defending  the  action  are  likely  to  be 
greater  than  the  sum  sued  for.  Even  if  you  successfully  defend  an  action  which  was 
seeking  say  E15,000,  if  your  own  expenses  came  to  E20,000  (which  is  not  unlikely)  then 
the  defence  has  been  uneconomic. 
There  is  particular  step  which  defenders  can  take  to  safeguard  their  positions  as  regards 
expenses,  the  use  of  the  "tender"  or  "payment-in  This  is  a  mechanism  whereby  a 
formal  offer  in  settlement  is  made  in  the  course  of  litigation.  If  the  pursuer  or  claimant 
rejects  the  sum  offered  but  ultimately  fails  to  win  more  damages  than  the  amount  offered 
(the  existence  of  a  tender  is  not  made  known  to  the  judge  awarding  damages),  then  the 
pursuer  is  liable  to  meet  the  defender's  expenses  from  the  point  where  the  tender  was 
lodged  onwards.  Rejecting  a  reasonable  offer  may  also  have  implications  for  the 
continued  availability  of  legal  aid  70 
.A  variation  on  the  theme,  known  as  a  Williamson 
tender7l,  relates  to  the  apportionment  of  liability  between  different  defenders.  If  there 131 
are  multiple  pursuers,  a  separate  tender  or  payment-in  must  be  made  in  respect  of  each 
pursuer  or  claimant72. 
An  alternative  route  for  would-be  claimants  who  cannot  afford  to  raise  an  action  but  who 
also  cannot  get  legal  aid  is  the  use  of  conditional  fee,  or  "no  win-no  feel)  arrangements 
whereby  lawyers  accept  a  case  on  a  speculative  basis,  as  introduced  by  the  Court  and 
Legal  Services  Act  1990,  section  58.  In  most  US jurisdictions  contingency  fees  consist 
of  the  lawyers  taking  a  portion  (typically  around  a  third)  of  the  damages  ultimately 
awarded  (if  any),  and  accepting  the  risk  of  not  getting  paid  if  the  claim  is  ultimately 
unsuccessful.  Such  arrangements  are  currently  unlawful  in  the  UK,  although  the 
restricted  form  of  conditional  fees  which  has  been  instituted  permits  the  solicitors  acting 
under  a  no  win-no  fee  arrangement  receive  an  enhanced  fee  (typically  double)  if  the 
action  succeeds,  rather  than  a  proportion  of  the  damages  awarded.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  the  introduction  of  such  arrangements  represents  a  sea-change  in  the 
way  legal  services  will  have  to  be  provided  73 
. 
The  problem  with  such  arrangements  is 
that  they  require  the  lawyers  to  be  prepared  to  accept  the  financial  risks  associated  with 
losing  the  case,  which  may  prevent  some  potential  litigants  from  finding  a  lawyer 
prepared  to  take  their  case  if  it  is  particularly  difficult  or  likely  to  be  very  expensive  (i.  e. 
most  medical  litigation).  It  does,  however,  offer  another  avenue  for  those  whose 
financial  standing  makes  them  ineligible  for  Legal  Aid. 
Finally,  something  should  be  said  concerning  the  overall  costs  of  litigation.  In  its 
evidence  to  the  Lord  Chancellor's  review  of  civil  justice,  the  National  Consumer  Council 
estimated  that  85  pence  of  every  pound  awarded  in  compensation  was  used  up  by 
CoStS74. 
IV:  The  Leqal  Context  of  the  Doctor-Patient  Relationship: 
A:  Constitutional  Law: 
In  the  broadest  sense,  any  doctor-patient  relationship  takes  place  against  a  background 
of  wider  socio-economic  and  legal  relationships.  At  its  most  basic,  these  are  the  notions 
of  liberal  capitalism  and  constitutional  monarchy  which,  in  effect,  describe  the  legal 
make-up  of  the  United  Kingdom.  More  specifically,  this  legal  framework  creates  a  series 
of  rights  and  duties  within  which  individuals  have  to  work,  and  it  is  with  these  rights  and 
75  duties  that  we  are  concerned 132 
Doctors  in  the  UK  have  unique  privileges  only  insofar  as  conferred  by  statute.  Thus, 
only  a  registered  medical  practitioner  may  prescribe  certain  drugs,  or  issue  certain 
statutory  certificates  relating  to  illness.  Such  areas,  while  they  definitely  affect  the 
powers  of  doctors,  and  the  rights  of  patients  who  consult  them,  are  not  generally  the 
subject  of  litigation.  Subject  to  certain  minor  alterations,  therefore,  doctors  are  subject  to 
the  same  common  law  as  everyone  else. 
The  legal  nexus  of  a  doctor-patient  relationship  will  vary  according  to  circumstances. 
There  may  be  a  contract  between  the  doctor  and  the  patient,  as  in  the  case  of  private 
medicine,  or  there  may  be  no  contract,  as  in  the  case  of  NHS  treatment.  The  patient 
may  have  consented  to  treatment,  in  some  way  or  another,  or  there  may  be  no  consent, 
as  in  the  case  of  emergencies  or  where  the  patient  is  deemed  to  be  legally  incapable  of 
giving  consent.  It  is  thus  not  easy  to  place  a  specific  legal  tag  on  the  relationship.  The 
only  constant  feature  is  that  the  doctor,  as  is  any  other  person,  is  under  a  duty  not  to 
harm  the  patient  by  acts  which  it  is  reasonably  foreseeable  are  likely  to  injure  theM76. 
B:  Private  Law: 
Private  law  is  the  law  regulating  the  rights  and  duties  of  persons  inter  se.  "Persons"  here 
means  juristic  persons,  which  can  include  corporate  bodies  such  as  health  authorities.  It 
is  accepted  that  corporate  bodies  and  (under  statute)  the  Crown  77  may  sue  and  be  sued 
in  their  own  right  for  the  enforcement  or  breach  of  private  law  rights.  Doctors  and  others 
in  the  health  care  team  may  be  sued  (and  sue)  as  private  individuals.  What,  then,  are 
the  rights  and  duties  which  private  law  imputes  into  medical  situations? 
The  doctor-patient  relationship  is  regulated  almost  entirely  by  the  common  law,  subject 
to  certain  minor  amendments  78 
. 
At  common  law,  a  doctor  has  no  duty  to  treat  a  patient. 
This  was  true  historically,  and  remained  true  even  after  Donoghue  v  Stevenson  79 
drastically  expanded  the  nature  of  liability  for  negligent  injury.  In  that  case,  Lord  Atkin 
based  his  judgement  on  the  so-called  "neighbour  principle": 
"The  rule  that  you  are  to  love  your  neighbour  becomes  in  law:  You  must  not 
injure  your  neighbour,  and  the  lawyer's  question:  Who  is  my  neighbour? 
receives  a  restricted  reply.  You  must  take  reasonable  care  to  avoid  acts  and 
omissions  which  you  can  reasonably  foresee  would  be  likely  to  injure  your 
neighbour.  Who,  then,  in  law,  is  my  neighbour?  The  answer  seems  to  be 
persons  who  are  so  closely  and  directly  affected  by  my  act  that  I  ought 133 
reasonably  to  have  them  in  contemplation  as  being  so  affected  when  I  am 
directing  my  mind  to  the  acts  or  omissions  which  are  called  in  question.  "  80 
The  Biblical  answer  to  the  question  'Who  is  my  neighbour"  received  the  parable  of  the 
Good  Samaritan  as  a  reply8'  . 
Would  Lord  Atkin's  principle  impose  a  duty  on  the  Levite 
who  passed  by?  A  reading  of  the  above  passage,  in  its  Biblical  context,  would  suggest 
that  it  would.  It  would  seem  reasonably  foreseeable  that  a  man  lying  bleeding  by  the 
roadside  would  suffer  from  the  failure  of  a  passer-by  to  assist  him.  As  it  turns  out, 
however,  the  common  law  imposes  no  duty  of  care  on  passers-by  to  act  in  such 
circumstances.  Since  the  common  law  treats  doctors  like  everyone  else,  by  logical 
extension  there  is  no  common  law  obligation  on  doctors  to  treat  someone  not  already  a 
patient,  even  in  emergencies.  Thus,  it  would  appear  that  a  hospital  casualty  unit  which 
closed  its  doors  and  refused  to  admit  any  more  patients  would  incur  no  liability  under  this 
area  of  the  common  IaW82 
,  although  it  may  be  liable  on  other  grounds  discussed  later. 
Indeed,  it  has  been  suggested  that, 
"The  law  almost  discourages  the  Good  Samaritan.  For  if  the  doctor  comes  to 
the  sick  man's  aid  he  undertakes  a  duty  to  him  and  will  be  liable  if  his  skill 
fails  him.  it 
83 
It  was  against  this  background  of  a  duty  of  care  imposed  on  doctors  (and  the  consequent 
possibility  of  substantial  damages  being  awarded  against  the  doctor)  acting  in  such 
circumstances  that  a  number  of  US  states  enacted  so-called  "Good  Samaritan" 
legislation,  designed  to  remove  this  disincentive  for  doctors  to  undertake  emergency 
treatment  of  passers-b  Y84  . 
These  have  been  criticised  as  unnecessary  and  insulting85 
. 
There  is  no  comparable  legislation  in  the  UK;  in  general,  a  doctor  has  no  duty  to  treat  the 
man  in  the  street,  but  if  he  chooses  to  do  so,  he  is  under  a  duty  not  to  act  negligently  and 
may  be  held  liable  in  damages  if  he  is.  In  fact,  "Good  Samaritan"  legislation  appears  to 
be  unique  to  the  United  States;  it  has  been  noted  that  many  continental  jurisdictions 
have  reacted  in  the  opposite  way,  by  making  it  an  offence  for  a  doctor  to  fail  to  act  in 
such  emergency  situations  instead  of  removing  (or  limiting)  his  liability86. 
However,  it  is  misleading  to  say  that  there  is  no  duty  at  all  on  a  doctor  to  act.  Firstly,  if  a 
doctor  has  undertaken  to  treat  a  patient,  he  is  obliged  to  continue  treating  that  patient 
until  either  the  patient  wishes  to,  or  agrees  to,  end  the  relationship,  or  else  the  patient's 
care  is  taken  over  by  another  competent  doctor,  or  the  patient  dies.  Failure  on  the  part 
of  a  doctor  to  continue  treatment  until  one  of  these  conditions  is  satisfied  is  known  as 
abandonment.  The  only  British  case  in  point  here  is  Bamett  v  Kensington  &  Chelsea 134 
HMC87 
, 
but  the  principle  is  well-established  in  the  U.  S.  88,  and  would  appear  to  be  equally 
actionable  in  the  British  courts.  This  view  is  supported  by  the  speech  of  Lord  Keith  in 
Airedale  NHS  Trust  v  Blandý'. 
The  second  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  doctors  have  no  duty  to  treat  relates  to 
general  practitioners  within  the  NHS,  whose  contract  of  service  obliges  them  to  treat  any 
emergency  arising  within  their  own  practice.  area,  and,  if  no  other  doctor  is  available, 
within  the  entire  area  of  their  Health  Authority.  There  are  a  number  of  limitations  on  this 
duty;  but  for  present  purposes,  the  question  is  whether  a  person  (not  one  of  the  doctor's 
existing  patients)  could  rely  on  the  doctor's  contract  with  the  authority  to  establish  that 
the  doctor  owed  him  a  duty  of  care.  There  appear  to  be  no  decided  cases  on  this  point; 
in  the  only  case  where  the  issue  was  raised,  the  doctor's  lawyers  conceded  that  the 
creation  of  the  NHS  had  created  a  legal  duty  to  the  public  on  the  terms  of  the  contract  of 
service9o.  A  further  point  to  consider  is  that  the  "contractual"  relationship  between  the 
GP  and  the  health  authority  has  been  classified  by  the  House  of  Lords  as  being  founded 
in  public  law  under  the  relevant  statutes,  although  it  grants  private  law  rights  to  the 
docto?  '.  This  would  tend  to  suggest  that  the  GP  "contract"  is  a  public  law  creation  which 
inadvertently  creates  private  law  rights.  If  these  extend  to  imposing  a  duty  of  care  on 
GPs,  this  would  tend  to  support  Braziees  analysis.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  some 
commentators  see  no  difficulty  in  establishing  a  duty  of  care  in  such  circumstances: 
"The  essential  problem  is  not  in  establishing  a  duty  to  aftend  but  in  proving 
that  in  not  attending  the  doctor  was  in  breach  of  duty.  General  practitioners 
must  be  allowed  some  discretion  in  determining  which  calls  to  respond  to.  it  92 
In  Scotland,  the  position  is  much  clearer,  since  it  is  well  established  in  Scots  Law  that  a 
contract  can  readily  confer  rights  on  a  third  party  not  party  to  the  contract,  i.  e.  it  can 
create  a  ius  quaesitum  tertio.  Under  this  rule  of  law,  the  third  party  or  tertius  will  have 
title  to  sue  if  he  belongs  to  a  particular  class  of  persons  named  or  referred  to  in  the 
contract,  and  where  it  can  be  shown  that  the  object  of  the  contract  was  clearly  to 
advance  the  interests  of  that  class  of  persons.  A  contract  intended  to  confer  benefits  on 
the  general  public  will  not  confer  title  to  sue  on  anyone,  howevee  3.  On  the  basis  that 
emergency  patients  within  a  defined  area  constitute  a  sufficiently-defined  class  of 
persons  to  be  granted  a  ius  quaesitum  tertid  by  the  GP  contract,  this  provision  should 
impose  a  duty  of  care  on  all  Scottish  GPs  within  their  practice  areas. 
But  if  no  duty  is  incumbent  on  the  individual  doctor  (except  as  noted  above),  are  any 
duties  incumbent  on  the  NHS  itself?  As  noted  above,  the  NHS  is  an  organ  of  state,  and 135 
as  such  is  susceptible  to  public  law  forms  of  action  -  and  in  particular  to  judicial  review  of 
administrative  action.  This  is  considered  next;  but  in  the  private  law  context,  it  has  been 
held  that  it  is  at  least  arguable  that  the  ambulance  service  owes  people  a  duty  to  provide 
a  prompt  service  and  to  provide  treatment  en  route  to  hospital94. 
C:  Public  law: 
In  a  judicial  review,  the  courts  scrutinise  the  activities  of  public  and  administrative  bodies 
95  to  ensure  that  they  act  "reasonably",  i.  e.  not  contrary  to  the  precepts  of  natural  justice 
, 
and  that  they  act  within  the  law,  i.  e.  that  they  exercise  duties  incumbent  on  them  under 
statute  and  do  not  exceed  their  jurisdiction.  The  classic  description  of  the  purposes  of 
judicial  review  is  taken  from  the  judgement  in  Associated  Provincial  Picture  Houses  v 
Wednesbury  Corporation".  This  held  that  in  questions  of  Policy  decisions,  the  court  will 
overturn  such  a  decision  only  if  it  is  so  unreasonable  that  no  reasonable  body  could  have 
made  it.  It  should  be  noted  then  that  judicial  review  is  not  an  appeal  from  the  original 
decision-making  body;  the  courts  have  consistently  refused  to  substitute  their  own 
decision  for  that  of  the  body  in  question  97 
,  and  are  only  concerned  with  questions  of 
procedural  fairness  and  legality.  The  traditional  grounds  for  judicial  review  have  recently 
been  expanded  by  the  courts  to  include  fundamental  error  of  fact  and  "proportionality",  a 
concept  applied  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights;  this  is  considered  infra  in  the 
context  of  the  functions  of  litigation  in  controlling  other  regulatory  bodies.  Secondly, 
judicial  review  is  a  discretionary  remedy:  the  leave  of  the  court  is  required  before  an 
action  can  proceed",  and  before  this  happens  the  applicant  must  generally  show 
1.  sufficient  interest  in  the  policy  decision  to  be  reviewed,  and 
2.  that  any  other  remedies  available  (such  as  appeal)  have  been  exhausted,  unless 
it  would  be  unreasonable  to  do  so  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
This  leads  to  an  interesting  procedural  difficulty  encountered  in  such  cases:  it  has  been 
held  (in  the  House  of  Lords)  that  as  a  general  rule,  a  person  seeking  to  overturn  the 
decisions  of  a  public  body  must  use  the  procedure  for  judicial  review,  rather  than  any 
private  law  procedures",  unless  the  case  is  in  reality  concerned  with  private  rights  (e.  g. 
an  action  for  negligence)  and  doesn't  raise  any  public  law  issues'00. 
Judicial  review  is  the  mechanism  by  which  the  courts  (and  through  them,  the  citizen) 
ensure  that  public  sector  bodies  adhere  to  their  statutory  functions,  and  act  reasonably 
in  their  conduct  in  furtherance  of  these  functions.  Two  examples  will  be  given  to  show 
the  uses  to  which  public  law  remedies  have  been  put  in  the  medical  context. 136 
The  first  concerns  the  duty,  or  otherwise,  of  the  National  Health  Service  (as  opposed  to 
individual  doctors)  to  treat  people.  While  this  thesis  is  not  examining  mechanisms  within 
the  NHS  to  regulate  itself,  it  is  still  necessary  to  consider  the  courts'  approach  to  the 
NHS  as  this  is  the  main  provider  of  health  care  in  the  country  and  provides  the  largest 
number  of  examples  of  litigation  being  used  as  a  regulatory  tool.  In  Rv  St  Mary-s 
Hospital  Ethical  Committee  ex  p.  Haryidttlol  the  court  held  that  where  treatment  was 
refused  on  non-medical  grounds,  this  could  be  reviewed.  In  this  case  the  applicant 
failed  to  show  that  the  decision  was  either  procedurally  unfair  or  itself  unlawful,  but  the 
judge  indicated  that  refusal  to  treat  on,  for  example,  grounds  of  race  would  be  illegal.  It 
is  therefore  authority  for  the  proposition  that  the  right  to  NHS  treatment  is  legally 
enforceable. 
The  second  line  of  authority  concerns  a  series  of  unsuccessful  judicial  review  applicants. 
In  essence,  all  these  cases  revolve  around  the  National  Health  Service  Act  1977.  This 
imposes  a  duty  on  the  Secretary  of  State  to  provide  a  "comprehensive  health  service  0  02 
and  to  provide,  to  such  extent  as  he  considers  necessary  to  meet  all  reasonable 
requirements,  such  services  as  hospitals,  medical  and  ambulance  services  103  The 
cases  were  concerned  with  the  question  of  whether  this  "duty"  was  justiciable. 
The  cases  all  revolved  around  patients  denied  treatment  which  had  been  deemed  to  be 
medically  necessary,  on  the  basis  of  lack  of  sufficient  resources  (usually  availability  of 
trained  nursing  staff)  to  conduct  the  treatment.  The  answer  is  that  overall  allocation  of 
resources  to  the  NHS  by  Parliament  is  completely  non-justiciable'04  and  that  individual 
patients  may  not  sue  the  Secretary  of  State  for  damages.  It  has  been  suggested, 
however,  that  in  extreme  cases  (e.  g.  deliberately  subverting  the  health  service),  even  this 
05  would  be  susceptible  to  judicial  review'  . 
The  situation  is  little  different  as  regards  decision-making  delegated  to  Health 
Authorities.  There  is  a  line  of  judicial  decisions  here:  firstly  the  High  Court  held  that 
decisions  as  regards  resource  allocation  by  authorities  were  non-justiciable'  06 
, 
then  the 
Court  of  Appeal  in  the  same  case  said  these  decisions  were  justiciable,  but  that  the 
courts  would  not  interfere  unless  the  decision  were  'Wednesbury  unreasonable",  and 
1117 
finally  the  High  Court  held  that  this  rule  applied  even  in  life-threatening  situabons. 
Furthermore,  it  was  suggested  that  in  future  the  courts  would  not  (and  should  not  be 
asked)  to  intervene  unless  there  was  at  least  ptima  facie  evidence  of  unreasonableness. 
Thus,  while  the  right  to  seek  review  has  broadened  somewhat,  this  broadening  has  been 
accompanied  by  increasingly  stricter  rules  regarding  the  appropriateness  of  exercising 
this  right. 137 
In  the  context  of  regulating  medicine,  what  emerges  is  a  very  clear  "hands-off'  approach 
by  the  courts.  In  a  sense,  then,  the  provision  of  NHS  services  is  effectively  unregulated 
by  litigation,  being  controlled  in  the  first  place  by  the  parliamentary  accountability  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Health,  and  in  the  second  place  by  the  administrative  machinery  of 
the  NHS  itself.  This  "hands-off'  approach  has  been  severely  criticised  by  several 
commentators'  0'3. 
The  point  made  here  is  not  that  the  courts  should  take  it  on  themselves  to  make  resource 
allocation  decisions;  they  should  not,  and  all  the  judges  concerned  conceded  this.  The 
criticism  concerns  the  degree  of  scrutiny  which  the  court  actually  exercises.  In  Rv 
Cambridge  HA  ex  p.  B'O",  Laws  J  at  first  instance  set  aside  the  decision  of  the  Health 
Authority  on  the  basis  of  failure  to  take  all  relevant  factors  into  consideration,  stating  that 
the  authority  "...  must  do  more  than  toll  the  bell  of  tight  resources...  They  must  explain 
the  priorities  that  have  led  them  to  decline  to  fund  the  treatment.  "  110  However,  his 
decision  was  overturned  on  appeal,  the  court  holding  that  there  was  no  need  for  the 
authority  to  justify  its  budget  allocation  decisions"'. 
Lastly,  while  technically  not  arising  in  a  public  law  action,  the  Court  of  Appeal  has 
recently  held  that  public  bodies  given  specific  statutory  responsibilities  can  seek 
injunctions  to  prevent  interference  with  the  performance  of  those  duties,  and  that  such 
"  112 
injunctions  will  be  granted  if  it  is "just  and  convenient  to  do  so  . 
E:  Hybrid  situations: 
The  most  widely-discussed  case  involving  the  use  of  private  law  procedures  to  address 
what  was  clearly  a  public  law  matter  occurred  in  the  much-discussed  case  of  Gillick  v 
West  Norfolk  and  Wisbech  AHA'  13 
. 
This  case  essentially  decided  (1)  the  legality  of 
providing  contraceptive  advice  and  services  to  under-16s,  and  (2)  whether  or  not  such 
advice  and  services  could  be  provided  without  the  knowledge  and/or  consent  of  the  girl's 
parents.  The  case  also  provides  a  clear  example  of  litigation  affecting  medical  practice: 
both  the  DHSS  (as  was)  guidelines  and  the  GIVIC's  ethical  guidelines  (the  "Blue  Book") 
relating  to  contraceptive  services  were  amended  after  each  stage  of  the  judgement, 
which  went  ultimately  to  the  House  of  Lords. 
Giffick  involved  a  challenge  to  a  policy  decision  (to  provide  contraceptive  services  to 
under-16s)  by  a  Health  Authority.  As  indicated  above'  14 
,a  person  seeking  to  impugn 
and  overturn  the  decision  of  a  public  authority  must  normally  use  judicial  review 
procedures,  but  Gillick  saw  a  challenge  to  such  a  decision  reviewed  by  the  courts  under 138 
ordinary  private  law  procedures.  The  procedure  in  question  was  an  action  by  Mrs  Gillick 
for  a  declaration  that  (1)  the  DHSS  advice  was  unlawful,  and  (2)  that  the  AHA  would  not 
give  contraceptive  advice  to  her  children  while  they  were  under  16  without  her  own 
knowledge  and  consent.  The  case  also  shows  an  interesting  interaction  between  the 
civil  and  criminal  law,  although  it  was  conceded  at  an  early  stage  that  if  the  declarator 
Number  (1)  were  granted,  then  Number  (2)  would  be  irrelevant  since  parental  consent 
could  not  legitimate  conduct  which  was  de  iure  illegal.  Ultimately  Mrs  Gillick  lost,  a 
majority  of  the  House  of  Lords  holding  that,  provided  certain  conditions  were  adhered  to, 
a  doctor  could  lawfully  prescribe  contraceptives  to  under-1  6s,  without  either  a  violation  of 
the  criminal  law  or  needing  parental  consent.  This  case  is  also  authority  for  the  right  of 
minors  to  consent  to  treatment  generally,  and  as  such  it  has  significantly  affected 
medical  practice. 
How  were  private  law  proceedings  used  in  what  looks  like  a  public  law  case?  This  was 
extensively  discussed  in  two  leading  articles'  15 
. 
Lord  Fraser  allowed  the  action  because 
it  had  begun  before  the  decision  in  O'Reilly  v  Mackman"6.  Lord  Scarman  felt  firstly  that 
it  fell  into  the  exception  created  by  Lord  Diplock  in  that  case  whereby  private  law 
proceedings  were  competent  if  the  invalidity  of  the  public  body's  decision  (i.  e.  a  public 
law  issue)  arose  as  a  collateral  feature  of  infringement  of  private  law  rights,  and 
secondly  there  was  no  objection  to  the  use  of  private  law  procedure  by  the  defendant, 
although  judicial  review  would  have  been  competent.  Lord  Bridge,  however,  doubted 
the  competence  of  judicial  review  in  this  case,  given  the  non-statutory  and  advisory 
nature  of  the  circular  in  question,  but  accepted  that  Mrs  Gillick  had  sufficient  locus  standi 
to  bring  the  present  action.  Lastly,  it  should  be  noted  that  Lord  Scarman  also  held  that  it 
was  competent  for  the  court,  in  a  civil  action  such  as  this,  to  grant  a  declaration  which 
would  obviously  influence  the  criminal  law.  This  power  cannot  technically  be  exercised 
by  the  supreme  Scottish  civil  court,  the  Court  of  Session,  as  declarators  of  that  court 
only  relate  to  civil  law  consequences  of  the  action.  '  17 
It  should  also  be  emphasised  that  the  Gilfick  ruling  applied  solely  to  England  and  Wales. 
In  Scotland,  without  any  clear  legal  justification,  the  practice  had  also  developed  of 
providing  contraceptives  to  under-16s.  However,  matters  in  Scotland  have  been  placed 
on  a  statutory  footing  and  are  therefore  considered  in  Chapter  6  infra. 
F:  Contractual  Liability  and  Medicine: 
There  was  far  greater  scope  for  a  breach  of  contract  action  in  medicine  prior  to  the 
inception  of  the  National  Health  Service.  Up  to  that  point,  the  majority  of  medical 139 
consultations  were  private  in  nature,  which  therefore  meant  the  existence  of  a  valid 
contract  between  the  doctor  and  whoever  paid  his  fees.  In  spite  of  this  commonplace 
nature  of  the  exercise,  doubts  remain  in  England  as  to  the  precise  moment  when  the 
contract  comes  in  to  existence.  In  Scots  law,  by  contrast,  a  valid  contract  requires  only 
offer  and  acceptance,  which  is  readily  shown  or  inferred  from  the  fact  of  the  doctor 
actually  treating  the  patient. 
If  liability  is  to  be  based  ex  contractu  it  then  becomes  vitally  important  to  determine  what 
exactly  was  contracted  for.  In  this  context,  the  case  of  Thake  v  Maurice"'  is  relevant. 
The  plaintiff  paid  for  a  vasectomy,  which  reversed  itself  naturally.  At  first  instance,  it  was 
held  that  the  doctor  had  undertaken  to  sterilise  the  plaintiff  and,  having  failed  to  do  so, 
was  liable  for  breach  of  contract.  On  appeal,  the  court  held  that  the  surgeon  had  not 
given  an  absolute  undertaking  to  sterilise  the  patient;  he  had  merely  undertaken  to 
perform  the  operation  with  due  care.  This  case  reiterated  the  point  that  a  clause  will  be 
inferred  into  any  such  contract  to  the  effect  that  the  treatment  contracted-for  will  be 
carried  out  with  due  care.  Such  an  implied  clause  is  in  keeping  with  the  general 
common  law  of  contracts"g.  Thus,  negligent  performance  of  the  contract  will  give  rise  to 
an  action  for  breach  of  contract,  as  well  as  an  action  for  the  tort  or  delict  of  negligence. 
The  test  for  negligence  (discussed  infra)  being  identical  in  either  case,  there  is  no 
particular  advantage  for  either  the  contract  or  tort/delict  action  in  the  event  of  negligent 
performance,  apart  from  procedural  points  such  as  different  periods  of  prescription  and 
limitation.  But  Thake  v  Maurice,  while  holding  that  there  is  no  implied  "success  clause" 
in  medical  contracts,  does  leave  it  open  for  the  doctor  explicitly  to  warrant  success.  The 
courts  will  only  uphold  such  a  clause  if  it  makes  it  absolutely  clear  that  success  is 
actually  warranted.  While  there  is  no  British  case  applying  such  a  ruling  (apart  from 
Thake  at  first  instance),  a  number  of  Canadian  cosmetic  surgeons  have  been  held  liable 
under  this  heading  120 
. 
On  the  other  hand,  while  success  is  not  warranted,  neither  may 
the  doctor  reduce  his  liability  by  contractl2l. 
Of  course,  contractual  liability  is  only  of  interest  to  the  private  patient  ,  and  despite  its 
recent  growth,  private  medicine  is  still  very  much  in  the  minority  in  the  UK  today.  It  could 
be  argued  that  a  contract  exists  between  an  NHS  patient  and  doctor  as  a  result  of  the 
patient  requesting,  and  the  doctor  agreeing  to,  his  or  her  inclusion  on  the  GP's  list  of 
patients.  Consideration,  from  the  English  viewpoint,  is  provided  by  the  fact  that  the 
doctor's  payment  is  on  the  basis  of  capitation,  i.  e.  he  gets  more  money  the  more  patients 
he  has  on  the  list.  However,  the  NHS  doctor  is  acting  on  the  basis  of  the  relevant 
statutes,  and  the  House  of  Lords  has  held  that  performing  a  service  in  pursuance  of  a 
statutory  obligation  precludes  the  consensual  element  necessary  in  a  contraCt122.  It  is 123 
140 
implicit  in  the  Court  of  Appeal's  judgement  in  Hotson  v  East  Berkshire  HA  that  there  is 
no  contract  between  a  GP  and  his  or  her  patient.  The  practical  results  are  the  same  in 
either  case,  so  to  a  large  extent  the  existence  or  not  of  a  contract  between  an  NHS 
doctor  and  patient  is  irrelevant,  at  least  as  far  as  negligence  is  concerned.  There  remain 
procedural  differences  between  the  two  actions,  most  notably  in  terms  of  prescription  or 
limitabon,  and  in  an  action  for  breach  of  contract  it  is  unnecessary  to  prove  loss 
(although  this  would  be  necessary  in  order  to  win  more  than  nominal  damages'24) 
- 
Given  the  substantive  similarities  between  the  actions,  the  procedural  distinctions  are 
effectively  pleading  points  which  are  for  the  doctor's  legal  advisers  to  worry  about,  not 
for  the  doctor. 
V:  Medical  negligence: 
A:  The  basis  of  negligence  liability: 
In  the  foregoing  discussion,  we  have  seen  that  perhaps  the  only  constant  feature  of  the 
doctor-patient  relationship  is  the  existence  of  a  duty  of  care  between  the  doctor  and  the 
patient  being  treated.  It  is  at  this  juncture  that  the  law  most  closely  becomes  involved  in 
determining  the  quality  of  medical  treatment  required  of  a  doctor  as  a  matter  of  legal 
entitlement  rather  than  contractual  agreement  or  general  rights  against  the  State  through 
the  mechanism  of  the  NHS.  The  discussion  which  follows  is,  for  that  reason,  somewhat 
extended. 
The  legal  foundation  for  the  legal  duty  imposed  on  a  doctor  to  take  reasonable  care  is 
now  regarded  as  being  the  judgement  in  Donoghue  v  Stevenson  125 
-  you  are  under  a 
duty  not  to  harm  others  by  acts  which  it  is  reasonably  foreseeable  would  cause  harm.  In 
a  sense,  classifying  an  action  for  breach  of  this  duty  as  a  negligence  action  is  something 
of  a  misnomer,  since  the  action  also  extends  to  liability  for  intentional  acts;  intentionality 
is  no  defence  126 
. 
In  Scots  law,  the  test  is  one  of  damnum  iniufia  datum,  i.  e.  harm  caused 
by  a  wrongful  actl  27.  Such  wrongfulness  may  be  intentional  or  negligent,  so  intentionality 
is,  if  anything,  even  less  of  a  defence  in  Scotland. 
However,  the  notions  of  tortious  or  delictual  liability  extend  much  further  back  than  1932. 
The  first  recorded  malpractice  action,  for  instance,  was  brought  against  a  surgeon  in 
1374  1211 
. 
However,  early  cases  invariably  proceeded  on  the  basis  of  breach  of 
contractual  obligation.  Clear  decisions  showing  that  liability  for  defective  medical 
practice  can  arise  independently  of  contract  came  somewhat  more  recently:  Pippin  v 141 
Sheppard129  held  that  a  patient  had  a  right  of  action  against  a  negligent  doctor 
irrespective  of  contractual  relationships,  a  decision  followed  in  Scotland  in  Edgar  v 
Lamone'. 
A  related  point  concerns  the  doctor's  liability  to  the  patient  where  the  patient  is  being 
examined  for  the  benefit  of  a  third  party.  The  most  common  example  would  be  medical 
examinations  conducted  on  behalf  of  a  potential  or  actual  employer  of  the  patient.  In 
such  a  case,  it  would  seem  clear  that  Edgar  v  Lamont  does  not  apply,  and  that  the 
doctor  obviously  owes  a  contractual  duty  to  the  employer.  But  does  he  also  owe  a  duty 
to  the  patient  to  inform  him  of  the  results  if,  for  example,  he  diagnoses  a  potentially- 
serious  but  treatable  affliction?  The  issue  has  never  been  addressed  by  a  British  court, 
but  an  American  court  has  held  that  the  patient  in  such  cases  would  reasonably  expect 
to  be  informed  of  any  significant  findings;  a  duty  of  care  therefore  exists  between  the 
doctor  and  patient  in  addition  to  the  contractual  duty  to  the  employer  131 
. 
This  would 
appear  to  be  in  line  with  the  general  ambit  of  the  duty  of  care,  and  some  commentators 
132 
have  expressed  the  view  that  an  English  court  would  find  this  reasoning  "persuasive" 
B:  Ambit  of  the  Duty  of  Care: 
This  point  leads  us  nicely  to  the  first  major  issue  in  negligence  cases:  who  owes  the 
patient  a  duty  of  care?  Put  another  way,  who  can  the  patient  sue  if  things  go  wrong? 
As  we  have  seen,  the  principal  duty  of  care  is  incumbent  on  the  doctor  who  treats  the 
patient,  and  the  doctor-patient  relationship  probably  comes  into  existence  by  the 
patient's  presence  on  the  doctors  list.  But  modem  medicine  is  frequently  characterised 
by  the  need  for  whole  teams  of  doctors  and  allied  professionals  to  cooperate  in  the 
patient's  care  regime  -  to  say  nothing  of  the  attendant  care  by  nursing  and  non-medical 
ancillary  staff.  From  the  prospective  litigant's  perspective,  this  raises  two  issues.  Firstly, 
can  institutions  such  as  hospitals,  or  the  NHS  itself,  be  directly  liable  to  their  patients? 
Secondly,  what  duty  of  care  do  the  individuals  working  within  these  institutions 
themselves  owe  to  a  patient?  A  related  question  concerns  identifying  to  whom  a  duty  of 
care  may  be  owed.  Does  it,  for  instance,  arise  in  the  context  of  advising  the  next  of  kin 
of  a  deceased  patient  what  happened?  In  keeping  with  the  general  approach  of 
restricting  the  scope  of  liability  for  informational  issues,  the  courts  have  held  that  no  such 
duty  of  care  arises  133 
. 
The  general  approach  to  the  existence  of  a  duty  of  care  consists 
of  considering  three  issues:  foreseeability  of  loss  resulting  if  the  duty  is  breached, 
whether  it  is  fair,  just  and  reasonable  for  a  duty  to  be  imposed,  and  whether  there  be 
sufficient  proximity  between  the  parties'34.  In  advising  relatives  of  the  cause  of  death,  a 142 
doctor  may  have  close  contact  with  the  relatives,  but  unless  they  are  his  patients  this 
closeness  still  lacks  the  requisite  proximity  to  give  rise  to  a  duty  of  care. 
Historically,  hospitals  were  established  as  charitable  or  institutional  organisations  which 
had  no  contractual  liability  to  their  patientS135  . 
Evans  v  Liverpool  Corporation  136  held  that 
there  could  be  no  vicarious  liability  for  delicts  committed  by  doctors  since  their  employers 
did  not  exercise  control  over  them.  It  was  initially  held  in  Hillyer  v  Governors  of  St 
Bartholomew's  Hospita  P37  that  there  was  no  vicarious  liability  for  the  delicts  of  their 
employees,  but  on  appeal  this  decision  was  reversed;  it  was  further  held  that  there  could 
be  vicarious  liability  for  the  actions  of  doctors,  but  only  in  respect  of  their  administrative 
duties.  But  Hillyer  also  held  that  the  hospital  itself  had  a  duty  of  care  to  ensure  that  its 
staff  were  competent  and  that  adequate  resources  were  available. 
In  any  case,  the  formulation  of  vicarious  liability  applied  in  cases  such  as  these  is 
vulnerable  to  a  number  of  criticisms.  Vicarious  liability,  as  an  exception  to  the  normal 
fault-based  concept  of  negligence  liability,  is  often  justified  on  the  basis  Qui  sensit 
commodum  debit  sentine  et  onus,  "he  who  obtained  an  advantage  ought  to  bear  the 
disadvantage  as  well";  138  the  concept  of  justice  thus  can  be  seen  to  play  a  role  here,  as 
139  judges  occasionally  explicitly  acknowledge  Similarly,  the  "deterrence"  theory  holds 
that  vicarious  liability  gives  organisations  an  incentive  to  take  care  in  minimising  the  torts 
or  delicts  of  their  employees,  and  to  take  care  in  selecting  staff;  this  too  has  found 
judicial  support  140 
. 
The  distinction  formerly  made,  which  was  crucial  in  delimiting 
vicarious  liability  for  doctors'  actions,  was  between  contracts  of  service  (Jocatio  operarum 
)  where  vicarious  liability  applies,  and  contracts  for  services  (16catio  opens  faciendi  ) 
where  it  does  not141  . 
Later  cases  emphasised  that  there  must  be  an  element  of  control 
before  an  employer  could  be  vicariously  liable  142 
. 
It  is  this  element  of  control  which  is 
said  to  be  lacking  in  the  medical  sphere:  doctors  are  granted  clinical  autonomy  beyond 
their  employers'  ability  to  interfere  (except  in  very  unusual  circumstances),  and  these 
employers  are  in  any  event  unlikely  nowadays  to  be  medically  qualified  to  be  able  to 
exercise  control  even  if  they  wanted  to. 
The  strange  dichotomy  between  non-liability  for  doctors'  actions,  and  liability  for  those  of 
others  in  their  professional  capacities,  was  weakened  in  Gold  v  Essex  County  Cound  43 
which  held  that  the  employer  was  vicariously  liable  for  the  acts  of  a  radiographer,  and 
removed  in  Cassidy  v  Ministry  of  Health'44,  which  applied  vicarious  liability  to  all 
employees  and  all  activities  carried  out  in  the  course  of  that  employment.  145  In  Roe  v 
Ministry  of  Health146  the  court  went  further  and  found  the  hospital  vicariously  liable  for 143 
the  actions  of  a  part-time  anaesthetist  who  also  engaged  in  private  practice  -  exactly  the 
sort  of  person  who,  on  the  old  reading  of  the  law,  would  have  been  deemed  to  be  an 
independent  contractor.  The  present  approach  is  to  look  at  various  factors  in 
combination  with  each  other,  rather  than  any  one  conclusive  test.  Key  factors  include 
the  parties'  intentions,  duration  of  contract  and  method  of  payment,  freedom  of  selection 
of  employees,  and  ownership  of  the  tools  or  equipment  used  147 
. 
However,  a  more 
recent  trend  has  been  to  suggest  that  the  hospital  or  health  authority  may  itself  be  liable, 
not  vicariously  for  the  delicts  of  its  employees,  but  directly  for  breach  of  its  own  duty  of 
care  to  its  patients.  Thus  in  Wilsher  v  Essex  AHA  148  the  then  Vice  Chancellor  (Sir 
Nicholas  Browne-Wilkinson)  said 
66  a  health  authority  which  so  conducts  its  hospitals  that  it  fails  to  provide  the 
doctors  of  sufficient  skill  and  experience  to  give  the  minimum  treatment 
offered  at  the  hospital  may  be  directly  liable  in  negligence  to  the  patient.  " 
This  case  held  that  the  inexperience  of  staff  was  no  defence  to  an  action  of  negligence  - 
if  the  doctors  were  insufficiently  experienced  to  meet  the  requisite  standard  of  care,  then 
they  were  still  liable.  A  number  of  cases  have  been  raised  on  this  basis  149 
,  and  while 
they  have  generally  failed  on  evidential  grounds,  the  existence  of  a  direct  duty  to 
patients  by  hospitals  seems  to  be  widely  accepted  by  the  courts.  This  is  in  accordance 
with  the  general  law  of  negligence  150 
. 
In  a  sense,  this  is  the  corollary  to  the  resources 
cases  mentioned  above  151:  these  cases  held  that  failure  to  provide  a  service  due  to 
resource  limitations  was  not,  in  general,  aGtionable;  Wilsher  makes  the  point  that  if  you 
do  offer  the  service,  then  resource  constraints  are  no  justification  for  failing  to  meet  the 
requisite  standard  of  care.  As  a  final  point,  there  is  no  vicarious  liability  for  the  acts  of  a 
fellow  employee,  even  a  subordinate.  Consequently,  a  consultant  is  not  liable  for  the 
152  actions  of  registrars  under  his  direction 
C:  Nature  of  the  Duty  of  Care  and  the  Standard  of  Care: 
The  basic  elements  of  liability  for  negligent  acts  or  omissions  is,  essentially,  as  follows: 
I:  There  must  be  a  duty  of  care  owed  by  the  defender  to  the  pursuer. 
2:  There  must  be  a  breach  of  the  duty. 
3-  The  breach  must  cause 
loss.,,  153 
Having  established  that  the  doctor  (and  through  him  the  hospital  or  health  authority) 
owes  his  patient  a  duty  of  care,  it  is  now  necessary  to  consider  in  which  circumstances  a 144 
doctor  will  be  in  breach  of  that  duty.  In  layman's  terms,  when  is  a  doctor  deemed  to  be 
negligent? 
As  noted  above,  the  classic  exposition  as  regards  liability  for  negligent  acts  is  Lord 
Atkins'  "neighbour  principle"  in  Donoghue  v  Stevenson'54.  This  attributes  liability  for  acts 
which  the  "reasonable  man"  would  foresee  could  cause  harm.  However,  the  reasonable 
man  is  not  a  doctor,  and  will  therefore  have  at  best  a  very  limited  idea  of  what,  in  the 
context  of  medical  care,  is  or  is  not  likely  to  cause  harm.  How,  then,  do  the  courts 
assess  the  liability  of  those  who  profess  specialised  knowledge?  This  point  was  raised 
in  Hunter  v  HanleJ5*5;  Lord  President  Clyde  held,  in  a  widely-quoted  judgement,  that: 
"The  true  test  for  establishing  negligence  in  diagnosis  or  treatment  on  the  part 
of  a  doctor  is  whether  he  has  been  proven  guilty  of  such  failure  as  no 
ordinary  doctor  of  ordinary  skill  would  have  been  guilty  of  if  acting  with 
ordinary  care.  " 
This  test,  then,  is  a  specialised  application  of  the  general  rule  in  Donoghue  v  Stevenson, 
except  that  instead  of  basing  liability  on  the  "reasonable  man",  it  is  based  on  that  of  the 
"reasonable  doctor'  -  or  lawyer,  or  any  other  person  being  sued  on  the  basis  of  specialist 
(usually  professional)  knowledge.  The  judgement  in  Hunter  v  Hanley  was  quoted 
verbatim  and  applied  in  England  in  the  case  of  Bolam  v  Ffiern  Hospital  Management 
Committee  156 
,  and  subsequently  approved  by  the  House  of  LordS157.  It  is  accordingly 
known  as  the  "Bolam  test  ".  In  determining  what  constitutes  medical  negligence,  it  is 
necessary  to  show  (1)  that  a  usual  and  normal  course  of  treatment  exists;  (2)  that  it  was 
not  followed;  and  (3)  that  the  course  of  treatment  actually  adopted  is  one  of  such  a 
nature  that  no  professional  person  would  have  chosen  it  when  acting  with  ordinary 
care'58.  To  provide  an  adequate  description  of  medical  malpractice  law,  it  is  necessary 
to  provide  a  gloss  on  all  of  these  points. 
First  and  foremost,  the  test  obviously  places  heavy  reliance  on  medical  expert  evidence 
both  as  to  normal  practice  and  on  the  acceptability  of  the  course  actually  adopted. 
Since  both  sides  are  free  to  lead  their  own  expert  witnesses,  a  "trial  by  experts"  is  not 
uncommon  in  this  field  159 
. 
The  problem  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  "...  a  man  is  not 
negligent...  merely  because  there  is  a  body  of  opinion  who  would  take  a  contrary 
view.  "160  Or,  as  Lord  Denning  put  it,  "...  Mere  differences  of  opinion  are  not,  per  se, 
actionable.  n161 
. 
The  courts  have  been  consistently  reluctant  to  get  involved  in  debates 
between  different  bodies  of  medical  opinion  as  to  which  is  correct  162 
. 
The  practical 
upshot  of  this  is  that,  even  if  the  pursuer  finds  experts  willing  to  testify  on  his  or  her 145 
behalf,  if  the  defender  also  finds  such  experts  then  the  doctor  will  have  acted  in 
accordance  with  a  respectable  body  of  medical  opinion,  and  the  claim  will  fail.  There 
may  be  serious  practical  difficulties  in  finding  experts  prepared  to  testify  on  behalf  of 
patients.  On  the  other  hand,  the  courts  have,  on  occasion,  been  prepared  to  apply 
commonsense  notions  to  the  problem  at  hand  and,  if  they  conclude  that  the  issue  does 
not  raise  a  technical  medical  question  at  all,  may  decide  the  case  on  the  basis  of  their 
own  common  sense,  rather  than  the  expert  testimony  led  before  them.  Thus,  a  doctor's 
163  bad  handwriting  will  attract  liability  even  if  it  is  no  worse  than  most  doctors' 
A  few  more  points  need  to  be  made  about  the  duty  of  care.  Firstly,  while  it  is  clear  that 
clinical  judgements  are  susceptible  to  legal  review'64  , 
it  remains  true  that  adherence  to 
accepted  standards  will  seldom  be  challenged  by  the  courts.  This  approach  is 
somewhat  more  deferential  to  the  medical  profession  than  to  others,  where  it  has  been 
held  that  evidence  as  to  trade  practice  alone  is  not  conclusive  for  the  defender  if  there  is 
evidence  justifying  a  finding  that  this  practice  is  unsafe'65.  There  is,  however,  some 
authority  in  medical  cases  to  the  effect  that,  if  necessary,  judges  will  overrule  accepted 
medical  practice.  The  most  striking  example  of  this  is  in  Smith  v  Tunbtidge  Wells  HA  166 
in  which  the  judge,  Morland  J.,  effectively  held  that  evidence  as  to  standard  practice 
from  "the  greatest  of  experts"  in  the  field  in  question  was  insufficient  to  prove  that  the 
converse  view  was 
99  not  only  the  generally  accepted  proper  practice,  but  was  also  the  only 
reasonable  and  responsible  standard  of  care  to  be  expected  from  a 
consultant  in  [the  doctor's]  position  faced  with  the  plaintiffs  situation"  167 
This  case,  and  the  others  making  similar  judgements  as  to  the  correctness  of  accepted 
medical  practice,  concerned  information  disclosure;  they  are  considered  in  greater  detail 
below.  As  yet,  there  appear  to  be  no  cases  where  a  doctor  has  successfully  been  sued 
over  a  clinical  matter  (treatment  or  diagnosis)  where  he  followed  accepted  medical 
practice.  168  However,  the  Court  of  Appeal  has  indicated  that 
"it  is  not  enough  for  a  defendant  to  call  a  number  of  doctors  to  say  that  what 
he  had  done  or  not  done  was  in  accord  with  accepted  clinical  practice.  It  is 
necessary  for  the  judge  consider  that  evidence  and  decide  whether  that 
clinical  practice  puts  the  patient  unnecessarily  at  risk"  1611 
In  practice,  however,  the  effect  of  this  seems  merely  to  be  that  the  courts  are  withholding 
to  themselves  jurisdictional  grounds  to  challenge  medical  decisions  which  they  have  no 146 
intention  of  exercising;  even  respectable  evidence  that  what  the  defendant  did  was  a 
course  of  action  which  no  responsible  doctor  would  have  undertaken,  rather  than  simply 
saying  that  they  would  have  acted  differently,  is  still  not  sufficient  to  discredit  the 
defendant's  experts  who  support  him. 
The  second  factor  in  a  successful  professional  negligence  claim  is  that  you  must  show 
that  the  treatment  did  not  follow  any  accepted  practice.  There  are  three  problem  issues 
here.  Firstly,  even  if  you  show  that  the  doctor  departed  from  normal  practice,  this  does 
not  in  itself  show  negligence;  it  does  not  even  place  an  evidential  burden  on  the  doctor 
to  justify  his  departure  from  that  practice'70.  The  evidential  burden  remains  at  all  times 
on  the  pursuer  to  show  all  these  aspects  (i.  e.  accepted  practice,  departure  therefrom, 
and  unreasonableness  of  course  actually  adopted).  Secondly,  it  may  be  difficult  to  find 
out  exactly  what  has  happened.  The  Access  to  Health  Records  Act  1990  was  passed  to 
give  patients  access  to  their  own  medical  records.  The  1990  Act  was  not  retrospective, 
71  although  the  new  access  rights  under  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998  are'  ,  which  may 
help  to  alleviate  some  of  the  problems  claimants  have  experienced  in  this  field.  The 
problem  is  exacerbated  somewhat  by  the  fact  that  it  is  unclear  whether  a  doctor  is  under 
a  duty  of  ex  post  facto  disclosure  to  tell  a  patient  what  has  actually  happened  to  him, 
although  he  probably  iS172. 
The  third  problem  with  departure  from  accepted  practice  is,  however,  rather  more 
fundamental:  supposing  there  is  no  accepted  practice?  It  has  been  claimed  that  for  90% 
of  medical  conditions,  there  is  either  no  specific  remedy,  or  else  that  the  efficacy  of  the 
normally-adopted  treatment  is  unknown'73  . 
There  appears  to  be  no  case  law  on  this 
situation,  or  at  least  no  decided  cases  where  the  point  was  argued.  On  general 
principles,  it  would  seem  that  if  the  treatment  is  so  radical  and  innovative  that  no  other 
doctor  would  have  undertaken  it,  then  liability  would  follow.  Of  course,  the  causation 
problem  in  such  a  case  might  be  insuperable,  and  in  any  case  it  should  be  noted  that 
such  an  approach  simpficiter  would  discourage  doctors  from  trying  a  new  and  untried 
therapy  for  a  novel  disease.  The  action  could  still  fail  on  the  basis  that  for  an  action  to 
succeed,  the  duty  of  care  breached  must  be  fair  and  reasonable  as  a  matter  of  public 
PoliCY174. 
This  also  relates  to  the  third  aspect  of  the  claim,  that  you  must  show  that  the  course 
adopted  is  of  such  a  nature  that  no  professional  person  would  have  chosen  it  when 
acting  with  ordinary  care.  Given  the  relatively  fragile  scientific  base  of  medicine,  and  the 
huge  degree  of  variation  in  treatment,  we  can  graphically  display  medical  practice  as 
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It  Gan  thus  be  seen  that  most  findings  of  negligence  relate  to  activities  which  are  far  from 
the  core  of  good  medical  practice.  In  deciding  where,  on  this  diagram,  a  given 
intervention  would  lie,  the  courts  are  naturally  reliant  on  medical  evidence.  However,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  judges  still  decide,  ultimately,  on  whether  an  activity  is 
negligent.  Thus,  sets  1  to  4  above  are  medical  decisions;  set  5  is  a  legal  one.  This  point 
is  occasionally  noted  by  judges:  Lord  Scarman  once  observed  that  "The  law  imposes 
the  duty  of  care,  but  the  standard  of  care  is  a  matter  of  medical  judgement.  "  175  Having 
heard  medical  evidence  on  the  standard  of  care  (sets  1-4),  the  judge  determines 
whether  this  constitutes  a  breach  of  the  duty  of  care,  i.  e-  whether  the  pursuer's  claim  fits 
into  set  5. 
Some  comments  are  needed  on  assessing  the  standard  of  care.  The  standard  by  which 
a  doctors  acts  are  judged  is  by  what  was  the  prevailing  knowledge  at  that  time.  The 
clearest  example  of  this  is  where  a  misfortune  occurs  as  a  result  of  a  risk  which  could 
not  have  been  discovered  at  the  time  due  to  the  limitations  of  scientific  and  technical 
knowledge,  as  happened  in  Roe  v  Ministry  of  Health  176;  in  the  words  of  Lord  Denning, 
"We  must  not  look  at  the  1947  accident  with  1954  spectacles.  "177  The  rationale  is  that  a 
person  should  not  be  held  liable  for  following  a  course  of  action  which  is  only 
subsequently  shown  to  be  wrong.  The  converse  is  also  true,  however,  and  a  doctor  who 
adopts  an  unorthodox  course  of  treatment  will  incur  no  liability  if  it  is  subsequently  shown 
178 
to  be  correct 
Lastly,  the  standard  of  care  by  which  a  doctor  is  judged  is  that  of  his  own  specia 
litY179 
This  is  again  a  refinement  of  the  neighbour  principle:  for  "reasonable  man"  we  now 
substitute  "reasonable  consultant"  or  "reasonable  specialist";  the  test  remains  the  same. 148 
If  you  hold  yourself  out  as  being  qualified,  then  you  will  be  judged  by  the  standards  of 
the  qualification  you  claiM180.  In  a  hospital  setting,  this  means  that  much  importance  is 
placed  on  the  post  the  doctor  holds,  and  lack  of  competence  to  be  in  that  post  is  no 
defence  to  a  finding  of  negligence  181 
. 
However,  an  interesting  corollary  to  this  rule  can 
be  found  in  Mose  v  North  West  Hertfordshir*e  HA182 
. 
This  case  was  held  that  a  surgeon 
would  have  been  found  negligent  if  it  had  been  held  that  he  was  inexperienced  in  the 
type  of  operation  he  had  conducted.  The  rationale  was  that  it  would  have  been 
negligent  for  an  inexperienced  surgeon  to  attempt  the  procedure,  but  apparently  it  was 
perfectly  all  right  for  an  experienced  surgeon  to  try,  even  though  (as  happened)  he  then 
causes  damage  to  the  patient.  The  negligent  act  would  not  have  been  in  causing  the 
harm  which  occurred  (which  appears  to  occurred  as  a  result  of  an  acceptable  course  of 
action),  but  would  instead  have  been  in  attempting  to  do  something  which  you  were 
unqualified  to  do.  This  is  in  effect  a  new  limb  of  negligence,  in  that  it  is  reasonably 
foreseeable  that  you  will  cause  harm  by  attempting  something  intrinsically  beyond  your 
skill  -  even  if  you  follow  a  course  of  action  which  is  identical  to  one  which  an  appropriate 
specialist  would  have  followed. 
D:  Criticisms  of  the  Bolam  Test: 
The  Bolam  test  has  been  subjected  to  intense,  and  increasing,  criticism.  As  we  have 
seen,  it  appears  to  place  medical  evidence  on  a  pedestal  which  no  other  class  of 
evidence 
enjoys.  That  deference  is  criticised  as  follows: 
"The  standard  test  of  medical  negligence  was  set  down  in  1957...  This  test  has  a 
number  of  practical  implications.  If  the  conduct  in  question  did  not  fall  below  the 
minimum  standard  of  the  reasonably  competent  practitioner  in  that  field  of 
practice  at  that  time  then  it  does  not  constitute  negligence.  If  the  conduct  in 
question,  even  if  it  reflects  a  minority  view  of  how  practice  should  be  conducted 
and  even  if  there  is  a  body  of  opinion  who  would  take  a  contrary  view,  was  within 
a  reputable  minority  view  then  it  does  not  constitute  negligence. 
In  medical  cases  the  courts  go  further  [than  in  cases  involving  other 
professions]  and  defer  to  the  medical  witnesses  by  allowing  them  to  determine 
whether  the  conduct  in  question  conformed  with  the  standard  of  care  required  by 
law.  The  effect  is  that  it  is  the  medical  profession  rather  than  the  judges  which 
vj183 
sets  the  legal  standard  of  care  in  practice. 149 
More  fundamentally,  Goldrein  and  de  Haas  blame  it  for  a  fundamental  distortion  of  the 
entire  structure  of  medical  tort: 
when  seeking  to  establish  liability  for  negligence  in  an  accident  claim: 
There  has  to  be  balanced  (broadly  speaking)  the  risk  of  injury  to  the 
proposed  plaintiff  against  precautions  to  reduce  the  risk  to  be  taken  by 
the  proposed  defendant. 
'General  and  approved  practice',  where  relevant,  can  be  invoked  to  help 
guide  the  court  as  to  how  that  balance  is  to  be  struck 
Such  analysis  in  the  context  of  medical  negligence  has  been  clouded  by  'The 
Bolam  Test...  What  in  fact  does  Bolam  achieve?  Surely  it  has  two 
consequences: 
Firstly,  it  merges  into  one  confused  and  unsatisfactory  test,  the  three  entirely 
separate  avenues  of  analysis  otherwise  known  to  the  tort  lawyer: 
a  risk, 
b  precautions,  and 
c  where  should  the  balance  be  struck. 
Secondly,  it  makes  judges  subconsciously  believe  that  they  exercise  judgment  on 
the  central  issue  -  where  the  balance  should  be  stnick?  -  as  lawyers  rather  than 
as  laymen.  084 
A  1997  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords,  Bolitho  v  City  and  Hackney  Health  Authorityl  85, 
raised  the  question  of  whether  the  Bolam  test  was  applicable  to  questions  of  causation 
(causation  itself  is  considered  infra),  as  historically  it  was  felt  that  its  applicability  was 
restricted  to  the  question  of  duty  of  care  and  standard  of  care.  In  the  leading  judgement, 
Lord  Browne-Wilkinson  held  that  Bolam  was  indeed  relevant  in  deciding  issues  of 
causation  where  the  central  question  to  be  decided  was  what  should  have  been  done. 
However,  he  also  emphasised  that  the  courts  ultimately  retain  the  task  of  assessing 
whether  the  body  of  medical  opinion  led  before  the  court  is  a  reasonable  one,  and 
ultimately  the  court  can  overrule  even  unanimous  medical  opinion  if  that  opinion  is  not 
capable  of  withstanding  logical  analysis.  This  is  in  line  with  the  courts'  approach  to 
186  expert  evidence  generally  Opinion  is  split  as  to  the  effect  of  Bolitho.  Thus,  Davies 
suggests  that; 
"...  if  this  case  represents  any  real  change  at  all  it  is  that  the  courts  are  being 
more  explicit  in  publicising  their  rare  and  residual  power  to  question  medical 
practice.  The  slight  change  is  more  cultural  than  substantive.  087 150 
Whereas  Brazier  and  Miola  argue  that 
"Bolitho  has  already  made  a  difference.  Bolitho  has  been  applied  by  the  Court  of 
Appeal  to  uphold  a  judgement  against  a  defendant  general  practitioner.  In 
MarTiott  v  West  Midlands  Health  AuthofiV  88  the  judges  concluded  that  the  expert 
opinion  advanced  in  the  doctor's  favour  was  not  defensible.  Most  importantly 
Bolitho  has  been  decided  at  a  time  when  other  developments  also  point  to  a 
revolution  in  the  way  medical  malpractice  is  judged.  "'89 
The  emerging  evolution  of  this  area  of  law  is  taken  into  account  in  the  conclusions  infra. 
E:  Causation: 
It  is  not  enough  to  show  that  a  duty  of  care  exists,  and  was  breached  by  the  doctor.  For 
an  action  to  succeed  it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the  loss  you  suffered  was  caused  by 
that  breach  of  duty,  i.  e.  it  was  the  causa  causans  of  the  injury,  and  not  just  a  causa  sine 
qua  non.  This  is,  in  fact,  often  one  of  the  most  difficult  parts  of  an  action  for  malpractice: 
"It  is  generally  held  that  a  causal  connection  between  the  wrongdoer's  conduct 
(or  the  event  for  which  he  is  responsible)  and  the  resulting  harm  is  a  precondition 
of  his  liability  to  pay  compensation.  Establishing  the  causal  connection  between 
medical  negligence  and  the  injury  complained  of  is  probably  the  most  difficult 
task  in  medical  malpractice  litigation  (as  indeed  in  many  negligence  actions).  "  '90 
The  reasons  underlying  the  tests  used  for  establishing  this  causal  connection  have 
been  criticised  as  having  more  to  do  with  public  policy  aimed  at  controlling  potential 
liability  than  with  juristic  logic'9'.  The  following  discussion  will  focus  on  the  general 
principles  actually  applied  by  Scottish  and  English  courts,  and  the  variations  on  these 
principles  used  in  medical  cases. 
To  start  with,  it  is  clear  that  the  doctor  is  not  liable  simply  because  he  has  failed  to  make 
you  better: 
"There  is  no  absolute  liability  to  cure,  not  even  if  the  patient's  post-operative 
condition  is  worse  than  before,  though  such  facts  may  raise  a  prima  facie 
case  of  negligence.  ""2 151 
To  suggest  that  a  prima  facie  case  of  negligence  is  raised  in  such  circumstances  is 
to  start  with  the  most  favourable  (to  the  patient)  interpretation  of  events.  The  basic 
premise  of  causation  is  that  you  are  only  liable  for  the  harm  caused  by  your  wrongful 
actions.  This  can  be  described  as  the  "but-for"  premise:  you  are  liable  for  harm 
which  would  have  not  occurred  but  for  your  negligence.  In  trying  to  decide  whether 
93 
act  A  has  caused  injury  B,  the  choice  should  be  made  on  a  common  sense  basis' 
. 
Causation  is  easily  seen  to  be  lacking  in  Bamett  v  Chelsea  &  Kensington  HMC  194  in 
which  a  night  watchman  who  had  been  poisoned  received  no  treatment  from  the 
hospital.  There  was  a  duty  of  care,  and  a  clear  breach  of  that  duty.  But  the  evidence 
was  that  even  prompt  and  skilled  treatment  could  not  have  prevented  the  death  of  the 
watchman;  therefore  the  doctors  negligence  in  no  way  caused  or  exacerbated  the  injury, 
and  so  no  damages  were  recoverable.  Most  cases,  however,  are  not  so  easily  disposed 
of.  In  a  large  number  of  malpractice  claims,  the  negligence  complained  of  will  have 
arisen  in  the  course  of  treating  some  underlying  injury  or  illness.  How  is  the  court  to 
decide  whether  it  was  the  negligence  which  caused  the  deterioration,  or  the  underlying 
illness? 
The  general  rule  of  delict  is  that  if  the  breach  of  duty  by  the  defender  "materially 
contributed"  to  the  injury  suffered  by  the  pursuer,  then  the  defender  is  100%  liable  for 
the  loss  or  injury  sustained.  A  material  contribution  means  anything  other  than 
completely  peripheral  matters  covered  by  the  maxim  de  minimis  non  curat  lex  -  the  law 
is  not  concerned  with  trivialities.  Anything  which  had  more  than  a  de  minimis 
contribution  to  the  accident  will  therefore  render  the  defender  liable  in  full  damages. 
This  applies  even  if  the  defender  were  only  liable  to  the  extent  of,  say,  10% 
responsibility  for  the  harm:  he  will  have  to  pay  all  the  damages  unless  he  cites  the 
person  responsible  for  the  90%  contribution  as  a  co-defenderl  95  or  argues  contributory 
negligence  by  the  pursuer.  If  the  issue  is  whether  harm  was  caused  by  a  negligent  or 
non-negligent  cause,  then  there  is  no  apportionment  and  the  entire  case  will  hinge  on 
which  cause  is  deemed  to  have  been  responsible.  In  these  cases,  the  "but-for"  test  is 
largely  inapplicable,  and  the  issue  is  again  one  of  material  contribution,  where  even  a 
minority  culpable  cause  (i.  e.  one  caused  by  breach  of  duty  of  care)  will  render  the 
defender  wholly  liable  in  damages.  What  is  of  particular  importance  is  that  this  also 
applies  to  factors  which  serve  to  increase  the  risk  of  harm  being  caused  by  a  non- 
actionable  cause,  such  as  underlying  disease.  If  the  pursuer  succeeds  in  showing  that 
the  negligence  complained-of  materially  increases  the  risk  of  suffering  harm  from  the 
other  cause,  and  if  this  harm  materialises,  then  he  will  succeed  in  his  action'  96 
. 
From 152 
this,  it  would  seem  that  if  a  patient  suffers  an  injury  which  could  have  been  caused  either 
by  negligent  treatment  or  by  an  underlying  condition,  then  on  the  "McGhee  Principle"  he 
would  be  able  to  recover  damages. 
However,  consideration  of  the  medical  cases  shows  that  this  is  seldom  the  case.  There 
are  two  primary  constraints  on  the  McGhee  Principle  as  applied  in  this  area.  Firstly,  the 
principle  does  not  remove  all  the  evidential  hurdles  in  the  pursuers  path:  while  McGhee 
sets  out  circumstances  whereby  a  causa  sine  qua  non  may  be  elevated  to  the  status  of 
causa  causans,  it  is  still  necessary  for  the  pursuer  to  prove  causation  at  least  to  the 
extent  of  proving  that  the  breach  of  duty  of  care  was  a  causa  sine  qua  non.  A  modem 
interpretation  of  Bamett  would  be  that  the  failure  to  treat  was  not  shown  to  have  even 
such  a  de  minimis  effect  on  the  ultimate  harm,  but  the  rule  is better  seen  in  Kajoes  Tutor  v 
Ayrshire  &  ArTan  Health  Board'97 
.A  unanimous  Inner  House  and  unanimous  House  of 
Lords  overruled  the  Lord  Ordinary  and  denied  recovery  following  a  dispute  over 
causation,  negligence  having  been  admitted.  A  massive  overdose  of  penicillin  was 
administered  to  a  two  year-old  with  meningitis,  who  was  later  found  to  be  profoundly 
deaf.  Medical  evidence  was  that  meningitis  could  (and  often  did)  cause  deafness;  there 
was  no  evidence  at  all  as  to  whether  a  penicillin  overdose  could  cause  ft.  The  House  of 
Lords  held  that  reliance  on  the  McGhee  principle  was  only  possible  if  there  was  evidence 
to  make  the  breach  of  duty  of  care  a  causa  sine  qua  non.  If  such  evidence  were 
lacking,  then  McGhee  could  not  create  it. 
Insofar  as  Kay's  Tutor  proceeded  on  the  narrow  evidential  point  that  the  effect  of  the 
overdose  had  at  best  a  de  minimis  effect  in  causing  the  subsequent  blindness,  it  is 
nothing  more  than  a  tragic  illustration  of  the  general  rule-  However,  the  later  case  of 
Wilsher  v  Essex  AHA'98  held  that  where  the  breach  of  duty  resulted  in  circumstances 
which  could  give  rise  to  the  injury  actually  suffered,  it  was  still  not  open  to  the  plaintiff  to 
rely  on  McGhee  to  exclude  the  possibility  that  one  of  several  other  possible  causes  had 
not  been  responsible.  Insofar  as  the  evidence  was  split  as  to  whether  or  not  the 
negligent  act  was  capable  of  causing  the  injury,  it  would  have  been  possible  to  exclude 
McGhee  on  the  same  basis  as  in  Kays  Tutor,  namely  lack  of  evidence  making  the 
negligent  act  even  a  causa  sine  qua  non.  The  judgements,  however,  do  not  proceed  on 
this  basis. 
In  analysing  the  judgements  given  in  the  three  cases  of  Wardlaw'99,  McGhee200  and 
Wilshe?  01,  there  is  a  problem  in  that  much  of  what  is  said  seems  to  be  internally 
contradictory.  In  Wardlaw,  the  House  of  Lords  overruled  the  lower  courts  who  had 153 
applied  an  inversion  of  the  normal  rules  of  evidence,  i.  e.  they  had  said  that  it  was  for  the 
employer  to  disprove  causation  where  the  breach  of  duty  was  in  failing  to  take  measures 
designed  to  prevent  the  injury  which  occurred  202 
. 
The  real  test  was  whether  the  pursuer 
could  prove,  on  the  balance  of  probabilities,  that  the  breach  of  duty  caused  or  materially 
contributed  to  his  injury.  The  question  was  not  to  find  the  most  probable  source  of  the 
defender's  illness,  if  other  factors  have  a  material  contribution.  The  inconsistency  is  that 
the  court  went  on  to  hold  that  the  evidence  was  sufficient  to  warrant  an  inference  that 
the  breach  of  duty  had  made  a  material  contribution  to  the  injury.  This  was 
notwithstanding  the  finding  that  the  dust  caused  by  breach  of  duty  was  a  minority  factor. 
Since  a  presumption  of  causal  connection  is  sufficient  to  win  an  action,  the  effect  is  that 
the  defender  will  be  liable  unless  he  can  displace  this  presumption;  in  other  words,  the 
onus  is  then  on  the  defender  to  disprove  causation,  in  practice  if  not  in  strict  theory. 
In  some  ways,  McGhee  is  almost  indistinguishable  from  Wardlaw,  the  main  difference 
being  that  in  Wardlaw  medical  evidence  was  clear  that  the  pursuer's  illness  could  only 
have  been  caused  by  silica  dust  from  his  workplace,  whereas  in  McGhee  the  scientific 
knowledge  of  the  disease  was  insufficient  to  do  more  than  highlight  factors  which  tended 
to  increase  or  decrease  its  occurrence.  However,  since  the  evidence  was  that  the 
defender's  negligence  materially  increased  the  risk  of  the  injury  occurring,  this  was 
sufficient  to  amount  to  a  material  contribution  to  the  injury,  and  so  liability  followed. 
Again,  McGhee  was  concerned  with  cumulative  factors,  which  were  not  present  in 
Wilsher  (the  choice  there  being  between  wholly  discrete  causes;  ultimately,  Wilsher  was 
sent  for  retrial  because  there  were  insufficient  findings  in  fact  to  justify  a  decision  either 
way  without  inverting  the  onus  of  proof).  This  would  again  give  scope  for  not  applying 
McGhee  in  Wilsher  in  Wilsher,  either  the  negligent  act  caused  the  injury  or  it  didn't;  and 
if  it  didn't,  it  had  no  impact  or  effect  on  the  factor  which  actually  caused  ft.  The 
judgement  in  Wilsher  (by  Lord  Bridge,  the  other  four  Law  Lords  concurring)  actually 
proceeds  in  part  on  this  basis,  Lord  Bridge  adopting  part  of  the  dissenting  Court  of 
Appeal  judgement  by  Sir  Nicholas  Browne-Wilkinson  VC  that 
"A  failure  to  take  preventive  measures  against  one  out  of  five  possible  causes 
is  no  evidence  as  to  which  of  those  five  caused  the  injury. 
v&203 
However,  in  so  holding  he  ignores  a  highly  pertinent  statement  by  Lord  Kilbrandon- 
'When  you  find  it  proved  (a)  that  the  defenders  knew  that  to  take  the 
precaution  reduces  the  risk,  chance,  possibility  or  probability  of  the 154 
contracting  of  a  disease,  (b)  that  the  precaution  has  not  been  taken,  and  (c) 
that  the  disease  has  supervened,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  those  defenders 
can  demand  more  by  way  of  proof  of  the  probability  that  the  failure  caused  or 
it  204  contributed  to  the  physical  breakdown 
. 
Wilsher  has  done  little  to  clarify  the  law  on  causation,  either  in  medical  cases  or 
generally.  It  appears  that  Wilsher  creates  a  specific  departure  from  the  normal  tests  of 
causation  used  in  negligence  actions  and  applies  a  much  stricter  test  of  actual  proof  of 
agency  in  medical  negligence  cases.  If  this  is  true  205  then  there  is  one  rule  for  the 
doctors  and  one  for  everyone  else:  Wardlaw  and  McGhee  were  decided  explicitly  to 
assist  pursuers  facing  otherwise  insurmountable  problems  with  the  evidence,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  ensure  that  employers  (as  the  defenders  were)  could  not  escape  liability 
just  because  there  was  limited  scientific  knowledge  about  the  risks  they  exposed  their 
employees  to.  That  these  considerations  do  not  apply  to  pursuers  seeking  to  hold 
doctors  accountable  for  their  mistakes  may  be  an  indication  of  the  courts'  unwillingness 
to  regulate  the  medical  profession  in  any  systematic  way. 
Another  medical  peculiarity  concerning  causation  arose  in  Bolitho  v  City  and  Hackney 
Health  Author#1-06.  Causation,  in  general,  proceeds  on  the  "but-for"  basis:  but  for  your 
negligence,  I  would  not  have  suffered  the  injury  I  suffered.  In  Bolitho,  the  issue  revolved 
on  the  following  points:  but  for  the  negligence  of  the  attending  doctor  (actually  the  non- 
attending  doctor,  which  was  admitted  to  be  negligent),  the  patient  would  have  received 
medical  treatment.  However,  the  treatment  which  (hypothetically)  would  have  been 
given  is  treatment  according  to  the  Bolam  standard.  If,  at  that  stage,  it  would  have  been 
reasonable  (per  Bolam)  for  the  attending  doctor  not  to  have  given  a  particular  life-saving 
course  of  treatment,  then  the  plaintiff  will  have  failed  to  prove  causation.  Had  the  doctor 
attended  and  followed  a  reasonable  course  of  action,  the  injury  would  still  have  been 
suffered.  Viewed  in  this  light,  there  is  little  difference  between  Bolitho  and  Bamett.  The 
difference  is  in  the  subtle  point  that  an  equally  respectable  body  of  medical  opinion 
would  have  treated  on  attending,  thus  averting  the  injury.  Under  normal  rules  of 
causation,  this  question  would  fall  to  be  determined  by  asking  the  purely  factual  question 
of  whether  those  who  would,  but  for  their  negligence,  have  attended  the  patient,  have 
carded  out  the  treatment.  By  applying  the  Bolam  test  to  this  question  (i.  e.  by  asking 
whether  a  reasonable  body  of  medical  opinion  would  have  withheld  the  treatment,  rather 
than  whether  those  who  should  have  treated  would  have  done  so),  Bolam  has  been 
extended  into  a  new  area.  Yet  again,  the  rules  for  medical  negligence  appear  to  be 
different  from  those  applicable  elsewhere. 155 
A  final  point  on  causation  concerns  loss  of  a  chance  of  recovering  from  illness  or  injury: 
supposing  the  negligence  complained-of  did  not  cause  harm,  but  merely  deprived  the 
pursuer  a  chance  at  being  healed  or  cured?  The  normal  rules  of  recovery  prevent  the 
courts  awarding  proportionate  damages  based  on  the  chance  of  recovery  which  has 
been  lost  (e.  g.  awarding  50%  of  the  damages  normally  awarded  if  there  were  only  a 
50%  chance  of  effecting  a  cure)207  . 
Note  that  in  the  reverse  situation,  where  you  sue  for 
possible  future  complications,  there  is  the  possibility  of  seeking  provisional  damages, 
referred  to  supra,  which  reduces  the  likelihood  of  either  seriously  over-  or  under- 
compensating  a  patient208  . 
However,  when  the  incident  complained-of  has  robbed  a 
person  of  a  chance  of  recovery,  then  the  complications  have  already  arisen  and  the 
crystal  ball-gazing  conducted  by  the  courts  is  the  retrospective  one  of  whether,  with 
proper  treatment,  the  injury  or  illness  could  have  been  cured  or  avoided.  The  courts  in 
such  a  case  decide  the  issue  purely  on  the  basis  of  balance  of  probabilities.  if  proper 
treatment  would  have  afforded  a  greater  than  50%  chance  of  success,  you  are  entitled 
to  full  damageS209;  if  the  chance  would  have  been  less  than  50%,  you  get  nothing.  210  it 
was  pointed  out  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  that  this  would  render  doctors  immune  from  suit 
for  failing  to  treat  in  any  case  where  the  chances  of  success  were  less  than  50%21  ',  but 
this  reasoning  failed  to  persuade  the  House  of  Lords. 
It  is  worth  noting  in  relation  to  "lost  chance"  cases  that  proportionate  damages  are 
payable  under  claims  for  breach  of  contract.  Thus,  for  example,  a  solicitor  negligently 
handling  a  case  which  had  a  60%  chance  of  success  would  have  to  pay  compensation 
amounting  to  60%  of  the  damages  which  could  have  been  won  212 
. 
Thus,  private  patients 
suing  under  contract  have  a  chance  of  recovering  damages  which  their  counterparts 
treated  (or  not  treated)  on  the  NHS  are  denied.  This  would  seem  to  be  out  of  keeping 
with  the  series  of  decisions  noted  earlier  extending  the  liability  of  health  authorities  for 
their  employees,  and  the  law  would  seem  to  be  in  need  of  reform.  The  House  of  Lords 
left  open  the  wider  question  of  whether  a  less  than  50%  chance  could  ever  found  an 
action  in  tort;  the  general  consensus  seems  to  be  that  it  could,  but  only  in  unusual 
213  circumstance 
As  noted  above,  deterioration  in  the  patient  may  raise  a  prima  facie  case  of  negligence. 
The  patient  must  still  positively  prove  causation.  However,  the  courts  may  be  willing  to 
infer  certain  facts  in  the  absence  of  evidence  in  such  cases',  once  you  have  established 
prima  facie  negligence,  all  you  have  to  do  is  bring  it  home  to  the  defenderý  14  ;  however, 
notwithstanding  Professor  Walkers  comments  above,  it  seems  improbable  that  simple 
deterioration  in  a  patient's  condition  would  raise  the  inference  of  negligence  in  medical 156 
cases,  since  so  many  ill  people  deteriorate  even  with  the  best  possible  medical  care.  A 
stricter  form  of  inferred  negligence  arises  under  the  doctrine  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  - 
literally,  that  things  speak  for  themselves.  Initially  this  meant  simply  that  the  defender 
was  obliged  to  explain  what  had  happened.  The  current  rule  is  that,  if  res  ipsa  loquitur 
applies,  then  the  facts  raise  such  an  inference  of  negligence  that  the  defender  is  obliged 
to  explain  how  the  event  could  have  happened.  In  the  absence  of  such  an  explanation, 
the  court  will  find  for  the  pursuer215.  Res  ipsa  loquitur  applies  as  follows: 
'When  the  thing  is  shown  to  be  under  the  management  of  the  defendant  or 
his  servants  and  the  accident  is  such  as  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  does 
not  happen  if  those  who  have  the  management  use  proper  care,  it  affords 
reasonable  evidence,  in  the  absence  of  explanation  by  the  defendants,  that 
,,  216 
the  accident  arose  from  want  of  care  . 
The  classic  example  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  is  when,  for  instance,  a  barrel  falls  out  of  the 
17  defendant's  warehouse  and  lands  on  the  plaintiff2  . 
It  follows  that  since  deterioration 
can  occur  in  medical  cases  without  want  of  care,  that  the  doctrine  has  limited 
applicability  to  medical  cases.  Thus,  even  leaving  a  swab  in  a  patient  will  not  necessarily 
always  raise  a  presumption  of  negligence  218.  The  leading  description  of  how  res  ipsa 
loquitur  applies  in  a  medical  case  is  surprisingly  by  Lord  Denning219: 
"if  the  plaintiff  had  to  prove  that  some  particular  doctor  or  nurse  was 
negligent,  he  would  not  be  able  to  do  it.  But  he  was  not  put  to  that  impossible 
task:  he  says,  'I  went  into  hospital  to  be  cured  of  two  stiff  fingers.  I  have 
come  out  with  four  stiff  fingers  and  the  hand  is  useless.  That  should  not  have 
happened  if  due  care  had  been  used.  Explain  it,  if  you  can.  '  I  am  quite 
clearly  of  the  opinion  that  that  raises  a  prima  facie  case  against  the  hospital 
authorities...  They  have  nowhere  explained  how  it  could  have  happened 
without  negligence...  They  have  not  therefore  displaced  the  prima  facie  case 
against  them  and  are  liable  in  damages  to  the  plaintiff.  ,  220 
Of  course,  having  raised  the  presumption  of  negligence  against  the  defendant  is  not  the 
same  as  saying  the  plaintiff  has  won,  and  if  the  defendant  is  able  to  adduce  evidence 
either  disproving  negligence  221  or  else  suggesting  a  non-negligent  explanation  which 
was  as  likely  to  have  been  the  cause  of  injury  as  negligence  222 
, 
then  the  presumption  will 
have  been  rebuffed  and,  barring  further  evidence,  the  plaintiff  will  be  unable  to  recover. 
Another  possible  reason  for  the  relative  scarcity  of  res  ipsa  loquitur  in  the  decided  cases 157 
is  that  the  maxim  generally  only  applies  where  there  is  informational  asymmetry  in  the 
case,  i.  e.  the  defender  knows  what  happened  and  the  pursuer  doesn  e23 
- 
The  doctrine 
of  res  Osa  loquitur  was  considerably  expanded  by  the  American  courts  in  the  1970s, 
which  was  one  factor  in  the  "malpractice  crisis"  there  -  to  the  extent  that  10  states  have 
legislation  barring  or  restricting  the  application  of  the  rule  in  medical  caseS224  . 
The 
considerably  more  restricted  version  of  the  doctrine  applied  in  British  courts  is  another 
factor  suggesting  that  fears  of  an  impending  malpractice  crisis  in  the  UK  are  unfounded. 
VI:  Patient  Consent  to  Treatment: 
You  go  to  see  a  doctor.  The  doctor  gives  you  an  injection.  Quid  idlis?  On  the  bald  facts 
as  outlined  here,  the  doctor  has  committed  an  assault  and  may  be  liable  to  both  criminal 
and  civil  sanctions  at  the  patient's  behest.  If  a  doctor  invades  your  bodily  integrity  then, 
in  the  absence  of  other  factors,  he  is  committing  an  assaU  le25 
. 
The  civil  law  of  assault 
does  not  require  mens  rea  to  be  present  in  order  to  establish  guiltAiabilite6. 
Consequently,  good  intentions  (the  opposite  of  mens  rea)  do  not  constitute  a  defence  to 
an  action  for  assault.  This  is  true  even  of  medical  treatment  given  without  consent227;  the 
classic  quote  on  this  is  by  Cardozo  J: 
"Every  human  being  of  adult  years  and  sound  mind  has  a  right  to  determine 
what  shall  be  done  with  his  own  body,  and  a  surgeon  who  performs  an 
operation  without  his  patient's  consent,  commits  an  assault.  028 
In  this  context,  the  language  of  autonomy  (i.  e.  the  right  to  decide  what  happens  to  your 
own  body)  features  largely  in  Anglo-American  judgements.  This  is  shown  in  the  most 
explicit  terms  in  the  judgement  of  Butler-Sloss  U  in  Rv  Collins  and  Others  ex  parte  S229, 
where  she  stated  that 
"Even  when  his  or  her  own  life  depends  on  receiving  medical  treatment,  an  adult  of 
sound  mind  is  entified  to  refuse  ft.  This  reflects  the  autonomy  of  each  individual  and 
the  right  of  self  determination.  Yj230 
The  quality  of  information  to  be  given  is  considered  below  in  the  context  of  medical 
negligence.  For  the  purposes  of  assault  liability,  however,  the  view  expressed  in 
Chatterton  v  Gerson  231  that,  in  order  for  "consent"  given  by  a  patient  to  bar  an  action  for 
assault,  the  patient  must  be  "informed  in  broad  terms  of  the  nature  of  the  procedure 
which  is  intended"  remains  true.  Given  the  broad  general  consent  forms  routinely  used S232,158  in  the  NH  the  practical  upshot  of  this  is  that,  unless  the  consent  was  either  for  a 
totally  different  treatment  altogether  (e.  g.  a  hysterectomy  conducted  instead  of  minor 
gynaecological  surgery")  or  was  obtained  by  fraud  or  misrepresentation234  , 
then  no 
action  for  assault  will  lie  and  the  aggrieved  patient  must  sue  instead  in  negligence. 
Consent  obtained  by  duress  is  of  no  validity,  and  the  same  holds  true  for  a  withdrawal  of 
consent235  . 
Treatment  of  someone  who  has  mental  sufficient  mental  capacity  and 
refuses  treatment  will,  however,  be  actionable:  Bv  An  NHS  Truse36.  This  case  lays 
down  an  important  set  of  procedural  guidelines  to  be  followed  in  cases  where  an 
apparently-competent  patient  refuses  life-saving  or  life-continuing  treatmen  t237. 
A:  Where  Consent  Cannot  Be  Given: 
As  seen  above,  a  doctor  must  secure  his  or  her  patient's  consent  before  treating  them  in 
order  to  avoid  liability  for  battery  or  assault.  However,  there  are  three  areas  where  it 
may  be  problematic  to  obtain  consent  from  the  patient  himself  before  embarking  on 
treatment.  These  are  children,  the  mentally  incompetent,  and  in  cases  of  emergency. 
The  related  issue  of  whether  soldiers  and  prisoners,  for  instance,  are  capable  of  giving  a 
genuinely  voluntary  consent  is  more  a  question  of  the  quality  (as  opposed  to  the 
existence)  of  consent,  and  is  discussed  under  the  heading  of  negligence.  It  should  be 
noted,  however,  that  a  "consent"  which  is  extorted  is  generally  wholly  void.  23" 
1:  Eme[gencies: 
As  we  have  seen,  there  may  not  be  any  duty  incumbent  on  a  doctor  to  treat  a  patient  in 
an  emergency  situation.  But  if  the  doctor  acts  the  Good  Samaritan,  will  he  be  liable 
simply  for  failing  to  have  secured  the  (unconscious)  patient's  consent  first?  There  are 
two  alternative  possibilities  here.  The  first  consists  of  the  "classic"  emergency,  where 
the  patient's  entry  into  medical  care  may  well  be  in  an  ambulance  while  unconscious.  In 
the  second  situation,  the  patient  is  undergoing  surgery  (which  he  or  she  has  consented 
to)  when  the  surgeon  discovers  an  unrelated  life-threatening  condition  which  was 
previously  unknown. 
The  law  appears  to  be  that  in  a  genuine  emergency,  the  surgeon  is  permitted  to  take 
immediate  action.  One  older  case  justified  such  intervention  on  the  grounds  of  "tacit 
consent",  i.  e.  that  if  the  patient  could  have  seen  what  the  surgeon  could  see,  then  she 
would  have  consented  to  the  further  treatment239 
. 
This  idea  found  some  recent  support 
in  the  Court  of  Appeal,  which  took  the  general  notion  that  normal  everyday  contact  is 
inactionable  and  extended  it  as  applying  to  emergency  treatment240.  This  approach  was 159 
criticised  by  Butler-Sloss  LJ  (as  she  then  was)  in  the  Appeal  Court  stage  of  Re  F  (mental 
patient  Sterilisation)  241;  she  preferred  to  justify  the  intervention  on  the  grounds  of  public 
policy.  Lord  Goff  in  the  House  of  Lords  preferred  to  justify  it  by  permitting  a  defence  of 
neceSSW42 
. 
Brazier  makes  the  point  that  the  distinction  has  significant  evidential 
implications,  since  if  consent  is  implied  then,  following  Freeman  v  Home  Office  243  it  is  for 
the  pabent  alleging  lack  of  consent  to  prove  that  they  did  not  do  so;  if  intervention  is 
based  on  a  defence  of  necessity,  then  it  is  for  the  surgeon  to  prove  the  defence244.  The 
upshot,  however,  is  that  if  the  action  is  both  necessary  and  cannot  be  reasonably 
delayed,  then  no  liability  Will  folloW245 
. 
The  specific  problems  raised  by  the  issue  of 
whether  or  not  to  give  life-saving  blood  transfusions  to  a  devout  Jehovah's  Witness  who 
is  unconscious  have  not  been  addressed  by  the  British  courts.  The  issue  was  raised  in  a 
Canadian  case,  which  found  the  emergency  transfusions  to  be  unlawful  and  awarded 
substantial  damageS246. 
The  foregoing  principles  apply  equally  to  "discovered"  emergencies,  i.  e.  emergencies 
arising  in  the  course  of  other  medical  treatment.  Miscovered"  emergencies  differ  in  only 
two  respects.  Firstly,  within  the  NHS  the  standard  consent  form  for  surgery  specifically 
authorises  the  surgeon  to  carry  out  any  additional  procedure  if  it  is  necessary  for  the 
patient's  best  interests  and  can  be  justified  for  medical  reasonS247  . 
Again,  the  legal 
effect  of  this  part  of  the  form  has  not  been  tested  in  court.  As  regards  Jehovah's 
Witnesses,  the  next  part  of  the  form  specifically  requests  the  patient  to  advise  of  any 
procedures  which  he  or  she  does  not  wish  carried  out.  If  this  part  of  the  form  is  given 
effect,  it  would  in  practice  bar  the  doctor  from  giving  emergency  transfusions  if  the 
patient  had  previously  stated  such  opposition.  If  they  had  not,  when  specifically  asked 
to  do  so  on  the  form,  there  may  be  a  presumption  that  the  patient,  despite  being  a 
Jehovah's  Witness,  did  not  in  fact  object  to  the  use  of  blood  products. 
2:  Children: 
This  section  is  exclusively  concerned  with  England,  since  the  law  in  Scotland  has  been 
placed  on  a  statutory  footing  and  is  therefore  considered  in  Chapter  6.  Although  the  age 
of  majority  in  Britain  is  eighteen  2413 
, 
in  general  the  crucial  age  for  medical  purposes  is 
sixteen.  At  16,  a  person  is  presumed  capable  of  consenting  to  treatment  on  their  own 
behalf  (and  at  best  their  parents  have  a  very  limited  right  to  consent  for  theM24  )  and  has 
the  right  to  be  registered  with  aG  p250 
. 
For  children  under  16,  however,  the  situation  is 
somewhat  more  complicated.  The  Giffick  case  251  was  principallyGoncerned  with  the  right 
(or  otherwise)  of  children  under  16  to  receive  contraceptive  advice  and  treatment.  More 
generally,  it  establishes  that 160 
"Provided  the  patient,  whether  a  boy  or  a  girl,  is  capable  of  understanding 
what  is  proposed  and  of  expressing  his  or  her  own  wishes,  I  see  no  good 
reason  for  holding  that  he  or  she  lacks  the  capacity  to  express  them  validly 
and  effectively  and  to  authorise  the  medical  make  the  examination  or  give  the 
treatment  which  he  advises.  t,  252 
Lord  Scarman  referred  to  the  fact  that 
"...  parental  right  yields  to  the  child's  right  to  make  his  own  decisions  when  he 
reaches  sufficient  understanding  and  intelligence  to  be  capable  of  making  up 
his  own  mind  on  the  matter  requiring  decision.  453 
Thus,  if  a  child  under  16  is  capable  of  understanding  the  treatment  proposed,  he  or  she 
may  validly  consent  without  the  parents  being  involved.  If  the  child  fails  to  satisfy  the 
Gfifick  test  for  competence,  then  it  is  for  the  parent  (or  person  with  parental  authority)  to 
make  the  decision  for  the  child. 
In  terms  of  regulation,  then,  the  upshot  of  the  Gilfick  case  is  to  impose  on  doctors  a  duty 
to  satisfy  themselves  of  the  child's  competence  before  accepting  their  consent  as  valid 
(and  additionally,  in  the  case  of  contraception,  for  the  doctor  to  be  satisfied  that  the  girl 
will  have,  or  continue  having,  sexual  relationships  regardless  of  contraception,  plus 
certain  other  criteria  254). 
Two  problem  areas  remained  unresolved  by  Gilfick.  First,  what  if  the  parents  of  a 
"Giffick-incompetent"  child  withhold  consent  to  treatment  where  such  treatment  is  in  the 
t  255, 
child's  best  interests?  In  Re  J  (a  minor)(medical  treatmen)  the  court  held  that 
parental  rights,  and  particularly  those  exercised  by  the  courts  under  their  inherent 
jurisdiction,  must  be  exercised  solely  in  the  best  interests  of  the  child.  Thus,  where  the 
parents  object  to  treatment  which  is  necessary,  the  court  can  overrule  their  objection  and 
consent  on  the  child's 
behale56. 
Secondly,  can  a  parent  overrule  the  objections  of  a  child  who  is  under  16  but 
competent?  Gillick  held  that  the  child's  consent  overrules  parental  objections;  is  the 
converse  true?  The  issue  arose  in  the  case  of  Re  R  (a  minor)(wardship:  medical 
treatment)257 
. 
This  case  concerned  a  15  year-old  who  suffered  from  a  psychotic  disorder 
of  a  fluctuating  nature.  During  apparently  lucid  intervals,  when  she  appeared  to  be 161 
Giffick  competent,  she  refused  to  consent  to  being  given  anti-psychotic  medicaments.  In 
his  judgement,  Lord  Donaldson  MR  held  that  Gillick  did  not  apply,  and  that  while  a 
competent  child  could  of  her  own  volition  consent  to  treatment,  this  did  not  remove  the 
right  of  the  parent  (or  the  court,  acting  in  /oco  parentis)  to  override  a  refusal  to 
consen  e58 
. 
This  directly  contradicts  statements  in  Gillick  to  the  effect  that  a  competent 
child  patient  acquires  the  right  to  decide  whether  to  accept  or  refuse  treatment.  Lord 
Scarman,  for  instance,  specifically  stated  that 
'...  the  parental  right  to  determine  whether  or  not  their  minor  child  below  the 
age  of  16  will  have  medical  treatment  terminates  if  and  when  the  child 
achieves  a  sufficient  understanding  to  enable  him  or  her  to  understand  fully 
what  is  proposed.  it  259 
In  Re  R,  Farquharson  and  Staughton  LLJ  reached  the  same  result  as  Lord  Donaldson 
MR  by  adhering  to  Giffick  by  holding  that,  looked  at  in  the  wider  context,  the  girl  R  was 
not,  in  fact,  Giffick  competent  at  all.  This  meant  that  the  court  was  empowered  to  give  its 
consent  on  her  behalf,  without  having  to  override  an  otherwise-valid  refusal  by  a 
competent  patient  -  which  the  courts  in  general  will  not  do:  it  is  a  consistent  feature  that 
competent  persons  have  the  right  to  be  wrong,  and  a  court  will  not  (Lord  Donaldson 
apart)  substitute  its  own  decision  just  because  it  disagrees  with  the  patient260  . 
The 
position  of  allovAng  competent  refusal  to  be  overridden  has  been  criticised  as  illogical261. 
. 
3.  The  Mentally  Incompetent  Patient, 
This  thesis  is  primarily  concerned  with  adult,  competent  patients.  However,  it  will  be 
necessary  here  briefly  to  describe  the  ways  in  which  the  presumption  of  competence 
may  be  rebutted.  This  section  in  effect  asks  when  and  in  what  circumstances  a  doctor  is 
or  is  not  entitled  to  take  the  consent  (or  refusal)  of  an  adult  patient  at  face  value.  As  with 
children,  Scots  law  on  this  topic  has  been  placed  on  a  statutory  basis  and  is  considered 
in  Chapter  6. 
The  law  presumes  that  at  16  a  person  is  fully  competent  (as  regards  medical 
treatment262) 
,  although  this  presumption  too  may  be  rebutted.  Until  recently  there  was 
no  authoritative  legal  test  for  incompetence  263 
,  and  until  fairly  recently  there  were  no 
judicial  guidelines  on  this  point  at  all.  While  Gillick  supra  established  a  general  test  of 
competence  in  under-16s,  there  is  no  suggestion  that  the  converse  is  true,  i.  e.  that 
failure  to  understand  the  general  nature  and  purpose  of  what  is  intended  rebuts  the 162 
presumption  of  adult  competence.  However,  as  will  be  seen,  it  may  be  that  this  is  the 
actual  situation.  The  problem  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that,  even  in  cases  relating  to 
authorising  treatment  for  incompetent  patients,  the  issue  of  competence  itself  is  seldom, 
if  ever,  actually  addressed.  Until  recently  the  courts  had  inquired  into  the  person's 
capacity  in  only  one  case;  the  case  formulated  no  general  ruleS264. 
Capacity  is  not  a  binary  concept,  which  persons  either  have  or  not.  Thus,  in  The  Estate 
of  Park2155  it  was  held  that  Mr  Park  had  had  sufficient  capacity  to  marry,  but  insufficient 
capacity  to  make  a  valid  will.  It  follows  from  this  that  any  test  of  capacity  must  be 
flexible.  The  classic  work  by  Roth,  Meizel  and  Lidz  lists  five  possible  such  tests,  but 
most  illuminatingly  they  note  that 
"it  has  been  our  experience  that  competency  is  presumed  as  long  as  a 
patient  modulates  his  or  her  behaviour,  talks  in  a  comprehensible  way, 
remembers  what  he  or  she  has  been  told,  dresses  and  acts  so  as  to  appear 
to  be  in  meaningful  communication  with  the  environment,  and  has  not  been 
declared  legally  incompetent.  , 266 
Thus,  if  a  person  appears  reasonable,  competence  will  be  presumed.  However,  one  of 
the  factors  which  a  doctor  will  take  into  account  in  deciding  how  "reasonable"  a  patient  is 
whether  or  not  the  patient  actually  consents  to  the  treatment  the  doctor  is  proposing.  As 
seen  above,  a  consent  will  vitiate  assault,  i.  e.  be  legally  valid,  if  the  patient  is  "informed 
, 267  in  broad  terms  of  the  nature  of  the  procedure  which  is  intended' 
. 
It  has  been  argued 
that  from  this  it  follows  that  the  legal  test  of  capacity  is  that  the  patient  must  simply  be 
capable  of  understanding  the  general  nature  and  purpose  of  an  intervention 
268  The 
t  26 
issue  of  capacity  was  central  in  the  case  of  Re  IN  (a  minor)  (medical  treatmen)  9.  The 
Court  of  Appeal,  however,  failed  to  clarify  the  tests  which  they  were  applying  in  finding 
W  competent  (before  overruling  her  refusal  to  consent).  The  case  does,  however, 
establish  that  Giffick  does  not  establish  a  universal  test  of  competency  applicable  to 
adults  as  well  as  children,  notwithstanding  claims  to  the  contrary.  270 
Guidelines  on  adult  tests  of  competency  can  be  found  in  the  decision  in  Re  C  (adult. 
ref  I  of  ttt  271 
Usa  rea  men)  .  Thorpe  J  came  down  on  the  side  of  actual  understanding,  rather 
than  merely  being  capable  of  understanding,  the  nature,  purposes  and  effects  of  the 
treatment  in  question.  The  approach  of  Thorpe  J  was  followed  more  recently  in  Re  JT 
t  272 
(adult.  refusal  of  medical  treatmen) 
. 
The  court  in  that  case  applied  the  tests  of 
considering  whether  the  patient  understood  the  informabon  given  as  to  the  purpose  and 163 
nature  of  the  treatment,  whether  she  believed  that  information,  and  whether  she  realised 
the  consequences  of  refusing  treatment.  Interestingly  the  patient  in  question  was 
detained  under  the  Mental  Health  Act  1983,  but  the  fact  that  the  patient  was  suffering 
from  a  degree  of  mental  disability  justifying  her  compulsory  detention  created  no 
presumption  of  incompetence  to  make  decisions  concerning  treatmene  73 
. 
Most  recently, 
Bv  An  NHS  Truse74  lays  down  a  series  of  procedural  steps  to  be  followed  before  a 
patient's  refusal  to  consent  should  be  overruled;  this  involves  medical  opinions  (on  the 
basis  of  the  test  established  in  Re  MB275:  inability  to  comprehend  the  information,  and  in 
particular  the  consequences  of  refusal,  or  inability  to  use  the  information  and  weigh  it  in 
the  balance)  with  the  presumption  of  capacity  emphasised  and  resort  to  court  only  in 
cases  where  difficulties  cannot  be  resolved  even  after  bringing  in  independent  experts). 
In  Re  F  276 
, 
the  House  of  Lords  held  that  no  court  had  jurisdiction  to  give  or  withhold 
consent  to  an  operation  (in  this  case  therapeutic  sterilisation);  however,  the  court  did 
have  jurisdiction  to  declare  an  operation  lawful  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  consent. 
To  be  lawful,  the  operation  should  be  in  the  patients  best  interests  -  either  lifesaving,  or 
necessary  to  ensure  improvement  or  prevent  deterioration  in  the  patienf  s  health 
(including  mental  health),  and  in  accordance  with  a  responsible  body  of  medical  opinion. 
The  test  for  determining  the  "best  interests"  was  the  standard  Bolam  test277, 
notwithstanding  that  test's  origin  as  a  means  of  measuring  professional  competence. 
Precisely  why  "best  interests"  and  professional  competence  should  have  been 
rationalised  in  this  way  is  unclear.  In  any  event,  leaving  the  issue  to  the  doctors,  as  the 
court  in  Re  F  does,  cannot  be  regarded  as  effective  scrutiny  of  the  medical  profession  in 
this  area  -a  point  which  even  some  judges  have  expressed  misgivings  aboUt278. 
279 
However,  the  application  of  the  Bolarn  test  to  "best  interests"  was  criticised  in  SL  v  SL 
At  first  instance  280 
, 
the  High  Court  (Wall  J)  held  that  as  two  possible  course  of  treatment 
were  lawful,  per  the  Bolam  test,  it  was  for  the  mother  and  doctors  to  decide  between 
them  which  course  to  follow.  This  was  reversed  by  the  Court  of  Appeal;  Thorpe  U 
holding  that  Bolarn  "has  no  contribution  to  make  to  this  second  and  determinative  stage 
of  the  judicial  decision.  "  [i.  e.  best  intereStS]281.  Similarly,  in  the  same  case  Lady  Butler- 
Sloss  P  reiterated  her  view  that  it  "...  falls  to  the  judge  to  decide  whether  to  accept  or 
reject  the  expert  medical  opinion  that  an  operation  is,  or  is  not,  in  the  best  interests  of  a 
patient,,  282 
. 
The  procedure  to  be  followed  in  cases  where  the  patient  may  lack  capacity 
were  laid  down  in  detail  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  St  George's  Healthcare  NHS  Trust  v 
S211.  In  terms  of  this  procedure  it  is  not  always  necessary  to  apply  to  the  court  (although 
it  appears  to  be  necessary  to  notify  the  Official  Solicitor),  so  notwithstanding  the 164 
assertion  of  judicial  control  in  SL  v  SL2",  the  Bolam  test  will  still  tend  to  exert  a  strong 
influence  on  the  outcome. 
B:  Consent  to  treatment  and  negligence  liability: 
As  has  been  discussed  above,  the  doctor  must  secure  his  patient's  consent  before 
treating  or  examining  him  or  her  (or  else  be  within  one  of  the  recognised  exceptions  to 
that  rule)  to  avoid  liability  for  assault.  For  such  consent  to  be  effective  in  avoiding 
assault  liability,  the  patient  must  be  "informed  in  broad  terms  of  the  nature  of  the 
procedure  which  is  intended  vaE15 
. 
This,  however,  is  far  from  the  end  of  the  matter,  since 
there  still  exists,  quite  apart  from  liability  for  assault,  the  possibility  of  raising  an  action  in 
negligence.  Chatterton  v  Gerson  286  saw  a  judicial  policy  decision  that  cases  of  alleged 
inadequacy  as  to  information  and  warnings  are  more  properly  argued  in  negligence  than 
assault,  and  this  has  been  a  characteristic  of  judicial  decisions  in  this  field  287 
. 
From  the 
patient's  point  of  view,  the  key  point  in  all  this  is  that  a  lesser  degree  of  non-disclosure 
may  still  give  rise  to  an  action  in  negligence,  even  though  an  assault  action  fails. 
The  basic  principle  underlying  such  actions  is  that  the  doctor,  in  failing  to  provide 
relevant  information  (usually  regarding  the  risks  or  side-effects)  about  the  proposed 
intervention,  breached  his  duty  of  care  to  the  patient  -  specifically,  his  duty  to  inform  the 
patient  prior  to  obtaining  his  consent,  and  is  consequently  liable  in  damages.  However, 
since  judicial  policy  has  restricted  the  use  of  assault  actions  in  these  cases,  it  follows 
that  the  aggrieved  patient  must  pass  the  normal  hurdles  present  in  any  negligence 
action  -  namely,  the  existence  and  subsequent  breach  of  the  duty  of  care,  and 
causation. 
The  existence  of  a  duty  on  the  doctor  to  inform  his  patients  of  attendant  risks  is  implicit  in 
Chatterton  v  Gerson,  and  is  relatively  uncontentious  nowadays.  Problems  arise, 
however,  in  trying  to  delimit  the  ambit  of  this  duty  of  care,  and,  more  specifically,  in 
deciding  whether  it  has  or  has  not  been  breached.  Traditionally,  English  law  (but  not 
Scots)  decided  the  issue  on  the  basis  of  normal  medical  practice;  Bolam  v  Friem  HMC 
was  itself  concerned  with  failure  to  disclose,  as  well  as  with  negligence  in  the  actual 
treatment.  On  this  basis,  a  doctor  would  only  be  liable  for  having  failed  to  disclose 
information  which  no  reasonable  doctor  using  ordinary  skill  would  have  failed  to  disclose. 
However,  this  is  subject  to  the  criticism  that  giving  a  patient  sufficient  information  to 
make  an  informed  choice  as  to  treatment  options  is  not  really  a  medical  decision  at  all, 
and  that  consequently  liability  for  non-disclosure  of  information  should  not  be  decided  on 
the  same  basis  as  liability  for  negligence  in  diagnosis  and  treatment.  This  criticism  gave 165 
rise,  in  a  number  of  overseas  jurisdictions,  to  what  has  become  known  as  the  "doctrine 
of  informed  consent"288.  "Informed  consent"  actually  embodies  a  number  of  distinct 
themes  and  is  not  a  unitary  conceptm;  its  key  features  are  as  follows: 
"The  principle  of  informed  consent  requires  that  health  professionals,  before 
any  diagnostic  or  therapeutic  procedure  is  carried  out  which  may  have  a 
reasonable  possibility  of  harm  to  the  patient,  explain  to  the  patient  what  is 
involved  in  order  to  secure  the  understanding  of  the  patient  to  proceed.  of  2W 
Crucially,  respect  for  patient  autonomy  meant  that  the  test  of  how  much  information 
should  be  given  was  set  by  the  court,  not  by  the  medical  profession  291 
. 
The  alternative 
test  created  in  Canterbury  v  Spence  292  (and  subsequently  adopted  by  around  one-third 
of  US  jurisdictions2w)  was  to  apply  a  "prudent  patient"  test:  what  would  a  "prudent 
patient"  in  the  plaintiff's  shoes  would  want  to  know?  A  similar  test  has  been  applied  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  294.  "Informed  consent"  applies  a  new  test  for  establishing 
breach  of  duty  of  Gare;  but  in  order  for  a  claim  to  succeed,  the  pabent  must  still  show 
causation. 
Causation  in  information  negligence  cases  proceeds  on  the  traditional  "but-foe,  basis.  in 
this  context,  what  it  amounts  to  is  showing  that  not  only  was  the  doctor  negligent  in  not 
informing  you  of  the  risks,  but  also  that  if  you  had  been  so  informed,  you  would  have 
refused  to  undergo  the  treatment.  The  courts  are  reluctant  to  accept  evidence  to  this 
effect  at  face  value,  and  so  a  further  test  is  usually  applied  in  assessing  the  plaintiffs 
testimony295.  It  follows  that  if  you  can  prove  you  would  have  refused  to  consent  had  you 
been  properly  informed,  the  doctor  will  be  liable  for  any  injury  resulting  from  the 
procedure  -  even  ones  you  were  warned  of  -  as  you  wouldn't  have  been  exposed  to 
any  risks  if  fully  informed  296 
In  Sidaway  v  Board  of  Govemors  of  the  Bethlem  Royal  and  the  Maudsley  HospitaIS297 
, 
the  House  of  Lords  resoundingly  rejected  informed  consent  in  English  law  (Lord 
Scarman  dissenting).  The  exact  content  of  the  decision  in  Sidaway  is  unclear,  as  there 
are  four  separate  judgements,  not  all  consistent  with  each  other.  This  has  caused  some 
298  disagreement  among  commentators  as  to  the  true  extent  of  the  judgement 
. 
While 
there  are  indications  in  the  judgements  in  the  case  that  the  Bolam  test  should  be 
modified  in  certain  respects  in  information  disclosure  cases,  subsequent  English  cases 
have  given  it  a  restrictive  interpretation  299 
,  and  the  current  law  seems  to  be  an  almost- 
blanket  application  of  an  unmodified  Bolam  test.  Only  a  few  cases  have  found  accepted 
medical  practice  concerning  disclosure  insufficient  in  law300.  These  decisions  were  at 166 
first  instance;  the  Court  of  Appeal  has  displayed  at  tendency  of  overturning  High  Court 
judges'  attempts  at  utilising  Sidaway  loopholee  I- 
In  Scotland,  the  starting  point  was  that  unlike  Bolam,  Hunter  v  Hanle/02  only  ever 
applied  a  professional  standards  test  to  diagnosis  and  treatment,  not  to  disclosure. 
Consequently,  it  was  at  least  theoretically  possible  for  a  Scottish  court,  even  after 
Sidaway,  to  reach  a  different  conclusion.  However,  in  Moyes  v  Lothian  Health  Board303 
Lord  Caplan,  facing  the  issue  head-on,  held  that  Sidaway  applied  an  unmodified  Bolam 
test  -  and  proceeded  to  do  the  same  himself. 
"...  1  can  read  nothing  in  the  majority  view  which  suggests  that  the  extent  and 
quality  of  warning  to  be  given  by  a  doctor  to  the  patient  should  not  in  the  last 
resort  be  govemed  by  medical  criteria. 
"  304 
05  In  Goorkani  v  Tayside  Health  Board 
, 
the  pursuer  failed  on  the  grounds  of  lack  of 
causation  to  recover  damages  for  the  infertility  he  suffered  (an  undisclosed  side-effect  of 
the  treatment)  as  the  judge  was  not  satisfied  that  he  would  have  refused  the  treatment 
even  if  informed.  However,  he  still  recovered  E2500  damages  for  the  shock  and  distress 
of  finding  out  about  the  infertility  without  prior  warning.  This  illustrates  at  least  one  way 
in  which  the  courts  are  increasingly  intervening,  within  the  constraints  imposed  by 
306  Sidaway,  to  provide  a  remedy  in  cases  of  information  negligence 
The  upshot  of  the  decided  cases  on  consent  in  Britain  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
courts  are  unwilling  to  apply  different  standards  to  a  doctor's  duty  to  take  reasonable 
care  in  diagnosis  and  treatment  (which  are  specifically  medical  technical  skills),  and  his 
duty  to  inform  his  patient  and  get  their  consent,  which  is  arguably  not  a  technical 
decision  at  all.  Certainly  fears  that  informed  consent  could  be  used  as  a  tool  to  expand 
the  negligence  liability  of  physicians307  appear  to  be  misplaced".  Informed  consent 
itself  can  be  criticised  for  imposing  an  objective  standard  rather  than  asking  what  the 
actual  subjective  patient  would  want309. 
Another  drawback  is  that  most  "informed  consent"  tests  continue  to  recognise  an 
exception  to  the  normal  rules  known  as  "therapeutic  privilege  This  exception  means 
that  if  certain  information  would  be  harmful  to  the  patient,  then  the  doctor  is  entitled  to 
withhold  that  information.  Therapeutic  privilege  (which  has  been  described  as  "vastly 
overused"  in  praCtiCe31O)  is  determined  on  the  basis  of  professional  practice;  but,  as  has 
been  noted, 167 
"in  taking  it  upon  himself  to  determine  what  will  be  most  beneficial  or  least 
harmful  to  this  patient,  the  physician  is  not  simply  making  ill-founded  medical 
judgements  which  might  someday  be  confirmed  by  psychiatric  research.  He 
011  is  making  moral  evaluations  of  the  most  basic  and  problematic  kind 
. 
The  upshot  of  these  rules  would  seem  to  indicate  that,  unless  and  until  Sidaway  is 
overruled  or  medical  practice  changes  so  much  as  to  render  it  obsolete,  that  the 
negligence  action  for  inadequate  counselling  and  information  disclosure  is  destined  to 
remain  very  much  an  underdeveloped  and  unsatisfactory  area  of  medical  law;  indeed,  it 
has  been  argued  that  for  an  action  to  succeed,  there  would  have  to  be  sufficiently  poor 
information  as  to  be  susceptible  to  an  assault  action  312 
. 
Nor  can  informed  consent  be 
advocated  as  a  suitable  route  forward,  although  continental-style  patient-based 
I'materiality  of  risks"  tests  have  much  to  commend  them  313 
. 
The  courts'  current 
regulation  of  this  issue  has  been  seriously  unbalanced  in  favour  of  doctors. 
VII:  Confidentiality  and  verbal  inoury: 
A:  Basic  rules  of  confidentiality: 
The  law  of  confidentiality  is  relatively  underdeveloped  in  both  Scotland  and  England;  a 
number  of  the  problems  inherent  in  this  field  became  apparent  in  the  litigation 
surrounding  Peter  Wright's  book  Spycatche?  14 
. 
The  problems  in  this  area  of  the  law 
have  led  both  the  Law  Commission  315  and  the  Scottish  Law  Commission  316  to  suggest 
major  statutory  amendments  to  the  common  law.  At  the  time  of  writing,  neither  proposal 
has  been  the  subject  of  legislation.  It  should  be  recalled,  however,  that  the 
implementation  of  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998  and  Human  Rights  Act  1998  (both 
considered  in  Chapter  6  infra)  have  had  a  major  impact  on  the  law  as  it  relates  to  privacy 
and  disclosure  of  information.  Most  of  the  recent  cases  involving  breach  of  confidence 
have  also  argued  breach  of  data  protection  rules,  and  are  accordingly  considered  in 
Chapter  6  infra;  the  following  discussion  concerns  the  preceding  common  law  position. 
However,  in  spite  of  the  complexity  of  the  law  in  this  area,  it  will  be  dealt  with  relatively 
briefly  since  the  major  regulatory  actor  here  is  not  the  courts,  but  rather  the  GIVIC.  The 
reasons  for  the  GIVIC's  primacy  here  are  twofold-  firstly,  the  GIVIC  imposes  a  greater  duty 
of  confidentiality  on  a  doctor  than  the  law  doeS317.  Secondly,  as  will  be  seen  below,  the 
law  of  confidentiality  in  medical  matters  is  largely  only  useful  proactively,  i.  e.  to  obtain  an 
injunction  or  interdict  preventing  a  threatened  breach  of  confidence  from  arising-,  if 168 
breach  of  confidence  has  occurred,  it  can  prove  exceedingly  difficult  to  actually  win 
substantive  damages.  This  alone  can  act  as  a  major  disincentive  to  litigation,  and  may 
partly  explain  the  relative  paucity  of  cases  in  this  field.  The  fact  that  Legal  Aid  is  not 
available  for  actions  of  "verbal  injury"  may  also  have  an  impact.  However,  there  is 
considerable  interdependence  between  law  and  ethics  in  this  area:  Xv  Y318  and  Wv 
EdgelP  both  considered  the  GIVIC's  guidance  to  doctors  on  confidentiality  in  reaching  a 
decision,  and  the  GIVIC  correspondingly  accepts  that  there  is  no  ethical  breach  of  the 
duty  of  confidentiality  where  such  breach  is  required  by  IaW320. 
The  medical  duty  of  confidentiality  has  its  origins  in  the  Hippocratic  Oath.  The  important 
question  is  how  this  ethical  obligation,  repeated  in  some  form  in  all  the  modem  variations 
of  the  Hippocratic  Oath  321  translates  into  law. 
The  answer  to  this  question  is  complicated  by  the  slightly  unusual  historical  origins  of  the 
action  for  breach  of  confidence.  The  Scottish  Law  Commission  are  of  the  opinion  that 
early  cases  on  the  point  in  Scotland,  while  looking  delictual  in  character,  were  in  fact 
based  on  breach  of  common  law  copyright322  . 
The  Commission  accepted  the  existence 
of  a  delictual  duty  here,  but  could  reach  no  firm  conclusion  as  to  whether  this  arose  as  a 
result  of  a  prior  relationship  of  confidentiality  between  the  parties,  or  could  arise 
circumstantiallY323  . 
The  Commission's  proposals  favour  the  [after  approach  324 
, 
but  since 
in  the  medical  sphere  there  clearly  is  a  pre-existing  relationship  of  confidentiality,  we  can 
conveniently  ignore  this  problem. 
In  England,  the  case  law  begins  with  the  equitable  presumption  that  "he  who  has 
received  information  in  confidence  shall  not  take  advantage  of  it.  "325  Equitable  remedies, 
in  particular  the  injunction,  were  available;  following  Lord  Cairns'  Act  of  1858  damages 
could  be  awarded  by  the  Chancery  courts,  as  well  as  the  equitable  remedy  of  accounting 
for  profits.  However,  in  the  medical  sphere  there  will  seldom  be  any  profits  to  account 
for.  The  courts  have  also  entertained  actions  for  breach  of  confidence  based  on  an 
implied  contractual  terM326,  which  has  led  to  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  courts' 
jurisdictional  base.  The  courts  have  been  prepared  to  intervene  irrespective  of,  and 
occasionally  acknowledging,  this  uncertainty327  . 
The  duality  of  approach  was 
summarised  by  Lord  Keith  in  the  Spycatcher  case  as  follows: 
"The  obligation  may  be  imposed  by  an  express  or  implied  term  in  a  contract, 
but  it  may  also  exist  independently  of  any  contract  on  the  basis  of  an 
equitable  principle  of  confidence.  ev  328 169 
This  was  based  on  a  general  principle  that  an  invasion  of  personal  privacy  may  be 
sufficiently  serious  to  justify  the  law's  intervention  32"  and  may  therefore  extend  to  third 
parties.  Lord  Keith  quoted  with  approval  the  following: 
U 
... 
in  common  with  other  professional  men,  for  instance  a  priest...  and  there 
are  of  course  others,  the  doctor  is  under  a  duty  not  to  disclose  (voluntarily) 
without  the  consent  of  his  patient,  information  which  he,  the  doctor,  has 
gained  in  his  professional  capacity...  save  in  very  exceptional 
circumstances.  030 
Much  more  recently,  it  has  been  held  that  confidentiality  can  arise  even  in  the  absence 
of  any  pre-existing  relationship  between  the  parties,  as  when  a  reporter  sees  a 
supermodel  entering  a  drug  rehabilitation 
cliniC331 
,  although  this  case  was  post-Human 
Rights  Act  and  so  this  development  (which  has  been  severely  criticised  as  doing 
damage  to  the  law  of  confidentialitY332)  is  considered  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  6.  It  is 
however  clear  that,  whatever  the  legal  genesis  of  the  action,  the  law  will  act  to  uphold 
confidentiality,  and  that  such  confidentiality  definitely  extends  to  the  doctor-patient 
relationship.  The  question  then  becomes,  in  what  circumstances  does  the  law  permit 
this  obligation  to  be  breached? 
B:  Exceptions  to  the  Duty  of  Confidentiality: 
At  one  extreme,  Kattow,  writing  from  a  German  perspective,  has  argued  for  an  absolute 
defence  of  medical  confidentiality  without  any  exceptions  whatsoever333,  claiming  that 
legally-imposed  disclosure  risks  turning  doctors  into  political  informers.  However,  it  is 
clear  that  this  is  not  the  law  in  Britain.  In  its  ethical  guidance  to  doctors,  the  GIVIC  allows 
exceptions  to  the  rule  of  confidentiality  in  a  number  of  circumstances  including  patient 
consent,  sharing  with  other  members  of  the  health  care  team,  where  required  by  law  or, 
most  problematically,  where  disclosure  is  in  the  public  interest.  Some  of  these  points 
require  comment. 
While  it  would  seem  unobjectionable  that  other  health  care  professionals  involved  in  a 
patient's  care  should  have  access  to  their  health  records,  problems  arise  when  non- 
professionals  have  such  access  -  such  as  health  service  managerS334  . 
This  has  led  to 
the  creation  of  "Caldicott  GuardianSn335  who  are  responsible  for  ensuring  that  medical 
information  in  the  NHS  is  not  misused;  Caldicott  Guardians  are  typically  the  medical 
director,  or  a  similarly  high-ranking  clinician,  of  the  NHS  body  in  question. 170 
336  Secondly,  doctors  enjoy  no  legal  privilege  entitling  them  to  refuse  to  give  evidence 
unlike  lawyerS337 
- 
There  are  also  a  large  number  of  statutes  require  disclosure.  These 
cover  a  huge  variety  of  areas  ranging  from  notification  of  infectious  diseases33"  to 
informing  the  authorities  of  possible  terrorist  involvement339.  As  a  statutory  requirement, 
disclosure  under  this  heading  gives  rise  to  no  particular  legal  problems,  but  some  may 
find  the  inroads  made  into  the  sanctity  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship  to  be  excessive. 
The  most  problematic  area,  however,  remains  the  public  interest  exception  -  which  in 
general  only  permits,  rather  than  requires,  the  doctor  to  breach  confidentiality  340.  In 
these  cases,  it  is  therefore  the  doctor  who  decides  whether  or  not  to  breach  the  patient's 
confidences.  What  is  the  law's  reaction  if  he  does  so? 
Historically,  judges  equivocated  between  regarding  the  doctor  who  informed  the  police 
of  a  patient's  crime  as  having  acted  cruelly341  and  holding  that  the  investigation  of 
serious  crime  always  entitled  a  doctor  to  breach  confidence  342  on  the  basis  that  since 
"there  is  no  equity  in  the  disclosure  of  iniquW43,  equitable  remedies  could  not  be 
sought  in  such  cases.  The  case  of  Lion  Laboratories  Ltd  v  Evans344  held  that  the  public 
interest  defence  was  not  limited  to  situations  of  disclosing  criminal  activities  if  it  were 
"vital  in  the  public  interest  to  publish  a  part  of  his  confidential  information"345.  This 
IN  overruled  (or  denied  the  existence  of)  the  so-called  "iniquity  rule  . 
Two  cases  show  the  extent  of  the  current  exception  to  confidentiality  in  the  public 
intereSt346 
. 
Firstly,  Xv  ya47  saw  Rose  J  performing,  in  his  own  words,  either  "a  balancing 
exercise,  or  an  exercise  in  judicial  judgement,  or  both  m348  in  deciding  whether  or  not  to 
allow  a  newspaper  to  identify  two  GPs  who  were  HIV-positive.  The  newspaper  had 
acquired  the  information  through  a  breach  of  confidence  by  Health  Authority  staff,  with 
the  newspapers  active  collusion.  Rose  J  held  that  there  was  a  public  as  well  as  a 
private  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  medical  confidentiality,  and  went  on  to  find  that 
this  outweighed  the  public  interests  in  freedom  of  the  press  and  of  actually  learning  who 
the  affected  doctors  were.  He  consequently  granted  a  permanent  injunction  against 
publication.  More  recently,  the  ongoing  litigation  in  Hv  Associated  Newspapers  Ltd.  34", 
also  involving  a  healthcare  worker,  H,  who  is  HIV  positive,  also  challenged  the  legality  of 
a  proposed  "look-backm  exercise  by  which  the  health  authority  proposed  to  notify  H's 
patients  that  they  had  been  exposed  to  an  infection  risk.  The  Court  of  Appeal  upheld  a 
prohibition  on  publication  of  details  which  would  allow  H  to  be  identified,  but  ordered  him 
to  make  available  to  the  health  authority  such  records  as  might  reasonably  be  required 
for  the  look-back  exercise,  if  that  exercise  is  carried  out  (the  legality  of  this  was  remitted 
back  to  the  High  Court  and  at  time  of  writing  had  not  been  determined).  The  disclosure 171 
of  these  records  was  explicitly  on  the  basis  that  they  were  not  to  be  further  disclosed  or 
any  action  taken  on  the  basis  of  them  until  the  issue  had  been  determined. 
Wv  EdgelP50  is  perhaps  more  typical  of  the  sort  of  predicament  which  may  face  a  doctor 
contemplating  breaching  confidentiality  in  the  public  interest.  Dr  Edgell,  the  defendant, 
was  asked  to  prepare  a  psychiatric  report  on  W  with  a  view  to  having  W  transferred  out 
of  a  secure  hospital.  The  report  was  unfavourable.  Without  Ws  consent,  Dr  Edgell 
forwarded  it  to  the  Secretary  of  State  and  hence  to  the  Tribunal  deciding  the  issue.  The 
Court  of  Appeal  refused  the  claim,  but  disagreed  with  Scott  J  at  first  instance  that  W's 
private  interest  was  the  main  issue  to  be  balanced:  it  was  the  competing  elements  of  the 
public  interest  which  mattered.  Dr  Edgell  had  acted  entirely  properly  since  he  had 
disclosed  the  information  to  the  appropriate  authorities,  and  not  for  instance  sold  it  to  a 
newspaper"'. 
C:  Damages  for  Breach  of  Confidence: 
The  are  a  number  of  problems  regarding  damages  for  breach  of  confidence  which, 
again,  are  related  to  the  complicated  history  of  the  action.  This  area  of  the  law  largely 
developed  around  breach  of  commercial  confidentiality,  and  assumed  that  there  would 
be  some  form  of  economic  loss  flowing  from  the  harm  suffered  (and  some 
corresponding  gain  by  another  person),  for  instance  the  value  of  a  trade  secret.  This 
also  allows  damages  to  be  quantified  and  profits  to  be  accounted  for  (or  an  action  for 
unjustified  enrichment  to  succeed).  Thus,  in  the  Spycatcher  case,  Times  Newspapers 
were  found  to  have  acted  in  breach  of  confidence,  and  consequently  had  to  account  for 
profits. 
However,  in  most  cases  of  breach  of  medical  confidence  there  will  be  no  such  profit  to 
account  for,  and  no  measurable  economic  loss.  Can  the  patient  recover  damages  for 
hurt  feelings  and  embarrassment?  In  IN  v  Edgell,  Scott  J  followed  Bliss  v  South  East 
Thames  RHA  352  in  holding  such  damages  to  be  not  recoverable.  This  led  the  Law 
Commission  to  recommend  a  change  in  the  law  allowing  such  recovery  353 
. 
However,  in 
Campbell  v  MGN  Ltd354,  damages  were  awarded  for  hurt  feelings,  although  the  case  did 
not  involve  a  doctor-patient  relationship;  as  noted  above  this  case  has  been  criticised  as 
seriously  distorting  the  pre-existing  law  of  confidentiality.  In  Scotland,  there  is  also  no 
clear  authority  on  the  question  of  damages.  The  Scottish  Law  Commission  were  of  the 
opinion  that  they  were  recoverable,  but  recommended  clarifying  legislation  355 
. 172 
D:  Verbal  injury  actions  as  a  way  of  upholding  confidentiality: 
A  complicat.  ing  factor  in  Scotland  relates  to  the  co-existence  in  Scots  law  of  three 
separate  delicts;  arising  from  verbal  injury.  Scots  law  draws  no  distinction  between 
(written)  libel  and  (verbal)  slander,  both  are  treated  under  the  delict  of  defamation,  which 
protects  "fame,  reputation  and  honoue'35'5  This  follows  the  Lex  Aquilia  and  allows 
damages  where  these  arise  due  to  loss  of  reputation  wrongfully  caused.  However,  since 
vefitas  (truth,  or,  in  English  terminology,  justification)  is  a  complete  defence  to  such 
actionS357  , 
they  are  accordingly  of  very  limited  use  in  the  medical  sphere  where  the  harm 
alleged  will  usually  involve  disclosure  of  true  facts.  Of  course,  the  existence  of  the  law 
of  defamation  imposes  an  additional  duty  on  the  doctor  to  ensure  that  the  information  he 
discloses  is,  in  fact,  true.  The  Lex  Aquilia,  like  English  law,  requires  loss  to  follow  from 
the  defamation  before  damages  are  payable.  However,  Scots  law  also  follows  the 
Roman  actio  injuriarum  in  allowing  action  for  insult  or  affront  (contumelia).  Such  an 
action  lies  for  insult  irrespective  of  loss  caused  thereby,  which  raise  the  possibility  of 
winning  substantial  damages  purely  for  hurt  feelings.  Again,  though,  since  truth  is  a 
defence  under  the  actid  injuriarum  it  also  has  limited  applicability  here. 
But  there  is  another  variety  of  verbal  injury  action  which  avoids  this  restriction.  This  is 
the  action  for  convicium,  based  on  a  Praetorian  edict358  against  bringing  others  into 
"hatred,  ridicule  or  contempt".  There  is,  however  a  lively  debate  among  academics  over 
whether  such  an  action  for  convidium  is  actually  part  of  Scots  law359.  The  case  of  Stee/e 
v  Scottish  Dail  Record360  was  decided  on  the  basis  of  convidium  at  first  instance,  Y 
although  the  issue  was  not  raised  on  appeal  (Counsel  having  agreed  to  treat  it  as  a  case 
of  verbal  injury).  The  following  discussion  will  assume  that  the  action  is  competent  in 
Scots  law.  Its  importance  here  is  that  it  appears  that  in  convidium,  the  maxim  veritas 
convidium  non  excusat  applies,  so  that  the  truth  of  the  offending  statement  is  no 
defence36'.  This  means  if  a  doctor  (whether  in  breach  of  confidence  or  not,  and 
irrespective  of  justification)  divulges  information  which  causes  insult  or  affront  to  the 
patient,  then  an  action  for  convidium  will  lie  and  damages  will  be  recoverable.  Precisely 
what  defences  would  succeed  in  avoiding  liability  in  convidium  is  unclear,  since  by  the 
nature  of  the  delict  the  communication  must  be  intended  to  bring  the  subject  of  it  into 
ridicule  or  contempt.  From  the  doctor's  point  of  view,  lack  of  malice  is  likely  to  prove  an 
effective  defence  if  the  action  falls  within  those  categories  which  would  also  be  covered 
by  the  public  interest  defence  in  a  corresponding  breach  of  confidence  case.  From  the 
patient's  perspective,  while  this  approach  would  deny  a  remedy  in  certain  situations,  it 
still  has  the  advantage  that  if  there  is  no  public  interest  justifying  the  publication,  it  would 173 
be  far  easier  to  recover  damages  for  convicium  than  for  breach  of  confidence. 
Secondly,  the  convidium  action  can  succeed  without  the  necessity  of  having  to  show  the 
existence  of  a  duty  of  confidentiality  and  breach  thereof.  This  may  have  relevance  for 
disclosure  by  non-medical  personnel  having  access  to  medical  records.  Non-medical 
personnel  are  not  bound  by  GIVIC  rules  on  confidentiality,  so  it  would  be  highly 
appropriate  for  the  law  to  provide  a  mechanism  whereby  the  victims  of  such  "leaks" 
could  seek  redress,  and  at  the  same  time  deter  people  from  making  such  breaches  of 
confidence  in  the  first  place.  The  convicium  action  could  provide  such  a  mechanism. 
E:  Confidentiality:  Special  cases: 
The  two  prime  examples  here  are  children  and  the  mentally  incompetent.  Do  they  enjoy 
the  same  right  to  confidentiality  as  the  competent  adult  does?  Secondly,  does  the 
obligation  of  confidentiality  extend  beyond  the  patient's  death? 
As  regards  children,  the  law  seems  to  be  based  on  an  interpretation  of  Gillick  v  West 
Norfolk  and  Wisbech  AHA362.  If  this  interpretation  is  correct,  then  a  duty  of 
confidentiality  arises  between  the  doctor  and  child  patient  if  the  child  has  sufficient 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  a  confidential  relationship  to  acquire  the  capacity  to  enter 
into  one  363 
. 
This  may  not  necessarily  be  the  same  capacity  as  that  required  to  consent 
to  examination  and  treatment364.  If  the  child  has  this  requisite  capacity,  then  the  duty  of 
confidentiality  exists  and  will  be  in  breached  if  the  child's  parents  are  informed. 
Conversely,  if  the  child  is  deemed  incompetent,  then  it  follows  that  there  is  no  duty  of 
confidentiality.  Problems  could  arise  if  the  child  is  incompetent  as  regards  consenting  to 
the  treatment  in  question  but  competent  to  form  a  confidential  relationship  with  the 
doctor.  In  such  circumstances,  the  doctor  could  face  an  action  for  breach  of  confidence 
from  the  child  patient,  as  well  as  possible  disciplinary  sanctionS385  (action  by  the  parents 
would  only  be  competent  if  parental  rights  have  been  infringed,  which  would  not  be  the 
case  here  366) 
. 
An  action  by  the  child  would  seem  to  lie  in  any  case  where  the  breach  of 
confidence  could  not  be  justified  as  for  an  adult  patient367  ,  although  the  chances  of 
368  success  in  such  an  action  are  probably  not  high 
. 
In  any  case,  a  breach  of  confidence 
action  is  only  competent  where  there  is  a  duty  of  confidentiality,  so  the  doctors  main 
defence  to  such  an  action  would  say  that,  in  his  professional  judgement,  the  minor  was 
incompetent  and  therefore  owed  no  such  duty.  Following  Gillick,  it  would  be  hard  for  a 
court  to  deny  the  logic  of  this,  so  to  all  intents  and  purposes  there  is  likely  to  be  no 
chance  of  a  successful  breach  of  confidence  action  by  a  minor  patient  in  these 
circumstances,  and  child  patients  are  left  only  with  the  uncertain  protection  afforded  by 
medical  ethics. 174 
As  regards  incompetent  adults,  however,  this  approach  means  that  there  is  no  legal  bar 
on  a  doctor  disclosing  details  of  a  patient  who  is  incompetent,  as  they  are  by  definition 
incapable  of  entering  into  a  confidential  relationship.  Of  course,  in  the  case  of  adults 
there  is  a  legal  presumption  of  competence,  so  if  taken  to  court  the  divulging  doctor 
would  still  have  to  prove  his  patient's  incompetence  in  order  to  justify  his  breach  of 
confidence  (or,  more  accurately,  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  duty  of  confidentiality). 
However,  this  analysis  (if  followed  by  a  court)  could  still  provide  no  redress  for  the 
patient,  simply  because  of  his  incompetence.  This  would  leave  the  disciplinary 
sanctions  of  the  GIVIC  as  the  only  protection  for  the  confidentiality  of  incompetent 
patients,  and,  powerful  though  these  sanctions  may  be,  it  would  be  a  highly 
inappropriate  stance  for  the  law  to  adopt.  And  for  this  reason  it  is  submitted  that  a 
British  court  would  find  this  reason  unsatisfactory,  and  instead  apply  a  different 
approach.  This  could,  for  instance,  regard  the  duty  of  confidentiality  as  arising 
automatically  in  the  doctor-patient  relationship.  In  the  case  of  young  (i.  e.  Gillick- 
incompetent)  children,  there  would  be  an  exception  requiring  the  doctor  to  disclose  the 
information  to  the  parents  or  guardian.  Indeed,  since  the  overriding  factor  is  the  child's 
best  interests,  there  will  very  often  be  a  positive  duty  to  disclose,  particularly  with  very 
young  children. 
The  problem  issue  in  this  field  typically  concerns  girls  under  16  seeking  contraceptive 
advice  and  treatment,  but  being  worried  that  the  doctor  will  tell  her  parents.  If  the  "best 
interests"  test  specifically  takes  into  account  the  fear  and  embarrassment  such  a  girl  will 
experience,  then  even  a  doctor  concluding  his  patient  was  Giffick-incompetent  would  not 
have  carte  blanche  to  inform  the  girl's  parents  that  she  had  sought  contraceptive  or 
other  advice  or  treatment.  This  approach  could  be  extended  to  mentally-incompetent 
adults,  the  main  difference  being  that  here,  there  is  no-one  in  loco  parentis  to  whom  the 
doctor  is  entitled  to  disclose  facts  about  the  patient. 
As  regards  the  dead,  the  ethical  situation  is  clear-  the  WHO  Declaration  of  Geneva  369 
states  clearly  that  I  will  respect  the  secrets  which  are  confided  in  me,  even  after  the 
patient  has  died.  "  This  is  repeated  in  the  GIVIC  Blue  Book,  which  states  that: 
"The  fact  of  a  patient's  death  does  not,  of  itself  release  a  doctor  from  the 
obligation  to  maintain  confidentiality.  " 
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Such  ethical  constraints  reflect  the  furore  caused  by  incidents  like  that  when  Lord  Moran, 
physician  to  Winston  Churchill,  published  his  memoirs  which  included  details  of  the 175 
wartime  Prime  Minister's  medical  historY371 
. 
But  the  law  does  not  impose  such  dgorous 
safeguards.  While  there  seems  to  be  no  decided  authodty  for  this  view,  there  are  two 
lines  of  reasoning  indicating  ft.  Firstly,  by  statute  372  a  dead  person  cannot  be  defamed; 
by  process  of  analogy  this  could  extend  to  actions  for  breach  of  confidence,  since  in 
such  an  action  the  estate  itself  suffers  no  harm  which  it  is  entitled  to  recover.  Secondly, 
it  could  be  argued  that  death  of  the  patient  ends  the  relationship  of  confidentiality,  since 
there  is  now  no-one  to  whom  the  doctor  can  owe  the  duty;  clearly,  he  owes  no  duty  to 
the  estate  or  descendants  of  the  deceased,  and  for  an  action  of  positive  breach  of 
confidence  to  succeed,  the  court  would  have  to  be  convinced  that  the  duty  was  owed  to 
society  in  general,  or  else  that,  having  acquired  the  status  of  confidentiality  through 
being  disclosed  in  the  context  of  such  a  relationship,  the  mere  termination  of  that 
relationship  (which  may  not  have  been  due  to  the  death  of  the  patient)  does  not  of  itself 
change  the  character  of  the  information  so  received,  which  should  continue  to  be 
protected.  An  analogy  with  the  situation  whereby  an  ex-employee  is  not  entitled  to  use 
confidential  information  despite  no  longer  being  in  a  relationship  of  confidentiality  may 
be  drawn  373 
. 
However,  the  problem  of  damages  remains  insuperable,  and  even  if  such 
an  action  were  theoretically  possible,  for  all  practical  purposes  it  would  serve  no  useful 
function. 
F:  Telling  relatives: 
It  is  common  practice  for  doctors  to  consult  with  the  relatives  of  patients,  particularly 
those  diagnosed  as  having  a  terminal  illness.  The  precise  legal  justification  for  this  is 
unclear,  and  may  be  non-existent.  It  is  arguable  (if  implausible)  that  a  doctor  sued  for 
breach  of  confidence  having  discussed  a  patient's  medical  affairs  with  his  relatives  could 
plead  some  form  of  the  public  interest  defence,  in  that  discussions  with  relatives  are  a 
socially-acceptable,  indeed  socially  highly-approved  course  of  action,  and  that  it  would 
be  inappropriate  for  the  courts  to  reach  a  decision  which  tended  to  inhibit  it.  More 
plausibly,  it  may  instead  be  that  the  patient's  consent  to  such  disclosure  is  implied  or 
presumed.  However,  this  may  simply  not  be  the  case;  as  Newdick  says,  "The  question 
n374  is  very  delicate... 
The  pressures  on  a  doctor  faced  with  this  problem  are  conflicting.  The  law  provides 
scant  grounds  for  justifying  disclosure  to  relativeS375  . 
However,  the  GIVIC's  rule  81  (c) 
provides  that 
"If,  in  particular  circumstances,  the  doctor  believes  it  undesirable  on  medical 
grounds  to  seek  the  patient's  consent,  information  regarding  the  patient's health  may  sometimes  be  given  in  confidence  to  a  close  relative  or  person  in 
a  similar  relationship  to  the  patient. 
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This  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  doctor  is  under  no  obligation  to  tell  relatives,  but 
that  if  he  does  in  accordance  with  the  above  guidance,  he  won't  face  disciplinary 
proceedings  -  whatever  stance  the  law  takes  on  thiS377 
. 
However,  the  Health  Services 
Commissione  P78  criticised  a  hospital  precisely  because  it  failed  to  inform  the  relatives  of 
a  patient  about  his  terminal  cance  P71 
,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  such  notification  may 
have  been  unlawful.  This  shows  clearly  how  different  regulatory  actors  can  both  interact 
and  conflict  over  a  given  issue,  possibly  partly  due  to  insufficient  understanding  of  what 
the  other  parts  of  the  regulatory  picture  are  doing. 
A  much  more  pointed  discussion  focuses  on  the  circumstances  where  a  doctor  may  find 
it  necessary  to  breach  a  patient's  confidence  in  order  to  avert  harm  to  another  person. 
This  has  most  recently  arisen  in  the  context  of  HIV  and  AIDS,  but  the  same  principles 
apply  to  other  infectious  diseaseS380 
, 
dangerous  psychiatric  patientS381,  and  patients  who 
are  dangerously  unfit  for  certain  activities  such  as  driving.  May  the  doctor  tell  the 
patient's  partner/the  police/the  public  health  authorities/the  DVLC?  And  if  he  does  not, 
will  he  face  a  court  action  from  the  person  who  suffered  as  a  result  of  his  failure  to  do 
so? 
It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  cases  where  there  is  a  clear  risk  to  an  identifiable  person, 
and  cases  where  the  risk  is  to  a  class  of  persons  or  the  public  at  large.  Apart  from  the 
old  (and  discredited  382)  case  of  Holgate  v  Lancashire  Mental  Hospitals  Boa  &83  there  is 
no  British  authority  directly  in  point.  In  IN  v  Edgell,  W  claimed  that  his  dangerousness 
didn't  justify  Dr  Edgell  breaching  confidentiality  in  telling  the  appropriate  authorities,  but 
failed  in  court.  On  this  basis,  if  a  patient  (a  bus  driver,  say)  has  epilepsy  but  intends  to 
keep  driving  the  doctor  might  be  justified  in  telling  DVLC  (but  not  the  bus  passengers  384) 
. 
But  it  is  one  thing  to  say  a  doctor  is  justified  in  breaching  confidence,  another  to  say  he 
will  be  liable  in  damages  for  failing  to  exercise  that  option.  In  cases  where  there  is  no 
readily  identifiable  prospective  victim,  it  seems  that  any  action  would  fail  purely  on  the 
general  principles  of  lack  of  foreseeability  or  lack  of  duty  of  care. 
If  there  is  an  identifiable  victim  likely  to  be  hurt  if  the  doctor  doesn't  act,  this  points 
towards  a  duty  to  inform  -  particularly  if  that  victim  is  another  patient  of  the  doctors. 
Ethically,  the  GIVIC  advocates  securing  the  patient's  consent  to  partner  notification,  but 
notes  that  if  such  consent  is  not  forthcoming  then "...  there  are  grounds  for  such  a  disclosure  only  where  there  is  a  serious  and 
identifiable  risk  to  a  specific  individual  who,  if  not  so  informed,  would  be 
085  exposed  to  infection. 
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The  GIVIC  also  imposes  a  duty  on  doctors  to  'Whistle-blow"  on  any  infected  colleagues. 
Whether  the  law  would  similarly  impose  a  duty  on  doctors  to  notify  partners  in  such 
circumstances  is  unclear,  but  it  is  submitted  that  it  would,  and  that  a  partner  infected 
following  a  doctor's  refusal  to  notify  him  or  her  could  recover  damages.  The  reason  for 
this  conclusion  is  this:  in  accordance  with  the  general  rules  of  tort  or  delict,  the  doctor 
owes  a  duty  of  care  to  those  whom  he  can  reasonably  foresee  will  be  harmed  by  his  act 
or,  here,  his  omission.  In  the  case  of  the  partner  of  an  HIV+  patient,  it  is  readily 
foreseeable  that  they  will  be  exposed  to  harm,  notwithstanding  that  the  harm  is  inflicted 
by  a  third  party.  The  issue  then  becomes  a  balance  of  competing  interests:  the  interests 
of  the  patient  in  his  continued  privacy,  coupled  with  the  general  rule  that  there  is  no 
liability  for  the  acts  of  third  partieS386,  weighed  against  the  partner's  right  not  to  become 
infected.  The  complication  introduced  by  liability  for  third  party  actions  is  effectively  now 
one  of  causation  and  foreseeability  rather  than  a  rigid  policy  387 
,  and  it  has  been  held  that 
liability  for  third  party  actions  exists  if  it  is  the  likelihood  of  exactly  that  kind  of  action 
which  the  defender  was  under  a  duty  to  prevent388  -  which  is  exactly  the  case  here.  So 
we  are  left  with  the  straight  weighing  of  whether  the  patient's  right  of  confidentiality  is 
sufficient  to  defeat  the  partner's  right  not  to  be  infected.  The  result  of  this  balancing 
exercise  is  unclear,  which  in  itself  is  an  indication  that  the  civil  law  is  lacking  somewhat  in 
its  regulation  of  this  area  through  lack  of  sufficiently-clear  rules. 
VIII:  Reaulation  of  ethico-leaal  controversies: 
A:  Introduction: 
The  foregoing  discussion  presents  only  the  briefest  outline  of  the  case  law  as  it  has 
affected  the  doctor-patient  relationship.  The  subtleties  and  problems  inherent  in  any  of 
these  have,  for  the  sake  of  brevity  and  direct  relevance,  largely  been  either  omitted  or 
only  briefly  alluded  to. 
The  remaining  problem  areas  with  regard  to  regulating  doctors'  conduct  relate  to  issues 
of  ethical  controversy  such  as  modern  reproductive  medicine,  abortion,  selective  non- 
treatment  of  neonates,  p  hysicia  n  -assisted  suicide,  euthanasia,  and  withholding  life- 
sustaining  treatment.  The  problematic  issues  of  points  as  yet  unanswered  by  the  law, 
and  the  extremely  complex  (and  occasionally  vitdolic)  ethical  arguments  are  not 178 
addressed  except  insofar  as  these  issues  have  direct  bearing  on  the  resolution  of  the 
matter  under  discussion.  While  ethical  and  moral  considerations  doubtless  weigh 
heavily  on  individual  doctors  and  others  making  decisions  in  these  cases,  they  cannot 
be  regarded  as  part  of  the  regulatory  framework,  and  are  consequently  outwith  the 
scope  of  this  thesis.  However,  it  is  important  to  realise  that  certain  ideas  run  through  a 
number  of  the  cases,  in  particular  a  desire  to  "do  the  right  thing".  Consequently  it  is 
necessary  to  be  sensitive  to  the  ethical  considerations  in  these  areas"89. 
Proceeding  chronologically,  medical  involvement  with  life  arises  first  in  the  course  of 
counselling  and  examining  potential  parents,  then  with  assisting  conception  in  any  of  a 
large  number  Of  Ways  390  or  else  by  assisting  with  or  arranging  what  can  be  non-medical 
forms  of  assistance,  such  as  surrogacy  or  AID;  facing  a  claim  for  the  pregnancy  arising 
at  all  following  a  failed  sterilisation  or  abortion,  or  the  mothers  refusal  to  have  an 
abortion;  considering  whether  to  carry  out  an  abortion;  being  faced  with  a  maternal- 
foetal  conflict  in  the  event  of  complications  or  refusal  of  the  mother  to  accept  treatment 
intended  to  help  the  foetus;  assisting  with  the  birth  itself;  deciding  whether  to  perform 
lifesaving  surgery  (or  even  commonplace  treatment)  or  not  if  the  child  is  born 
handicapped;  facing  liability  to  the  parents  or  the  child  if  the  child  is  born  handicapped 
as  a  result  of  alleged  negligence  on  the  doctors  part;  facing  liability  to  the  child  either 
because  of  prenatal  injury  which  has  resulted  in  the  child  being  born  with  some  defect 
which,  but  for  the  injury  it  wouldn't  have  had,  or  because  of  a  claim  that  the  child  should 
not  have  been  born  at  all;  deciding,  after  birth,  whether  continued  treatment  is  justified; 
overruling  parental  objections  to  treating  the  child;  deciding  whether  to  examine  and 
treat  the  child  without  the  consent  of  the  parents,  and  whether  to  inform  the  parents  of 
that  decision  and  approach;  owing  the  normal  duty  of  care  to  patients  (and  occasionally 
non-patients)  throughout  their  adult  lives,  including  making  decisions  as  to  that  patienf  s 
entitlement  to  both  therapeutic  and  non-therapeutic  treatment;  and  finally,  being  party  to 
decisions  at  the  end  of  life  as  to  withholding391  or  ceasing  life-sustaining  treatment,  and 
possibly  even  assisting  with  the  patient's  suicide,  accelerating  their  death  in  order  to 
alleviate  pain  or  even  killing  them.  A  number  of  these  acts,  particularly  the  last  two, 
remain  criminal  offences  in  the  UK  and  were  considered  in  Chapter  3.  It  should  be 
noted  that  almost  any  of  the  others  could  also  give  rise  to  criminal  proceedings  in  certain 
circumstances. 
These  issues  give  rise  to  a  host  of  ethical  problems  which  need  not  concern  us  here, 
although  the  ethical  considerations  do  affect  the  decisions  reached.  In  a  field  such  as 
this,  which  is  almost  completely  novel,  ethical  considerations  probably  have  more  impact 179 
on  the  final  decision  than  the  general  body  of  law.  The  scope  of  medical  ethics  as 
espoused  by  the  GIVIC  as  a  regulatory  tool  are  discussed  in  Chapter  6;  the  regulatory 
power  of  philosophical  medical  ethics  in  abstracto  is  impossible  to  gauge  and  has  to  be 
regarded  as  an  extant  but  unquantifiable  background  feature  which  is  outwith  the  scope 
of  this  work.  Ethical  issues  aside,  however,  the  extant  law  in  these  areas  can  be 
described  relatively  succinctly. 
We  have  already  seen,  in  the  foregoing  discussion,  how  the  law  has  been  used  in 
contentious  areas  such  as  the  provision  of  contraceptive  advice  and  treatment  to  under- 
16s.  The  discussion  which  follows  proceeds  by  looking  at  matters  chronologically, 
starting  with  injury  suffered  prior  to  birth,  proceeding  to  consider  matters  relating  to 
assisted  conception,  and  concludes  by  considering  end  of  life  situations. 
B:  Pre-birth  injuries: 
This  area  can  be  dealt  with  relatively  briefly.  It  is  now  established  that  English  common 
law  allows  an  action  by  a  child  for  injuries  suffered  prior  to  birth,  notwithstanding  the 
child's  pre-natal  lack  of  legal  personalitY392  . 
Any  such  English  cases  are  liable  to  be  rare, 
since  it  is  now  over  20  years  since  the  passage  of  the  Congenital  Disabilities  (Civil 
Liability)  Act  1976,  but  the  rule  is  likely  to  be  strongly  influential  in  Scotland,  where  the 
1976  Act  doesn't  appIY393.  In  the  first  place,  the  English  rule  was  partly  based  on  Roman 
laW394 
,  and  Roman  law  is  still  a  valid  source  of  Scots  law  in  the  absence  of  other 
authority395.  Secondly,  it  was  the  very  fact  that  the  Scottish  Law  Commission  were  of  the 
opinion  that  such  a  right  existed  at  common  law  that  led  to  the  1976  Act  not  being 
extended  to  Scotland3". 
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In  either  country  the  child  must  be  born  alive  to  have  any  right  of  action  . 
On  the  basis 
that  there  won't  be  any  more  claims  under  English  common  law  it  is  unnecessary  to 
discuss  this,  and  the  1976  Act  is  discussed  in  Chapter  6.  The  Scottish  courts  reached  a 
similar  view  of  the  law  in  the  case  of  Hamilton  v  Fife  Health  Board398  where  the  court 
held  that  the  child  who  suffered  from  pre-natal  injury  was  not  a  "person"  while  in  utero, 
and  thus  enjoyed  no  rights  at  that  time.  However,  on  being  born  alive  the  child  became 
a  person  in  law,  and  the  harm  done  was  only  suffered  at  that  point  (non-persons  not 
being  capable  of  suffering  a  legal  harm).  Damages  were  accordingly  held  to  be 
recoverable.  Whether  the  mother's  actions  can  be  imputed  to  the  child  as  contributory 
negligence  remains  open  to  question.  A  more  contentious  issue  concerns  cases  where 
a  child  is  born  which  has  been  so  seriously  damaged  before  birth  that  the  essence  of  its 
claim  is  that  it  should  never  have  been  allowed  to  be  born.  The  English  courts  have 180 
rejected  such  a  claim  for  'Wrongful  life"'399,  and  it  is  unlikely  that  a  Scottish  court  would 
depart  from  this.  However,  that  is  not  to  say  that  the  parents  would  not  have  a  claim  for 
the  birth  of  such  a  child;  the  courts  have  rejected  the  argument  that  the  mother  of  such  a 
disabled  foetus  should  have  an  abortion,  and  that  her  failure  to  do  so  is  a  novus  actus 
interveniens 
C:  Medically-assisted  conception: 
Moving  forward,  the  issue  has  arisen  of  whether  doctors  may  treat  pregnant  women 
without  their  consent  in  the  interests  of  the  unborn  child.  Some  of  the  applicable  case- 
law  in  this  area  has  already  been  considered  in  the  context  of  patient  consent  supra. 
It  is  clear  that  parental  wishes  are  insufficient  to  deny  medical  care  to  a  child  once 
born  401 
, 
but  in  such  a  case  the  only  rights  of  the  parent  which  are  violated  are  their  rights 
qua  parents  -  which  exist  in  the  interests  of  the  child,  not  of  the  parents.  In  the  case  of  a 
child  in  utero,  non-consensual  treatment  clearly  involves  violating  the  bodily  integrity  of 
the  mother  -  bodily  integrity  which  the  law  is  generally  presumed  to  uphold.  Yet  in  Re  S 
t  402  (adult:  refusal  of  treatmen)  the  court  authorised  a  caesarean  section  against  the 
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express  wishes  of  the  mother.  The  ethics  of  this  appear  questionable  ,  since  the 
authorisation  was  done  in  the  face  of  a  refusal  by  a  patient  who  was  not  seen  to  lack 
capacity  to  consent  to  the  procedure  or  not.  As  was  discussed  supra,  the  law  proceeds 
on  the  basis  that  an  adult  is  presumed  to  have  full  mental  capacity  and  as  such  is  free  to 
consent  to  or  refuse  treatment  for  any  reason  unless  that  presumption  is  displaced 
(which  appears  not  to  have  been  the  case  in  Re  S).  Lord  Donaldson  MR's  dictum  in  the 
case  was  based  on  the  rights  of  the  foetus,  and  was  reached  in  the  face  of  authority  just 
considered  that  a  child  is  not  a  person  in  the  eyes  of  the  law  (and  is  consequently 
404  incapable  of  having  any  rights  vest  in  it)  until  born  alive 
Most  of  the  cases  in  this  area  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  the  pregnant  woman  actually 
lacked  capacity  to  make  the  decision  herself,  and  accordingly  the  courts  could  proceed 
to  authorise  the  treatment  on  her  behalf  (presumably  on  the  basis  of  a  substituted 
judgement  test,  although  this  is  seldom  articulated  405).  It  is  clear  that  here,  as  in  many 
other  problem  areas  of  medical  law,  the  doctors  course  is  not  to  do  as  he  sees  fit,  but  to 
petition  the  court.  If  the  court  decides  that  the  proposed  intervention  (or  whatever)  is 
unlawful,  then  the  doctor  will  learn  this  before  exposing  himself  to  a  claim  for  damages, 
and  it  is  better  for  the  patient  not  to  have  the  unlawful  treatment  inflicted  on  him  or  her 
than  to  suffer  it  and  then  try  to  seek  damages  after  the  event.  "Prevention  is  better  than 181 
cure"  is  as  true  of  medico-legal  controversy  as  of  medical  treatment.  And  if  the  court 
decides  that  a  given  course  is  lawful,  they  will  generally  merely  authorise  the  doctor  to 
do  it,  not  order  him  to  406  As  Lord  Denning  once  said,  there  were  no  conceivable 
situations  where  the  court 
U 
...  should  ever  require  a  medical  practitioner  to  adopt  a  course  of  treatment 
which  in  the  bona  fide  clinical  judgement  of  that  practitioner  is  contraindicated  as 
not  being  in  the  best  interests  of  the  patient. 
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Consequently,  the  decision  remains  the  doctors,  unless  the  treatment  has  been  found  to 
be  unlawful.  Whether  it  is  appropriate  for  doctors  to  be  making  such  decisions,  and 
whether  the  courts  can  be  said  to  be  exercising  proper  control  of  the  medical  profession 
in  making  such  declarations,  is  open  to  question  -  but  that  is  the  law.  The  problems 
inherent  in  the  courts'  approach  to  problems  of  this  nature  are  discussed  in  the  final  part 
of  this  chapter.  Consistent  with  the  judicial  approach  which  refuses  to  order  doctors  to 
do  anything,  so  too  the  courts  have  refused  to  accept  the  costs  of  medically-assisted 
reproduction  or  surrogacy  as  recoverable  damages  in  cases  of  negligently-inflicted 
408 
sterilisation 
Assistance  at  the  birth  is  a  routine  medical  intervention  (assuming  the  mother  consents 
to  that  treatment)  and  is  governed  by  the  normal  rules  of  negligence;  the  main  difference 
is  that  any  negligence  which  leaves  the  child  alive  but  permanently  injured  will  tend  to 
result  in  far  higher  awards  of  damages  than  most  other  caseeO9.  As  to  failing  to  treat  a 
new-born  infant,  this  is  covered  more  by  the  criminal  laW4'0.  The  issue  of  treating 
t  411. 
children  over  parental  objections  was  raised  in  Re  S  (a  minor)  (medical  treatmen) 
This  followed  the  pattern  mentioned  above,  the  doctors  going  to  court  for  permission 
(which  was  granted)  to  give  a  blood  transfusion  to  the  child  of  two  devoted  Jehovah's 
Witnesses,  the  parents  objecting  to  the  transfusion  on  religious  grounds.  The  issue  of 
treating  a  child  on  the  basis  of  the  child's  own  consent  has  already  been  dealt  with,  as 
have  the  duties  of  care  and  confidentiality  required  in  the  context  of  "ordinary"  medical 
care,  and  the  circumstances  whereby  a  patient  can  challenge  a  decision  not  to  treat  him 
due  to  resource  shortages. 
Where  the  decision  not  to  treat  is  not  based  on  resource  limitations,  there  may  be  more 
chance  of  successfully  challenging  the  decision.  In  Rv  St  Marys  Hospital  Ethical 
Committee  ex  p  HatTiote",  it  was  held  that  any  decision  not  to  treat  someone  on  non- 
medical  grounds  was  susceptible  to  judicial  review.  However  the  courts,  it  will  be 
remembered,  apply  the  "Wednesbury'  standard  to  judicial  review,  which  means  a 182 
decision  not  to  treat  will  be  upheld  unless  it  is  so  unreasonable  that  no  reasonable 
doctor  or  health  authority  could  have  made  it;  the  judgement  noted  that  a  policy  refusing 
treatment  to  Jews  or  members  of  ethnic  minorities  would  definitely  be  unreasonable. 
This  applies  even  in  cases  concerning  life-saving  treatment,  which  takes  us  to  the  final 
area. 
D:  End  of  life  decisions: 
There  are  two  principle  areas  where  the  law  has  been  utilised  in  challenging  (or  clarifying 
the  legality  of)  medical  decisions  which  will  ultimately  result  in  the  death  of  the  patient. 
The  first  concerns  decisions  to  discontinue  treatment  which  is  of  no  clinical  benefit  to  the 
patient,  usually  because  the  patient  is  in  a  persistent  vegetative  state.  The  second 
concerns  decisions  to  withhold  or  discontinue  treatment  (usually  on  resource  grounds) 
which  could  benefit  the  person. 
The  decisions  concerning  cessation  of  life-continuing  treatment  have  already  been 
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considered  . 
In  essence,  a  declaration  by  the  High  Court  (in  England  and  Wales)  will 
preclude  prosecution,  or  a  declarator  by  the  Court  of  Session  will  entitle  a  doctor  to  the 
protection  of  the  Lord  Advocate's  binding  policy  statement  not  to  prosecute  in  such 
cases.  The  familiar  pattern  of  seeking  advance  clearance  from  the  courts  can  again  be 
seen  in  this  approach.  The  courts  have  recently  drawn  attention  to  the  fact  that  there 
are  currently  two  sets  of  guidance  on  PVS,  not  entirely  consonant  with  each  other,  and 
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suggested  that  it  was  time  the  guidelines  on  the  existence  of  PVS  were  reviewed 
Judicial  suggestions  on  medical  practice  of  this  type  are  exceedingly  rare. 
In  the  case  of  discontinuance  of  therapeutic  treatment,  or  a  decision  not  to  offer  it  in  the 
first  place,  this  issue  has  been  considered  in  the  discussion  of  judicial  review  cases  and 
C5 
NHS  statutory  duties  supra.  The  issue  also  arose  in  Rv  Camblidge  HA  ex  pB 
another  case  concerning  resource  allocation,  in  the  context  of  treatment  which  was 
lifesaving  but  very  expensive  and  arguably  experimental  in  nature.  The  decision  not  to 
offer  the  treatment  was  upheld  by  the  courts,  principally  because  it  was  not  so 
unreasonable  that  no  reasonable  health  authority,  properly  directing  itself,  would  never 
have  reached  it.  However,  there  was  also  some  more  general  discussion  of  what  a 
health  authority  had  to  do  by  way  of  justification  of  such  decisions;  the  decision  was 
defended  principally  on  economic  grounds.  Yet  the  discussion  of  utilitarian  values  and 
resources  was  not  initially  a  factor  in  the  case;  the  original  decision  not  to  offer  further 
treatment  to  the  child  having  been  taken  on  purely  clinical  groundS416;  the  court  failed  to 
pay  any  attention  to  the  clinical  aspects  and  decided  the  case  purely  on  the  basis  of 183 
resources.  This  was  notwithstanding  clear-cut  evidence  that  at  least  One  respectable 
body  of  medical  opinion  would  not  have  given  the  treatment  irrespective  of  costs.  If 
nothing  else,  the  case  shows  the  courts'  unwillingness  to  interfere  with  decisions 
reached  on  whether  to  treat  or  not,  whether  the  reasons  for  doing  so  are  clinical  or  not. 
A  more  pointed  issue  confronted  the  courts  in  the  case  of  Re  A  (Children)  (conjoined 
twins:  medical  treatment)  (no.  2)417,  the  so-called  conjoined  twins  case.  Here,  an 
operation  to  separate  Siamese  twins,  Mary  and  Jodie,  would  inevitably  result  in  the 
death  of  one  of  them,  Mary.  However,  the  uncontroverted  medical  evidence  was  that  if 
not  separated,  both  twins  would  die  within  at  best  a  few  months.  The  hospital  petitioned 
the  court  for  a  declaration  that  it  could  carry  out  the  operation,  notwithstanding  that  it 
would  inevitably  kill  Mary.  This  raised  issues  of  family  law  and  criminal  law.  In  the  family 
law  context,  the  court  clearly  found  little  difficulty  in  balancing  the  competing  interests  of 
the  two  twins.  Mary  was  bound  to  die.  Jodie  could  be  saved.  Her  interests  in  having 
the  operation  performed  clearly  outweighed  those  of  Mary.  The  criminal  law  aspects  of 
the  case  are  less  clear,  but  ultimately  the  Court  of  Appeal  was  prepared  to  hold  that  the 
operation  would  not  be  murder,  notwithstanding  that  it  incorporated  all  the  ingredients  of 
that  crime  (although  Walker  LJ's  judgement  indicates  that  the  bona  fide  exercise  of 
clinical  judgement  which  will  inevitably  result  in  death  cannot  co-exist  with  the  mens  rea 
of  murder).  Having  toyed  with  the  idea  of  deciding  that  the  issue  of  the  conflict  between 
Mary  and  Jodie's  rights  was  too  complex  for  a  court  to  decide,  the  Court  ultimately  found 
that  it  could  not,  in  all  conscience,  avoid  the  issue  and  so  proceeded  to  carry  out  the 
balancing  exercise  described  and  issued  its  decision  accordingly.  While  the  facts  of  this 
case  are  highly  unusual  and  singular,  the  court's  decision  does  go  somewhat  further 
than  any  previous  decisions  in  terms  of  the  court's  power  to  declare  proposed  actions 
lawful. 
Getting  the  court's  sanction  before  stopping  treatment  (or,  as  in  Re  A  (Children)  carrying 
out  treatment  with  such  drastic  consequences)  is  important  because  having  done  so,  the 
doctor  will  also  be  immune  from  criminal  liabilitY418.  Medical  opinion  is  important  even 
where  the  patient  dies  as  a  result  of  the  doctors  actions.  In  terms  of  Rv  Adomakd0g, 
discussed  in  Chapter  3  supra,  a  charge  of  manslaughter  by  criminal  negligence  must 
first  satisfy  the  normal  civil  test  of  negligence  before  considering  whether  the  negligence 
was  gross  as  to  amount  to  a  crime;  consequently,  such  medical  testimony  will  be  a 
prerequisite  to  a  verdict  of  manslaughte  ý20;  this  again  shows  the  interplay  between  the 
different  spheres. 184 
In  summary,  while  these  areas  are  of  pressing  ethical  importance,  and  often  highlight  the 
need  for  law  reform  or  the  creation  of  a  suitable  forum  for  deciding  these  issues  in  a 
sensitive  and  appropriate  way,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  doctor,  the  mechanism 
exists  whereby  he  can  apply  to  court  for  a  suitable  declaration,  and,  in  effect,  let  the 
court  sort  out  the  competing  and  conflicting  interests  at  stake.  Such  is  the  level  of  the 
law's  regulation  as  it  affects  the  doctor;  all  the  doctor  need  know  is  which  areas  of 
decision-making  fall  into  those  categories  where  prior  judicial  approval  would  be 
advisable. 
IX:  Litilaafion  and  other  regulatory  bodies: 
As  mentioned  at  the  outset,  the  justiciability  of  other  regulatory  bodies'  decisions  is 
principally  considered  in  the  discussion  of  those  other  bodies.  However,  a  few  general 
comments  are  included  here  for  completeness. 
To  start  with,  the  nature  of  the  regulatory  bodies  selected  for  inclusion  in  this  thesis 
means  that  they  are  all  susceptible  to  judicial  review  actions,  at  least  in  relation  to  their 
public  law  functions.  This  category  encompasses  virtually  all  the  regulatory  tasks  carried 
out  by  those  bodies.  To  this  generalisation  there  are  a  few  exceptions.  Firstly,  the 
superior  courts  are  themselves  not  susceptible  to  judicial  review,  which  (as  explained 
above)  is  the  mechanism  whereby  the  supedor  courts  ensure  lower  courts  and  tdbunals 
and  administrative  bodies  carry  out  their  allotted  functions  propedy.  Secondly,  the  lower 
cdminal  courts  in  Scotland  are  also  not  susceptible  to  judicial  review  per  se,  although 
equivalent  procedures  allowing  decisions  to  be  reviewed  by  the  High  Court  of  Justiciary 
(which  is  staffed  as  the  same  judges  as  the  Court  of  Session)  do  exist. 
To  recap  briefly,  the  actions  of  a  body  can  be  challenged  on  judicial  review  on  the  basis 
of  illegality,  irrationality  or  procedural  improprietY421 
. 
The  grounds  for  quashing  a 
decision  also  extend  to  the  adequacy  of  reasoning  and  supporting  facts,  i.  e.  taking  into 
account  irrelevant  considerations,  failing  to  take  account  of  relevant  and  material 
considerations,  or  if  there  is  no  proper  basis  in  fact  to  support  a  decision  requiring  a 
factual  baSiS422. 
This  level  of  scrutiny  is  applicable  across  the  regulatory  framework.  The  distinction 
between  policy  issues  and  other  matters  has  recently  been  revisited  by  the  House  of 
Lords,  albeit  in  a  non-medical 
conteXt423 
. 
The  case  in  question  suggests  that 
proportionality  424  should  be  considered  as  a  separate  ground  of  judicial  review  at 
common  law,  as  should  straightforward  misunderstanding  or  ignorance  of  an  established 185 
and  relevant  fact"'.  This  expansion  was  considered  in  the  case  which  was  brought 
under  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998,  but  the  expansion  of  judicial  review  jurisdiction  was 
not,  according  to  their  Lordships,  driven  by  that  Act  but  was  simply  a  development  of  the 
common  law. 
The  volume  of  judicial  review  cases  of  regulatory  bodies  is  significantly  reduced  because 
as  will  be  seen  in  subsequent  chapters,  many  of  the  statutes  under  which  these  other 
bodies  have  been  established  include  an  appeal  to  the  courts  or,  in  some  cases,  to  the 
Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council,  and  are  therefore  considered  under  the  aegis  of 
the  mechanism  in  question  rather  than  here.  However,  judicial  review  is  still  important 
firstly  because  it  allows  review  of  the  decision  by  someone  other  than  the  person  being 
regulated.  Most  statutory  appeals  are  only  available  to  the  individual  practitioner  who  is 
being  subjected  to  the  regulator's  discipline,  whereas  anyone  who  can  show  sufficient 
title  and  interest  to  sue  can  raise  a  judicial  review.  This  could,  at  least  in  theory,  include 
a  patient  aggrieved  at  the  perceived  leniency  or  inaction  of  a  regulator  towards  a  doctor 
who  is  allegedly  in  breach  of  the  rules  of  the  regulator  in  question. 
Judicial  review  can  also  be  used  as  an  alternative  to  statutory  appeals  by  those 
regulated,  particularly  where  the  statutory  appeal  would  not  provide  an  adequate  remedy 
(which  is  a  prerequisite  in  any  case,  judicial  review  in  general  not  being  available  where 
an  alternative  remedy  exists).  It  has,  for  example,  been  used  to  challenge  an  alleged 
breach  of  natural  justice  by  the  regulatory  mechaniSM426.  It  is  also  the  appropriate  way 
for  someone  aggrieved  by  a  proposed  course  of  action  to  challenge  that  proposal  before 
it  has  been  carried 
OUt427. 
X:  The  effects  of  medical  litigation: 
This  section  will  seek  to  assess,  in  necessarily  general  terms,  the  effects  of  civil  litigation 
in  achieving  its  assigned  regulatory  functions,  viz.  the  provision  of  a  system  of  redress 
for  those  who  suffer  due  to  a  failure  to  adhere  to  acceptable  standards,  setting  and 
upholding  standards,  provision  of  a  system  of  investigation  into  whether  standards  are 
being  adhered  to,  the  airing  of  grievances,  punishing  failure  to  adhere  to  standards, 
facilitating  good  medical  practice,  and  regulating  the  regulatory  system. 
The  effects  of  civil  litigation  in  terms  of  medical  regulation  will  also  be  assessed  by 
looking  at  three  "target"  groups  in  terms  of  the  different  aspects  of  regulatory  task  being 
undertaken.  These  groups  are  the  regulated  themselves  (i.  e.  doctors),  the  regulators 
(i.  e.  those  operating  other  parts  of  the  regulatory  bureaucracy),  and  those  who  stand  to 186 
benefit  from  the  regulation,  i.  e.  the  general  public  as  being  actual  or  potential  patients  of 
the  doctors. 
A:  Effects  on  doctors: 
1:  Personal  inmury  actions: 
The  most  prevalent  form  of  medical  litigation  is,  as  seen,  the  action  for  personal  injury. 
The  effects  of  personal  injury  actions  on  doctors  are,  on  one  level,  far  less  marked  than 
previously.  Until  January  1990,  NHS  hospital  doctors  were  required  by  their  contract  of 
employment  to  carry  professional  liability  insurance.  This  requirement  is  imposed  on 
many  other  professionals,  such  as  solicitors,  by  their  statutory  regulatory  body  rather 
than  their  employers;  the  fact  that  this  was  an  NHS  requirement  means  there  is  no 
requirement  for  doctors  in  private  practice  to  have  any  form  of  indemnity  insurance. 
Since  1990,  NHS  indemn  itY428  has  meant  that  the  NHS  will  now  directly  pick  up  the 
financial  liability  of  any  NHS  hospital  doctor.  From  the  doctor's  perspective,  there  was 
little  change  since  in  the  event  that  damages  were  awarded  against  them,  it  simply 
means  that  instead  of  one  third  party  (the  insurer,  typically  one  of  the  medical  defence 
organisations)  paying  the  damages  and  costs,  another  third  party  (the  employing  part  of 
the  NHS)  picks  it  up  instead.  It  is  extremely  rare  in  the  UK  for  a  doctor  ever  to  have  to 
meet  an  award  personally  (in  contrast  to  the  situation  in  the  US429).  Given  how  large  the 
damages  which  can  be  awarded  are  relative  to  the  personal  wealth  of  the  individual 
doctor,  such  a  situation  benefits  both  doctors  (who  do  not  face  the  prospect  of  personal 
bankruptcy)  and  patients  (who  can  be  reassured  that  if  they  win,  someone  will  be  able  to 
pay  the  compensation  in  question). 
NHS  indemnity  only  extends  only  to  NHS  hospital  doctors,  and  does  not  apply  to  general 
practitioners  or  to  private  medical  practice  (including  any  private  practice  done  by  NHS 
hospital  doctors).  In  these  other  sectors,  the  doctors  are  likely  to  carry  insurance  for  self 
protection,  rather  than  under  compulsion.  However,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  a  patient 
injured  by  a  private  practitioner  will  be  able  to  recover  damages  in  full,  which  could  be 
considered  to  be  an  extremely  unsatisfactory  situation. 
There  are,  however,  implications  to  personal  injury  actions  beyond  the  financial.  The 
doctor  who  is  being  sued  for  negligence  may  regard  this  as  a  serious  slur  on  his  or  her 
professionalism.  While  there  is  no  formal  mechanism  currently  in  place  whereby  anyone 
tracks  negligence  actions  against  specific  doctors,  or  takes  any  form  of  action  where  the 
court  has  held  that  a  doctor  failed  to  meet  the  requisite  standard  of  care,  such  conduct r.  S430 
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may  (exceptionally)  attract  the  attention  of  the  GIVIC  or  other  regulato,  . 
And  the 
personal  impact  of  litigation  should  not  be  underestimated.  One  US  study  analysed  the 
impact  of  being  sued  for  malpractice.  The  resufts  have  been  summarised  as  follows: 
"Thirty-nine  per  cent  of  physicians  admitted  to  four  or  five  symptoms  suggestive 
of  a  major  depression;  20  per  cent  acknowledged  another  group  of  symptoms 
including  anger,  change  of  mood,  tension,  frustration  and  the  like;  8  per  cent 
noted  the  onset  of  physical  illness,  of  which  2  per  cent  had  a  myocardial 
infarction;  8  per  cent  noted  the  aggravation  of  a  previously  diagnosed  illness; 
18.8  per  cent  felt  a  loss  of  nerve  in  a  clinical  situation;  14  per  cent  felt  less  self- 
confident...  56.5  per  cent  said  they  and  their  families  had  suffered  as  a  result  of 
the  suit...  This  degree  of  emotional  damage  is  unacceptable  but  the  worst  part  is 
that  75  per  cent  of  the  physicians  experiencing  this  emotional  trauma  were  later 
acquitted  by  the  courts.  So  it  is  the  litigation  process  which  is  so  very  damaging 
to  physicians.  n431 
The  situation  in  the  UK  has  not,  so  far  as  this  writer  has  been  able  to  ascertain,  been 
studied,  although  similar  effects  were  noted  in  a  study  of  doctors  who  had  been  the 
subject  of  complaintS432  . 
There  is,  however,  at  least  one  suggestion  that  doctors  in  the 
UK  have  been  driven  to  the  verge  of  suicide  by  the  stress  of  being  sued  433 
. 
In  addition, 
the  doctor  being  sued  will  require  to  attend  court  if  matters  proceed  that  far,  and  will 
have  had  to  spend  time  reviewing  matters  with  lawyers  and  expert  witnesses.  This  is  a 
time-consuming  process,  and  probably  contributes  to  the  stress  generated.  The  number 
of  doctors  facing  this  stressful  experience  be  underestimated:  almost  one  third  of  the 
3,500  doctors  who  responded  to  a  survey  by  the  magazine  General  Practitioner  had 
faced  a  claim  for  negligence  434.  While  this  was  a  self-selecting  sample,  it  seems  that 
some  37%  of  consultants  and  senior  registrars  in  the  NHS  were  sued  at  least  once  in 
435  1996 
,  which  suggests  that  the  survey  respondents  were  not  unrepresentative. 
The  action  for  personal  injury  is,  however,  also  argued  to  have  beneficial  effects  too.  In 
particular,  it  is  often  argued  (usually  in  response  to  suggestions  that  medical  malpractice 
actions  should  be  abolished  altogether  in  favour  of  so-called  "no  fault"  compensation 
schemes)  that  tort  and  delict  serve  a  useful  purpose  in  upholding  the  accountability  of 
individual  doctors.  The  argument  runs  that  the  possibility  of  being  sued,  with  the 
attendant  adverse  publicity  this  generates,  deters  the  doctor  from  acting  negligently  and 
thus  serves  to  enhance  the  overall  standard  of  medical  practice,  particularly 
diagnoSiS436. 188 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of  difficulties  inherent  in  this  theory.  As  we  have  seen,  a 
doctor  found  to  have  been  negligent  in  this  country  is  highly  unlikely  to  face  any 
personal  financial  repercussions,  in  marked  contrast  to  the  US  situation  where  the 
possibility  is  a  real  one.  The  introduction  of  NHS  indemnity  represented  a  major  shift  in 
policy,  however,  and  doctors  covered  no  longed  have  to  worry  even  about  premiums. 
Some  suggested  that  this  would  also  mean  doctors  stopped  complaining  about  the 
current  tort  system.  437 
A  major  problem  with  the  deterrent  theory  lies  in  assessing  the  actual  deterrent  effect 
exerted.  The  problem  has  been  described  as  follows: 
"One  of  the  difficulties...  has  been  the  diffuse  nature  of  the  information  flows 
generated  by  negligence  claims.  Tort  actions  for  medical  negligence  tend  to  be 
brought  by  single  plaintiffs  against  single  defendants  or  a  small  group  of 
defendants  united  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  by  their  involvement  with  the  care  of  the 
individual  victim  of  an  adverse  event.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  cases  where 
negligence  is  admitted  are  settled  privately  between  the  parties  and  there  is  no 
public  statement  about  the  outcome.  Claim  databases,  if  they  exist  at  all,  are  the 
property  of  insurers... 
On  the  other  hand,  the  value  to  the  public  of  such  data  is  equally  clear.  To 
the  extent  that  tort  claims  signal  the  presence  of  sub-standard  medical  care, 
information  on  the  frequency  and  severity  of  such  claims  can  contribute  to  the 
effective  monitoring  of  quality  in  the  health  care  sector.  Given  that  such  data, 
once  collected,  could  be  disseminated  at  very  low  cost,  it  seems  that  it  is  socially 
beneficial  for  private  databases  to  be  made  public.  However,  this  misses  the 
point  that  the  information  would  not  be  collected  by  insurers  if  it  were  to  be  made 
j)  438  public,  as  it  would  no  longer  lead  to  any  private  return  . 
In  essence,  the  cases  which  actually  go  to  court  are  a  small  minority  representing  the 
most  borderline  issues;  the  serious  breaches  of  standards  are  handled  privately  and  not 
subject  to  detailed  analysis  which  is  available  to  the  public  (or  indeed,  to  much  of  the 
regulatory  system  either)  and  so  there  is  no  feedback  loop  to  the  doctor  in  question. 
There  is  no  mechanism  within  the  system  of  civil  litigation  itself  intended  to  create  a 
deterrent  effect,  only  the  fear  factor  inherent  in  the  possibility  of  being  sued.  Such  fear 
of  litigation  may  provoke  better  medical  behaviour,  but  equally  it  may  result  in 
interventions  which  are  arguably  inappropriate. 
Finally,  therefore,  mention  should  be  made  of  the  concept  of  "defensive  medicine.  "  This 189 
expression  is  normally  used  to  describe  the  situation  whereby  a  doctor  carries  out  a 
procedure  for  the  principal  reason  of  avoiding  subsequent  civil  liability  rather  than 
because  (absent  the  threat  of  litigation)  it  is  clinically  indicated.  The  arguments  for  and 
against  have  been  put  as  follows: 
"It  is  suggested  that  a  doctor,  aware  of  the  risks  of  litigation  arising  from  the 
performance  of  a  particular  medical  procedure,  will  have  that  risk  in  mind  rather 
than  the  primary  concern,  the  health  and  welfare  of  patients.  There  is  ample 
evidence  that  in  the  USA,  the  cost  of  insurance  has  meant  that  fewer  doctors  are 
willing  to  practise  certain  'well  litigated'  areas  of  medical  practice,  such  as 
gynaecology.  The  shadow  of  litigation  may  also  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  the 
development  of  innovative  forms  of  treatment. 
There  are  those,  however,  who  believe  that  the  practice  of  defensive  medicine,  if 
it  really  exists  at  all,  is  actually  only  evidence  of  a  correctly  cautious  approach  to 
the  practice  of  medicine.  The  individual  patient,  the  arguments  goes,  cannot 
suffer  unduly  in  a  regime  of  'careful'  medicine.  If  the  doctor  has  an  awareness  of 
the  prospect  of  litigation,  this  may  lead  to  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  need  for 
the  patient  to  be  fully  and  accurately  informed  of  the  need  for  surgery,  the  risks 
involved  in  it  and  the  alternative  forms  of  treatment  that  might  be  available.  In 
response  to  this  it  is  contended  that  to  have  such  a  'cautious'  approach  to  each 
patient  would  be  practically  impossible  and  economically  disastrous.  Modern 
medicine  exists  in  a  society  where  resources  are  limited,  the  population  is  ageing 
and  the  demands  on  the  health-care  system  as  a  whole  difficult  to  withstand.  To 
devote  such  time  to  each  patient  would  invariably  mean  that  there  was  less  time 
for  someone  else.  To  have  a  clinical  regime  based  on  the  chances  of  being  sued 
could  ultimately  destroy  the  system.  "439 
As  has  been  seen  above,  the  tests  for  clinical  negligence  are  set  by  accepted  medical 
practice.  Against  this  background,  fears  of  defensive  medicine  appear  unfounded.  If 
the  medical  profession  itself  continues  to  adhere  to  a  practice  which  does  not  require 
every  conceivable  diagnostic  test  to  be  carried  out  at  the  first  suspicion  of  a  problem, 
then  the  doctor  who  follows  this  practice  will  not,  under  the  current  tests,  be  held  to  have 
been  negligent.  It  may  be  that  much  of  the  fear  concerning  misplaced  defensive 
medicine  is  based  on  the  American  experience,  where  lay  juries  will  sometimes  award 
damages  even  where  there  is  no  clear  medical  evidence  of  any  negligence440  and 
defensive  medicine  is  estimated  to  cost  between  15  and  35  per  cent  to  the  cost  of 
medical  care"'.  Certainly  there  seems  to  be  no  clear  evidence  that  defensive  medicine 190 
is  a  problem  in  the  UK  442 
,  and  one  study  in  particular  concluded  that  any  UK  "malpractice 
crisis"  concerned  "the  difficulties  facing  patients  and  their  relatives  bringing  a  claim 
against  doctors.  m"3 
2:  Other  civil  liticiation: 
Other  forms  of  civil  litigation  tend  not  to  be  addressed  to  the  actions  of  specific  doctors, 
so  the  effects  of  such  actions  are,  from  the  individual  perspective,  less  marked.  The 
effects  of  the  Giffick  case444,  for  example,  were  pervasive  and,  until  the  decision  was 
reversed  by  the  House  of  Lords,  resulted  in  a  nationwide  change  in  medical  practice. 
Other  cases  are  more  limited;  the  cases  on  authorising  treatment  without  consent  or  on 
withholding  treatment,  for  example,  lay  down  a  general  ly-applica  b  le  framework  for 
doctors  operating  in  these  fields  to  adhere  to  if  faced  with  that  sort  of  problem.  Provided 
the  appropriate  clearance  has  been  secured  in  advance,  the  doctor  will  not  face 
subsequent  civil  or  criminal  sanction  for  following  the  course  of  action  duly  authorised. 
Litigation  based  on  resource  decisions  could  (if  they  ever  succeed)  result  in  resources 
being  made  available  to  allow  the  doctor  to  carry  out  some  procedure  which  that  doctor 
has  already  decided  is  clinically  indicated  (recalling  that  the  courts  will  not,  as  a  rule, 
order  doctors  to  do  something  clinically  contra  indicated),  which  may  facilitate  good 
medical  practice  in  such  cases. 
B:  Effects  on  other  regulators: 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  main  way  the  civil  law  operates  to  control  other 
regulatory  mechanisms  is  through  the  judicial  review  action.  In  essence,  this  means  that 
in  carrying  out  their  functions  these  other  bodies  are  obliged  by  the  courts  to  act 
reasonably,  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  natural  justice,  and  on  a  correct 
understanding  of  their  legal  powers  and  duties.  Decisions  will  be  struck  down  if  they 
breach  any  of  these  precepts,  or  cannot  be  justified  on  the  evidence  which  the  body  had 
available.  More  recently,  fundamental  error  of  fact  has  become  a  separate  ground  for 
review,  as  has  proportionality:  if  the  decision  in  question  involves  infringing  the  rights  of 
someone  and  that  infringement  is  disproportionate  to  the  result  being  sought,  the 
decision  will  be  struck  down. 
The  courts  do  not,  as  a  rule,  substitute  their  own  view  on  the  subject  under  scrutiny  for 
that  of  the  original  decision-making  body.  Instead,  the  matter  is  remitted  back  to  the 
body  in  the  expectation  that  it  will  then  revisit  the  issue,  hopefully  this  time  avoiding  the 
errors  which  vitiated  the  previous  decision.  There  is,  however,  an  important  area  where 191 
the  courts  will  not  interfere  with  the  original  decision-maker  this  relates  to  the  areas  of 
policy  (or  uexpediency")  judgements  which  have  been  delegated  to  the  body  in  question. 
If  the  decision  in  question  properly  falls  into  the  area  of  policy,  where  the  body  will 
typically  be  taking  decisions  on  the  basis  of  the  "public  interest",  then  so  long  as  the 
body  has  behaved  reasonably  and  justified  its  decision  by  reference  to  the  correct  law 
and  facts,  then  the  courts  will  not  interfere  445 
. 
This  exclusion  from  the  scope  of  review  is 
clearly  seen  in  the  cases  relating  to  resource  allocation,  such  decisions  clearly  falling 
into  the  "policy"  sphere  and  accordingly  only  being  subjected  to  a  very  low  degree  of 
scrutiny.  What  this  means  in  practice  is  that  the  courts  are  happy  to  let  bodies  entrusted 
by  Parliament  with  a  particular  regulatory  task  to  get  on  with  it.  By  the  same  token,  if  a 
body  has  a  discretion  given  to  it,  then  it  is  expected  to  exercise  that  discretion  itself. 
Thus  both  improper  delegation  of  decision-making  powers  and  fettering  of  discretion  (for 
example,  by  slavish  adherence  to  a  rigid  policy)  will  provide  grounds  for  striking  down  a 
decision. 
A  recent  example  of  a  number  of  these  principles  can  be  seen  in  the  case  of  Rv  Human 
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Authority  ex  parte  (1)  Assisted  Reproduction  and 
Gynaecology  Centre  (2)  1.  ý46 
. 
There  was  conflicting  medical  research  on  how  many 
eggs  should  be  implanted  in  a  given  lVF  cycle.  This  led  to  judicial  review  of  the  HFEA, 
alleging  that  its  decision  to  forbid  a  particular  course  of  treatment  was  irrational  or  that  it 
had  fettered  its  discretion.  The  application  failed,  Ousely  J  holding  that  "irrationality" 
required  the  applicant  to  demonstrate  that  there  were  features  present  in  the  case  which 
took  it  outwith  the  scope  of  the  range  of  reasonable  responses  open  to  the  decision- 
maker.  Conflicting  academic  research  merely  showed  that  two  points  of  view  existed. 
For  the  court  to  attempt  to  adjudicate  between  competing  academic  theories  was  to 
become  involved  in  scrutiny  of  the  ments  of  the  decision  -  far  beyond  what  was  required 
to  ensure  that  the  decision  was  lawful.  Specific  allegations  of  fettering  discretion  were 
not  made  out  on  the  facts. 
The  rarely-utilised  action  for  implement  of  statutory  duty  provides  an  alternative  route  447 
to  much  the  same  end,  although  if  the  statutory  duty  in  question  is  generally-formulated, 
it  will  not  be  susceptible  to  review448. 
C:  Effects  on  patients  and  the  public: 
The  patient  who  embarks  on  litigation  in  the  medical  sphere  has,  as  we  have  seem, 
embarked  on  a  long  and  uncertain  journey;  it  is  necessary  to  consider  why.  Thus,  while 
Brazier  suggests  that 192 
"For  the  patient  for  whom  the  doctor's  mistake  resulted  in  disability  or  death, 
money  is  poor  compensation.  Finding  out  why  things  went  wrong  may  be  more 
important  to  the  patient  and  the  family.  "449 
Goldrein  and  de  Haas  comment  that 
"It  is  frequently  said  that  the  client  does  not  want  money,  but  only  to  find  out  what 
went  wrong  and  if  appropriate,  an  apology.  Medical  negligence  litigation  is  a 
curious  route  to  achieve  that  result.  If  the  client  only  wants  to  find  out  what  went 
wrong  and  an  apology,  then  more  vigorous  use  of  the  hospital  complaints 
procedure  is  a  more  compelling  route.  It  is  certainly  cheaper  than  an  adverse 
order  as  to  Costs.  A50 
For  present  purposes,  it  will  be  assumed  that  the  patient  actually  wants  the  remedy 
which  they  ask  the  court  for.  In  most  cases,  that  will  be  financial  compensation. 
We  saw  earlier  that  success  rates  in  malpractice  cases  are  exceptionally  low,  the  most 
recent  figure  being  that  only  13%  of  claims  actually  succeed  451 
. 
For  the  remaining  87%, 
the  effect  of  civil  litigation  is  that  having  embarked  on  a  long,  stressful  and  possibly 
expensive  process,  they  get  nothing  at  all.  The  13%  who  recover  in  this  forensic  lottery 
receive  potentially  huge  sums,  but  only  if  they  have  actually  suffered  a  genuinely  serious 
and  permanent  disability.  And  even  among  the  winners,  the  costs  of  the  present  system 
seriously  deplete  the  amount  recovered,  since  the  rules  on  recovery  of  expenses  seldom 
allow  for  recovery  of  all  costs  incurred.  Indeed,  this  factor  led  Allsop  and  Mulcahy  to 
suggest  that 
"The  fact  that  in  claims  under  C5000  the  costs  of  the  action  came  to  131  per  cent 
of  the  value  of  the  settlements  suggests  either  that  claimants  are  receiving  bad 
advice  from  their  lawyers  or  that  the  recovery  of  damages  is  not  their  primary 
aim.  PY452 
This  point  may  or  may  not  be  true;  certainly,  a  recent  survey  by  the  Law  Society 
indicated  that  client  satisfaction  with  their  solicitor  was  lower  for  medical  accidents  than 
for  other 
areaS453.  Similarly,  in  terms  of  dissatisfied  patients  wanting  their  "day  in  court", 
a  prediction  that  the  (New  Zealand)  Medical  Practitioners'  Disciplinary  Committee  was 
going  to  be  busy  following  the  abolition  of  malpractice  actions  in  that  jurisdiction  appears 
to  have  been  correCt454 
. 
However,  one  cannot  exclude  unrelated  factors  as  being 193 
behind  the  increase  in  complaints  to  the  statutory  regulator.  Such  increases  have  also 
been  recorded  in  the  UK  despite  the  continuing  right  of  access  to  the  CoUrtS455 
However,  the  (theoretical)  deterrent  effect  of  civil  litigation  referred  to  above  is  of  more 
general  significance;  if  the  theory  has  any  validity,  then  the  tort/delict  systems  benefit 
everyone  by  driving  up  standards  across  the  board  simply  by  their  existence.  However, 
as  we  have  seen  above,  the  actual  deterrent  effect  of  legal  action  in  the  UK  may  be 
minimal.  If  that  is  the  case,  then  a  system  which  fails  to  compensate  most  victims  of 
medical  accidents  is  bereft  of  any  countervailing  benefits. 
XI:  Summary  and  conclusions 
A:  Purpose: 
As  stated  supra,  there  are  a  number  of  purposes  apparent  in  the  forms  of  civil  litigation 
available  to  dissatisfied  parties  or  those  seeking  guidance  on  their  proposed  actions, 
falling  generally  into  the  categories  of  giving  financial  redress  to  the  victims  of  failure  to 
adhere  to  standards,  upholding  patient  autonomy  (at  least  in  theory),  and  protecting 
both  patients  and  doctors  by  providing  a  framework  allowing  the  legality  of  actions  to  be 
tested.  Critics  of  the  current  system  might  suggest  that  the  main  effects  are,  however, 
the  reduction  of  doctors'  liability  and  the  maintenance  of  professional  autonomy, 
although  it  may  also  serve  to  punish  wrongdoers.  The  system  of  civil  litigation  is  such 
that  it  is  reasonable  to  ascribe  all  eight  regulatory  tasks  to  it,  albeit  in  differing  degrees. 
B:  Mechanism: 
With  the  exception  of  certain  forms  of  contempt  of  court  (which  is  more  akin  to  the 
criminal  law  than  the  civil  law),  the  civil  courts  are  a  reactive  form  of  regulation  and 
require  someone  to  initiate  legal  proceedings  before  anything  else  can  happen. 
However,  once  that  action  has  been  initiated  the  court  system  does  provide  tools 
intended  to  allow  the  parties  to  the  action  to  locate,  secure  and  bring  to  the  court  the 
evidence  and  witnesses  which  those  parties  believe  will  be  helpful  to  their  case.  While 
the  courts  adopt  an  interventionist  stance  in  some  situations  (most  obviously  in  cases 
relating  to  child  welfare),  for  most  actions  the  civil  courts  still  essentially  follow  the 
"umpire"  role  described  supra. 
Assuming  that  there  is  no  extra-judicial  settlement  of  the  action,  matters  will  proceed  to 194 
court.  Each  side  is  then  entitled  to  lead  its  own  evidence,  so  far  as  admissible  and  so 
far  as  they  have  complied  with  applicable  procedural  rules.  Having  heard  the  evidence 
and  legal  submissions,  the  judge  reaches  a  decision.  He  or  she  then  issues  a 
judgement  which,  on  one  level,  is  the  end  of  the  court's  necessary  involvement  in  the 
dispute.  The  nature  of  the  decrees  which  the  court  can  issue  at  the  end  of  the  case  has 
already  been  considered;  the  effect  of  court  decrees  can  be  summarised  as  being  able 
to  clarify  what  the  respective  rights  and  duties  of  the  parties  to  the  action  are,  vis  a  vis 
each  other. 
There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which  court  orders  can  be  enforced,  but  in  the  context  of 
medical  regulation  these  are  largely  irrelevant  since  most  of  the  players  in  this  area 
against  whom  court  orders  are  issued  will  tend  to  obey  the  court's  ruling  without  the 
need  for  coercive  measures.  For  present  purposes,  suffice  to  say  that  there  are  ways  of 
ensuring  compliance,  most  of  which  involve  the  party  in  whose  favour  the  order  has 
been  granted  coming  back  to  court  in  the  event  of  the  other  party's  failure  to  obtemper 
the  decree.  The  courts  themselves  do  not  monitor  compliance  with  their  own  decrees, 
although  in  some  cases  they  will  set  future  dates  at  which  parties  are  required  to  appear 
to  explain  themselves. 
C:  Effect: 
The  effects  civil  litigation  are  obvious  insofar  as  at  the  end  of  the  process  there  is  a 
decision  by  the  court.  In  adversarial  proceedings  such  as  a  malpractice  action,  it  is  easy 
to  regard  this  as  meaning  that  there  is  a  winner  and  a  loser.  The  effect  of  the  court 
action  in  such  circumstances  is  that  the  previously  disputed  (or  unclear)  rights  and 
duties  of  the  parties  to  the  litigation  are  laid  down  explicitly  by  the  court.  There  are  also 
cost  and  expenses  issues  beyond  the  question  of  whose  opinion  of  the  law,  and  whose 
version  of  the  facts  (if  either)  the  court  has  decided  to  uphold,  which  will  occasionally 
mean  that  the  apparent  "winner"  can  end  up  being  more  out  of  pocket  than  the  "loser". 
The  system  also  has  the  side  effect  of  engendering  high  stress  levels  among  those  who 
are  sued  while  at  the  same  time  producing  a  far  lower  success  rate  for  those  who  sue 
than  other  areas  of  civil  litigation.  This  is  coupled  with  the  extremely  high  overheads 
associated  with  litigation  as  a  method  of  redressing  harm. 
What  is  far  harder  to  assess  is  the  wider  effect  of  the  system  of  civil  litigation  and  the 
tests  which  it  applies  on  the  general  practice  of  medicine  (and  the  activities  of  the  other 
medical  regulators).  Indeed,  what  evidence  there  is  seems  to  indicate  that  civil  litigation 
(specifically,  the  action  for  medical  negligence)  has  at  best  a  marginal  effect  on  clinical 195 
behaviour,  a  fact  which  reinforces  calls  (principally  driven  by  other  perceived 
deficiencies  of  the  malpractice  action)  to  abolish  the  malpractice  action  and  replace  it 
with  some  form  of  "no-fault"  compensation  scheme. 
The  ability  to  take  legal  action  against  (and  in  particular,  to  seek  judicial  review  of)  other 
regulators  is  not  so  easily  disposed  of,  however.  Displacing  the  supervisory  jurisdiction 
of  the  superior  courts  would  entail  a  major  shift  in  the  constitutional  norms  of  the  UK. 
There  appears  to  be  no  support  whatsoever  for  such  a  shift;  indeed,  most 
commentators  in  this  area  argue  for  more  penetrating  judicial  review,  rather  than  less. 
These  calls  in  themselves  suggest  that  judicial  review  in  its  current  (and,  it  has  to  be 
said,  recently  extended)  basis  is  inadequate  in  controlling  the  actions  of  administrative 
bodies.  It  may  instead  be  that  the  current  judicial  review  action  is  not  good  at  teasing 
out  reasons  behind  decisions,  rather  than  being  deficient  in  being  able  to  examine  the 
legality  of  decisions.  If  so,  this  is  a  criticism  which  can  be  applied  to  civil  litigation 
generally:  adversarial  proceedings,  whatever  they  may  achieve,  are  not  a  good  way  to 
get  at  the  reasons  behind  something. 
D:  Comparison  with  Core  Evaluation  Criteria: 
In  Chapters  1  and  2,  we  identified  seven  core  evaluation  criteria.  Civil  litigation  will  now 
be  assessed  against  each  of  these  in  turn. 
1:  Visibility: 
Civil  litigation  exists  for  the  sole  purpose  of  allowing  the  rule  of  law  to  be  enforced  by 
everyone.  This  purpose  is  highly  visible:  virtually  everyone  who  has  had  their  rights  (as 
they  perceive  them)  transgressed  knows  that,  in  theory  at  least,  they  can  sue  the 
transgressor.  Precisely  which  rights  the  law  (as  opposed  to  the  aggrieved  individual)  will 
recognise,  and  the  practical  difficulties  of  enforcing  these  rights,  may  not  be  so  well 
known,  but  there  is  a  highly  visible  legal  profession  (much  of  it  advertising  free  first 
interviews)  which  is  aware  of  these  drawbacks  and  which  can  readily  appraise  the  lay 
client  of  these  facts.  Less  visible  are  the  purposes  underlying  some  of  the  judicial 
decisions  on  where  liability  falls  and  the  tests  to  be  applied  in  answering  that  question, 
which  have  been  criticised  as  unduly  favourable  to  doctors. 
The  mechanisms  of  civil  litigation  are  highly  visible.  The  substantive  content  of  the  civil 
law  is  also  visible,  if  (like  criminal  law)  somewhat  opaque  to  the  non-specialist  and 
difficult  for  the  layperson  to  access.  Judicial  decisions,  particularly  from  the  higher 196 
courts  (which  enjoy  a  virtual  monopoly  on  medical  cases),  tend  to  be  accompanied  by 
written  judgements  which  are  increasingly  available  on  the  Internet  to  people  who  would 
not  generally  frequent  law  libraries  (traditionally  the  only  depository  of  the  law  as  laid 
down  in  judicial  decisions). 
Again  similar  to  the  criminal  law,  the  effects  of  civil  litigation  are  visible  in  terms  of  the 
outcome  on  the  parties  to  the  case,  but  virtually  impossible  to  identify,  far  less  measure, 
in  terms  of  their  impact  more  generally.  In  terms  of  publicity,  few  civil  cases  receive  the 
publicity  accorded  to  criminal  trials  (particularly  those  involving  serious  crimes)  and  only 
civil  cases  involving  celebrities  or  cases  whose  outcome  is  likely  to  involve  very  large 
numbers  of  people  tend  to  be  mentioned  in  the  mass  media.  However,  this  does  not 
appear  to  detract  from  public  awareness  of,  and  ability  to  find  out  about,  civil  litigation. 
Overall,  civil  litigation  is  considered  to  be  acceptable  in  terms  of  visibility,  and  appears  to 
be  moving  in  the  direction  of  even  greater  visibility  and  accessibility  to  information 
concerning  decisions. 
2:  Accountabilitv: 
This  chapter  has  as  its  focus  the  approach  of  the  civil  (or  common)  law  to  medical 
regulation.  The  common  law,  by  definition,  has  been  shaped  (arguably,  created)  by 
judges,  and  it  is  the  accountability  of  these  judges  which  we  are  presently  concerned 
with. 
The  judges  who  make  all  the  key  decisions  concerning  the  subject  matter  of  this  chapter 
are,  as  respects  the  parties  affected  by  those  decisions,  not  accountable  for  their 
decisions.  The  reasons  for  this  are  identical  to  those  applicable  to  judicial  accountability 
for  criminal  law  determinations,  i.  e.  that  being  able  to  hold  a  judge  accountable  for  his  or 
her  decisions  is  unlikely  to  satisfy  the  requirement  for  impartiality  in  decision-makers.  As 
with  the  criminal  law,  the  only  accountability  of  a  judge  at  first  instance  lies  in  the  ability 
of  the  appellate  courts  to  overrule  (and  criticise)  lower  courts.  The  civil  law  fairs  better 
than  the  criminal  law  since  in  civil  litigation  whichever  party  is  dissatisfied  with  the 
original  decision  can  appeal  against  it  (or  at  the  very  least  seek  leave  to  appeal),  in 
contrast  to  the  victim  of  crime  who  cannot  appeal  against  an  acquittal. 
For  these  reasons,  and  again  recognising  the  difficulty  in  reconciling  judicial 
accountability  with  judicial  independence,  it  is  concluded  that  civil  litigation  is  adequately 
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3:  Overall  Faimpem: 
As  explained  in  Chapter  2,  the  category  of  overall  fairness  incorporates  a  number  of 
aspects  including  impartiality,  accessibility,  and  speed  of  decision-making. 
Firstly,  as  regards  impartiality,  it  is  clear  that  the  rules  on  judicial  independence  and  the 
common  law  rule  nemo  judex  in  sua  causa,  i.  e.  that  no-one  should  be  judge  in  their  own 
cause,  ensure  that  the  decision  maker  in  civil  litigation  will  be  structurally  independent  of 
the  parties  to  the  dispute.  Civil  litigation  therefore  satisfies  the  "impartiality"  limb  of  this 
criterion. 
As  regards  accessibility,  the  problem  here  is  mostly  connected  to  the  extremely  high 
cost  of  litigation.  While  legal  aid  provides  a  safety  net  for  those  on  low  incomes,  there 
are  substantial  numbers  who  are  wealthy  enough  so  as  to  be  ineligible  for  legal  aid  but 
who  cannot  afford  the  costs  of  litigation.  Conditional  fee  arrangements  have  provided  a 
major  improvement  in  court  accessibility  for  these  people,  but  these  arrangements  still 
require  someone  to  be  persuaded  to  accept  the  risk  of  paying  the  costs  of  the  action  if  it 
fails.  Given  the  very  low  success  rate  for  malpractice  actions,  this  risk  would  seem  very 
real.  Civil  litigation  therefore  fails  to  satisfy  the  "accessibility"  limb  of  this  section. 
In  terms  of  speed,  the  laws  of  prescription  and  limitation  are  designed  to  strike  a 
balance  between  ensuring  cases  are  brought  timeously  (both  to  spare  defenders 
indefinite  uncertainty  and  to  ensure  cases  are  brought  while  the  evidence  is  still  fresh) 
and  not  denying  access  to  the  courts  where  the  interests  of  justice  so  require.  In  theory 
this  should  provide  a  reasonably  prompt  introduction  to  the  process  of  litigating  a  claim, 
but  as  we  have  seen  the  practice  is  that  many  medical  claims  are  not  found  to  be 
attributable  to  negligence  for  some  time,  or  else  are  injuries  to  people  under  the  age  of 
legal  capacity,  and  so  the  limitation  clock  does  not  always  even  start  ticking  for  some 
time  after  the  incident.  And  even  where  the  time  limits  for  raising  actions  have  passed, 
medical  cases  often  raise  issues  allowing  the  courts  to  permit  late  actions  to  be  raised. 
Once  embarked  on  the  process  of  litigation,  progress  becomes  even  slower  (apparently 
notwithstanding  recent  changes  in  the  rules  intended  to  speed  the  process  up)  and 
medical  cases  routinely  take  years  to  come  to  any  sort  of  conclusion.  Appeal 
proceedings  lengthen  the  process  even  more,  although  only  a  minority  of  cases  are 
appealed.  Accordingly,  for  the  majority  of  actions  the  system  of  civil  litigation  does  not 
satisfy  the  requirement  of  speed.  A  qualification  should  be  entered  here  in  relation  to 198 
judicial  review  actions,  which  often  proceed  very  quickly  Indeed  (even  in  Scotland, 
where  there  is  no  technical  time  limit  on  raising  judicial  review  proceedings).  However, 
these  actions  represent  too  small  a  proportion  of  civil  cases  to  save  the  system  overall 
from  being  deemed  to  fail  this  aspect. 
In  terms  of  fairness  generally,  while  the  courts  are  generally  taken  to  be  the  epitome  of 
impartial  decision  making,  it  is  necessary  to  qualify  this  statement  in  relation  to  medical 
cases.  The  judiciary,  despite  recent  re-assertions  of  their  ability  to  overrule  medical 
evidence,  appear  too  willing  to  accept  it  without  question.  This  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the 
healthy  scepticism  applied  to  other  evidence  led  before  the  courts.  In  particular,  there 
appears  to  be  no  way  to  challenge  whether  a  practice  accepted  by  a  responsible  body 
of  medical  opinion  is  rightly  held,  and  even  a  very  small  group  can  amount  to  a  "body"  of 
opinion.  In  addition,  professional  standards  tests  are  applied  in  areas  where  what  is  at 
issue  is  not  principally  a  question  of  medical  practice.  A  regulatory  deficit  has  been 
identified  in  a  large  number  of  areas  where  dissatisfied  parties  have  unsuccessfully 
sought  redress  through  the  courts  in  areas  such  as  judicial  review  of  non-treatment 
decisions.  Criticism  can  be  levelled  at  the  use  of  a  professional  standards  test  in 
consent  cases,  at  unrealistic  applications  of  causation  tests  in  malpractice  actions, 
inadequate  control  of  non-consensual  treatment,  inadequate  safeguards  for 
confidentiality,  and  general  excess  deferentiality  to  medical  witnesses.  For  this  reason, 
and  despite  the  courts'  institutionally  designed  impartiality,  they  are  deemed  not  to 
satisfy  the  "general  fairness"  limb  of  this  criterion.  And  in  failing  to  satisfy  both  the 
overall  aspects  of  fairness,  as  well  as  most  of  its  constituent  elements,  it  is  therefore 
concluded  that  civil  litigation  fails  the  standard  of  overall  fairness  as  a  whole. 
4:  Effectiveness: 
The  effectiveness  of  the  civil  courts  can  be  considered  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  At 
one  level,  the  courts  are  highly  effective  in  that  the  civil  law  has  mechanisms  in  place  to 
allow  those  who  wish  the  scope  of  their  rights  and  duties  to  be  clarified  to  have  them 
clarified.  Unless  the  courts  have  to  decline  jurisdiction  for  some  reason,  every  case 
pursued  by  a  party  will  (eventually)  reach  a  conclusion  and  a  decision  will  be  handed 
down.  As  between  the  parties  to  the  litigation,  and  in  relation  to  the  subject  matter  of 
the  dispute,  the  courts  are  very  effective  (even  if  one  might  quibble  with  the  way  in 
which  that  effectiveness  is  actually  applied  in  particular  cases.  ) 
On  a  different  level,  however,  one  can  consider  instead  the  wider  effectiveness  of  the 
civil  law  in  terms  of  its  purposes.  These  were  identified  in  particular  as  including  giving 199 
financial  redress  to  the  victims  of  failure  to  adhere  to  standards,  upholding  patient 
autonomy,  and  providing  a  framework  allowing  the  legality  of  actions  to  be  tested,  but 
with  elements  of  all  other  regulatory  tasks  to  some  extent.  For  present  purposes,  we 
are  concerned  particularly  with  the  regulatory  tasks  which  go  beyond  the  impact  of  a 
particular  case  on  the  parties. 
In  terms  of  setting  standards,  the  courts  can  be  regarded  as  completely  ineffective, 
having  in  all  but  name  delegated  this  task  to  the  medical  profession  itself.  The  courts 
do,  however,  uphold  the  standard  thus  set:  doctors  who  fail  to  meet  the  standard  will  be 
held  to  have  been  negligent,  and  (assuming  causation  is  shown)  compensation  awarded 
accordingly.  However,  whether  this  can  be  said  to  be  an  effective  way  of  upholding 
standards  is  a  different  question,  and  the  immense  difficulties  faced  by  pursuers  in 
medical  cases  suggest  that  the  standard  of  medical  practice  is  not  effectively  upheld  by 
the  courts.  In  the  wider  context,  the  courts  have  no  formal  remit  and  any  deterrent 
effect  which  the  prospect  of  being  sued  may  have  on  medical  practice  is  difficult  to 
quantify.  The  existence  of  "defensive  medicine"  (if  such  there  be)  indicates  that  the  civil 
courts  can  effect  a  change  in  medical  conduct,  albeit  inadvertently.  However,  the 
system  of  litigation  means  that  there  is  no  ongoing  monitoring  of  the  situation  by  the 
court,  no  follow-up  to  ensure  that  identified  shortcomings  have  been  redressed.  Nor  is 
there  any  formal  system  of  feedback  whereby  the  courts'  views  on  what  constitutes  an 
acceptable  standard  is  made  known  to  the  wider  medical  profession,  although  informal 
channels  do  provide  this.  Given  these  shortcomings,  it  appears  that  the  civil  courts  do 
not  effectively  perform  the  function  of  upholding  standards  of  medical  practice. 
Civil  litigation  plays  at  best  a  minimal  role  in  facilitating  medical  practice,  usually  in  the 
context  of  authorising  doctors  to  do  something  clinically  indicated  but  legally  uncertain. 
It  does  so  effectively  by  providing  a  framework  for  health  professionals  to  follow  when 
faced  with  such  a  situation. 
Perhaps  the  main  function  of  the  civil  courts  in  medical  matters  is  the  provision  of  a 
system  of  redress  for  those  who  have  suffered  due  to  a  failure  to  adhere  to  standards, 
yet  it  is  in  this  respect  that  the  civil  courts  are  most  heavily  criticised  by  commentators. 
Embarking  on  civil  litigation  is  not  seen  as  an  effective  way  of  providing  redress:  most 
victims  of  medical  mishaps  do  not  even  seek  to  use  this  route,  only  a  small  minority  of 
those  who  do  so  succeed  in  recovering  anything,  and  most  of  the  money  which  goes 
into  the  system  is  taken  up  by  operating  costs  rather  than  going  to  the  person  who  is  to 
be  compensated.  Yet  in  terms  of  this  framework,  these  are  all  shortcomings  in  relation 
to  other  evaluation  criteria  rather  than  the  effectiveness  of  civil  litigation  in  being  able  to 200 
award  compensation.  Assuming  the  problems  caused  by  shortcomings  falling  within 
other  criteria  are  overcome,  then  the  civil  courts  will,  with  a  high  degree  of  effectiveness, 
award  compensation.  Nonetheless,  the  cumulative  effect  of  these  other  problems  is 
such  as  to  frustrate  what  might  better  be  regarded  as  the  potential  (rather  than  actual) 
effectiveness  of  the  civil  courts  in  awarding  compensation 
Similarly,  while  the  route  may  be  a  long  and  expensive  one,  civil  litigation  does  provide 
an  effective  means  to  permit  grievances  to  be  aired  and  disputes  resolved.  Indeed,  we 
have  seen  the  frequent  suggestion  that  the  wish  to  have  their  "day  in  court  ",  rather  than 
the  recovery  of  compensation,  is  the  main  motivation  for  many  of  those  who  embark  on 
medical  litigation.  The  system  of  investigation  is  effective  so  far  as  it  goes,  but  is  only 
restricted  to  the  particulars  of  the  specific  case  in  question.  In  addition,  the  system  of 
adversarial  proceedings  is  not  really  intended  as  an  investigative  tool,  and  there  are 
considerable  shortcomings  in  using  it  to  this  end.  The  system  of  investigation  is 
therefore  deemed  effective  but  capable  of  significant  improvement. 
Punishment  of  wrongdoers  is  at  best  a  peripheral  purpose  for  systems  of  civil  litigation 
which  do  not  recognise  punitive  damages.  Insofar  as  this  is  a  purpose  of  the  civil  courts 
in  the  UK  at  all,  it  is  one  which  is  ineffective  in  that  it  will  almost  never  be  the  individual 
doctor  being  sued  who  actually  has  to  meet  the  bill  at  the  end  of  the  day.  The  stress  of 
being  sued  affects  41  guilty"  and  "innocent"  doctors  equally,  and  cannot  be  said  to  be 
effective  either,  while  the  punishment  of  adverse  publicity  will  only  affect  doctors  whose 
conduct  was  arguably  defensible  and  the  action  not  settled  quietly,  out  of  court. 
Lastly,  the  civil  courts  have  a  role  to  play  in  regulating  other  regulatory  bodies.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  courts  have  observed  a  distinction  between  policy  and  operational 
matters,  and  have  refused  to  intervene  (beyond  a  fairly  superficial  level)  on  policy 
matters.  However,  this  is  regarded  as  permitting  the  other  regulators  to  do  their  job 
(rather  than  the  courts  seeking  to  do  it  for  them)  and  is  not  seen  as  a  regulatory  failure, 
although  a  higher  degree  of  scrutiny  could  be  applied  without  doing  damage  to  that 
principle.  Accordingly,  the  courts  seem  to  be  effective  in  regulating  other  regulators, 
although  there  is  certainly  room  for  improvement. 
Overall,  the  courts  are  effective  at  all  the  main  regulatory  functions  they  are  tasked  with, 
with  the  notable  exceptions  of  setting  and  upholding  standards  of  medical  practice. 
There  is  room  for  significant  improvement  in  the  functions  of  investigating  mishaps  and 
regulating  other  regulators,  and  the  compensation  function  is  rendered  ineffectual  by 
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As  we  have  seen,  civil  litigation  is  very  expensive  and  an  estimated  85%  of  the  sums 
awarded  in  compensation  are  taken  up  in  CostS456  ,a 
figure  rising  to  131%  in  claims 
under  E5000457 
. 
This  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  staggeringly  inefficient  way  of 
compensating  people,  and  the  civil  courts  are  accordingly  deemed  to  fail  this  evaluation 
criterion. 
However,  that  is  purely  in  relation  to  medical  malpractice  actions  which,  while  they  may 
be  the  most  numerous  type  of  medical  litigation,  are  not  the  only  ones.  It  is  harder  to 
assess  the  efficiency  of  the  courts  in  relation  to  other  types  of  actions,  since  there  is 
rarely  a  damages  award  to  provide  a  benchmark  of  what  the  action  was  actually  worth 
to  the  parties.  However,  this  is  also  true  of  many  criminal  cases,  and  the  criticisms  of 
criminal  court  management  made  in  Chapter  4  are  equally  valid  to  all  types  of  civil  court 
proceedings.  For  this  reason,  it  is  concluded  that  civil  litigation  is  inefficient  for  all  types 
of  actions  -  but  the  inefficiencies  in  the  compensation  function,  particularly  when 
compared  to  the  relative  costs  of  "no-fault"  compensation  systems,  are  the  most 
marked. 
6:  Avoidance  of  undue  influence  with  good  medical  practice: 
In  a  widely-quoted  dictum,  Lord  Denning  once  compared  the  medical  malpractice  action 
to  someone  coming  at  the  doctor  with  a  knife  458 
,  an  approach  to  medical  malpractice 
cases  which  inspired  McLean  to  suggest  that 
"The  interests  of  the  community  then  are  seen  by  Lord  Denning  not  as  being  the 
facilitation  of  compensation  in  the  event  of  damage  as  a  result  of  medical 
intervention,  but  rather  as  being  that  medical  practice  should  be  interfered  with 
as  little  as  possible.  "459 
This  point  appears  to  be  generally  applicable:  courts  in  the  UK  seem  excessively  keen 
to  avoid  any  expansion  of  the  existing  grounds  of  civil  liability  so  far  as  the  medical 
profession  is  concerned.  This  can  be  seen  clearly  in  the  judgements  in  Sidaway  v 
Board  of  Govemors  of  the  Royal  Bethlern  Hospital,  considered  supra.  Given  the 
deferential  approach  the  courts  have  adopted  in  relation  to  medical  evidence  of  what 
medical  practice  should  consist  of,  it  seems  that  there  is  little  prospect  of  a  malpractice 
crisis  occurring  in  the  UK,  nor  of  doctors  being  driven  to  otherwise  unnecessary 202 
defensive  medicine.  For  this  reason  the  civil  courts  pass  the  test  of  not  unduly 
interfering  with  good  medical  practice,  although  the  stress  associated  with  the  process 
arguably  interferes  unduly  with  good  medical  personnel.  The  situation  might  be 
somewhat  different  in  relation  to  the  courts'  (occasional)  refusal  to  authodse  treatment 
of  people  who  refuse  consent,  but  given  our  starting  premise  of  what  good  medical 
practice  is,  such  refusals  are  actually  preventing  medical  treatment  from  taking  place 
which  would  fall  outwith  our  definition  of  "good"  medical  treatment. 
Finally,  however,  mention  should  be  made  of  the  cost  implications  of  civil  litigation. 
Money  spent  on  compensating  the  victims  of  medical  mishaps  (or  indeed,  money  spent 
seeking  declarators  or  on  any  other  court  action)  is  money  which  is  not  being  spent  on 
patient  care.  Accordingly,  the  existence  of  an  inefficient  system  of  patient 
compensation  in  itself  has  an  adverse  impact  on  patient  care  overall.  However,  as  this 
is  more  a  function  of  the  realities  of  resource  limitations  rather  than  the  inefficiencies  of 
the  courts,  it  is  concluded  for  present  purposes  that  the  civil  courts  satisfy  this  evaluation 
criterion. 
7:  Respect  for  patient  autonomv: 
In  some  respects,  the  corpus  of  medical  law  involves  one  long  dialogue  with  the 
language  of  autonomy.  This,  however,  is  not  to  say  that  the  civil  law  adequately 
respects  the  autonomy  of  those  within  its  jurisdiction. 
The  key  here  lies  in  the  law  relating  to  consent  to  treatment,  since  it  is  in  the  free 
expression  of  consent  that  the  autonomous  individual  agrees  to  the  course  of  treatment 
being  proposed.  But  as  we  have  seen,  this  law  is  highly  defective  in  allowing  the 
medical  profession  rather  than  the  individual  patient  decide  how  much  information  the 
patient  receives  before  the  consent  is  deemed  valid  in  law.  It  also  allows  the  refusal  of 
treatment  of  autonomous  individuals  to  be  overridden  in  some  instances,  most  notably 
in  the  case  of  pregnant  women.  A  system  of  law  which  fails  to  protect  the  autonomy  of 
any  person  or  group,  particularly  a  group  which  is  more  vulnerable  than  most,  can  be 
classed  as  deficient.  Laws  which  only  protect  the  autonomy  of  people  or  groups  who 
are  capable  of  protecting  their  own  interests  are  of  no  use,  or  worse  still  serve  only  the 
purpose  of  propaganda. 
Insofar  as  the  civil  law  allows  doctors  to  withhold  information  from  patients  who  could 
reasonably  be  expected  to  have  wanted  to  know  it  or  to  lie  to  patients  in  the  face  of 
direct  questions  so  as  to  secure  a  so-called  "consent",  the  civil  law  is  flawed  in  its 203 
protection  of  patient  autonomy  against  medical  paternalism.  Insofar  as  the  civil  law 
authorises  intrusive  treatment  of  individuals  recognised  as  having  mental  capacity 
against  their  wishes,  it  actively  participates  in  the  destruction  of  those  individuals  I 
autonomy.  Accordingly,  civil  litigation  is  deemed  not  to  satisfy  this  evaluation  criterion. 
E:  Conclusions: 
Civil  litigation  and  the  civil  law  are  perhaps  the  most  pervasive  of  the  regulatory 
mechanisms.  Anyone  (in  theory)  can  institute  legal  proceedings,  and  anyone  can  be 
sued.  This  pervasiveness  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  civil  litigation  can  play  a  part 
(admittedly  in  some  cases  a  peripheral  one)  in  all  eight  regulatory  functions. 
However,  closer  scrutiny  reveals  that  the  civil  law's  role  is  more  limited  than  one  might 
imagine.  While  recourse  to  the  civil  courts  is  a  remedy  known  to  virtually  everyone,  and 
while  the  courts  you  can  raise  proceedings  in  are  themselves  accountable  higher  up  the 
appeal  hierarchy,  it  has  to  be  said  that  the  courts  themselves  stack  the  deck  unfairly  in 
favour  of  the  medical  profession.  This  assumes  one  has  reached  court  in  the  first  place, 
having  overcome  access  difficulties  and  delays  along  the  way,  coupled  with 
investigative  tools  which  are  not  really  designed  to  discover  the  truth  of  the  situation. 
If  these  hurdles  are  overcome,  the  civil  courts  are  effective  in  relation  to  the  cases 
before  them  but  have  at  best  a  peripheral  impact  in  the  wider  world,  and  exert  virtually 
no  effect  at  all  in  setting  or  upholding  standards.  In  cases  where  compensation  is 
awarded,  very  often  more  money  is  absorbed  by  the  system  itself  than  is  paid  out  in 
compensation.  And  while  the  system  does  not  interfere  with  doctors  doing  what  they 
should  be  doing,  neither  does  it  stop  them  from  doing  what  their  patients  (if  properly 
informed)  would  not  want  them  to  do. 
Certain  functions  of  civil  litigation,  such  as  the  supervisory  judicial  review  jurisdiction, 
could  only  be  changed  by  altering  the  constitutional  makeup  of  the  UK,  and  in  these 
areas  it  appears  certain  that  the  current  system  (possibly  with  some  tinkering)  will 
remain  in  place  for  the  foreseeable  future. 
Other  aspects,  however,  are  not  set  in  constitutional  tablets  of  stone  and  are  pdme 
candidates  for  reform.  The  medical  malpractice  action  is  one  such,  and  calls  for  reform 
in  this  area  have  provoked  the  government  into  serious  consideration  of  alternatives, 
460 
including  "no-fault"  compensation  . 
While  many  of  the  defects  in  the  current  system 
may  be  insurmountable,  or  only  capable  of  being  resolved  by  means  of  injecting  more 204 
cash  than  is  likely  in  the  foreseeable  future,  many  of  the  worst  failings  of  the  current 
system  could  be  cured  or  substantially  alleviated  by  the  introduction  of  a  well  thought- 
out  no  fault  compensation  scheme. Chapter  4  notes: 
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Chapter  5:  Statutory  Regulatory  Bodies 
1:  Introduction  and  Scope: 
This  chapter  analyses  the  statutory  regulatory  bodies  which  have  been  established  by 
law  to  perform  regulatory  tasks  in  the  field  of  health  care.  A  number  of  bodies  have  been 
established  for  a  variety  of  purposes.  Closer  scrutiny  of  the  category,  however,  served 
to  exclude  all  but  one  statutory  regulatory  body.  The  exception  is  the  General  Medical 
Council  (GIVIC).  The  GIVIC  is  included  here  because:  it  is  established  by  legislation;  it 
performs  (or  seeks  to  perform)  specific  regulatory  functions;  the  regulatory  functions 
undertaken  involve  an  element  of  discretion  as  to  what  is  acceptable;  its  jurisdiction 
extends  to  medical  conduct  universally;  and  its  determinations  have  legally-binding 
effect  on  those  being  regulated. 
However,  before  proceeding  to  consider  the  GIVIC,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  roles 
and  remits  of  other  bodies  created  by  or  under  statute.  The  main  bodies  omitted  from 
detailed  examination  in  this  Chapter,  and  the  reasons  for  their  exclusion,  are  as  follows: 
The  Information  Commissioner  (IC)-.  the  IC  is  an  official  tasked  with  regulatory 
and  supervisory  functions  under  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998  and  Freedom  of 
Information  Act  2000.  However,  she  is  not  included  in  this  section  because  the 
effects  of  the  legislation  she  is  responsible  for  apply  by  force  of  law  without  her 
intervention,  and  the  duties  created  by  the  legislation  are  enforceable  in  the 
ordinary  courts  without  need  for  her  intervention.  This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
GIVIC,  which  is  entrusted  with  policy  discretion  as  to  what  is  or  is  not  acceptable. 
The  IC's  role  is  limited  to  enforcing  standards  laid  down  in  the  legislation  itself 
whether  by  initiating  court  action  or  through  the  system  of  assessments  (which 
can  be  regarded  as  a  system  of  alternative  dispute  resolution).  Accordingly,  the 
Data  Protection  Act  1998  and  Freedom  of  Information  Act  2000  are  considered  in 
Chapter  6  infra. 
The  Mental  Health  Act  Commission  (and  Mental  Welfare  Commission  for 
Scotland):  these  bodies  are  established  in  terms  of  the  Mental  Health  Act  1983 
and  Mental  Health  (Scotland)  Act  1984  respectively'.  The  remit  of  these  bodies  is 
limited  to  overseeing  the  treatment  of  persons  compulsodly  detained  under 
mental  health  legislation.  Given  this  limited  scope,  and  the  fact  that  the  Mental 
Health  Act  Commission  has  explicitly  indicated  that  its  role  is  essentially  one  of 223 
2 
review  and  advice  rather  than  an  inspectorate  role  , 
they  are  considered  to  fall 
outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  In  addition,  the  facilities  within  which  people  are 
detained  are  exclusively  NHS  facilities,  and  therefore  the  bodies  principally 
responsible  for  overseeing  such  detention  can  reasonably  be  regarded  as  NHS 
regulatory  systems,  and  are  accordingly  outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
The  National  Audit  Office  and  Audit  Commission/Audit  Commission  for  Scotland. 
these  bodies  are  established  to  oversee  the  financial  management  of  government 
agencies.  Again,  given  their  limited  remit  they  are  outwith  the  scope  of  this 
thesis. 
Assorted  advisory  bodies.  There  are  many  bodies  established  to  review  current 
practice  in  healthcare,  provide  guidance  and  assistance  or  carry  out  similar 
functions.  However,  the  functions  performed  are  purely  advisory  in  nature.  As 
described  in  Chapter  2,  the  only  bodies  included  for  study  within  this  thesis  are 
those  which  fulfil  an  identifiable  regulatory  function.  Advisory  bodies  do  not  fulfil 
any  of  these  roles,  and  for  this  reason  are  accordingly  not  included. 
The  National  Clinical  Assessment  Authority,  the  Commission  for  Health 
Improvement  (CHI)  and  a  variety  of  other  bodies  which,  while  they  have  a  clear 
remit  in  terms  of  regulating  the  standard  of  care,  are  purely  NHS  internal  bodies. 
The  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Authority  (HFEA):  This  is  established  in 
terms  of  the  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  1990,  section  5.  The 
functions  of  the  HFEA  are,  to  quote  itself, 
"...  to  regulate,  by  means  of  a  licensing  system,  any  research  or  treatment 
which  involves  the  creation,  keeping  and  use  of  human  embryos  outside 
the  body,  or  the  storage  or  donation  of  human  eggs  and  sperm.  It  must 
also  maintain  a  Code  of  Practice  giving  guidance  about  the  proper 
conduct  of  the  licensed  activities.  "3 
In  fact,  even  this  short  description  of  the  HFEA's  jurisdiction  was  briefly 
questioned:  in  the  case  of  R  (on  application  of  Quintavalle)  v  Secretary  of  State 
for  Health,  the  court  at  first  instance  4  held  that  organisms  created  by  CNR  (the 
technique  commonly  known  as  "cloning")  were  not  embryos  within  the  Act's 
definition,  and  so  were  not  covered  at  all  by  the  statutory  regime.  The  decision 224 
was  rapidly  reversed  by  the  Court  of  Appeal5,  but  not  before  Padiament  had 
(even  more  rapidly)  passed  the  Human  Reproductive  Cloning  Act  2001,  making  it 
illegal  to  place  an  embryo  created  by  CNR  in  a  woman.  For  purposes  of  this 
thesis,  however,  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  the  role  of  the  HFEA  is  narrowly 
confined  to  those  involved  in  areas  of  embryology  and  infertility  treatment.  As 
such,  most  doctors  are  outwith  the  scope  of  influence  of  its  activities.  Since  this 
thesis  only  seeks  to  analyse  the  impact  of  what  could  be  called  "universal" 
regulatory  systems,  the  HFEA  is  not  considered  in  any  more  detail. 
e  The  Unrelated  Live  Transplant  Regulatory  Authority  (ULTRA):  This  is  established 
under  the  Human  Organ  Transplants  (Unrelated  Persons)  Regulations  19896, 
themselves  made  under  the  Human  Organ  Transplants  Act  19897 
. 
This 
legislation  was  passed  as  an  emergency  response  to  a  scandal  involving  "kidneys 
for  sale  11 
,  an  activity  which  brought  down  the  weight  of  the  GIVIC's  disciplinary 
sanctions  8.  The  Act's  principle  effect  is  to  outlaw  commercial  dealings  in  human 
organs,  and  as  such  is  a  form  of  direct  statutory  regulation  of  the  type  considered 
in  Chapter  6.  Section  2(l)  of  the  Act  creates  two  offences  relating  to  removing  or 
transplanting  organs  from  a  live  donor  to  an  unrelated  recipient.  Section  2(3)  of 
the  Act  disapplies  the  prohibition  if  the  Authority  created  under  the  Act  is  satisfied 
as  to  certain  conditions. 
The  conditions  laid  down  in  the  Regulations  are,  in  essence,  that  the  doctor  has 
caused  the  matter  to  be  referred  to  ULTRA  for  its  consideration  of  the  matter,  that 
the  person  whose  organ  it  is  proposed  to  remove  has  given  their  free  and 
informed  consent  to  the  procedure,  and  that  there  is  no  inducement  given  or  to 
be  given  which  would  fall  foul  of  the  prohibition  found  in  Section  1  of  the  Act. 
It  can  be  seen  that,  in  terms  of  structure  and  function,  ULTRA  fulfils  most  of  the 
criteria  for  inclusion  in  this  Chapter  as  a  statutory  regulatory  body.  However, 
given  the  extremely  narrow  remit  which  ULTRA  has,  and  (as  with  the  HFEA) 
given  that  the  overwhelming  majority  of  doctors  have  no  involvement  in  the  area 
of  medical  practice  covered  by  ULTRA  (and  will  accordingly  be  unaffected  by  its 
existence,  even  theoretically),  it  is  not  proposed  to  examine  it  in  any  greater 
detail. 
*  The  National  Care  Standards  Commission:  this  is  established  under  the  Care 
Standards  Act  2000,  and  has  jurisdiction  only  in  England  and  Wales.  Its  purpose 
is  to  residential  care  homes,  and  private  and  voluntary  health  care  providers.  The 225 
regulation  of  residential  care  homes  is  by  way  of  replacement  of  a  function 
previously  carried  out  by  local  social  services  departments,  but  the  regulation  and 
inspection  of  private/voluntary  health  care  providers  is  completely  new.  However, 
it  has  been  excluded  from  detailed  study  for  exactly  the  same  reason  as  NHS 
bodies  are  excluded,  namely  lack  of  universality  of  coverage.  Most  health  care 
provision  is  carried  out  under  the  auspices  of  the  NHS  and  is  therefore  outwith 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  new  Commission.  However,  in  creating  for  the  first  time  a 
standards  regulator  for  the  private  medical  sector,  this  legislation  does  represent 
a  significant  improvement  in  the  regulatory  landscape. 
Having  excluded  from  the  scope  of  this  thesis  all  the  other  bodies  which  could  potentially 
have  been  covered  by  the  description  of  "statutory  regulatory  body",  the  remainder  of  this 
chapter  will  consider  the  position  of  the  sole  remaining  contender,  the  General  Medical 
Council. 
11:  History  and  purpose  of  the  General  Medical  Council: 
The  GIVIC  (in  its  original  guise  as  the  General  Council  of  Medical  Education  and 
Registration)  is  one  of  the  oldest  bodies  in  the  regulatory  framework,  having  been 
established  originally  by  the  Medical  Act  1858.  It  is  not  intended  to  provide  an 
exhaustive  description  of  the  GIVIC  here.  Two  relatively  recent  studies  have  analysed  the 
history,  structure  and  functions  of  the  GMC9,  and  the  cases  dealt  with  by  the  GIVIC  under 
its  disciplinary  powerslo.  Little  would  be  gained  by  duplicating  this  research  here. 
Instead,  a  very  brief  summary  of  the  structures  and  powers  of  the  GIVIC  is  given,  followed 
by  an  analysis  of  its  regulatory  impact.  In  terms  of  nomenclature,  Smith  notes  that  while 
not  technically  designated  as  "the  General  Medical  Council"  until  1950,  the  body  was 
known  informally  as  the  "General  Medical  Council"  since  1859".  This  chapter  refers 
throughout  to  the  GIVIC,  although  some  comments  relate  to  times  when  it  was  not 
officially  so  called. 
The  GIVIC  was  adopted  as  part  of  the  overall  regulatory  landscape  by  Nye  Bevan  when 
he  was  instituting  the  NHS  12 
. 
The  subsequent  history  of  the  GIVIC  has  been  often 
unsettled,  and  a  doctors'  revolt  at  the  GIVIC's  proposals  to  introduce  annual  membership 
fees  would,  if  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  have  shut  down  the  NHS'  3.  Its  more 
recent  history  has  been  no  less  turbulent,  and  an  active  debate  over  the  future  of  the 
GIVIC  is  taking  place  at  the  time  of  writing  14 
. 
The  functions  of  the  GIVIC  when  it  was 
established  in  1858  were  fairly  well  summed  up  in  its  original  corporate  title  -  "The 
General  Council  for  Medical  Education  and  Registration".  In  essence,  the  GIVIC  (GCMER 226 
as  was)  had  responsibility  for  ensuring  the  medical  schools  provided  an  adequate 
standard  of  initial  training  for  would-be  doctors,  and  maintained  a  register  of  those  who 
had  gained  the  requisite  qualifications. 
These  functions  have  undergone  a  degree  of  evolution  since  1858,  but  these  two  original 
functions  remain  intact.  The  GIVIC's  current  statutory  basis  is  the  Medical  Act  1983,  as 
amended  (hereafter  referred  to  as  "the  Act").  The  Long  Title  to  the  Act's  original 
predecessor,  the  Medical  Act  1858,  states  that  it  is 
"An  Act  to  regulate  the  Qualifications  of  Practitioners  in  Medicine  and  Surgery" 
The  specific  duties  imposed  on  the  GIVIC  are,  in  essence,  a  way  of  fleshing  out  this 
statement.  Thus,  when  one  scrutinises  the  Act  for  the  specific  ways  in  which  the  GMC 
regulates  the  qualifications  of  medicine  and  surgery,  one  finds  the  following  duties: 
9  Section  2:  the  GIVIC  has  to  keep  a  register  of  medical  practitioners  consisting  of  four 
categories  of  (fully)  registered  medical  practitioners,  plus  a  list  of  "medical 
11  practitioners  with  limited  registration  . 
It  is  inclusion  on  this  list  (or  these  lists;  for 
simplicity,  the  registers  will  be  referred  to  in  the  singular  hereafter)  which  provides 
conclusive  proof  15  of  someone's  status  as  a  registered  medical  practitioner.  Some  of 
these  advantages  of  this  status  can  be  found  in  the  Act  itself.  Section  46  provides 
than  only  a  registered  medical  practitioner  can  recover  fees  for  medical  services 
lawfully  rendered;  Section  47  provides  that  only  a  registered  medical  practitioner  may 
be  appointed  as  physician  in  the  armed  forces,  prisons,  mental  institutions  or  other 
public  establishments,  and  Section  48  states  that  any  certificate  requiring  to  be 
signed  by  a  medical  practitioner  is  only  valid  if  the  practitioner  is  registered.  The 
details  to  be  kept  in  the  Register  are  described  in  Part  IV  of  the  Act  (Sections  30  to 
34).  It  is  erasure  from  this  Register,  colloquially  known  as  being  "struck  off', 
(discussed  infra)  which  represents  the  most  severe  sanction  in  response  to  a  doctor 
who  has  failed  to  meet  or  maintain  the  requisite  standard  of  behaviour,  practice,  or 
health.  Section  49  creates  the  offence  of  wilfully  and  falsely  holding  yourself  out  to 
be  a  doctor  of  medicine  (or  equivalent  title)  or  being  registered  under  the  Act  when 
you  are  not  in  fact  so  registered.  This  offence  is  punishable  by  a  fine  of  Level  Five 
on  the  standard  scale  16 
. 
However,  fraudulent  practice  may  also  lead  to  other  crimes 
being  libelled  such  as  assault,  the  defences  mentioned  in  Chapter  3  not  generally 
being  available  to  fake  practitioners.  In  one  reported  case,  the  offender  was 
sentenced  to  five  years'  imprisonment  17 
. 
Erasure  from  the  Register  is  considered 
in  fra  , 227 
Section  5:  the  Education  Committee  of  the  GMC  (one  of  seven  statutory  committees 
the  GMC  is  required  to  have  by  virtue  of  section  1), 
'I  shall  have  the  general  function  of  promoting  high  standards  of  medical 
08  education  and  coordinating  all  stages  of  medical  education  .I 
and 
9  Section  35:  the  GIVIC  has  the  power  to  provide  advice  to  the  medical  profession  on 
matters  of  medical  ethics  or  professional  conduct.  To  this  has  been  added  the  power 
to  advise  on  standards  of  professional  performance9. 
These  purposes  are  as  given  in  the  GIVIC's  parent  statute.  However,  it  is  also  useful  to 
consi  er  the  GMC's  own  view  as  to  its  purpose,  i.  e.  to  identify  the  ends  to  which  the 
GMC  carries  out  these  statutory  functions. 
The  GIVIC's  current  public  consultation  documents  provide  the  most  recent  description  of 
its  own  perceived  purposes.  The  consultation  document  on  the  structure  of  the  G 
MC20 
states  unequivocally  that 
"While  the  structures  for  delivering  the  GIVIC's  functions  need  to  change,  the 
GIVIC's  role  will  remain  the  same:  to  protect  the  public.  "" 
While  the  theme  of  protecting  the  public  is  a  recurring  one  in  the  GIVIC's  own  literature, 
the  only  context  in  which  the  expression  appears  in  the  Act  itself  is  in  relation  to  the 
making  of  interim  suspension  orders.  It  was  not  until  the  Act  was  amended  by  the 
Medical  (Professional  Performance)  Act  1995  that  protection  of  the  public  explicitly 
became  an  objective  for  the  disciplinary  system.  Arguably,  the  GIVIC  was  (prior  to  that 
amendment  coming  into  force)  merely  applying  its  own  interpretation  of  the  law.  The 
precise  mechanisms  by  which  the  GIVIC  undertakes  its  four  tasks  described  comes  next; 
whether  the  GMC's  assertion  that  its  powers  are  "strong  and  effective"  is  considered 
thereafter.  There  is,  additionally,  a  statutory  provision  22  whereby  the  Privy  Council  is 
authorised  to  step  in  if  it  (the  Privy  Council)  feels  the  GIVIC  is  not  doing  its  job  properly. 228 
If 
the  GMC: 
The  GIVIC's  main  statutory  powers  are  carried  out  through  seven  statutory  committees, 
as  described  in  Section  1  of  the  Act23 
. 
The  Review  Board  for  Overseas  Qualified 
Practitioners,  maintained  by  Section  28  of  the  Act,  has  a  number  of  appellate  functions  in 
relation  to  doctors  qualified  outwith  Britain  and  the  EU.  In  addition,  it  is  technically  the 
Registrar  of  the  GIVIC  who  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  maintaining  the  registerý  4  rather 
than  the  GIVIC  corporately.  The  Registrar  also  has  a  number  of  specified  functions  to  be 
carried  out  on  behalf  of  the  GIVIC,  such  as  the  obligation  to  notify  persons  affected  by 
decisions  of  the  Council  or  its  committees  as  to  the  outcome  of  that  decision  25 
. 
The 
Registrars  functions  may  instead  be  carried  out  by  a  deputy  or  assistan  t26 
. 
As  will  be 
seen  below,  the  preliminary  screener  also  plays  a  key  role  in  the  disciplinary  functions; 
this  was  a  customary  role  which  has  found  its  way  into  the  statutory  framework  27 
The  functions  and  constitution  of  the  GIVIC  were  analysed  in  detail  by  an  independent 
Committee  of  Inquiry,  the  "Merrison  Inquiry  I).  In  its  report28,  the  committee  endorsed  the 
concept  of  professional  self-regulation  and  accepted  that  the  inter-relationship  between 
the  GIVIC's  functions,  particularly  the  connection  between  the  standards  of  education 
needed  to  be  placed  on  the  register,  and  the  rules  on  being  entitled  to  remain  on  the 
register  thereafter,  meant  that  a  single  body  should  continue  to  be  responsible  for  both 
aspects. 
This  observation  goes  to  the  heart  of  how  the  GIVIC  operates.  In  terms  of  regulatory 
strategy,  it  has  clearly  opted  for  the  compliance  model  by  requiring  the  appropriate 
licensing  of  individuals  (through  their  inclusion  in  the  register)  as  a  prerequisite  to 
enjoying  the  advantages  of  membership  of  the  profession.  The  GIVIC,  through  its 
statutory  control  of  medical  education  and  the  qualifications  entitling  one  to  registration, 
controls  the  entry  criteria  for  the  medical  profession.  The  same  GIVIC  controls  the 
disciplinary  mechanism  through  which  someone  who  has  become  registered  can  be 
removed  from  the  register.  Lastly,  the  GIVIC  has  responsibility  for  publishing  guidance  on 
the  standards  to  be  achieved  by  registered  medical  practitioners,  so  it  is  able  to  establish 
(at  least  to  some  extent)  the  rules  against  which  those  brought  before  its  disciplinary 
mechanisms  will  be  judged.  In  keeping  with  Merrison,  it  is  convenient  to  analyse  the 
GIVIC's  functions  in  terms  of  how  one  becomes  registered,  what  one  is  expected  to  do 
(and  not  do)  while  registered,  and  how  one  stops  being  registered  29 
. 229 
A:  Medical  Education  and  Registration: 
These  two  aspects  are  heavily  intertwined.  Medical  education  is  a  necessary 
prerequisite  to  registration,  while  registration  itself  is  dependent  on  previous  education. 
Indeed,  the  nature  of  the  previous  education  can  determine  the  nature  of  the  registration 
you  receive. 
The  education  remit  of  the  GIVIC  is  entrusted  to  the  Education  Committee.  Like  the  other 
statutory  committees,  the  Education  Committee  enjoys  a  degree  of  independence  from 
the  main  Council  simply  because  the  Act  determines  that  it  is  the  Committee,  not  the 
Council,  which  has  the  "general  function  of  promoting  high  standards  of  medical 
education  . 
%)30  The  Education  Committee  also  enjoys  the  unusual  privilege  of  electing  its 
own  chairperson  (unusual  in  that  most  committee  chairs  are  appointed  by  the  president 
of  the  Council 
31  ). 
On  paper,  the  powers  of  the  GIVIC  to  regulate  medical  education  are  immense,  although 
the  statutory  derivation  is  somewhat  convoluted.  Inclusion  in  the  Register  is  conditional 
on  one  of  three  routes,  in  which  the  GIVIC  exercises  theoretical  near-absolute  control 
over  two  of  them.  In  all  cases,  and  irrespective  of  how  a  doctor  became  qualified  or  what 
qualifications  he  or  she  possesses,  registration  (including  remaining  on  the  Register  after 
qualification)  is  conditional  on  payment  of  the  appropriate  feeS32 
. 
The  only  exception  to 
this  is  in  relation  to  visiting  EEC  practitioners.  33 
1:  Persons  reqistered  by  virtue  of  European  Law: 
The  first  route  to  inclusion  in  the  Register  is  that  you  are  an  EU  national  qualified 
elsewhere  in  the  European  Union,  in  which  case  European  laws  on  freedom  of 
movement  of  workers  and  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications  mean  you  are 
entitled  to  practise  in  the  UK  without  further  formality  being  required  or  permitted  34 
. 
The 
GIVIC  has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  status  of  European  qualifications,  but  the  regulatory 
framework  is  maintained  in  that  it  enjoys  powers  to  give  effect  to  the  equivalent  to 
striking  off  or  suspension  if  imposed  by  other  EU  regulatory  authoritieS35  and  it  may  itself 
discipline  medical  practitioners  practising  in  the  UK  under  the  auspices  of  other  EU 
qualificationS36  . 
European  legislation  allowed  persons  to  practise  medicine  as  registered 
medical  practitioners  without  GIVIC  approval  for  the  first  time.  The  GIVIC  was  banned 
from  requiring  linguistic  tests  of  EU-qualified  doctors,  something  which  apparently 
37 
caused  upset  in  the  GIVIC  at  the  time 230 
2:  0  terseas-aualified  doctors: 
The  second  qualification  route  involves  persons  qualifying  uoverseas"  (i.  e.  outwith  the 
UK,  but  presumably  other  than  EU  nationals  holding  primary  European  qualifications); 
Part  III  of  the  Act  lays  out  a  detailed  sedes  of  rules  concerning  this.  The  upshot  of  these 
rules  is  that  you  must  either  hold  a  qualification  recognised  as  equivalent  to  UK 
registrable  qualificationS38,  or  else  have  an  acceptable  (but  not  recognised)  overseas 
qualification  and  pass  an  exam  (set  under  the  auspices  of  the  GMC)39.  The  mutual 
recognition  rules  are,  apparently,  an  old  relic  of  Empire  40 
,  and  recognition  has  been 
steadily  decreasing  over  the  years.  There  are,  as  at  November  2001,24  recognised 
institutions;  the  GIVIC  itself  indicates  that  it  is  seeking  to  change  the  rules  because  it 
41  believes  they  are  "unfair" 
. 
Persons  possessing  a  recognised  overseas  qualification, 
and  who  satisfy  the  same  rules  on  work  experience  as  domestically-qualified  applicants, 
are  entitled  to  full  registration. 
Conversely,  the  possession  of  an  acceptable  overseas  qualification  and  passing  the 
necessary  exams  only  entities  the  applicant  to  limited  registration.  Dealing  with  doctors 
qualifying  overseas  (but  who  did  not  qualify  from  a  "recognised"  institution)  remains  a 
significant  part  of  the  GIVIC's  workload.  Candidates  falling  into  this  latter  category  are 
those  who  hold  a  primary  medical  qualification  from  any  institution  listed  in  the  World 
Health  Organisation's  Directory  of  Medical  Schools,  but  which  do  not  appear  on  the  list  of 
institutions  "recognised"  under  Section  19.  Such  candidates  require  to  satisfy  the  GIVIC 
(technically  the  Registrar)  on  five  points,  listed  in  Section  22(l)  of  the  Act,  viz.  having 
been  selected  for  employment  in  a  UK  hospital  or  other  approved  institution,  holding  an 
acceptable  overseas  qualification,  knowledge  of  English,  being  of  good  character,  and 
appropriate  skills,  knowledge  and  experience. 
There  are  two  main  aspects  to  this  which  occupy  the  GIVIC's  time,  the  other  three 
elements  being  (in  effect)  prerequisites.  Existence  of  the  acceptable  overseas 
qualification  is  a  necessary  element  but  the  GIVIC's  role  is  limited  to  checking  its 
authenticity;  the  same  is  true  of  offers  of  employment.  While  in  theory  the  requirement  to 
be  of  "good  character'  could  be  actively  examined  by  the  GIVIC,  in  practice  this  seems  to 
be  limited  to  checking  that  the  applicant  has  not  been  convicted  of  certain  types  of 
offence.  An  exception  to  the  lack  of  active  scrutiny  of  these  matters  by  the  GIVIC  arises 
in  that  the  Overseas  Committee  uses  the  requirement  to  be  of  good  character  as  a 
means  of  exercising  disciplinary  powers  over  those  having  limited  registration  against 
whom  charges  of  misconduct  have  been  made;  this  is  considered  infra. 231 
The  GIVIC's  main  concern  is  with  the  tests  applied  under  which  linguistic  and  clinical 
ability  are  checked.  Linguistic  ability  is  measured  according  to  the  IELTS  test  sedes  set 
by  the  British  Council.  The  actual  scores  required  vary  depending  on  whether  the 
applicant  has  passed  the  PLAB  test  (see  below),  on  the  basis  that  the  PLAB 
14 
...  provi  es  additional  objective  assessment  of  communication  in  a  clinical 
context. 
YP42 
The  Professional  and  Linguistic  Assessment  Board,  or  PLAB,  was  established  following 
the  passage  of  the  Medical  Act  1978,  which  replaced  temporary  registration  with  limited 
registration,  although  PLAB  is  not  formally  recognised  by  statute.  Instead,  successive 
Medical  Acts  have  recognised  the  ability  of  the  GIVIC  to  grant  registration  to  those  who 
satisfy  the  GIVIC  (or  its  Registrar)  as  to  certain  issues;  these  issues  are  in  effect 
delegated  to  the  PLAB  by  the  GIVIC.  "Passing  the  PLAB",  as  it  is known,  involves  clinical 
problem  solving  exercises,  in  the  form  of  a  written  exam  (which,  since  it  is  in  English,  is 
the  basis  for  saying  it  also  assesses  clinical  English).  Pass  rates  for  the  PLAB  and  its 
predecessor  TRAB  varied  from  22%  to  43%  between  1975  and  1988  43 
. 
While  the  PLAB 
itself  does  not  enjoy  formal  statutory  status,  the  Medical  Act  1983  does  provide  a 
mechanism  for  appeals  to  be  taken  against  adverse  decisions  in  relation  to  overseas- 
qualified  doctors.  Section  28  of  the  Act  continues  in  existence  the  Review  Board  for 
Overseas  Qualified  Practitioners.  This  Board  has  the  power  to  hear  appeals  against 
decisions  of  the  GIVIC  in  relation  to  overseas-qualified  doctors  (both  those  with 
"recognised"  and  "acceptable"  qualifications).  The  Board  itself  consists  of  a  chairman 
and  deputy  chairman  appointed  by  the  President  on  the  recommendations  of  the 
councils  for  postgraduate  education  in  England  and  Wales,  Scotland  and  Northern 
Ireland;  they  may  not  be  members  of  the  Council.  The  other  members  (currently  seven) 
are  members  of  the  Council,  and  must  include  one  elected  member,  one  appointed 
member,  and  one  overseas-qualified  doctor.  44  However,  despite  this  elaborate 
machinery,  the  review  of  decisions  which  the  Review  Board  can  carry  out  is  only  advisory 
in  nature.  Ultimately,  the  President  (or  some  other  person  appointed  by  the  Council) 
retains  the  final  say  on  whether  to  reverse  or  uphold  the  original  decision;  the  only 
obligation  incumbent  upon  them  is  to  "have  regard"  to  the  Review  Board's  opinion  on  the 
matter". 
Limited  registration  without  passing  the  PLAB  exam  is  possible  if  an  overseas-qualified 
doctor  is  sponsored  for  postgraduate  training  by  a  small  number  of  Royal  Colleges  or 
other  postgraduate  institutionS46  . 
These  are  subject  to  prior  approval  by  the  GMC  which 
seeks  to  build  quality  assurance  measures  into  its  approval  system;  it  is  not  intended  to 47 
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be  an  alternative  route  for  those  who  have  failed  the  PLAB 
. 
Sponsorship  does  not, 
however,  exempt  overseas  doctors  from  the  requirement  to  pass  the  IELTS  linguistic 
proficiency  test. 
3:  Registration  followinq  qualification  in  the  UK: 
The  third,  and  most  common,  route  to  becoming  fully  registered  involves  registration  by 
virtue  of  holding  a  primary  United  Kingdom  qualification,  passing  a  qualifying 
examination,  and  having  the  requisite  experience  48 
. 
There  is  no  need  for  a  person 
claiming  full  registration  under  the  "domestic  qualification"  route  to  satisfy  the  GIVIC  that 
they  are  of  good  character.  "Qualifying  exam"  and  a  "primary  United  Kingdom 
qualification"  are  defined  in  Section  4;  in  essence,  it  means  a  medical  degree  awarded 
by  any  of  the  UK's  medical  schools,  plus  a  few  other  routes  involving  the  Royal  Colleges 
and  similar  bodies.  The  bodies  able  to  award  primary  UK  qualifications  are  also  able  to 
hold  qualifying  examinations. 
The  GIVIC  exercises  the  most  influence  over  the  UK  qualification  route.  In  terms  of 
Section  5,  the  Education  Committee  of  the  GIVIC  shall  determine  the  content  both  of  the 
medical  curriculum  leading  up  to  the  award  of  primary  qualifications,  and  also  the 
standard  of  proficiency  required  to  pass  the  qualifying  examination.  It  is  also  allowed  to 
determine  the  pattern  of  post-qualifying  work  experience  necessary  to  move  from 
provisional  to  full  registration.  The  powers  of  the  Education  Committee  are,  on  paper  at 
least,  impressive:  visitors  and  inspectors  can  be  appointed  to  monitor  medical  teaching 
and  examinations  respectively4g.  If  the  Committee  feels  that  an  institution  is  not 
maintaining  the  appropriate  standards  either  in  teaching  or  examining,  it  may  make 
representations  to  the  Privy  Council  which,  if  it  sees  fit,  may  direct  that  the  qualification  or 
examination  no  longer  entities  recipients  thereof  to  registration  under  the  ACt50. 
Revocation  of  the  Order  does  not  entitle  such  individuals  to  registration  5'.  Similar  powers 
exist  allowing  the  Committee  to  appoint  visitors  to  postgraduate  training  institutions, 
52 
although  there  are  no  formal  powers  to  withhold  recognition  of  a  particular  institution 
. 
This  is  because  recognition  of  training  institutions  is  done  by  the  qualification-awarding 
bodies  rather  than  the  GIVIC 
itself53. 
In  reality,  it  would  appear  that  the  GIVIC  does  not  utilise  its  formal  statutory  powers.  The 
Education  Committee  itself  has  traditionally  been  composed  of  some  of  the  most 
influential  figures  in  the  medical  education  commun  itY54 
. 
There  are  consequently  internal 
and  external  politics  involved  in  getting  the  Education  Committee  to  use  any  of  the 
powers  theoretically  available  to  it55.  Indeed,  Allsop  and  Mulcahy  indicate  that  the  GMC's 233 
activity  in  this  area  (such  as  it  was)  was  ineffective  56  This  inactivity  is  illustrated  by 
Stacey's  revelation  that  between  1959  and  1982,  none  of  the  older  UK  universities  was 
inspected  by  the  GMC57 
.A 
limited  inspection  was  conducted  in  1982,  but  this  only 
occurred  following  representations  by  the  Presidents  of  three  Royal  CollegeS5'.  Given 
that  the  GIVIC  acted  following  these  representations,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  GIVIC's 
inactivity  in  other  areas  is  an  indication  that  mafters  are  proceeding  properly  without  the 
need  for  intervention.  Stacey  herself  is  sceptical  about  such  claims,  noting  that  the 
survey  of  education  showed  that  "the  study  of  some  subjects  was  honoured  more  in  the 
breach  than  the  observance.  "59 
4:  Types  of  registration: 
As  noted  above,  the  GIVIC's  duty  under  Section  2  is  to  keep  a  register  of  medical 
practitioners  consisting  of  four  categories  of  (fully)  registered  medical  practitioners,  plus  a 
list  of  "medical  practitioners  with  limited  registration".  In  addition,  these  is  a  category  of 
uprovisional  registration"  under  Section  15. 
In  practical  terms,  the  only  real  differences  are  between  full  registration,  provisional 
registration  and  limited  registration.  Full  registration  can  be  achieved  through  a  number 
of  different  routes;  the  other  forms  of  registration  are  (all  going  well)  merely  steps  on  the 
way  to  becoming  fully  registered.  There  are  additional  forms  of  registration  applicable  to 
visiting  EU  nationaIS60  and  temporary  full  registration  for  visiting  overseas  specia  liStS61. 
Both  of  these  are  subject  to  time  IiMitS62 
. 
Full,  unlimited  registration  can  be  achieved  by 
means  of  the  domestic  route,  the  EU  route,  and  the  two  routes  for  overseas  doctors. 
Limited  registration  only  applies  to  overseas  doctors  whose  qualification  is  not 
it  recognised"  for  purposes  of  Section  19.  Limited  registration  only  permits  the  person  to 
act  as  though  fully  registered  in  relation  to  a  particular  (supervised)  employment  in  a 
63 
hospital  or  other  approved  institution 
,  selection  for  employment  in  such  an  institution 
being  a  prerequisite  for  limited  registration  64 
. 
Registration  is  specific  to  the  post,  so 
repeat  applications  may  be  necessary  if  short-term  posts  are  all  that  is  available. 
Registration  can  only  last  for  a  maximum  (aggregate)  period  of  five  years.  65 
The  satisfactory  experience  required  of  UK-qualified  doctors,  and  those  having  a 
recognised  overseas  qualification,  is  experience  of  working  in  a  resident  medical 
capacity  in  one  or  more  approved  hospitals  or  other  approved  institutions.  This  work  has 
to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  an  examining  body,  acquiring  the  experience  appropriate 
for  that  body's  area  of  practice  involving  at  least  two  branches  of  medicine,  and 234 
satisfactory  service'.  Work  experience  is  acquired  before  full  registration  through  the 
category  of  "provisional  registration".  67  This  is  similar  to  limited  registration  in  that  it 
permits  the  person  provisionally  registered  to  act  as  a  registered  medical  practitioner  so 
far  as  is  necessary  for  them  to  gain  the  experience  required  by  Section  10.  The  main 
difference  is  that,  unlike  limited  registration,  provisional  registration  is  neither  post- 
specific  nor  time-limited. 
B:  Obligations  of  doctors: 
There  are  a  number  of  duties  incumbent  on  the  doctor  who  wishes  to  remain  registered. 
The  first  of  these  is  straightforward:  the  duty68  to  pay  an  annual  fee  if  you  wish  to  remain 
on  the  RegisteO9.  Fees  are  payable  in  respect  of  being  added  to  the  Register,  being 
retained  on  it  and  (in  the  event  that  you  are  removed  from  it  for  any  reason)  for 
restoration  to  it.  No  fee  can  be  charged  to  visiting  EEC  practitionerS70  ,  although  if  such  a 
person  becomes  established  in  the  UK  their  entitlement  to  be  registered  as  a  visitor 
ceases  and  they  would  thereafter  be  obliged  to  pay  the  fee  like  anyone  else. 
More  significantly,  the  GIVIC  also  has  the  power  to  issue  "advice  for  members  of  the 
medical  profession  on  standards  of  professional  conduct  or  on  medical  ethics"  . 
7'  For  a 
long  time,  the  GIVIC  has  periodically  produced  the  so-called  "Blue  Book  oj72  describing 
those  areas  of  conduct  (or  more  accurately,  misconduct)  which  are  likely  to  attract  the 
attention  of  the  disciplinary  procedures  described  infra.  The  Blue  Book  has,  however, 
been  described  as  a  "best  sins  guide  "73  because  in  essence  all  it  did  was  reiterate  areas 
where  a  particular  course  of  conduct  had  resulted  in  the  GIVIC  imposing  disciplinary 
measures  on  a  doctor.  It  made  no  attempt  to  lay  down  more  general  principles  as  a 
guide  to  future  conduct  beyond  the  very  broadest  (and  least  helpful)  remarks.  This 
approach  has  changed,  and  the  Council  does  now  produce  a  reasonably  extensive  list  of 
guidance  material  for  the  benefit  of  the  profession.  The  GIVIC  has  summarised  the  duties 
of  the  registered  practitioner  in  14  key  principleS74. 
Detailed  discussion  of  the  content  of  the  GIVIC's  guidance  would  effectively  amount  to  a 
re-writing  of  Good  Medical  Practice  75  and  so  this  has  not  been  done.  For  present 
purposes  what  is  important  is  to  note  that  the  obligations  imposed  on  doctors  do  not  end 
the  moment  the  Registrar  of  the  GIVIC  enters  his  or  her  name  on  the  Register  without  any 
provision  or  limitation. 
The  next  section  analyses  the  extent  to  which  these  ongoing  obligations  are  enforceable, 
and  enforced,  by  the  GIVIC  and  how  it  goes  about  enforcing  them. 235 
C:  Disciplinary  Functions  of  the  GMC: 
It  is  in  the  exercise  of  its  disciplinary  functions  that  the  GIVIC  most  often  comes  into  the 
public's  attention.  This  particularly  involves  the  powers  under  Section  36(l)(b),  where  a 
fully  registered  person  is  judged  by  the  Professional  Conduct  Committee  to  have  been 
guilty  of  "serious  professional  misconduct"  (hereafter  "SPIVI"),  or  where  an  allegation  of 
SPM  is  made  against  such  a  person.  The  same  procedures  apply  in  relation  to  fully 
registered  persons  who  have  either  been  convicted  in  the  British  Islands  of  a  criminal 
offence  or  (more  recently)  who  "have  been  convicted  elsewhere  of  an  offence  which,  if 
76  committed  in  England  and  Wales,  would  constitute  a  criminal  offence"  . 
The  GIVIC  is  a 
19  public  authority"  for  the  purposes  of  Section  6  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998,  and  so  the 
disciplinary  functions  of  the  GIVIC  require  to  be  compatible  with  the  ECHR  right  to  a  fair 
tria  177.  While  the  impact  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  is  principally  considered  in  Chapter  7 
infra,  it  is  convenient  to  note  the  impact  which  cases  brought  under  that  Act  have  had  on 
the  GIVIC's  functions  at  the  appropriate  part  of  the  discussion. 
1:  Prelimina!  y  screeninq  procedures: 
In  the  early  days  of  the  GIVIC,  disciplinary  matters  were  dealt  with  by  the  full  Council,  a 
situation  only  amended  by  the  creation  of  a  separate  disciplinary  committee  in  terms  of 
the  Medical  Act  195078 
. 
This,  of  course,  potentially  raised  the  problem  of  cluttering  up 
the  Council  meetings  with  manifestly  ill-founded  allegations  of  the  sort  described  by 
Pyke-Lees: 
11 
...  one  patient  stated  that  'I  was  definitely  of  sound  mind  before,  during  and  after 
death',  complained  principally  of  the  actions  of  doctors  after  that  event,  and 
signed  himself  'the  late'  so-and-so. 
"79 
To  avoid  this  problem,  a  screening  procedure  has  always  existed.  Initially  this  function 
was  carried  out  by  the  Branch  Councils  for  England,  Ireland  and  Scotland,  but  was  taken 
over  by  the  President  in  188980.  This  screening  power  does  not  feature  in  the  statutory 
scheme  of  things  but  is  instead  a  creation  of  the  GIVIC  itself.  The  potential  power  this 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  preliminary  screener  (who  was  always  the  President  of  the 
Council  until  1988  81  should  not  be  underestimated.  The  formal  delegation  of  power  to 
the  President  was 
to  withhold  obviously  unfit  cases  of  complaint  from  reference  to  the  General 
Council. 
),  82 236 
However,  the  decision  as  to  what  constituted  "obviously  unfit"  was  that  of  the  preliminary 
screener  alone.  A  conservative  approach  could  render  the  rest  of  the  disciplinary 
mechanism  nugatory  by  screening  out  all  or  almost  all  complaints.  An  actual  example  of 
this  approach  has  been  given,  described  as  follows: 
"Some  hint  of  the  narrow  way  in  which  these  powers  could  be  defined,  even  into 
the  1950s,  is  given  in  a  summary  history  of  the  GIVIC  written  by  MR  Draper,  a 
former  registrar.  Writing  in  the  1982  GIVIC  Annual  Reports,  he  comments  on  the 
central  role  of  past  presidents  in  disciplinary  proceedings.  He  says  they  often 
acted  alone  in  deciding  which  cases  went  forward.  He  reports  that  Sir  David 
Campbell  (President  from  1950  to  1961)  thought  that  the  abuse  of  a  professional 
confidence  could  never  amount  to  'infamous  conduct',  that  the  non-bona  fide 
prescribing  of  dangerous  drugs  should  be  dealt  with  by  the  Home  Office,  not  the 
GIVIC,  and  that  the  Council  should  'take  no  cognisance  of  findings  of  the  Medical 
Service  Committee  [the  tribunal  dealing  with  complaints  against  family 
practitioners]  that  a  doctor  had  failed  to  visit  and  treat  patients.  '  Draper  also 
comments  that  the  complainants  could  be  told  that  they  must  pay  the  legal  costs 
of  presenting  a  complaint,  which  was  likely  to  deter  all  but  the  most  'wealthy  or 
determined'.  ; v83 
Clearly  leaving  such  power  in  the  hands  of  a  single,  largely  unaccountable,  individual 
was  open  to  criticism.  While  decisions  of  the  preliminary  screener  are  susceptible  to 
judicial  revieW84,  this  would  only  apply  in  the  most  extreme  circumstances.  Accordingly, 
the  rules  were  changed  in  1990  so  that  the  decision  of  the  preliminary  screener  must 
have  the  concurrence  of  a  lay  member  of  the  CounciI85.  Commenting  on  these 
provisions,  Smith  notes  that 
"From  the  point  of  view  of  accountability,  these  non-public  filtering  processes  are 
of  crucial  importance,  a  fortiori,  since  the  proportion  of  cases  screened  out  is  so 
large.  The  Council  does,  however,  seem  to  be  demonstrating  a  recent  and 
commendable  tendency  to  disclose  its  activities  in  this  area  to  a  greater  extent 
and  in  greater  detail  than  in  the  past.  iv86 
More  recently,  the  Privy  Council  has  held  (admittedly  in  a  dental  case  involving  a  similar, 
but  not  identical  system)  that  the  preliminary  screener  should  not  subsequently  be 
87 
involved  in  either  the  PPC  or  PCC  stages  of  any  disciplinary  action 237 
2:  Preliminary  Proceedings  Commiftee  and  Interim  Orders  Commiftee 
Assuming  the  preliminary  screener  does  not  reject  the  complaint  as  unfounded,  the 
allegation  is  then  passed  onto  the  Preliminary  Proceedings  Committee  (hereafter  the 
"PPC").  Criminal  convictions  of  registered  medical  practitioners  also  come  to  the  PPC, 
with  the  exception  of  convictions  resulting  in  absolute  or  conditional  discharge  and  minor 
motoring  offences"". 
The  PPC  presently  consists  of  seven  members,  including  two  lay  members.  It  sits  in 
camera,  except  in  cases  which  appear  to  call  for  immediate  action.  Such  cases  should 
now,  however,  be  referred  to  the  Interim  Orders  Committee  (IOC).  A  challenge  to  the 
practice  of  the  PPC  sifting  in  camera  was  rejected  by  the  Privy  Council,  which  held  that 
disclosing  notes  of  such  deliberations  would  seriously  inhibit  freedom  of  discussion  and 
be  contrary  to  the  public  interest"9.  The  main  function  of  the  PPC  is  found  in  Section 
42(2)  of  the  Act.  The  PPC  itself  can  decide  to  discontinue  proceedings,  either  with  or 
without  issuing  advice  or  a  warning  to  the  doctor  in  question;  it  can  refer  the  doctor  to  the 
health  procedures  described  infra,  or  refer  the  matter  to  a  hearing  before  the 
Professional  Conduct  Committee  (hereafter  the  "PCC").  Interestingly,  it  does  not  appear 
to  be  competent  for  the  PPC  to  refer  a  matter  to  the  Committee  on  Professional  Practice. 
Despite  the  creation  in  2000  of  the  IOC,  it  appears  to  remain  competent  for  the  PPC  to 
suspend  a  doctors  registration  or  make  it  subject  to  conditions,  and  to  do  so  forthwith. 
Any  such  immediate  action  requires  the  PPC  (or  any  other  committee  of  the  GIVIC  having 
the  power  to  make  such  an  order)  to  afford  the  doctor  in  question  the  opportunity  of 
appearing  before  the  Committee  in  question  and  being  heard  on  the  question  of 
immediate  suspension  or  conditions9o.  The  Committee  is  thereafter  obliged  to  provide 
reasons  explaining  why,  if  it  imposes  immediate  suspension,  it  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  this  was  a  necessary  and  proportionate  step  to  take9'. 
The  significance  of  the  Interim  Orders  Committee  in  this  equation  is  that  the  IOC,  which 
was  created  in  2000  by  an  amendment  to  the  ACt92  is  specifically  tasked  with  the  issue  of 
deciding  whether  the  allegations  against  a  doctor  are  so  serious  as  to  warrant  immediate 
action.  The  formal  amendments  to  the  Act  itself  create  a  new  statutory  committee  of  the 
GIVIC.  However,  there  is  no  requirement  for  the  other  committees  having  the  power  to 
impose  immediate  suspension  on  a  doctor  referred  to  theM93  to  pass  the  matter  to  the 
IOC  for  its  consideration.  This  could,  but  for  the  GIVIC's  internal  handling  of  these 
matters,  lead  to  a  duplication  of  powers.  The  amendments  creating  the  IOC  also  create 
additional  powers  allowing  suspensions  to  be  extended  and  continued;  they  also  require 238 
such  extensions  to  be  referred  to  the  courts  and  therefore  (in  effect)  create  more 
94  extensive  rights  of  appeal  to  the  courts  against  such  interim  measures  . 
For  present  purposes,  however,  the  effects  of  these  two  committees  are  as  follows:  the 
PPC  acts  as  a  second  stage  screening  mechanism,  and  the  IOC  serves  to  provide 
measures  in  cases  of  urgency  where  this  is  required  (in  terms  of  the  statutory  tests)  for 
the  protection  of  the  public,  in  the  public  interest,  or  in  the  interests  of  the  actual  d  octo  e5- 
It  should  be  noted  that  these  are  alternative,  rather  than  cumulative,  grounds  for  action 
and  it  is  competent  for  the  IOC  to  make  an  order  even  when  not  all  three  elements  are 
present96.  Suspension  has  the  effect  that  the  registered  person  is,  for  the  duration  of  the 
97  suspension,  to  be  treated  as  not  registered  . 
If  conditions  are  applied  to  a  person's 
registration,  failure  to  comply  with  those  conditions  may  in  itself  result  in  the  person's 
. 
98 
registration  being  suspended  or  the  person  being  struck  off  the  register 
3:  The  Professional  Conduct  Commiftee: 
The  Professional  Conduct  Committee,  or  PCC,  exercises  the  ultimate  power  of  the  GIVIC 
to  remove  a  fully  registered  person  from  the  registerý9.  Its  powers  are  found  in  Section 
36.  It  has  jurisdiction  under  that  section  in  respect  of  three  areas- 
*  Conviction  in  the  British  Islands'00  of  a  criminal  offence  or  conviction  elsewhere  of 
an  offence  which  would,  if  commifted  in  England  and  Wales,  be  a  criminal 
offence. 
*  Committing  some  act  or  omission  which  amounts  to  "serious  professional 
misconduct";  or 
e  Breaching  conditions  attached  to  registration  by  the  PCC  or  other  statutory 
committee  of  the  GIVIC  able  to  attach  conditions  to  registration. 
Technically  there  are  no  specific  powers  to  discipline  those  who  practise  while  their 
registration  is  suspended.  However,  as  noted,  the  effect  of  suspension  is  that  you  are 
treated  as  though  unregistered.  The  Act  is  silent  on  the  subject  disciplining  those  who 
are  suspended.  However,  any  medical  practice  by  someone  whose  registration  is 
suspended  will  be  tantamount  to  practice  by  an  unregistered  person  and  so  potentially 
amounts  to  a  criminal  offence.  Unqualified  practice  (which  practice  while  suspended  is 
equivalent  to)  is  also  grounds  for  the  PCC  to  strike  someone  off  the  register, 
notwithstanding  that  they  shouldn't  have  been  there  (or  are  treated  as  not  being  there)  in 
the  first  place'O'. 239 
The  PCC  procedures  are  akin  to  a  criminal  court,  and  Smith  identifies  increasing 
similarity  to  the  forensic  model  as  an  ongoing  trend  102 
. 
The  jurisdiction  and  procedures 
are  fully  described  by  Smith'  03  and  are  not  examined  in  detail  here.  The  main  features 
are  that  the  PCC  sits  in  open  session  with  (typically)  a  full  contingent  of  lawyers  advising 
Council,  committee,  and  the  doctor  whose  conduct  is  under  scrutiny  104 
. 
Evidence  is 
given  on  oath  and  the  evidential  standard  is  the  same  as  that  in  criminal  proceedings,  i.  e. 
proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  The  onus  of  proof  lies  on  the  GIVIC  to  prove  that  the 
doctor  has  been  guilty  of  serious  professional  misconduct,  although  it  is  not  open  to  a 
doctor  convicted  of  an  offence  in  the  British  Islands  to  dispute  the  fact  of  that 
105  conviction  In  such  cases,  the  proceedings  before  the  PPC  are  purely  to  determine 
the  response  of  the  GIVIC  to  the  conviction. 
Sanctions  available  to  the  PCC  are  erasing  the  person  accused  from  the  register, 
suspending  that  registration  for  up  to  12  months,  or  placing  conditions  on  that 
registration  for  up  to  three  years.  106  The  Committee  can  alternatively  find  the  allegations 
not  proven,  can  admonish  the  doctor,  or  can  continue  deliberations  for  such  period  as 
the  Committee  sees  fit.  This  latter  appears  to  have  been  particularly  common  prior  to  the 
introduction  of  formal  health  procedures,  as  it  permitted  the  PCC  to  monitor  a  doctors 
rehabilitation.  Matters  can  be  referred  to  the  Health  Committee  or  Committee  on 
Professional  Practice,  and  in  particularly  serious  cases  the  Committee  can  suspend 
registration  forthwith.  It  is  only  this  [after  sanction  which  requires  the  doctor  to  stop 
practising  during  the  course  of  the  procedures.  The  varying  sanctions  are  ranked  by 
Smith  as  indicating  a  range  of  opinions  of  the  committee  to  the  conduct,  ranging  from 
"concern"  to  "gravest  concern".  107  There  is  an  appeal  against  any  decision  of  the  PCC  to 
the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Councillo",  considered  infra.  While  erasure  is  the 
most  severe  (non-interim)  sanction  available  to  the  PCC,  it  is  important  to  note  that  it  is 
possible  for  a  person  "struck  off'  to  apply  for  re-admission  to  the  Register'09.  This 
previously  required  ten  months  to  have  expired  either  from  being  struck  off,  or  from  a 
previous  unsuccessful  application  to  be  so  restored.  Following  criticism,  however,  the 
period  was  extended"O  so  that  now  at  least  five  years  must  have  elapsed  before  you  can 
apply  for  re-admission  after  being  struck  off,  or  twelve  months  elapse  following  a 
previous  unsuccessful  application  for  re-admission.  In  addition  the  PCC  may  require 
such  an  applicant  to  satisfy  the  committee  as  to  the  person's  good  character, 
professional  competence  or  health  before  restoring  them"'.  After  a  second  (or  more) 
unsuccessful  application  for  re-admission  the  PCC  may  suspend  the  right  to  re-apply 
indefinitely'  12 
,  although  this  suspension  is  itself  subject  to  application  for  review  after 
13  14 
three  years'  and  an  appeal  against  such  a  suspension  order  lies  to  the  Privy Council' 
. 240 
Most  of  the  litigation  involving  the  GIVIC  has  revolved  around  the  concept  of  "serious 
professional  misconduct"  which  justifies  the  imposition  of  disciplinary  measures  absent  a 
criminal  conviction.  The  expression  "serious  professional  misconduct"  replaces  the 
expression  found  in  the  original  legislation,  "infamous  conduct  in  any  professional 
respect"'  15 
. 
Again,  it  is  not  intended  to  review  that  body  of  case  law  here'  16 
. 
For  present 
purposes,  the  key  issue  is  the  current  operative  definition  applied  by  the  PCC  in  its  daily 
working  (and  also  repeated  in  its  published  advice  to  the  profession): 
uConduct  connected  with  his  profession  in  which  [the  doctor]  concerned  has  fallen 
short,  by  omission  or  commission,  of  the  standards  of  conduct  expected  amongst 
[doctors],  and  that  such  falling  short  as  is  established  should  be  serious"'  17 
One  important  point  to  take  from  the  definition  is  that  the  conduct  must  be  "serious".  The 
Privy  Council  (in  a  dental  appeal  dealing  with  an  identical  statutory  formulation)  has  held 
that  this  requires  a  two-stage  approach  by  the  PCC:  firstly  whether  the  conduct  has 
fallen  short  of  the  standards  expected,  and  secondly  whether  this  failure  is  serious 
enough  to  justify  an  adverse  finding'".  It  is  not  necessary  for  the  conduct  to  be  directly 
connected  to  actual  medical  practice,  although  there  does  have  to  be  some  connection 
to  medical  practice.  Thus,  for  example,  a  doctor  acting  as  chief  executive  of  a  hospital, 
may  be  found  guilty  of  serious  professional  misconduct  even  where  the  misconduct  was 
more  of  a  managerial  failure  than  one  related  to  his  practice  of  medicine'  1  '9. 
Finally,  as  noted  in  Chapter  4,  the  decisions  of  the  PCC  (and  indeed,  of  the  GIVIC 
generally)  are  susceptible  to  judicial  review,  and  as  a  public  authority  the  GIVIC  is  bound 
by  the  terms  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998.  The  main  implication  of  this  is  that  the 
sanction  imposed  by  the  PCC  must  be  proportionate  to  the  offence  120 
. 
However,  it  is  not 
necessary  (except  perhaps  in  exceptional  cases)  for  the  PCC  to  give  reasons  for  its 
decisions  on  matters  of  faCt121. 
4.  -  Health  Procedures: 
Health  procedures  were  introduced  in  1980,  under  amendments  brought  in  by  the  Health 
Act  1978.  However,  the  formal  procedures  of  the  Health  Committee  are  intended  to  act 
only  as  a  backstop,  and  the  intention  behind  the  procedures  introduced  is  to  deal  with  as 
many  health  referrals  as  possible  in  an  informal  way"'.  The  informality  is  introduced  by 
the  use  of  a  preliminary  screener  for  health,  whose  functions  are  akin  to  those  of  the 
preliminary  screener  already  mentioned.  The  health  screener's  job  is  really  to  enlist  the 
doctor  in  appreciating  that  the  doctor  may  have  a  problem  The  majodty  of  referrals  to 241 
the  health  screener  are  for  alcohol  or  drug  misuse  or  mental  illness  -  all  conditions  which 
might  make  it  more  difficult  for  the  person  affected  to  realise  that  they  are  affected.  The 
health  screener  is  generally  a  psychiatrist.  A  lay  screener  has  also  been  added  to  the 
health  screening  procedures  123 
. 
The  general  thrust  of  the  health  screener's  activity  is  to 
encourage  self-help  supported  by  local  action. 
The  PPC  and  PCC  can  refer  matters  to  the  Health  Committee  if  it  appears  to  those  other 
committees  that  there  is  an  issue  relating  to  the  doctors  fitness  to  practise  as  a 
consequence  of  physical  or  mental  health  problems.  Indeed,  the  courts  have  held  that 
while  not  strictly  mandatory,  such  referral  should  be  made  by  the  PCC  as  soon  as  the 
124 
issue  emerges 
The  formal  procedures  of  the  Health  Committee  itself  are,  in  large  measure,  only  there 
for  those  cases  where  the  doctor  refuses  to  cooperate,  either  with  the  initial  medical 
examination  itself  or  with  the  treatment  or  restrictions  on  activity  proposed  following  this 
examination  125 
. 
The  procedures,  while  formal,  lack  the  quasi-criminal  trappings  of  PCC 
procedure  126 
. 
The  jurisdiction  of  the  Health  Committee  extends  to  cases  where  the 
doctor's  fitness  to  practise  is  seriously  impaired  by  reason  of  physical  or  mental 
condition  127 
. 
The  Committee  may  suspend  registration  for  up  to  one  year,  or  impose 
conditions  for  up  to  three  years.  Failure  to  comply  with  conditions  may  in  itself  result  in 
suspension  128  The  wording  of  Section  37  requires  the  Health  Committee  to  make  a 
judgement  as  to  the  fitness  to  practise  of  the  doctor  in  question,  and  this  judgement  is 
presumably  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of  evidence  led  before  it.  However,  the  doctor  who 
refuses  to  be  medically  examined  will  still  have  no  cause  for  complaint  if  the  Committee 
then  decides  that  he  or  she  is  unfit,  on  the  basis  of  old  information  . 
12" 
This  avoids 
doctors  from  using  what  would  otherwise  be  a  fairly  serious  loophole  in  the  system. 
The  deliberations  of  the  Health  Committee  take  place  in  camem  which,  given  the  subject 
matter  of  its  jurisdiction,  is  perhaps  unsurprising.  However,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
the  approach  lacks  openness: 
"One  of  the  difficulties  with  referring  a  case  to  the  Health  Committee,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  public  accountability,  is  that,  because  that  Committee's 
proceedings  are  conducted  in  private,  the  public  does  not  know  what  transpires 
during  the  proceedings.  It  would  be  useful  in  this  regard,  while  not  unnecessarily 
infringing  the  confidentiality  of  Health  Committee  proceedings,  if  the  GIVIC's 
Minutes  recorded  the  dispositions  of  the  Health  Committee  in  cases  which  have 242 
been  referred  from  the  PCC,  to  enable  the  public  to  see  that  the  case  has  been 
effectively  disposed  of.  "130 
There  is,  however,  a  degree  of  interaction  between  the  (in  camera)  Health  Committee 
and  the  (open  to  the  public)  PCC.  Thus,  while  a  large  proportion  of  the  Health 
Committee's  work  consists  of  doctors  who  are  addicted  to  drugs  or  alcohol  131 
, 
if  the 
doctor  has  received  a  criminal  conviction  in  relation  to  these  matters  then  it  is  the  PCC 
which  has  jurisdiction,  although  it  may  subsequently  refer  the  matter  to  the  Health 
Committee.  132  Furthermore,  failure  by  the  doctor  to  observe  the  limitations  of  any 
conditions  attached  to  his  or  her  registration  by  the  Committee  may  result  in  the  doctor 
being  suspended.  Continuing  to  practise  while  suspended  may,  as  noted  above, 
constitute  grounds  for  the  PCC  exercising  its  disciplinary  powers  to  strike  a  doctor  off  - 
This  supportive  approach  has,  however,  been  criticised  as  a  mechanism  whereby  the 
"medicalisation"  of  deviance  allows  a  greater  number  of  doctors  to  be  treated  as  sick 




5-  Professional  Performance  Procedures- 
Historically,  the  GIVIC  was  not  formally  concerned  with  standards  of  medical  practice. 
Assuming  a  doctor  was  correctly  registered  and  did  not  commit  any  offence  or  act 
amounting  to  serious  professional  misconduct,  the  fact  that  he  or  she  was  not  very  good 
(or  even  competent)  would  only  attract  the  GIVIC's  attention  if  the  poor  performance  was 
attributable  to  health  problems.  As  the  GIVIC  itself  put  matters,  it  is  only  concerned  with 
errors  of  diagnosis  or  treatment  where  the  doctors  conduct  is  such  as  to  raise  a  question 
of  serious  professional  miscond  Uct  134 
. 
This  approach  was  subject  to  severe  criticism, 
including  a  private  members  bill  introduced  into  Parliament  seeking  to  introduce  a  two- 
tier  discipline  system  135 
. 
The  upshot  of  this  activity  was  the  passage  of  the  Medical 
(Professional  Performance)  Act  1995  which,  for  the  first  time,  gave  the  GIVIC  a  formal 
role  in  monitoring  and  evaluating  the  professional  practice  of  doctors. 
This  Act  created  another  two  statutory  committees:  the  Assessment  Referral  Committee 
and  the  Committee  on  Professional  Performance.  The  Assessment  Referral  Committee 
serves  the  same  general  function  as  the  PPC  (but  in  relation  to  handling  complaints 
about  professional  performance  136  ).  The  Committee  on  Professional  Performance  has 
jurisdiction  where  the  standard  of  professional  performance  of  a  fully  registered  person  is 
137 
found  to  have  been  seriously  deficient  In  the  first  case  involving  the  professional 243 
performance  procedures  to  have  reached  the  Privy  Council,  it  was  held  that  the 
91  seriously  deficient"  performance  has  to  be  in  relation  to  the  subject  matter  of  the 
complaint,  emphasising  that  the  procedure  remains  complaint-driven  and  is  therefore 
essentially  reactive  138 
. 
The  sanctions  available  are  the  same  as  those  of  the  Health 
Committee,  i.  e.  suspension  for  up  to  one  year,  conditional  registration  for  up  to  three 
years.  The  practitioner  who  continues  in  practice  in  violation  of  conditions  imposed  by 
the  committee  can  be  suspended,  and  as  with  other  provisions  the  doctor  who  continues 
in  practice  can  be  struck  off  by  the  PCC. 
The  GIVIC  has  defined  the  new  procedures  as  follows: 
"'Seriously  deficient  performance'  is  a  new  idea.  We  have  defined  it  as  'a 
departure  from  good  professional  practice,  whether  or  not  it  is  covered  by  specific 
GIVIC  guidance,  sufficiently  serious  to  call  into  question  a  doctors  registration 
This  means  that  we  will  question  your  registration  if  we  believe  that  you  are, 
repeatedly  or  persistently,  not  meeting  the  professional  standards  appropriate  to 
the  work  you  are  doing  -  especially  if  you  might  be  putting  patients  at  risk.  This 
could  include  failure  to  follow  the  guidance  in  our  booklet  Good  Medical 
Practice"139 
In  terms  of  the  procedure  adopted  by  the  GIVIC,  referral  to  the  Committee  only  occurs  as 
a  result  of  non-cooperation  with  the  (non-statutory)  assessment  procedure  by  which  the 
GIVIC  seeks  to  get  a  view  of  the  doctors  ability.  This  involves  a  GIVIC  member  acting  as 
case  co-ordinator,  and  the  establishment  of  an  assessment  panel  consisting  of  two 
appropriate  specialists  and  a  lay  person.  Even  the  fact  that  an  assessment  is  taking 
place  is  kept  confidential.  A  report  is  then  sent  to  the  GIVIC  listing  any  improvements 
required  140 
. 
The  procedures,  while  generally  welcomed  as  better  than  the  previous 
regulatory  gap,  have  been  subject  to  criticism: 
"Taking  a  lay  perspective,  Stacey  is  concerned  that  they  will  be  too  complex  and 
difficult  to  understand;  decisions  will  still  be  taken  in  pdvate;  and  there  will  be  no 
appeal  against  a  decision  not  to  pursue  a  case.  Nor  is  there  any  obligation  to  tell 
complainants  what  has  happened,  or  allow  them  to  put  their  concerns... 
Robinson  has  made  much  the  same  points  but  is  also  concerned  with  the  delays 
involved  in  dealing  with  a  deficient  doctor.  If  a  doctor  has  a  complaint  against  her 
or  him  going  through  other  NHS  complaint  procedures  or  the  courts,  any  GIVIC 
action  has  to  wait  until  these  are  completed.  She  has  suggested  that  these 
actions  may  take  years  and  meanwhile  the  doctor  concerned  continues  to 244 
practise.  She  is  also  sceptical  that  a  short  period  of  training  (at  taxpayers' 
expense)  can  remedy  deficient  performance. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  medical  profession,  concerns  have  also  been 
expressed.  Not  surprisingly,  these  centre  on  the  impact  of  widening  the  net  of 
surveillance.  Some  commentators  are  concerned  about  the  large  number  of 
people  involved  in  the  procedures  and  the  consequent  threat  to  the  doctor's 
privacy.  They  also  draw  attention  to  the  problems  of  maintaining  the 
confidentiality  of  patients  and  doctors  and  the  need  for  a  fair  and  unbiased 
consideration  of  the  issues.  "141 
Having  seen  the  mechanisms  by  which  the  GIVIC  seeks  to  regulate  the  medical 
profession,  the  next  section  considers  the  effects  which  this  actually  has  on  medical 
practice. 
IV:  Effect  of  GMC  requlation: 
In  terms  of  measuring  the  actual  effect  which  the  GIVIC  exerts  on  professional  practice,  it 
is  salutary  to  note  some  points  flagged  up  by  Smith  in  the  course  of  his  GIVIC-specific 
analysis: 
"...  great  caution  must  be  exercised  in  analysing  the  sanctions  imposed  by  the 
GIVIC's  Committees  owing  to  the  multivariate  nature  of  the  influences  which  affect 
the  decision-making  carried  out  in  imposing  sanctions.  Simplistic  correlational 
analyses  based  upon  inadequate  or  imprecise  data  may  create  confusion  and 
disclose  misleading  trends  resulting  in  misunderstanding  of  the  issues  involved 
and  perhaps  ill-founded  criticism.  In  addition,  because  of  the  complexity  of  the 
circumstances  involved  in  individual  cases,  and  especially  those  which  involve 
protracted  and  frequent  appearances  before  the  Council,  the  analysis  of 
sanctions  can  often  fail  to  reflect  the  full  range  of  subtle  and  varied  factors  which 
influence  Committees  in  arriving  at  their  decisions.  "142 
Having  said  that,  both  Smith  and  the  other  commentators  whose  comments  have 
informed  the  analysis  in  this  section  have  all  had  a  lot  to  say  about  the  efficacy  (or 
otherwise)  of  the  GIVIC's  interventions.  On  a  positive  note,  Smith  himself  notes  the  very 
low  rates  of  recidivism  among  those  struck  off  and  then  restored  to  the  Register  143 
. 
However,  the  summary  of  his  overall  study  is  less  flattering.  The  positive  aspects  he 
identifies  include  the  overall  effectiveness  in  terms  of  specific  deterrence,  the  fairness 
surrounding  procedures,  the  lack  of  impact  on  the  public  purse  and  the  increasing  lay 245 
involvement.  However,  his  conclusion  is  that  the  whole  jurisdiction  was  inadequately 
considered  at  the  GIVIC's  inception  and  has  retained  these  flaws  throughout'44. 
Stacey's  study,  conducted  with  the  benefit  of  inside  information  (albeit  as  a  lay  member) 
is  equally  critical,  concluding  that  the  GIVIC  is  not  adequately  fulfilling  its  obligations  to  the 
145 
state,  in  large  measure  due  to  its  failure  to  address  shortcomings  in  medical  education 
its  inability  (at  that  time)  to  deal  with  continuing  competence,  and  its  tendency  to  favour 
the  profession  rather  than  the  publiC146. 
Allsop  and  Mulcahy,  in  the  course  of  a  study  of  the  GIVIC  which  attempted  to  place  it 
more  in  the  context  of  the  overall  regulatory  system  (including  NHS  mechanisms  and 
informal  controls  which  are  outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis),  note  that  the  GIVIC  follows  a 
prosecutory/disciplinary  model  of  regulation  which  is,  however,  dependent  on  complaints 
being  made.  As  a  body,  the  GIVIC's  complaints  procedures  are  too  little-known  for  this  to 
be  a  common  occurrence.  The  mechanisms  themselves  are  lacking  in  public 
accountability,  particularly  at  the  screening  stages  and  in  relation  to  the  health 
procedures.  They  highlight  a  reliance  by  the  GIVIC  in  passing  matters  back  to  NHS 
regulatory  mechanisms  if  possible,  notwithstanding  that  these  mechanisms  do  not 
dovetail  properly  with  the  GIVIC's  procedures  and  jurisdiction.  There  is  an  unwillingness 
to  hear  complaints  while  litigation  is  pending.  The  threshold  for  serious  professional 
misconduct  is  too  high,  and  the  whole  mechanism  fails  to  pay  adequate  attention  to  the 
147  person  complaining 
Lastly,  in  terms  of  critiques  of  the  GIVIC,  the  report  of  the  Inquiry  into  the  Bristol  Royal 
Infirmary  148  examined  at  some  length  the  failure  of  the  GIVIC  to  prevent  the  deaths  of  a 
number  of  paediatric  patients,  and  indeed  considered  whether  the  rules  of  the  GIVIC 
applicable  at  the  time  (1984-1995)  actually  contributed  to  the  ongoing  problem.  The 
Inquiry's  final  report  made  a  large  number  of  findings  (many  of  them,  it  has  to  be  said, 
based  on  evidence  from  the  then  president  of  the  GIVIC,  Sir  Donald  Irvine,  to  the  Inquiry) 
that  the  protection  of  patients  by  the  GIVIC  was,  at  that  time  in  any  case,  highly  deficient 
in  a  number  of  respects. 
The  main  defects  in  the  GIVIC's  protective  functions  at  that  time,  as  highlighted  by  the 
Inquiry,  were  as  follows: 
GIVIC  regulation  was  regarded  as  a  means  of  coping  with  exceptional  misconduct, 
not  a  way  to  improve  standards  genera 
IIY149 246 
9  No  emphasis  was  placed  on  areas  such  as  consent  which  the  GIVIC  considered  to 
be  the  exclusive  preserve  of  the  civil  CoUrtS150 
*  Guidance  against  making  disparaging  comments  about  colleagues  was  widely 
perceived  in  such  a  way  as  to  discourage  doctors  from  raising  legitimate  concerns 
about  the  performance  or  conduct  of  colleagues,  particularly  at  the  start  of  the 
period  1984-1995,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  (also  initially),  there  was  no 
professional  guidance  at  all  from  the  GIVIC  indicating  that  doctors  had  any  ethical 
obligation  to  raise  concerns  affecting  patient  safety  with  anybod  Y151 
*  The  functions  of  the  GIVIC  were  not  properly  co-ordinated  with  other  regulators  152 
The  GMC  was  perceived  by  many  as  being  more  interested  in  protecting  doctors 
than  in  protecting  patients'  53 
*  The  threshold  of  "serious"  professional  misconduct  was  too  high,  which,  coupled 
with  the  high  burden  of  proof  in  proceedings  before  the  PCC,  left  the  public 
inadequately  protected  due  to  the  difficulty  of  removing  a  doctor  from  the  register 
on  the  basis  of  his  or  her  unsatisfactory  practice  154 
*  The  entire  regulatory  approach  of  the  GIVIC  at  that  time  was  reactive  and 
complaint-d  riven,  rather  than  proactive'  55  ;  and 
o  The  GIVIC  was  unable  to  enforce  clinical  standards  (which  it  was  not,  in  any  event, 
responsible  for  setting  in  the  first  place) 
156 
It  should  be  remembered  that  these  comments  were  in  relation  to  the  GIVIC's  approach  to 
these  areas  within  the  1984-1995  timeframe  considered  by  the  Inquiry,  and  that  the 
Inquiry  itself  also  heard  much  evidence  of  a  changed  culture  and  improved  procedures 
within  the  GIVIC.  The  extent  to  which  these  improvements  in  policy  are  reflected  in 
practice  is  much  harder  to  assess. 
To  summarise  these  comments,  both  from  Bristol  and  elsewhere,  it  appears  that  the 
GIVIC  is  reasonably  effective  as  a  guardian  of  standards  of  conduct  and  the  ability  of 
doctors  to  practice  as  a  result  of  health  problems,  albeit  the  supervision  is  purely  reactive 
and  the  sanctions  seem  to  be  biased  against  doctors  who  offend  against  professional 
esteem  rather  than  those  who  offend  or  harm  patients.  The  professional  practice 
jurisdiction  has  not  been  subject  to  detailed  analysis  since  its  inception  157 
, 
but  the 
comments  made  above  suggest  that  the  procedures  (possibly  for  good  reason)  are 
insufficiently  clear  to  the  public.  Overall,  in  spite  of  recent  improvements,  there  is  still 
much  that  could  be  done  to  improve. 247 
V:  Summary: 
A:  Purpose  of  the  GMC: 
The  purpose  of  the  GIVIC  is  clear  enough  in  terms  of  both  its  parent  statute  and  the 
GIVIC's  own  statements:  it  regulates  the  qualifications  necessary  to  become  a  registered 
medical  practitioner,  maintains  a  register  of  those  who  continue  to  be  eligible  for  this 
status,  and  takes  action  against  those  alleged  not  to  be  fit  or  eligible  for  continued 
inclusion.  In  so  doing,  the  GIVIC  asserts  that  its  main  purpose  is  to  protect  the  public. 
However,  it  appears  that  its  practices  tend  to  be  driven  more  by  considerations  of 
protecting  the  profession  itself. 
B:  Mechanisms  of  the  GMC: 
The  GIVIC  acts  formally  through  its  statutory  committees.  These  have  power  to  restrict  or 
suspend  registration  (and  with  it  to  remove  the  privileges  attached  to  registration)  and,  in 
the  case  of  the  PCC,  have  the  power  to  remove  a  doctor  from  the  register  altogether. 
Most  of  the  work,  however,  is  done  on  an  informal  basis,  away  from  any  public  scrutiny. 
Thus,  the  systems  of  utilising  screeners  (both  for  conduct  and  health  referrals)  and  the  in 
camera  nature  of  proceedings  before  certain  key  committees  mean  that  it  is  very  hard  to 
analyse  fully  what  the  GIVIC  does. 
C:  Effects  of  the  GMC: 
As  we  have  seen,  the  GIVIC  has  an  acceptably  low  level  of  recidivists  so  it  is,  on  one  level 
at  least,  effective.  However,  the  reactive  nature  of  the  GIVIC's  procedures  make  any 
attempt  at  estimating  how  much  conduct  which  would  attract  the  GIVIC's  sanctions  (if  the 
GIVIC  knew  of  the  conduct  in  question)  impossible  to  gauge.  The  deliberately  informal 
and  confidential  nature  of  much  (if  not  most)  of  the  work  done  similarly  makes  full 
analysis  impossible.  Perhaps  the  best  testament  of  the  GIVICs  effects  is,  however,  a 
form  of  peer  review:  as  noted  above,  doctors  registered  in  the  UK  are  held  in  high 
esteem  across  the  world  by  medical  colleagues.  Such  esteem  would  not,  it  is  submitted, 
continue  if  the  GIVIC's  powers  did  not  exert  a  genuine  influence  in  securing  and 
maintaining  the  highest  professional  standards. 248 
VI:  Comparison  with  Core  Evaluation  Criteria: 
In  Chapters  1  and  2,  we  identified  seven  core  criteria  against  which  each  segment  of  the 
medical  regulatory  framework  would  be  measured.  The  workings  of  the  GIVIC  will  now 
be  assessed  against  each  of  the  evaluation  criteria  in  turn. 
A:  Visibility: 
The  purposes  for  which  the  GIVIC  exists  are  generally  highly  visible  in  terms  of  legislative 
declarations  and  the  GMCs  own  pronouncements.  What  is  less  clear  is  the  workings  of 
the  mechanisms  by  which  these  actually  translate  into  practice. 
The  mechanisms  of  the  GIVIC  are  a  mixture  of  highly  visible  and  deliberately  opaque. 
The  nature  of  the  formal  decision-making  bodies  and  officials  and  criteria  for  decision- 
making  within  these  mechanisms,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  actions  of  the  PCC,  are 
conducted  in  the  glare  of  full  publicity  and  are  regularly  reported  in  the  national  media. 
However,  the  preceding  decisions  to  proceed  to  the  PCC  are  almost  impossible  to 
analyse  and  question.  The  PCC's  lack  of  fully  reasoned  decisions  is  also  worthy  of 
particular  criticism. 
The  effects  of  the  GIVIC  are  highly  visible  in  many  respects,  and  completely  invisible  in 
others.  PCC  proceedings  being  conducted  in  public  are,  of  course,  very  visible  -  but 
virtually  everything  prior  to  the  PCC  is  kept  a  secret.  As  with  the  criminal  law,  the  effects 
of  the  GIVIC  are  probably  best  seen  by  their  absence  than  their  presence.  Most  doctors 
appear  to  be  behaving  appropriately,  but  it  is  impossible  to  tell  if  this  is  the  result  of 
general  compliance  to  the  rules  or  merely  lack  of  discovery  of  improper  or  substandard 
conduct.  Again,  this  can  be  criticised. 
Overall,  the  GIVIC  is  considered  to  be  unacceptable  in  terms  of  visibility,  in  spite  of  recent 
reforms  in  the  direction  of  more  openness. 
B:  Accountability: 
"Accountability",  in  the  context  of  a  self-regulatory  system,  is  a  concept  which  needs  to 
be  handled  with  care.  The  majority  of  the  GIVIC's  members  are,  by  law,  elected  by  the 
profession  and  so  are  accountable  to  the  profession  for  their  actions.  However,  where 
accountability  is  for  policing  that  same  group,  this  is  not  necessarily  a  good  thing.  it  is 
not  unreasonable  to  postulate  that  doctors  may  (perhaps  subconsciously)  display  a  bias 249 
in  favour  of  colleagues  who  are  facing  disciplinary  proceedings;  some  of  the  studies 
suggested  a  degree  of  bias  in  the  GIVIC's  mechanisms  which  favoured  protecting  the 
profession.  Thus,  while  having  an  elected  majority  may  make  the  GIVIC  more 
accountable  to  the  profession,  it  could  have  an  adverse  impact  on  the  fairness  of  its 
proceedings.  However,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  a  direct  link  between  this  potential 
bias  and  the  elected  nature  of  the  majority  of  the  Council.  Appointed  medical  members 
(of  whom  there  are  a  considerable  number)  could  equally  display  such  bias  in  favour  of 
medical  colleagues. 
It  is,  however,  in  terms  of  accountability  to  the  general  public  that  the  GIVIC  scores  most 
poorly.  All  the  commentators  have  criticised  the  GIVIC  on  this  score.  Too  many  things 
happen  which  are  done  away  from  public  scrutiny.  Giving  lay  screeners  a  veto  over 
decisions  not  to  proceed  further  with  complaints  is  a  welcome  step  forward,  but  since  the 
screening  decision  then  proceeds  to  another  secret  interim  committee  (on  which  the 
minority  lay  members  have  no  veto)  the  procedure  is  still  inadequate.  While  accepting 
that  there  are  legitimate  grounds  for  protecting  confidentiality  in  some  circumstances, 
there  appears  to  be  no  good  reason  for  not  requiring  these  secret  procedures  to 
produce  appropriately  anonymised  accounts  of  what  they  have  done.  The  lack  of 
feedback  to  the  complainant  is  another  shortcoming  in  this  area. 
Overall,  therefore,  it  is  concluded  that  the  GIVIC  fails  to  satisfy  the  criterion  of 
accountability. 
C:  Overall  Fairness: 
In  the  context  of  the  PCC,  this  section  adopts  the  comments  of  Smith: 
"Members  of  the  PCC  attempt  to  act  fairly  when  dealing  with  cases  in  terms  of 
allowing  opposing  interests  equal  priority,  and  permitting  both  sides  to  state  their 
case... 
Aspects  of  proceedings  which  may  still  be  seen  as  unfair  include  the  problem  of 
the  GIVIC  dealing  with  cases  involving  disputed  theories  of  medicine  prior  to  the 
resolution  of  the  question  in  the  professional  scientific  and  medical  community; 
the  failure  in  some  cases  to  give  practitioners  sufficient  notice  of  charges 
(particularly  where  many  and  complex  allegations  are  involved);  the  failure  to  give 
clear  and  unequivocal  notification  to  some  practitioners  of  conditions  imposed  on 
their  registration;  the  failure  of  Committees  to  give  reasoned  decisions;  the 
imposition  of  numerous  consecutive  directions  for  postponement  or  suspension; 250 
problems  associated  with  imposing  conditions  on  the  registration  of  practitioners 
which  are  unclear  or  unworkable;  the  inability  of  suspended  practitioners,  on 
occasion,  to  supply  the  names  of  referees  owing  to  their  being  out  of  touch  with 
colleagues  while  suspended;  the  problem  of  immediate  suspension  being  under- 
used  and  inconsistently  imposed  in  some  cases;  and  the  fact  that  some 
practitioners  are  unaware  of  ways  in  which  to  satisfy  Committees  of  their  good 
"151  conduct  on  applications  for  restoration  . 
There  is,  however,  another  aspect  to  fairness:  fairness  to  those  who  make  complaints  to 
the  GIVIC  about  a  doctor.  Such  a  complainer  may  be  advised  if  it  is  proposed  to  take  a 
case  to  the  PCC,  but  will  not  always  be  advised  as  to  what  has  happened  prior  to  that 
stage.  The  prior  stages  also  do  not  give  the  complainer  an  opportunity  to  put  his  or  her 
case  across,  proceeding  purely  on  the  basis  of  written  statements  of  complaint. 
However,  these  are  largely  attributable  to  the  prior  failure  in  terms  of  accountability  and 
visibility.  Accordingly,  it  is  concluded  that  the  GIVIC  does  satisfy  the  test  of  overall 
fairness. 
D:  Effectiveness: 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  practical  effects  of  the  GIVIC  are,  in  some  respects, 
unquantifiable.  This  section  is  therefore  concerned  only  with  the  quantifiable  effects. 
From  what  we  can  observe,  does  the  GMC  do  what  it  sets  out  to  achieve? 
The  answer  here  would  appear  to  be  yes:  the  GIVIC  has  mechanisms  in  place  to 
describe  what  is  or  is  not  acceptable  conduct,  how  to  determine  if  someone  has 
committed  unacceptable  conduct  if  they  dispute  the  allegation,  and  a  system  of  means 
of  disposal  aimed  partly  at  punishing  the  doctor  and  deterring  him/her  and  others  from 
any  future  wrongdoing,  but  principally  to  prevent  the  doctor  from  being  able  to  cause  any 
more  damage  (be  it  physical  harm  to  patients  or  harm  to  the  profession's  image).  The 
reactive  nature  of  these  procedures  remains  a  problem,  although  the  current  proposals 
for  revalidation  by  doctors  may  address  this  problem.  For  a  reactive  system,  the  GIVIC 
does  what  it  does  well  enough  to  maintain  standards. 
In  general,  therefore,  it  is  considered  that  the  GIVIC  is  sufficiently  effective. 
E:  Efficiency: 251 
Quasi-criminal  procedures  such  as  that  used  by  the  PCC  are  expensive.  Local  health 
resolutions  are  inexpensive.  Both  have  the  same  objective  in  mind,  i.  e.  ensuring  that 
those  who  are  on  the  register  are  fit  to  practice  medicine.  The  more  informal  procedures 
referred  to  above  can  be  criticised  on  other  counts,  but  they  are  clearly  more  efficient 
(assuming  they  work  and  therefore  reflect  the  lower  cost  base  in  terms  of  productive 
efficiency)  than  formal  ones  involving  committees  sifting  for  days  on  end  in  London  with 
full  supporting  cast  of  lawyers  and  support  staff.  In  addition,  the  GIVIC  is  self-funding  (or 
at  least,  and  in  the  face  of  the  1970s  professional  revolt),  funded  by  contributions  from 
its  membership.  It  therefore  makes  no  drain  on  the  public  purse. 
Accordingly,  it  is  felt  that  the  GIVIC  is  efficient. 
F:  Avoidance  of  undue  influence  with  good  medical  practice: 
One  of  the  main  reasons  that  advocates  of  professional  self-regulation  argue  for  its 
retention  is  the  perceived  need  to  avoid  having  an  external  body  interfering  with  what 
they  perceive  as  being  the  profession's  own  affairs.  Against  this  background,  it  would  be 
surprising  if  the  GIVIC  were  to  be  found  to  interfere  unduly  with  its  own  members'  practice 
of  medicine.  While  criticisms  of  the  GIVIC  are  widespread,  this  is  not  one  of  them. 
Accordingly,  it  is felt  that  the  GIVIC  satisfies  the  criterion  of  avoidance  of  interference  with 
good  medical  practice. 
G:  Respect  for  patient  autonomy: 
Respect  for  patient  autonomy  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  areas  on  which  the  GIVIC  issues 
guidance  to  the  medical  profession.  Having  said  that,  it  is  unfortunate  that  in  some 
respects  the  disciplinary  functions  of  the  GIVIC  fail  to  follow  its  own  advice.  In  particular, 
the  fact  that  so  many  procedures  are  followed  without  any  reference  to  the  patient 
(assuming  for  these  purposes  that  it  is  a  patient  or  former  patient  of  the  doctor  who  has 
made  the  complaint)  cannot  genuinely  be  said  to  be  treating  that  patient  as  an  end  in  his 
or  her  own  right.  However,  this  is  again  a  failure  provoked  by  the  preceding  failures  in 
accountability  and  visibility. 
Accordingly,  it  is  therefore  concluded  that  the  GIVIC  does  adequately  respect  patient 
autonomy. 
VII:  Conclusions  and  Postscript: 252 
The  GIVIC  clearly  has  a  central  role  to  play  in  the  regulation  of  the  medical  profession; 
that,  indeed,  is  its  raison  dlfte.  In  carrying  out  these  functions  it  has  an  series  of  formal 
mechanisms  and  an  array  of  disciplinary  sanctions  at  its  disposal.  It  has  an  equally  large 
array  of  informal  mechanisms  supplementing  and  underpinning  the  statutory  schemes. 
Given  that  overall  standards  of  the  medical  profession  in  the  UK  appear  high,  it  could  be 
said  to  be  doing  its  job. 
However,  the  detailed  analysis  of  the  mechanisms,  and  the  ways  in  which  they  are 
deployed,  highlight  a  number  of  weaknesses  in  the  current  scheme.  Indeed,  it  is  very 
hard  to  be  sure  to  what  extent  the  GIVIC's  mechanisms  contribute  to  the  standard  of 
medical  practice  in  general,  and  how  much  could  be  attributed  to  peer  pressure  and 
review,  employer  scrutiny  and  informal  controls  such  as  decisions  not  to  appoint  doctors 
known  (through  informal  channels)  to  be  less  than  top  performers.  One  can  point  to  the 
fact  that  the  GIVIC  has  only  exercised  any  formal  control  over  standards  of  practice  for 
the  last  six  of  its  143  years,  with  no  appreciable  (or  at  least  quantifiable)  improvement  in 
standards,  as  indicating  that  perhaps  the  GIVIC's  powers  are  really  only  of  particular  use 
in  relation  to  the  "bad  apples",  and  make  no  real  difference  to  the  ordinary  practitioner. 
This  in  itself  is  not  a  bad  thing;  the  criminal  law,  for  example,  performs  a  similar  function. 
However,  for  the  body  which  is  given  the  key  statutory  responsibility  for  medical 
regulation  to  take  a  late,  and  still  reactive,  approach  to  standards  of  practice  is  not  really 
a  solid  foundation  on  which  to  build  the  regulatory  machinery  of  this  country.  Given  that 
no  other  body  regulates  private  practitioners,  and  given  the  difficulties  in  using  the  civil 
courts  to  enforce  standards  of  care  noted  in  Chapter  4  supra,  this  area  was  (until  1995) 
suffering  from  a  major  regulatory  failure.  Whether  the  professional  performance 
procedures  are  adequate  to  fill  this  gap  is  still  open  to  question,  and  it  seems  clear  that 
more  research  should  be  done  on  this  area.  Possibly  the  GIVIC's  proposals  to  introduce 
"  revalidation"  for  all  doctors  wishing  to  practice  medicine  159  will  address  the  issue 
adequately'60.  For  now,  the  main  regulator  of  the  medical  profession  cannot  be  said  to 
be  doing  all  it  could. 
This  situation  may  change  under  new  proposals  before  Parliament.  The  National  Health 
Service  Reform  and  Health  Care  Professions  Bill  2002  includes,  in  Part  2,  the 
establishment  of  a  new  body,  the  Council  for  the  Regulation  of  Health  Care 
Professiona  IS161 
. 
This  is  intended  to  oversee  the  activities  of  various  health  care 
professions'  regulatory  bodies,  including  the  GIVIC,  to  ensure  that  they  act  in  the  interests 
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In  some  respects,  the  imposition  of  an  external  regulator  (a  sort  of  over-regulator)  to  a 
body  which  has  been  regarded  as  the  epitome  of  state-sponsored  self-regulation  could 
be  seen  as  weakening  the  principle  of  professional  self-regulation.  In  one  sense,  this  is 
true:  the  new  proposals  will  allow  the  Council  to  investigate  and  report  on  the  functions 
of  the  GMC'  63  (and  its  counterparts  for  other  health  care  professions,  as  well  as  making 
comparisons  between  the  various  regulatory  bodies'64),  and,  if  it  is  "desirable  to  do  so  for 
the  protection  of  members  of  the  public",  direct  these  regulatory  bodies  (including  the 
GIVIC)  to  make  rules  so  as  to  achieve  a  particular  effectl  65.  It  would  also  be  able  to 
investigate  complaints  about  the  regulatory  bodies  covered  166,  although  the  specifics  of 
who  would  be  able  to  complain  and  the  matters  to  be  included  (and  excluded)  from  such 
167  investigation  are  to  be  specified  by  statutory  instrument 
,  making  more  specific 
comment  impossible  at  this  time.  Lastly,  the  proposed  Council  would  be  able  to  appeal 
decisions  of  the  GIVIC  (and  others)  to  the  courts  168  if  it  feels  disciplinary  or  competence 
matters  have  been  treated  unduly  lenientlyl"9  or  in  relation  to  decisions  not  to  take  such 
action  or  to  restore  someone  to  the  register  following  previous  disciplinary  action  170.  All 
of  these  powers,  if  enacted  and  used,  would  mean  that  decisions  concerning 
professional  regulation  were  being  taken  by  a  body  which,  in  the  Department  of  Health's 
view  at  least,  will  be  comprised  of  a  majority  of  persons  who  speak  for  the  interests  of 
patients  and  the  wider  publiCl  71. 
One  alternative  view  is  to  regard  the  powers  of  this  proposed  new  body  as  simply  being 
an  extension  of  the  existing  powers  of  scrutiny  which  exist  (and  which,  in  the  main,  have 
always  existed)  in  relation  to  the  GIVIC:  oversight  by  the  courts  coupled  with  default 
powers  vested  in  the  Privy  Council.  The  new  proposals  simply  clarify  and  codify 
procedures  which  could  have  been  effected  through  appropriate  resort  to  the  courts 
and/or  the  Privy  Council  (and  subject  to  these  bodies  agreeing  that  the  suggested 
intervention  properly  lay  within  their  respective  jurisdictions). 
It  is  submitted  that  a  better  view  is  to  consider  what  is  currently  being  debated  in 
Parliament  as  a  radical  departure  from  the  past.  This  is  not  to  say  that  what  is  proposed 
will  detract  from  or  dilute  the  principle  of  professional  self-regulation.  It  is  instead  to  say 
that  these  proposals  recognise  that  the  GIVIC  (and  its  counterparts)  forms  part  of  the 
machinery  of  the  state.  it  may  be  self-regulating  and  self-funding,  but  it  is  ultimately 
clothed  with  the  power  of  government,  and  as  such  the  modern  democratic  consensus 
requires  it  to  be  accountable  to  a  wider  constituency  than  its  own  membership.  In  this 
context,  the  GIVIC  is  being  placed  on  exactly  the  same  footing  as  other  professions.  As 
an  example,  solicitors  in  Scotland  are  subject  to  the  disciplinary  mechanisms  of  the  Law 
Society  of  Scotland,  the  relevant  professional  regulatory  body  172 
. 
However,  if  someone 254 
complains  to  the  Law  Society  and  is  dissatisfied  with  the  handling  of  their  complaint,  they 
have  a  further  right  of  complaint  to  an  impartial  "over-regulator",  the  Scottish  Legal 
Services  Ombudsman  173 
. 
The  ombudsman  has  certain  dghts  in  relation  to  investigations 
by  the  Law  Society  which  do  not  exactly  mirror  the  powers  for  the  proposed  Council,  but 
the  point  is  that  professional  self-regulation  is  not  incompatible  with  extemal  oversight. 
Indeed,  the  Scottish  ombudsman  himself  saw  no  conflict  between  these  two  concepts. 
In  his  1995  Annual  Report,  he  expressed  the  following  opinion: 
"There  appears  no  reason  why  self  regulation  should  not  work  so  long  as  the  Law 
Society  recognises  that  it  needs  to  constantly  review  the  way  in  which  it  and  its 
members  interface  with  the  Public,  so  long  as  it  is  prepared  to  welcome 
constructive  criticism  and  so  long  as  its  Client  Relations  &  Complaints  Office  is 
provided  with  the  resources  that  are  necessary  and  changes  are  implemented  to 
074  ensure  that  investigations  are  effectively  controlled  . 
If  the  proposals  currently  going  through  Parliament  are  ultimately  enacted  (as  is  likely), 
there  will  be  an  external  body  able  to  intervene  so  as  to  provide  a  check  on  whether  or 
not  self  regulation  is  working  properly.  Such  a  measure  (if  it  lives  up  to  its  Department  of 
Health  description)  can  only  improve  the  regulatory  landscape,  and  as  such  is  to  be 
welcomed. 255 
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Chapter  6:  Direct  Statutory  Regulation: 
Introduction: 
This  chapter  considers  areas  where  Parliament  has  laid  down  the  parameters  of  the  conduct  in 
question,  and  not  delegated  the  matter  to  the  courts  (civil  or  criminal)  or  to  some  other  actor 
such  as  a  regulatory  body.  There  remains  a  considerable  overlap  between  this  chapter  and 
others,  since  much  of  the  direct  statutory  regulation  concerned  will  be  enforceab  le  in  the  courts 
at  the  behest  of  someone  alleging  a  failure  to  adhere  to  Parliament's  new  standards.  Sector- 
specific  effects  of  legislation  have  already  been  considered  within  some  of  the  preceding 
chapters;  the  present  Chapter  seeks  to  analyse  the  wider  impact  of  legislative  innovations. 
As  previously,  considerations  of  both  space  and  research  methodology  require  some 
material  to  be  excluded.  It  is  worth  noting  that  even  a  textbook  intended  to  provide  a 
comprehensive  collection  of  medical  statutes  requires  to  exclude  a  huge  volume  of 
material  from  a  book  running  to  400  pages'.  So  far  as  methodology  is  concerned,  two 
main  factors  have  served  to  reduce  the  scope  of  this  Chapter.  Firstly,  the  requirement 
that  a  regulatory  measure  have  universal  coverage  excludes  not  only  the  huge  body  of 
law  relating  to  the  structures  and  functions  of  the  NHS,  but  also  a  number  of  statutes 
which,  while  of  theoretically  general  applicability,  only  really  impact  on  a  small  number  of 
practitioners  working  in  particular  specialities.  A  number  of  the  more  obvious  examples  of 
this  type  are  mentioned  in  this  Chapter  for  the  sake  of  completeness,  but  are  not  subject 
to  any  analysis,  Secondly,  to  avoid  duplication,  statutes  whose  impact  has  been 
considered  in  previous  chapters  are  also  excluded. 
The  main  exception  to  the  exception,  however,  arises  in  respect  of  statutes  which  affect 
the  civil  rights  and  obligations  of  individuals  vis-d-vis  their  health  care  provider.  The 
emphasis  of  Chapter  4  was  on  the  role  of  the  civil  courts  in  regulating  medical  practice 
and  so,  underpinning  that  approach,  there  was  an  emphasis  on  the  rules  of  the  common 
law  as  laid  down  (or  discovered)  by  the  courts.  The  emphasis  of  this  Chapter  is  to 
consider  changes  to  the  rights  and  duties  of  individuals  or  bodies  following  Parliamentary 
intervention,  and  so  statutory  variations  to  the  previous  common  law  position  are 
considered  within  the  ambit  of  this  Chapter. 
In  the  course  of  preparing  this  Chapter,  it  became  apparent  that  the  statutes  included  fell 
into  two  categories,  and  the  chapter's  structure  reflects  this.  The  first  group  of  statutes 
considered  represent  limited  interventions  by  Parliament,  typically  in  response  to  a 
particular  area  of  controversy  which  had  reached  prominent  public  attention.  A  selection 262 
of  the  more  prominent  statutes  failing  into  this  group  is  given,  but  the  limited  scope  of 
there  measures  precludes  them  from  being  subjected  to  any  detailed  analysis.  The 
second  group  are  statutes  which  (at  least  arguably)  change  the  entire  legal  landscape. 
Only  two  statutes  appear  to  have  created  such  a  widespread  impact:  the  Human  Rights 
Act  1998  (hereafter  "HRA")  and  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998  (hereafter  "DPA). 
11:  Subject-specific  Statutory  Interventions: 
As  noted  above,  this  section  is  in  effect  a  list  of  areas  where  Parliament  has  seen  fit  to 
legislate  on  a  particular  area  so  as  to  vary  pre-existing  civil  dghts  (and  occasionally  to 
impose  criminal  sanctions).  The  list  is  not  comprehensive,  and  no  detailed  analysis  is 
offered  on  the  impact  of  these  measures.  One  reason  for  this  lack  of  analysis  is  that  the 
measures  considered  are  generally  binary  in  nature:  previously  you  could  do  this,  now 
you  can't. 
A:  Assorted  public  health  legislation: 
The  main  legislation  consists  of  the  Venereal  Disease  Act  1917  and  the  Public  Health 
(Control  of  Diseases)  Act  1984.  This  legislation  concerns  the  potential  compulsory 
detention  and/or  treatment  of  individuals  suffering  from  any  of  a  variety  of  "notifiable 
diseases".  The  specific  diseases  which  are  "notifiable"  are  contained  in  the  Health 
2  (Infectious  Diseases)  Regulations  1985 
. 
In  essence,  Parliament  has  determined  that  for 
the  overall  good  of  society,  individuals  suffering  from  these  diseases  forfeit  their  right  to 
liberty  and  personal  bodily  integrity.  Those  having  a  notifiable  disease  also  forfeit  their 
right  to  confidentiality,  since  doctors  are  under  a  statutory  obligation  to  advise  the 
appropriate  authorities  if  they  diagnose  such  a  disease  in  a  patient.  Neither  HIV  nor  AIDS 
is  notifiable,  but  they  are  subject  to  a  slightly  different  regime  under  the  AIDS  (Control)  Act 
1987.  It  has,  however,  been  argued  that  the  current  trends  towards  liberalism  may  result 
in  this  approach  being  challenged  and,  ultimately,  changed  3. 
B:  Human  Tissue  Act  1961: 
This  is  the  legislation  (amended  by  the  Anatomy  Act  1984  and  Corneal  Tissue  Act  1986) 
by  which  Parliament  sought  to  regulate  the  use  which  could  be  made  of  tissue  or  organS4 
removed  from  dead  bodies.  Recent  scandals  over  organ  retention  have  shown  that  this 
legislation  is  highly  flawed.  The  Final  Report  of  the  Independent  Review  Group  on 
Retention  of  Organs  at  Post-Mortem5  stated  that  the  1961  Act  should  be  replaced 
completelY6. 263 
It  is  understood  that  this  recommendation  has  been  accepted  by  the  Scottish  Executive. 
Similar  recommendations  were  made  by  the  parallel  English  inquiry  7.  Given  that  the 
legislation  would  appear  to  be  due  for  repeal  in  the  near  future,  its  current  form  is  not 
considered  further  here. 
C:  Abortion  Act  1967: 
Most  of  the  applicable  parts  of  the  Abortion  Act  1967  were  considered  in  Chapter  3.  It  is 
mentioned  here  simply  as  an  example  of  the  changes  which  Parliament  can  bring  about, 
but  which  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  judicial  development  to  effect  (not  least  because 
the  1967  Act  was  creating  a  statutory  defence  to  what  was,  in  England  and  Wales  at  any 
rate,  a  statutory  offence).  The  knock-on  effect  of  this  change  to  the  criminal  law  was  also 
picked  up  on  in  Chapter  4:  Parliament  having  removed  the  criminal  sanctions  attaching  to 
therapeutic  abortion,  the  courts  proceeded  to  regard  it  as  any  other  form  of  medical 
intervention,  giving  rise  to  civil  liability  for  negligence  in  appropriate  cases. 
D:  Congenital  Disabilities  (Civil  Liability)  Act  1976: 
This  legislation,  which  applies  only  in  England  and  Wales,  was  arguably  unnecessary. 
The  Act  was  intended  to  allow  a  child  bom  with  disabilities  caused  by  someone's 
negligent  action  in  relation  to  the  child's  parents,  or  to  the  mother  in  the  course  of 
pregnancy  or  the  child  itself  in  the  course  of  birth,  to  bring  an  action  in  tort  against  the 
person  whose  negligence  caused  the  disability.  At  the  same  time,  the  Act  sought  to 
exclude  the  possibility  of  a  child  suing  its  mother  for  such  negligence  (although  the  rule  is 
modified  slightly  in  relation  to  a  woman  driving  while  pregnane),  and  also  sought  to  rule 
out  the  possibility  of  so-called  "wrongful  life"  actione.  As  such,  the  Act  represents  a 
deliberate  attempt  by  Parliament  to  change  the  common  law  rules  of  liability  in  such 
circumstances.  The  Act  itself  was  subsequently  amended  to  cover  ex  utero  negligence 
arising  (typically)  out  of  IVF  treatment'O. 
However,  the  courts  have  subsequently  held  that  the  Act  in  large  measure  simply 
reflected  the  pre-existing  (but  unstated)  common  law  position,  at  least  in  relation  to 
England  and  Wales.  In  the  cases  of  Barton  v  Islington  HA  and  de  Marte/1  v  Merton  and 
Sutton  HA",  the  court  held  that  a  child  born  disabled  as  a  result  of  another's  negligence 
could  raise  an  action  notwithstanding  its  pre-birth  lack  of  legal  personality.  In  McKay  v 
Essex  AHA12 
, 
the  court  held  there  was  no  right  of  action  for  "wrongful  life"  (i.  e.  a  claim  the 
essence  of  which  was  that  the  person  on  whose  behalf  the  claim  was  being  made  should 
not  have  been  born  at  all). 264 
Some  commentators  have  suggested  that  the  1976  Act  inadvertently  creates  an  action  for 
"  wrongful  life",  at  least  in  certain  circumstances  13 
. 
Another  commentator  has  suggested 
that  the  Act's  supposed  abolition  of  wrongful  life  actions  is  incomplete  and  that  a  common 
law  action  for  wrongful  life  could  be  sustained  notwithstanding  the  passing  of  the  Act,  in 
relation  to  injuries  or  disabilities  arising  without  any  negligence"  . 
However,  these 
comments  fly  in  the  face  of  the  Court  of  Appeal's  opinions  on  the  matter  (albeit  stated 
obfterý)  and  therefore  appear  not  to  reflect  the  Act  as  it  is  applied  in  practice. 
E:  Vaccine  Damage  Payments  Act  1979: 
In  Chapter  4,  a  number  of  criticisms  of  fault-based  compensation  systems  were  noted, 
together  with  a  final  mention  that  so-called  "no-fault"  compensation  generally  meant  more 
money  going  to  compensate  victims  rather  than  going  to  overheads  than  in  civil  litigation. 
However,  the  Vaccine  Damage  Payments  Act  1979  establishes  a  "no-fault"  compensation 
scheme,  albeit  in  the  limited  area  of  persons  who  are  severely  injured  by  one  of  a 
specified  number  of  vaccines  against  particular  infectious  diseases.  The  reasons  for  this 
sector-specific  policy  are  described  by  Brazier  as  follows: 
"Vaccine  damage  is  a  candidate  for  special  treatment  because  of  the  distinction  in 
social  effect  between  vaccines  and  other  drugs.  Generally  the  benefit  and  risk  of 
taking  a  drug  rests  with  the  individual  patient  alone.  No  one  else  suffers  directly  if 
he  does  not  take  the  drug.  No  one  else  benefits  directly  if  he  does.  With  a 
vaccine  the  position  is  Merent.  If  a  child  is  immunized  against  contagious 
disease,  the  child  himself  benefits  from  the  immunity  conferred  and  his  friends  and 
schoolfellows  benefit  from  the  elimination  of  the  risk  that  he  will  pass  that  disease 
on  to  them.  Consequently,  vaccination  of  young  children  against  tetanus, 
diphtheria,  polio,  measles  and  whooping  cough  is  actively  promoted  by  the 
Department  of  Health.  "16 
The  scope  of  the  scheme  is  limited  to  those  who  are  severely  disabled  (meaning 
disablement  to  the  extent  of  80%  or  more,  as  measured  under  social  security  legislation 
teStS1  7)  as  a  result  of  vaccination  for  one  of  the  specified  diseases"  and  subject  to  certain 
other  criteria  such  as  place  and  time  of  vaccination'9.  The  same  principles  apply  to 
damage  caused  by  vaccination  of  the  motherýo.  The  successful  claimant  is  entitled  to  a 
one-off  payment  of  a  fixed  sum,  currently  set  at  : E100,00021. 265 
The  main  reasons  for  excluding  this  Act  from  detailed  examination  were  spelled  out  in 
Chapter  2:  a  "pure"  no-fault  compensation  system  does  not  (in  the  absence  of  additional 
features)  fulfil  any  of  the  regulatory  functions  identified  in  Chapter  2.  The  scheme 
established  by  this  legislation  pays  compensation  following  injury  or  harm  occurring  as  a 
result  of  vaccination,  and  not  (as  with  one  of  the  identified  regulatory  tasks)  because  of 
any  failure  to  adhere  to  standards. 
F:  Mental  Health  Act  1983/Mental  Health  (Scotland)  Act  1984: 
The  mental  health  legislation  under  discussion  here  forms  the  core  of  an  extremely  large 
and  complex  area  of  the  law.  Aside  from  methodological  considerations,  space  alone 
would  preclude  this  thesis  from  including  a  detailed  examinabon  of  mental  health  law. 
Mental  health  legislation  creates  a  highly-detailed  legal  code  applicable  to  persons 
suffering  from  a  "mental  disorder",  and  in  particular  to  their  reception,  care  and  treatment 
and  to  the  management  of  their  affairs.  Aspects  of  this  include  compulsory  admission  to 
hospital,  procedures  to  be  followed  where  the  person  is  facing  a  criminal  trial  or  has  been 
convicted  of  an  offence,  rules  regarding  what  forms  of  treatment  may  be  given  to  such 
patients  without  their  consent,  and  the  established  of  mental  health  tribunals  to  hear 
appeals  against  (in  particular)  decisions  concerning  compulsory  hospitalisation.  While 
there  are  some  distinctions  between  the  Scottish  legislation  and  its  counterpart  in  England 
and  Wales,  particularly  in  relation  to  procedures  which  require  to  be  referred  to  the  courts, 
in  general  the  two  pieces  of  legislation  address  an  identical  problem  and  adopt  similar 
solutions. 
Clearly  much  of  the  acfivity  under  these  Acts  falls  within  our  concept  of  regulation,  and  a 
number  of  distinct  regulatory  tasks  are  being  carded  out.  However,  this  legislation  is 
concerned  with  adults  whose  mental  capacity  is  deemed  to  be  impaired  to  the  extent  that 
overriding  mechanisms  are  necessary  either  for  the  protection  or  well-being  of  the 
individual  concerned,  or  else  for  the  protection  of  the  public.  The  main  thrust  of  this  thesis 
has  been  to  consider  the  mechanisms  which  apply  to  adult  patients  of  full  capacity,  and  so 
the  body  of  mental  health  law  can  be  regarded  as  peripheral  to  the  main  body  of  rules 
under  consideration. 
Before  moving  on,  however,  it  is  useful  to  consider  a  few  of  the  rules  embodied  in  this 
legislation  as  examples  of  how  legislation  can  be  used  to  address  complex  issues 
surrounding  the  care  and  management  of  a  difficult  but  vulnerable  client  group.  Some  of 
the  responses  embodied  in  the  legislation  are  pragmatic  responses  to  a  real  problem,  but 
one  can  also  see  certain  issues  of  policy  surrounding  the  rules  adopted.  Thus,  in 266 
delimiting  the  scope  of  the  (English)  Mental  Health  Act  1983,  we  see  in  Section  1(3)  the 
provision  that  mental  disorder  (which  is,  in  effect,  the  triggering  definition  under  mental 
health  legislation)  is  not  to  be  inferred  or  diagnosed  as  a  result  of  the  person's  promiscuity 
or  other  immoral  conduct,  sexual  deviancy  or  dependence  on  alcohol  or  drugs.  While 
some  of  these  other  conditions  may  be  felt  to  need  a  social  response,  Parliament  was 
making  it  abundantly  clear  that  the  mental  health  legislation  was  not  to  be  used  for  that 
purpose. 
The  general  scheme  of  mental  health  legislation  is,  in  very  general  terms,  as  follows22: 
1:  Compulso!  y  detention: 
Compulsory  detention  in  a  mental  hospital  is  permitted  for  both  assessment  and  treatment 
purposes.  Compulsory  admission  to  hospital  for  assessment  is  permitted  under  Section  2 
of  the  Act,  and  can  be  done  only  where 
The  individual  to  be  detained  suffers  from  a  mental  disorder; 
The  nature  or  degree  of  the  mental  disorder  warrants  compulsory  detention  for 
assessment23; 
The  individual's  detention  is  either  in  the  interests  of  his  or  her  own  health  or  safety 
or  for  the  protection  of  otherS24  ;  and 
The  application  for  compulsory  detention  of  the  individual  is  based  on  the 
recommendations  of  two  registered  medical  practitioners  25 
. 
The  detention  may  initially  be  for  only  28  days,  although  this  can  be  extended  in  practice 
by  subsequently  making  an  application  for  admission  for  treatment.  Compulsory 
admission  for  treatment  is  permitted  under  Section  3.  This  is  subject  to  virtually  identical 
terms,  except  that  the  individual's  mental  disorder  must  be  of  a  type  appropriate  for 
26  treatment  which  will  alleviate  or  prevent  deterioration  in  his  condition  ,a 
term  which  the 
courts  have  interpreted  broadly27.  In  addition,  the  treatment  must  be  necessary  for  the 
patient's  health  and  safety  or  the  protection  of  others  but  cannot  be  provided  unless  the 
patient  is  compulsorily  detained  28  Again,  two  medical  practitioners  must  support  the 
application  29 
. 
Any  compulsory  detention  of  a  person  under  the  Act  is  subject  to  an  appeal  (technically  an 
"application")  to  a  Mental  Health  Review  Tribunal,  established  under  Section  65  of  the  Act. 
The  Tribunal  is  authorised  to  review  compulsory  admissions,  and  if  satisfied  that  the 
grounds  under  which  admission  was  made  do  not  apply  or  are  not  made  out,  may  order 
the  discharge  of  the  patient30  . 
This  procedure  has  recently  been  found  insufficient  to  meet 267 
the  requirements  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  and  the  provision  declared  incompatible 
with  Article  5  of  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  by  the  Court  of  Appeal3l 
. 
As  a 
result,  it  is  probable  that  aspects  of  the  legislation  vvill  be  amended  in  the  near  future. 
There  are,  associated  with  the  compulsory  admission  provisions,  rules  covering  leave  of 
absence  from  the  hospital.  Leave  of  absence  could  originally  be  granted  for  six  months 
only"  . 
This  resulted  in  a  practice  growing  up  whereby  patients  were  granted  leave  of 
absence  and  then  recalled  to  hospital  shortly  before  the  six  months  expired,  purely  to 
allow  the  period  of  leave  of  absence  to  be  renewed.  This  practice  was  declared  unlawful 
by  the  courtS33'  which  (at  least  in  part)  resulted  in  the  procedures  being  changed  by  the 
Mental  Health  (Patients  in  the  Community)  Act  1995. 
One  regulatory  gap  which  has  become  apparent  in  the  current  scope  of  the  legislation  is 
the  situation  of  "informal  patients".  These  are  persons  who,  while  resident  in  the  hospital 
already,  were  not  formally  admitted  under  the  compulsory  procedures  because  they  did 
not  object  to  going  to  hospital  at  the  time  when  they  were  admitted.  Informal  patients  are 
catered  for  by  section  5  of  the  Act,  which  provides  that  the  compulsory  admissions 
procedures  can  be  used  even  though  the  patient  is  already  an  in-patient  in  the  hospital, 
and  by  Section  131,  which  covers  uinformal  admission"  of  patients  who  are  treated  as  in- 
patients  in  a  hospital  notwithstanding  that  the  formal  admission  procedures  have  not  been 
followed.  In  Rv  Bournewood  Community  and  Mental  Health  NHS  Trust  ex  parte  L  34 
, 
the 
House  of  Lords  recognised  that  such  patients  are,  in  fact,  detained  in  hospital  but  held 
that  the  detention  and  (non-consensual)  treatment  of  such  individuals  was  lawful  on  the 
common  law  basis  of  necessity.  However,  as  such  individuals  do  not  benefit  from  the 
U  second  opinion"  rules  (on  which  see  infra)  or  from  supervision  by  the  Mental  Health  Act 
Commission  35 
, 
the  "informal"  treatment  of  this  group  of  patients  (which  is  far  greater  in 
number  than  those  who  are  formally  admitted  36)  is  not  really regulated  by  the  Act  at  all  and 
a  regulatory  deficit  would  appear  to  exist. 
2:  Consent  to  treatment 
In  terms  of  the  legislative  scheme,  compulsory  hospitalisation  occurs  in  two  stages:  firstly, 
the  patient  is  admitted  for  assessment,  and  then  they  may  be  admitted  for  treatment. 
Given  that  the  patient  has  had  to  be  subjected  to  compulsory  measures  in  order  to  get 
them  into  hospital  at  all,  it  is  reasonably  predictable  that  they  may  not  be  the  most  willing 
or  co-operative  patient  and  that  the  consent  required  in  terms  of  both  criminal  and  civil  law 
may  not  be  forthcoming. 268 
It  is  at  this  point  that  policy  issues  enter  into  the  picture.  Having  determined  that  a  person 
is  suffering  from  a  mental  disorder  of  a  type  or  degree  justifying  their  compulsory 
admission  to  hospital,  the  question  then  arises:  to  what  extent  does  society,  through 
mental  health  legislation,  allow  treatment  of  those  who  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  consent 
to  that  treatment  on  their  own  behalf?  There  are  two  distinct  elements  here.  Chapter  4 
analysed  how  the  common  law  deals  with  the  patient  unable  to  give  consent.  However, 
there  are  different  considerations  where  someone  actively  refuses  to  consent.  The  criteda 
under  which  someone  may  be  compulsorily  admitted  to  hospital  are  not  the  same  as  the 
legal  tests  for  capacity,  and  it  is  theoretically  possible  for  someone  to  be  admitted  under 
mental  health  legislation  who  is  legally  competent  to  consent  to  treatment  or  not. 
The  approach  adopted  by  the  Act  is  essentially  paternalistic,  and  subject  to  some  minor 
exceptions,  a  patient  detained  under  the  Act  may  be  treated  even  if  incapable  of 
consenting  -  and  may  also  be  treated  even  if  they  have  refused  consent,  provided  that  a 
registered  medical  practitioner  (not  being  the  responsible  medical  officer,  a  doctor  on 
whom  certain  duties  are  imposed  under  the  Act)  has  certified  that 
"...  having  regard  to  the  likelihood  of  [the  treatment's]  alleviating  or  preventing  a 
deterioration  of  his  condition,  the  treatment  should  be  given 
ij37 
There  are  some  additional  safeguards  attached  to  this  procedure  in  that  before  the  doctor 
is  permitted  to  make  this  certification,  he  or  she  must  consult  with  two  other  people  who 
have  been  involved  in  the  patient's  care,  one  of  whom  must  be  a  nurse,  the  other  of  whom 
must  be  neither  a  nurse  nor  a  registered  medical  practitioner38.  Curiously,  in  the  case  of 
detained  patients  who  have  consented  to  the  treatment,  the  procedure  is  actually  still 
more  onerous  than  that  which  applies  to  patients  in  general,  in  that  the  doctor  has  to 
certify  that  the  patient  has  understood  the  nature,  purpose  and  likely  effects  of  the 
treatment,  and  has  consented  to  it39 
. 
The  "second  opinion"  doctor  should  give  adequate 
reasons  for  his  opinion  40 
1 
if  this  opinion  is  challenged  in  law,  the  doctors  involved  may  be 
cross-examined  even  in  judicial  review  proceedingS41. 
An  exception  to  the  rule  permitting  treatment  without  consent  (or  in  the  face  of  objection) 
is  found  in  Section  57  of  the  Act.  This  states  that  treatment  consisting  of  the  surgical 
destruction  of  brain  tissue  (or  of  the  functioning  of  brain  tissue)  can  only  be  done  with  the 
consent  of  the  patient  (which  again  must  be  shown  by  means  of  a  certificate  by  the  doctor, 
backed  by  two  non-doctors'  opinions,  that  the  patient  has  understood  the  nature,  purpose 
and  likely  effects  of  the  treatment,  and  has  consented  to  It)42.  In  essence,  it  appears  that 
Parliament  has  decided  that  paternalism,  even  in  relation  to  patients  admitted  under 
compulsion,  has  its  limits.  This  limit  is  found  in  psychosurgery,  and  the  state's  interest  in 269 
non-consensual  treatment  of  those  with  mental  disorders  has  been  deemed  to  be 
insufficient  to  warrant  subjecting  people  to  irreversible  brain  surgery  against  their  wishes. 
This,  of  course,  may  at  the  same  time  deprive  those  who  are  incapable  of  consenting  from 
receiving  treatment  which  may  have  cured  them  -  precisely  the  sort  of  paternalistic 
intervention  which  Komrad  argues  is  morally  justifiable43 
. 
However,  at  least  one  Appeal 
Court  judge  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  compulsory  treatment  of  someone  detained 
compulsorily  but  having  capacity  cannot  be  justified  under  heightened  "human  rights" 
scrutiny".  This  is  considered  belOW45. 
Mental  health  legislation  encompasses  other  procedures  in  relation  to  patients  who  are 
not  incarcerated,  such  as  guardianship  ordere6,  as  well  as  after-care  orders  and  the 
procedure  for  supervision  orders  introduced  by  the  Mental  Health  (Patients  in  the 
Community)  Act  1995.  However,  as  it  is  the  compulsory  detention  and  treatment  of 
individuals  which  represents  the  greatest  intrusion  on  individual  rights,  it  is  not  proposed 
to  discuss  these  other  aspects  of  the  legislation. 
G:  Age  of  Legal  Capacity  (Scotland)  Act  1991  (and  related  legislation): 
As  previously  stated,  this  thesis  is  principally  concerned  with  the  treatment  of  adult 
patients  with  full  capacity.  This  raises  the  question  of  when  the  law  recognises  someone 
as  an  adult.  The  age  of  majority  in  Britain  is  eighteen  47 
, 
in  itself  a  statutory  innovation  on 
the  traditional  age  of  21.  However,  while  18  remains  important  in  many  contexts  (e.  g.  the 
right  to  vote,  and  in  relation  to  any  number  of  age-restricted  goods),  its  importance  in  the 
medical  sphere  is  somewhat  less  marked.  For  most  purposes  in  the  medical  context,  16 
is  far  more  important.  It  is  at  this  age  that  the  individual  is  presumed  capable  of 
consenting  to  treatment  on  their  own  behale8  and  can  register  with  a  GP  in  their  own 
name". 
In  Scotland,  the  progressive  reduction  in  the  age  at  which  persons  are  able  to  make 
decisions  on  their  own  behalf  has  gone  a  stage  further.  In  terms  of  Section  2(4)  of  the 
Age  of  Legal  Capacity  (Scotland)  Act  1991, 
"A  person  under  the  age  of  16  years  shall  have  legal  capacity  to  consent  on  his 
own  behalf  to  any  surgical,  medical  or  dental  procedure  or  treatment  where,  in  the 
opinion  of  a  qualified  medical  practitioner'50  attending  him,  he  is  capable  of 
understanding  the  nature  and  possible  consequences  of  the  procedure  or 
treatment.  " 270 
The  1991  Act  was  silent  on  the  subject  of  concurrent  parental  rights  to  consent  to  a 
procedure  which  the  child,  having  capacity,  has  refused  to  consent  to.  It  was  noted  in 
Chapter  4  that  in  England  and  Wales  the  law  seems  to  be  that  parents  can  overrule  a 
competent  refusal  by  a  child  51 
. 
Against  this  background,  the  1991  Act  has  to  be  read 
alongside  the  provisions  of  the  Children  (Scotland)  Act  1995.  This  later  Act  spells  out  the 
extent  (and  permissible  uses)  of  parental  rights  and  responsibilities,  including  the 
responsibility  to  act  as  the  child's  legal  representative  52 
. 
This  is  defined  as 
"...  a  reference  to  that  person,  in  the  interests  of  the  child...  acting  in,  or  giving 
consent  to,  any  transaction  where  the  child  is  incapable  of  so  acting  or  consenting 
on  his  own  behalf.  " 
53 
From  this  it  can  be  seen  that  in  Scotland,  parental  rights  cannot  be  exercised  where  the 
child  has  capacity  to  exercise  that  right  on  his  or  her  own  behalf.  If  there  were  any  doubt 
that  this  was  the  case,  the  doubt  has  effectively  been  removed  by  Section  131A(l)  of  the 
Education  (Scotland)  Act  1980-54,  which  provides  that 
"Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  prejudice  any  capacity  of  a  child  enjoyed  by  virtue  of  section 
2(4)  of  the  Age  of  Legal  Capacity  (Scotland)  Act  1991...;  and  without  prejudice  to  that 
generality,  where  under  or  by  virtue  of  this  Act  a  child  is  required  to  submit,  or  to  be 
submitted,  to  any  medical  or  dental  examination,  inspection  or  treatment  but  the  child 
has  the  capacity  mentioned  in  the  said  section  2(4),  the  examination,  inspection  or 
treatment  shall  only  be  carded  out  if  the  child  consents.  " 
H:  Prohibition  of  Female  Circumcision  Act  1985: 
In  terms  of  scope,  this  is  one  of  the  narrowest  legislative  interventions  into  medical  law.  It 
is  also  one  of  the  shortest.  The  Act  outlaws  female  circumcision,  making  it  a  criminal 
offence  punishable  by  up  to  five  years'  imprisonmen  f5.  It  is  similarly  punishable  to  "aid, 
abet,  counsel  or  procure"  someone  else  to  perform  such  an  operation  on  someone  other 
than  the  procuring  party56.  It  is  not,  on  the  face  of  it,  unlawful  to  offer  to  perform  such  an 
operation,  although  the  GIVIC  has  regarded  such  offers  as  justifying  "striking  off"  doctors 
who  do  S057. 
There  are  savings  in  Section  2  of  the  Act  for  necessary  surgical  operations  carried  out  by 
registered  medical  practitioners  or  (in  case  of  birth-related  operations)  by  midwifes. 
"Necessary"  in  this  context  means  necessary  for  physical  or  mental  health,  disregarding 
the  effect  of  custom  or  ritual  in  assessing  mental  health58. 271 
1:  Surrogacy  Arrangements  Act  1985: 
Surrogacy  arrangements  arise  where  a  woman  carries  a  child  to  term  on  behalf  of 
someone  else,  and  (if  all  goes  to  plan)  to  whom  she  will  give  the  child  on  or  shortly  after 
birth.  Modem  lVF  techniques  mean  that  it  is  possible  for  the  surrogate  mother  to  carry  a 
child  to  which  she  has  no  genetic  relationship.  The  expression  applies  equally  to  the 
situation  where  the  surrogate  mother  is  also  the  genetic  mother  of  the  child  who  is  to  be 
given  away  to  someone  else  (most  commonly  to  a  couple,  the  male  partner  of  which  is  the 
father  of  the  child  -  whether  by  artificial  or  natural  means).  The  Surrogacy  Arrangements 
Act  1985  was  the  only  part  of  the  1984  Warnock  Report59  to  receive  a  rapid  legislative 
response.  This  may  have  been  in  response  to  a  highly-publicised  (and  controversial) 
case  involving  a  surrogacy  arrangement  which  reached  the  courts  relatively  shortly  after 
the  report  had  made  recommendations  on  that  very  subjecfo. 
The  1985  Act  outlaws  commercial  surrogacy,  which  is  to  say  that  it  outlaws  acting  as  an 
intermediary  between  the  surrogate  mother  and  the  prospective  social  parents.  It  does 
not  outlaw  payments  to  the  surrogate  mother,  nor  criminalize  the  prospective  parents  for 
making  or  offering  such  payments.  It  is  only  the  activities  of  intermediaries  acting  for  gain 
which  are  outlawed  by  this  Act6l,  although  direct  payments  may  potentially  fall  foul  of  other 
legislation  62 
. 
Surrogacy  arrangements  are,  by  virtue  of  an  amendment  to  the  Act, 
expressly  rendered  unenforceable  63 
. 
While  not  enacted  under  the  1985  Act,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  one  particular  legislative 
clarification  which  is  of  particular  relevance  in  this  area.  Section  27  of  the  Human 
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act  199064  provides  that,  so  far  as  the  law  of  the  UK  is 
concerned,  the  legal  mother  of  a  child  is  the  woman  who  bears  the  child,  irrespective  of 
genetic  relationship  (or  lack  thereof)  to  the  child.  This  avoids  any  scope  for  an  argument 
by  the  genetic  mother  that  the  surrogate  was  withholding  the  genetic  mothers  child  from 
her  without  lawful  authority. 
Neither  the  Surrogacy  Arrangements  Act  1985  nor  subsequent  legislation  actually  outlaws 
surrogacy  arrangements  per  se.  Given  the  scope  for  commercial  exploitation  of  poor  but 
healthy  women  by  (usually)  wealthy  couples,  one  might  argue  that  this  is  a  regulatory  gap. 
It  can  equally  be  viewed  as  regulatory  respect  for  the  autonomous  decision  of  a  capable 
adult  woman  to  allow  others  to  benefit  from  the  use  of  her  womb  for  a  while.  For  the 
purposes  of  this  thesis,  there  is  no  regulatory  gap  because  the  rules  specify 
unambiguously  who  the  parents  of  any  given  child  are,  and  (through  the  adoption 
legislation  or  the  special  procedure  under  the  1990  Act65)  who  is  able  to  seek  parental 
rights  and  responsibilities  in  respect  of  that  child.  A  recent  case  indicated  that,  had  the 272 
case  ansen  after  2  October  2000,  the  claimant  would  have  challenged  sections  1  and  2  of 
this  Act  under  the  Human  Rights  Ae. 
J:  Hurnan  Organ  Transplants  Act  1989: 
This  legislation  provided  the  legislative  background  to  the  Unrelated  Live  Transplant 
Regulatory  Authority  (ULTRA),  mentioned  in  Chapter  5.  It  is  worth  mentioning,  in  this 
context,  a  more  general  point  concerning  the  material  included  within  this  Chapter.  The 
1989  Act  creates  a  prohibition  on  live  organ  transplants  except  where  the  recipient  of  the 
organ  is  genetically  related  to  the  donor,  or  else  where  the  transplant  has  been  approved 
by  ULTRA.  In  this  respect,  the  (conditional)  prohibition  of  unrelated  live  organ  transplants 
can  be  regarded  as  the  criminal  sanction  underpinning  the  functioning  of  ULTRA,  rather 
than  a  legislative  goal  in  itself.  It  would  appear  that  legislation  following  this  pattern  does 
not  really  intend  to  outlaw  the  conduct  in  question,  so  much  as  seek  to  ensure  that  the 
conduct  falls  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  appropriate  regulatory  body.  Legislation  which 
renders  conduct  conditionally  criminal  in  this  way  is  not,  barring  relevant  extraneous 
features,  mentioned  or  discussed  in  this  chapter. 
For  present  purposes,  however,  it  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  Human  Organ  Transplants 
Act  1989  also  creates  a  free-standing  and  absolute  prohibition  on  commercial  dealings  in 
human  organe',  and  also  outlaws  advertising  services  connected  to  commercial  organ 
sales". 
K:  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000: 
In  Chapter  5,  considerable  time  was  devoted  to  discussions  of  the  tests  established  (or 
not  established)  by  the  courts  in  relation  to  treatment  decisions  for  adults  deemed  to  be 
(or  at  least  treated  as)  incapable  of  consenting  to  or  refusing  treatment.  This  thesis 
proceeds  on  a  Britain-wide  basis;  had  it  proceeded  on  a  purely  Scottish  basis,  or  if  the 
2000  Act  had  been  passed  by  Westminster  on  a  Britain-wide  basis,  almost  all  of  that 
discussion  would  have  been  rendered  superfluous.  This  legislation  represents  the  first 
major  piece  of  law-making  by  the  devolved  Scottish  Parliament,  and  provides  a  complex 
and  ambitious  series  of  rules  and  procedures  where  previously  there  was  a  legal  void6g. 
The  Act  itself  is  faidy  large  (89  sections  and  six  schedules)  backed  by  a  number  of 
statutory  instruments  70 
. 
It  establishes  a  number  of  important  procedures  in  relation  to 
matters  such  as  the  appointment  of  persons  with  powers  of  attorney  and  a  new  category 
of  persons  having  welfare  powers  of  attorney,  establishes  a  new  regime  for  the 
management  of  the  property  of  those  with  a  mental  incapacity,  another  new  regime  for  the 273 
appointment  of  guardians  able  to  look  after  the  affairs  of  such  individuals  (with  related 
rules  allowing  for  the  making  of  specific  intervention  orders),  all  backed  up  by  supervisory 
powers  given  to  local  social  work  authorities,  the  Mental  Welfare  Commission  and  the 
office  of  the  Public  Guardian,  all  with  recourse  to  the  civil  courts  in  some  circumstances. 
In  particular,  local  authorities  are  obliged  to  seek  authority  from  the  court  to  intervene  on 
behalf  of  the  individual  if  it  is  necessary  to  do  so  in  order  to  protect  the  property,  financial 
affairs  or  personal  welfare  of  the  individual  and  A  appears  that  no-one  else  will  be  seeking 
to  apply7l.  For  present  purposes,  however,  attention  will  be  focussed  on  only  two  aspects 
of  this  legislation:  the  tests  for  incapacity,  and  the  rules  authorising  interventions  in 
general  and  medical  treatment  in  particular. 
Incapacity  is  given  a  fairly  straightforward  definition: 
"'Incapable'  means  incapable  of  - 
(a)  acting;  or 
(b)  making  decisions;  or 
(c)  communicating  decisions;  or 
(d)  understanding  decisions;  or 
(e)  retaining  the  memory  of  decisions, 
as  mentioned  in  any  provision  of  this  Act,  by  reason  of  mental  disorder  or of  inability  to 
communicate  because  of  physical  disability;  but  a  person  shall  not  fall  within  this 
definition  by  reason  only  of  a  lack  or  deficiency  in  a  faculty  of  communication  if  that  lack 
or  deficiency  can  be  made  good  by  human  or  mechanical  aid  (whether  of  an 
interpretive  nature  or  otherwise);  and 
'incapacity'  shall  be  construed  accordingly.  n72 
The  Act  specifically  allows  anyone  directly  affected  by  a  decision  that  someone  is 
incapable  (including,  most  importantly,  the  adult  himself  or  herself)  to  appeal  that  decision 
to  the  sheriff  and  thereafter  to  the  Court  of  Session  73 
. 
The  general  principles  underpinning  any  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  an  adult  with  an 
incapacity  are  spelled  out  in  Section  1.  The  principles  are  that  interventions  should  only 
take  place  if  they  will  benefit  the  individual  and  the  benefit  cannot  reasonably  be  otherwise 
achieved  74  ;  the  intervention  must  be  the  least  restrictive  option  75 
,  and  in  deciding  whether 
it  should  happen,  account  must  be  taken  of  the  past  and  present  wishes  and  feelings  of 
the  adult  (so  far  as  these  can  be  ascertained),  and  of  their  nearest  relative  and  primary 
carer,  as  well  as  any  guardian  or  attorney  or  anyone  appearing  to  have  an  interest  in  the 
adult's  welfare  76 
. 
Anyone  exercising  any  powers  under  the  Act  is  also  required  to 274 
encourage  the  adult  to  exercise  whatever  skills  he  or  she  has  in  relation  to  the  matter  in 
question,  and  encourage  him  or  her  to  develop  new  skills  77 
- 
These  general  principles  apply  to  medical  treatment,  but  are  bolstered  by  some  specifics. 
Any  proposed  medical  intervention  must  therefore  accord  with  the  general  principles  of 
individual  benefit,  minimum  intervention  and  so  on. 
The  rules  relating  specifically  to  medical  interventions  are  found  in  Part  5  of  the  Act".  The 
general  thrust  of  this  Part  is  that  the  doctor  who  is  primarily  responsible  is  given  authority 
"to  do  what  is  reasonable  in  the  circumstances,  in  relation  to  the  medical  treatment79,  to 
safeguard  or  promote  the  physical  or  mental  health  of  the  adult.  "80  This  power  only  arises 
once  the  doctor  has  certified,  in  an  approved  form,  that  in  his  or  her  opinion  the  patient  is 
incapable  in  relation  to  making  a  decision  about  the  treatment  in  question  81 
. 
From  this  it 
can  be  seen  that  the  Act  applies  an  issue-specific  assessment  of  capacity. 
There  are  a  number  of  limitations  and  safeguards  built  into  this  general  pattern.  Thus, 
the  general  power  to  treat  an  incompetent  adult  does  not  extend  to  the  use  of  force  or 
detention  unless  immediately  necessary  and  only  for  so  long  is  necessary',  nor  does  it 
allow  doctors  to  use  the  mechanism  to  place  someone  in  hospital  for  compulsory 
treatment  of  mental  disorde  r83  , 
the  procedure  for  which  remains  the  Mental  Health 
(Scotland)  Act  1984.  Some  forms  of  treatment  (in  particular,  those  which  cannot  be 
carried  out  under  mental  health  legislation  without  the  patient's  consent)  are  excluded 
from  the  general  authorisation  84 
. 
If  the  doctor's  authority  to  treat  the  person  is  challenged, 
no  treatment  is  authorised  under  this  Act  until  the  challenge  is  resolved"5.  There  are 
provisions  whereby  disagreements  between  the  doctor  and  other  proxieS86  can  be  referred 
to  what  amounts  to  an  independent  medical  referee  87 
. 
Collusion  is  prevented  by  giving 
any  person  having  an  interest  in  the  patient's  welfare  a  right  to  appeal  the  treatment 
decision  to  the  Court  of  Session  in  cases  where  the  doctor  and  proxies  agree  on  the 
proposed  course  of  action  88 
. 
The  general  power  to  treat  cannot  be  exercised  where  (to 
the  knowledge  of  the  doctor)  there  is  a  more  specific  power  relating  to  the  treatment 
granted  to  a  proxy89,  or  where  such  a  power  is  in  the  course  of  being  applied  foeo.  Nor 
can  it  be  used  to  authorise  treatment  which  is  the  subject  of  an  interdic?  '. 
There  are  particular  restrictions  on  conducting  research  on  persons  incapable  of 
consenting  to  it.  Any  such  research  has  to  satisfy  the  following  conditions: 
9  the  research  cannot  be  carried  out  on  persons  having  capacity 
the  research  is  into  the  causes,  diagnosis,  treatment  or  care  of  the  incapacity  or 
the  effects  of  treatment  for  it 275 
"  the  research  is  likely  to  produce  benefit  to  the  patient  (or  others  suffering  from  the 
same  incapaCfty92) 
"  there  is  no  or  minimal  risk  to,  or  discomfort  imposed  on,  the  patient 
"  there  are  no  indications  of  unwillingness  to  participate;  and 
e  the  research  has  been  approved  by  the  Ethics  Committee  (set  up  by  the  Act)  93 
It  would  appear  that  there  is  an  appeal  against  the  decision  to  carry  out  research, 
although  the  drafting  is  unclear.  Section  52  states  that  any  decision  94  taken  for  the 
purposes  of  Part  5  of  the  Act  can  be  appealed  to  the  sheriff  by  any  person  having  an 
interest  in  the  personal  welfare  of  the  incapable  adult.  However,  this  appeal  is  stated  to 
be  against  "a  decision...  as  to  the  medical  treatment  of  the  aduft"9,5.  This  raises  the 
question  of  whether  research  counts  as  treatment.  "Treatment",  as  we  saw,  is  defined  as 
including  "any  procedure  or  treatment  designed  to  safeguard  or  promote  physical  or 
mental  health.  ""6  Given  that  some  forms  of  medical  research  will  not  do  this,  then  (at  least 
arguably)  decisions  as  to  carrying  out  such  research  on  the  incapax  could  not  be 
appealed  against.  Such  research  would,  admittedly,  be  unlikely  to  find  approval  from  the 
Ethics  Committee,  but  there  does  appear  to  be  a  minor  gap  in  the  otherwise 
comprehensive  system  of  safeguards  built  into  this  legislation. 
L:  Freedom  of  Information  Act  2000/Freedom  of  Information  (Scotland)  Act  2002: 
This  legislation  is  closely  connected  to  the  provisions  of  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998,  and 
is  therefore  considered  under  that  heading  below. 
M:  Human  Reproductive  Cloning  Act  2001: 
This  Act  was  mentioned  bdefly  in  Chapter  5,  and  its  coverage  here  will  be  similarly  brief. 
The  Act  was  passed  as  an  emergency  legislative  response  to  the  decision  at  first  instance 
in  the  case  of  R  (on  application  of  Quintavalle)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Health  97 
,  which 
held  that  organisms  created  by  "cloning"  (technically  called  CNR)  were  not  embryos  within 
the  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Act's  definition,  and  so  were  not  covered  by  the 
statutory  regime. 
The  Human  Reproductive  Cloning  Act  2001  simply  makes  it  illegal  to  place  an  embryo 
created  by  CNR  (or  indeed,  by  any  other  as  yet  unknown  technique  not  involving 
fertilisation")  in  a  woman.  The  offence  is  punishable  by  up  to  ten  years'  imprisonment". 276 
III:  The  Human  Rights  Act  1998: 
A:  Structure  of  the  Act: 
The  Human  Rights  Act  1998  ("HRA")  "gives  further  effect  to"'00  the  1950  European 
Convention  of  Human  Rights  or,  in  popular  terminology,  "incorporates"  it  into  the  laws  of 
the  UK. 
The  HRA  does  not  relate  to  the  entire  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Instead, 
only  those  parts  found  in  Schedule  1  to  the  Act  are  covered.  This  consists  of  Articles  2- 
12,14  and  16-18  of  the  Convention  proper,  Articles  1-3  of  the  First  Protocol,  and  Articles 
1  and  2  of  the  Sixth  Protocol.  These  are  known  collectively  as  "Convention  Rights 
Some  controversy  surrounded  the  government's  decision  not  to  include  Article  13,  which 
confers  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy  before  the  national  authority.  The  official 
response  to  this  was  that  the  right  to  judicial  remedies  conferred  by  Section  8  of  the  Act 
was  sufficient  guarantee  of  a  remedy'O'.  This  may  not  be  entirely  correct,  as  Section  8 
empowers  courts  to  grant  "...  such  relief  or  remedy,  or  make  such  order...  as  it  considers 
just  and  appropriate"'  02  which  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as  "effective"'  03 
. 
It  is  useful  to  consider  the  effect  of  the  Act  in  three  distinct  ways"  the  duty  imposed  on 
public  authorities,  the  new  interpretive  approach,  and  the  enforcement  provisions.  There 
are  also  other  provisions  of  limited  relevance  to  this  thesis  which  are  not  be  considered  in 
detail.  Thereafter  the  scope  of  the  Convention  rights  will  be  considered,  together  with  the 
impact  or  potential  impact  which  these  rights  will  have  on  the  regulatory  machinery. 
So  far  as  public  authorities  are  concerned,  the  key  provision  in  the  Act  is  Section  6(1) 
which  makes  it  unlawful  for  them  to  "act  in  a  way  which  is  incompatible  with  a  Convention 
Right".  The  only  exception  to  this  is  where  primary  legislation  makes  it  impossible  for  the 
public  authority  to  do  other  than  to  violate  these  rights'04.  Such  instances  appear  to  be 
rare. 
The  expression  "public  authority"  is  partially  defined  by  Section  6:  Parliament 
(Westminster)  is  not  a  public  authority,  but  the  courts  are.  It  seems  clear  that  local 
authorities,  the  police,  the  army,  and  all  the  departments  of  central  government  will  be 
covered.  The  National  Health  Service  is  also  likely  to  be  included,  but  it  is  unclear  how  far 
down  the  NHS  structural  hierarchy  this  will  apply:  it  is  not  clear,  for  instance,  whether  the 
individual  GP  practice  (or  indeed,  the  individual  GP)  would  count  as  a  public  authority. 
The  definition  also  includes  "any  person  certain  of  whose  functions  are  functions  of  a 277 
public  nature"'05,  the  so-called  "Railtrack"  clause.  The  hybrid  public  authorities  caught  by 
this  section  are  only  affected  in  relation  to  their  public  functions'  06 
. 
More  generally,  all  legislation  and  regulations  must,  in  terms  of  Section  3,  be  read  and  given 
effect  to  (so  far  as  is  possible)  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  compatible  with  Convention  Rights.  This 
provision  is  retrospective'  07 
,  and  consequently  any  existing  interpretations  of  the  law,  no  matter 
how  well  established  and  authoritative,  have  to  be  revisited  and  changed  N  that  interpretation 
violates  Convention  Rights.  The  provision  has  been  held  (by  the  House  of  Lords)  to  permit 
courts  both  to  restrict  the  meaning  of  statutes,  but  also  to  allow  them  to  supply  additional 
provisions  (or  uread  into"  the  legislation  in  question)  in  a  way  which  would  have  been 
08  impermissible  before  the  Act  came  into  force' 
. 
Parfiamentary  sovereignty  is  preserved  as 
Section  3  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  primary  (i.  e.  Westminster)  legislation,  nor  of  subordinate 
legislation  where  the  parent  legislation  makes  it  impossible  for  the  subordinate  legislation  to  be 
made  compatible'o".  Section  2(l)  additionally  requires  courts,  when  determining  questions 
relating  to  Convention  rights,  to  take  into  account  decisions  of  the  European  Commission  on 
Human  Rights  and  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in  Strasbourg.  Within  this  two  further 
complications  arise.  Strasbourg  decisions  emphasise  that  the  Convention  is  a  "living 
instrument"  which  has  to  be  interpreted  with  evolving  social  notions  of  what  is  and  is  not 
acoeptablel'o;  activities  which  were  human  rights  compliant  ten  or  twenty  years  ago  may  not 
be  so  today.  The  Court  has  firmly  rejected  the  "original  intent"  approach  used  by  some 
conservative  US  Justices  to  interpret  the  US  Constitution.  However,  the  decisions  of  the 
Strasbourg  bodies  are  not  formally  binding  on  the  British  Courts.  When  steering  the  Human 
Rights  Bill  through  Parliament,  the  government  indicated  a  desire  to  see  the  growth  of  an 
indigenous  body  of  human  rights  law  and  the  provisions  of  the  Act  should  facilitate  this.  The 
judges  have  not  been  in  agreement  as  to  how  strong  an  injunction  Section  2(l)  actually  is"'. 
If  primary  legislation  is  found  to  be  incompatible  with  a  Convention  Right,  certain  Superior 
Courts  are  empowered  to  make  "declarations  of  incompatibility"  which  allow  for  a  "fast 
track"  procedure  to  amend  the  legislation"2.  This  has  no  effect  on  the  original  legal 
proceedings.  To  date,  only  three  declarations  have  been  made'  13:  one  in  relation  to  the 
Mental  Health  Act,  discussed  supra"",  one  in  relation  to  certain  provisions  of  the 
Consumer  Credit  Act  19741  15 
,  and  most  recently  in  respect  of  provisions  whereby  widows 
(but  not  widowers)  were  previously  entitled  to  certain  tax  allowances'".  In  Rv  A'  17 
, 
the 
House  of  Lords  emphasised  that  the  declaration  of  incompatibility  was  only  to  be  issued 
as  a  last  resort,  only  if  the  most  ling  uistically-strained  re-interpretation  of  a  provision  still 
left  it  to  be  read  as  incompatible  with  a  convention  right. 278 
The  enforcement  provisions  allow  the  victim  (or  potential  victim,  considered  below)  of  a 
breach  of  Convention  Rights  to  bring  proceedings  in  an  appropriate  Court  or  Tribunal. 
This  means  any  court  or  tribunal  able  to  grant  the  remedy  being  sought,  with  default 
jurisdiction  failing  on  the  Court  of  Session  and  High  Court  (in  Scotland)  or  the  High  Court 
(in  England  and  Wales).  The  courts  are  able  to  use  all  existing  remedies  against  the 
offending  public  body  including,  where  appropriate,  awards  of  damages  (subject  to  certain 
technical  restrictions).  However,  it  is  also  possible  to  raise  Convention  points  in  any  legal 
proceedings  whether  by  or  against  the  public  body.  The  only  defence  is  to  demonstrate 
that  the  activity  was  not  a  breach  of  the  right  in  question,  or  else  was  done  in  unavoidable 
compliance  with  primary  legislation.  The  Courts  are  themselves  public  bodies  under  the 
Act'  18 
,  and  are  therefore  bound  to  observe  Convenbon  Rights  directly,  even  if  not  asked 
to  do  so. 
Before  Convention  Rights  can  be  relied  on  in  Court,  Section  7(1)  of  the  Act  requires  the 
claimant  to  be  a  victim  (or  potential  victim)  of  the  unlawful  act.  "Victim"  is  defined  in 
Section  7(7)  by  reference  to  Article  34  of  the  Convention  (which  is  not  actually  included  in 
the  text  of  the  Act).  This  means  that  a  victim  must:  - 
be  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  high  contracting  party  (e.  g.  the  UK); 
be  a  person  (including  legal  person),  non-govemmental  organisation  or  group  of 
people.  Public  authorities,  being  regarded  as  part  of  the  machinery  of  the  state,  do  not 
count,  and  cannot  themselves  claim  to  be  victims  of  human  rights  breaches; 
claim  to  be  a  victim  of  an  alleged  breach  of  human  rights. 
This  last  element  precludes  general  interest  litigation  or  litigation  about  hypothetical 
breaches.  In  Amuur  v  France'19,  "victim"  was  held  to  mean  a  person  directly  affected  by 
the  Act  or  the  omission  in  question.  It  may  be  sufficient  simply  to  show  a  reasonable 
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likelihood  of  being  directly  affected  . 
It  is  not  necessary  to  show  actual  prejudice 
prejudice  suffered  goes  to  evaluation  of  "just  satisfaction"  rather  than  to  status  as  a  victim. 
Indirect  victims  of  a  breach  (e.  g.  next  of  kin)  may  have  standing.  Status  as  a  victim  is  not 
dissimilar  to  having  title  and  interest  to  seek  judicial  review;  being  a  victim  itself 
automatically  satisfies  title  and  interest  in  terms  of  Section  7(4). 
Section  8  of  the  Act  provides  that  courts  can  grant  any  remedy  in  respect  of  a  human 
rights  case  which  they  could  grant  in  any  other  case.  Accordingly,  any  court  able  to  grant 
damages  can  award  damages  in  human  rights  cases.  However,  the  award  of  damages  is 
restricted  by  Section  8(3)  to  cases  where  it  is  necessary  to  afford  'just  satisfaction"  to  the 279 
victim,  based  on  the  principles  of  the  European  Court  in  applying  Article  41  of  the 
Convention  (also  unhelpfully  omitted  from  the  text  of  the  Act).  In  providing  "just 
satisfaction  , 
the  Court  has  a  number  of  options: 
"in  many  cases  the  Court  has  found  that  the  finding  of  a  violation  is  in  itself  just 
satisfaction  and  in  others  that  a  token  amount  of  money  is  sufficient.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  some  cases  the  Court  awards  substantial  sums  of  money  to  successful 
applicants,  including  interest  when  the  Government  unduly  delays  payment.  On 
occasion,  the  Court  has  ordered  the  return  of  unlawfully  expropriated  property  to 
an  applicant.  "  121 
Damages  can  be  awarded  for  both  pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary  IOSS122 
. 
For  pecuniary 
loss,  damages  are  awarded  where  the  breach  of  Convention  Rights  has  made  a 
significant  and  financially  quantifiable  difference.  Only  actual  direct  losses  are  allowed  -  it 
will  remain  possible  to  challenge  a  claim  on  the  basis  of  remoteness  just  as  under  other 
civil  claims. 
Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  bring  a  human  rights  case  within  one  year  of  the  alleged  breach, 
unless  a  shorter  time  limit  is  prescribed  for  the  procedure  in  question"',  although  this  can 
be  extended  if  the  court  considers  it  equitable  to  do  S0124.  Claims  can,  in  general,  only  be 
brought  in  respect  of  violations  of  convention  rights  which  occurred  on  or  after  2  October 
2000.  However,  in  terms  of  Section  22(4),  a  victim  can  rely  on  convention  rights  in  any 
legal  proceedings  brought  by  public  authorities  before  2  October  2000  (but  not  in  appeals 
against  such  proceedings'  25). 
C:  Convention  rights: 
There  are,  in  accordance  with  the  European  Court's  approach  to  the  Convention,  three 
different  types  of  Convention  Rights.  The  three  types  of  rights  are  absolute,  limited  and 
qualified.  Absolute  Rights  admit  of  no  limitations  whatsoever.  Limited  Rights  are  similar 
except  that  there  will  be  stated  limitations.  Thus  the  Article  5  right  to  liberty  is  an  absolute 
right  except  for  the  series  of  exceptions  listed  within  the  Article.  If  the  detention  does  not 
satisfy  one  of  the  (fairly  closely  defined)  exceptions  to  the  general  principle  then  the 
detention  will  automatically  be  in  violation  of  the  Convention.  Qualified  Rights  are  easy  to 
spot,  typically  consisting  of  two  paragraphs.  The  first  paragraph  grants  the  impressive 
sounding  rights  or  freedoms  in  question;  the  second  paragraph,  however,  then  proceeds 
to  restrict  or  circumscribe  the  rights  in  some  way.  Rather  than  attempting  to  define  these 
exceptions  (as  limited  rights  have  the  limitation  defined),  instead  the  qualified  rights  are 
subject  to  a  series  of  tests  which  have  to  be  satisfied  before  a  breach  can  be  justified. 280 
Many  of  the  Articles  of  particular  relevance  to  the  medical  sphere  are  qualified  rights.  The 
tests  against  which  infringement  is  assessed  are  a  mixture  of  the  express  terms  of  the 
Convention,  and  the  Court's  approach  to  and  interpretation  of  the  Convention,  broadly  as 
follows: 
"  Is  the  interference  prescribed  by  law? 
"  Does  the  interference  pursue  a  legitimate  aim? 
"  Is  it  necessary  in  a  democratic  society?  (i.  e.  does  it  pursue  a  pressing  social 
need?  ) 
"  Is  it  proportionate  to  the  legitimate  aims  you  are  pursuing? 
"  Do  you  have  relevant  and  sufficient  reasons  for  the  interference? 
It  is  important  to  note  that  a  failure  on  any  of  these  points  will  mean  that  the  prima  facie 
infringement  of  the  Article  in  question  will  be  incapable  of  justification.  All  else  being 
equal,  a  human  rights  claim  should  succeed  in  these  circumstances. 
Proportionality  is  a  key  feature  of  this  approach,  and  means  simply  that  if  an  infringement 
of  a  Convention  Right  has  occurred,  then  attempts  to  justify  the  breach  must  show  that  the 
violation  was  no  more  than  was  necessary  to  achieve  the  legitimate  aim  pursued.  The 
measure  employed  (which  infringes  Convention  Rights)  must  be  proportionate  to  the  aims 
sought  to  be  realised.  there  must  be  a  fair  balance  struck  between  interests  of  the 
community  (as  represented  by  the  actions  of  the  public  authority)  and  the  rights  of  the 
individual.  Proportionality  is  also  a  general  control  test  utilised  by  Strasbourg,  and  as 
such  also  has  much  in  common  with  Wednesbury  126  unreasonableness.  There  are  two 
potential  domestic  approaches  to  proportionality:  the  first  is  to  consider  that 
proportionality  is  for  the  public  authority  or  officer  entrusted  with  the  operational  decision 
to  reach  a  view  on.  The  court's  function  thereafter  is  to  determine  whether  the  decision 
maker's  view  on  proportionality  was  a  reasonable  one.  This  approach  was  (in  essence) 
adopted  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Rv  Secretafy  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  ex 
parte  Mahmood  127 
. 
The  problem  with  this  approach,  however,  is  that  the  court  (itself  a 
public  authority)  could  find  itself  putting  a  judicial  seal  of  approval  on  a  course  of  action 
which  the  court  considered  to  be  disproportionate,  provided  it  was  not  what  we  might  refer 
to  as  "  Wednesbury-un  reason  a  bly-d  ispro  portion  ate".  And  since  the  European  Court  had 
already  concluded  that  Wednesbury  scrutiny  was  an  insufficient  safeguard  for  individual 
rights  because  the  threshold  for  impugning  decisions  was  too  high  128 
, 
it  was  arguable  that 
regarding  proportionality  as  just  another  aspect  of  decision-making  to  place  under  the 
Wednesbury  microscope  was  failing  to  provide  an  adequate  level  of  domestic  scrutiny. 281 
The  second  approach  is  that  the  court  itself  decides  whether  the  action  was  proportionate 
without  reference  to  what  the  original  decision-maker  actually  thought.  The  problem  is 
that  in  directly  assessing  whether  a  particular  activity  is  or  is  not  proportionate,  the  courts 
necessarily  have  to  consider  the  merits  of  a  decision  -  something  which,  on  constitutional 
grounds,  they  consistently  refused  to  do  under  common  law  judicial  review.  But  the 
proportionality  of  an  interference  is  impossible  to  measure  without  consideration  of  the 
merits  of  the  decision  being  implemented,  since  the  existence  of  a  better  (i.  e.  less 
intrusive)  alternative  will  render  the  proposed  option  disproportionate.  Ultimately,  the 
House  of  Lords  adopted  the  second  approach  in  terms  of  proportionality  review, 
disapproving  (though  not  formally  overruling)  the  Court  of  Appeal's  approach  in  the 
proceSS129. 
A  brief  description  of  some  of  the  more  relevant  Articles  now  follows. 
Article  2:  The  Right  To  Life 
The  question  has  arisen  as  to  when  "Iffe"  as  protected  by  this  Article  actually  begins.  The 
issue  has  never  been  substantively  addressed  by  the  Court,  but  the  Commission  has  had 
to  issue  opinions  on  the  subject.  The  leading  case  is  Paton  v  UK  430 
, 
in  which  the 
Commission  refused  to  apply  the  full  safeguards  of  Article  2  to  a  foetus  but,  conscious  of 
the  lack  of  any  consensus  on  the  subject  throughout  Europe,  declined  to  express  a  view 
on  when  life  began  or  on  what  safeguards  (if  any)  Article  2  conferred  on  a  foetus. 
Article  2  was  intended  from  the  outset  to  prohibit  the  lethal,  involuntary  "experiments" 
perpetrated  by  Nazi  doctors  during  the  Second  World  War,  although  a  more  explicit 
prohibition  on  such  atrocities  was  rejected  at  the  time  the  Convention  was  being 
drafted  131 
. 
It  was  a  Nazi  decree  which  led  to  the  only  Commission  decision  on  the 
applicability  of  Article  2  to  medical  interventionS132.  Commenting  on  this  decision,  Byk 
notes  that 
61 
...  recalling  that  each  case  was  special,  it  [the  Commission]  concluded  that  'the 
applicant  has  not  submitted  evidence  that  in  his  particular  case  a  blood  test 
would...  create  any  danger  to  his  life.  '  This  last  remark  has  some  bearing  on  an 
assessment,  for  example,  of  the  effects  of  compulsory  vaccination  carried  out 
despite  contra-indications.  ""33 
A  challenge  to  a  vaccination  programme  arose  in  Association  Xv  UW-14;  the  complaint 
was  held  admissible,  but  failed  on  its  facts.  Article  2  has  also  been  used  to  argue  for  a 
state  duty  to  warn  of  health  risks  and  to  monitor  potentially  harmful  effects  of  state  activity 282 
(in  the  actual  case,  this  was  nuclear  testing1n.  The  case  failed  on  the  facts,  but  the 
reasoning  and  logic  behind  the  application  would  seem  to  be  sound.  Article  2  issues  were 
raised  in  a  case  involving  compulsory  treatment  of  a  detained  mental  patient  who  had 
capacity  relative  to  the  treatment  involved  136 
. 
The  argument  here  was  that  the  patient  was 
so  vehemently  opposed  to  the  treatment  that  the  forcible  restraint  involved  in 
administering  it  could  put  a  strain  on  his  already  weak  heart.  Ultimately,  the  Court  of 
Appeal  decision  was  on  a  preliminary  point  only  and  this  aspect  did  not  come  up  for 
decision,  but  Simon  Brown  LJ's  opinion  in  the  case  suggests  that  it  is  just  a  matter  of  time 
before  this  comes  to  trial. 
Lastly,  it  has  been  held  that  nothing  in  Article  2  prevents  a  hospital  from  withholding  life- 
saving  treatment  from  someone  where  this  is  in  their  best  interests'  37 
. 
The  Article 
imposes  a  positive  obligation  on  the  State  to  provide  lifesaving  treatment  where  this  is  in 
the  patient's  best  interests,  but  not  where  the  treatment  would  be  futile'  38.  At  time  of 
writing,  there  are  no  decided  UK  cases  involving  Article  2  where  the  patient  has  died  in 
consequence  of  negligent  medical  treatment,  the  only  case  raised  which  sought  damages 
under  this  point  having  been  settled  out  of  court  139 
. 
Article  3.  Prohibition  Of  Torture 
This  has  been  interpreted  as  creating  a  hierarchy  (in  a  negative  sense)  of  prohibited 
conduct.  Torture  is  classed  as  the  most  serious  kind  of  ill-treatment,  whereas  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment  is  less  severe  than  torture  and  may  include  certain  physical  assaults, 
inhuman  detention  conditions  or  corporal  punishment.  Article  3  may  be  violated  as  a 
result  of  either  mental  or  physical  suffering,  or  a  combination  of  them.  The  Court  has 
established  a  number  of  relevant  criteria  to  assist  in  deciding  if  something  amounts  to 
torture  or  inhuman  treatment140 
. 
The  assessment  will  depend  on  a  number  of  factors 
including  location  (a  closed  environment  is  subject  to  more  intense  scrutiny  than  an  open 
one)  duration,  severity  (and  in  particular,  whether  there  are  any  lasting  effects  on  the 
victim)  and  the  vulnerability  of  the  victim  -  what  might  be  acceptable  in  relation  to  an  adult 
with  full  mental  capacity  might  not  be  acceptable  in  relation  to  a  child  or  a  frail  elderly 
person. 
Article  3  is  one  of  the  Articles  under  which  the  state  has  positive  obligations.  This  has 
been  interpreted  as  meaning  that  it  is  obliged  to  prevent  breaches  of  the  Article  by  one 
private  individual  against  another  -  particularly  in  relation  to  children  and  other  vulnerable 
persons.  In  particular,  there  is  a  duty  to  carry  out  an  effective  investigation  into  allegations 
of  torture  etc.  and  to  provide  explanations  for  injuries.  This  duty  most  commonly  arises  in 
relation  to  persons  suffering  otherwise  unexplained  injuries  while  in  police  custody,  but  the 283 
same  principle  would  apply  to  incidents  occurring  within  a  mental  hospital  or  residential  or 
nursing  home.  The  state  cannot,  according  to  Strasbourg  jurisprudence,  delegate 
responsibility  for  investigation/protection  to  other  bodies  or  individuals.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  to  what  extent  a  health  authority  (for  example)  would  be  able  to  delegate  its  duties  to 
a  private  nursing  home. 
Article  3  issues  have  arisen  with  particular  force  in  relation  to  compulsory  treatment  of 
psychiatric  patients.  With  regard  to  medical  treatment  given  to  such  persons,  the  Court 
gave  some  guidelines  in  the  case  of  Herczegfalvy  v.  Austria 
141 
: 
"The  Court  considers  that  the  position  of  inferiority  and  powerlessness  which  is 
typical  of  patients  confined  in  psychiatdc  hospitals  calls  for  increased  vigilance  in 
reviewing  whether  the  Convention  has  been  complied  with.  While  it  is  for  the 
medical  authodties  to  decide,  on  the  basis  of  the  recognised  rules  of  medical 
science,  on  the  therapeutic  methods  to  be  used,  if  necessary  by  force,  to  preserve 
the  physical  and  mental  health  of  patients  who  are  entirely  incapable  of  deciding  for 
themselves  and  for  whom  they  are  therefore  responsible,  such  patients 
nevertheless  remain  under  the  protection  of  Article  3,  whose  requirements  permit  no 
derogation. 
The  established  principles  of  medicine  are  admittedly  in  principle  decisive  in  such 
cases;  as  a  general  rule,  a  measure  which  is  a  therapeutic  necessity  cannot  be 
regarded  as  inhuman  or  degrading.  The  Court  must  nevertheless  satisfy  itself  that 
the  medical  necessity  has  been  convincingly  shown  to  exist.  "  142 
There  is  a  Commission  opinion  to  the  effect  that  force-feeding  a  prisoner  on  hunger  strike 
does  not  amount  to  a  breach  of  Article  3,  because  it  is  motivated  by  the  state's  obligations 
under  Article  2  to  protect  life  143 
. 
This  has  been  criticised  and  described  as  "unlikely  to  be 
followed  by  a  domestic  court.  "144  In  relation  to  consensual  patients,  there  are  at  the  very 
least  indications  from  opinions  of  the  European  Commission  that  failure  to  treat  someone 
in  need  may  raise  issues  under  Article  3.  In  Tanko  v  Finland  145 
, 
the  Commission  stated 
that 
"...  lack  of  proper  care  in  a  case  where  someone  is  suffering  from  a  serious  illness 
could  in  certain  circumstances  amount  to  treatment  contrary  to  Article  3.  " 
These  "certain  circumstances",  as  the  Commission  put  it,  arose  in  the  case  of  DV 
UK146. 
The  government  proposed  to  expel  a  convicted  drug  smuggler  who  had  advanced  AIDS 
and  a  poor  prognosis  to  St  Kitts.  This  was  alleged  to  be  a  violation  of  Articles  2,3  and  8 284 
as  the  person  would  not  continue  to  receive  any  treatment  for  their  condition,  and 
therefore  was  at  real  risk  of  dying  in  extremely  distressing  circumstances.  The  Court 
upheld  the  violation  of  Article  3,  ruling  that  the  discontinuation  of  treatment  would  amount 
to  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment.  The  absolute  nature  of  the  rights  under  Article  3 
meant  that  the  applicant  was  entitled  to  their  protection  notwithstanding  his  own 
reprehensible  conduct. 
Consent  to  treatment  has  arisen  in  the  context  of  Article  3.  In  Xv  Denmarkl  47  the 
Commission  considered  a  claim  that  a  woman  who  had  undergone  consensual 
sterilisation  had,  in  fact,  been  subjected  without  her  knowledge  or  consent  to  an 
experimental  procedure  which  therefore  amounted  to  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment. 
Ultimately  it  held  that  the  claim  was  not  made  out,  since  the  treatment  was  not  properly  to 
be  classed  as  a  medical  experiment.  The  Commission  also  noted  that  for  treatment  to 
constitute  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  it  has  to  reach  the  minimum  level  of  severity 
such  as  to  cause  considerable  physical  or  mental  suffering.  However,  it  did  accept  the 
principle  that  medical  experimentation  carried  out  without  consent  could,  in  some 
circumstances,  fall  foul  of  Article  3. 
As  with  Article  2,  it  has  been  held  that  nothing  in  Article  3  prevents  a  hospital  from 
48 
withholding  life-saving  treatment  from  someone  where  this  is  in  their  best  interests' 
More  controversially,  it  has  also  been  held  that  Article  3  has  no  applicability  to  an 
insensate  patient  such  as  one  who  is  in  a  Persistent  Vegetative  State  149 
. 
The  argument  is 
that  you  cannot  be  degraded  unless  you  are  aware  of  your  surroundings,  but  the  logic  of 
this  has  been  severely  criticised  150 
. 
Article  5:  Right  To  Liberty  And  Security 
People  have  the  right  not  to  be  arbitrarily  arrested  or  detained,  except  where  the  detention 
is  authorised  by  law  and  falls  within  one  of  the  categories  spelled  out  in  the  Article.  The 
Article  (which  is  subject  to  UK derogations  relating  to  the  situation  in  Northern  Ireland  and 
to  the  Crime,  Terrorism  and  Security  Act  2001)  does  not  just  apply  to  arrests  for  criminal 
matters,  but  covers  all  aspects  of  detention.  In  the  medical  context,  the  most  relevant 
aspects  of  the  Article  are  the  fact  that  it  includes  detention  for  medical  or  psychiatric 
reasons. 
The  Court  examined  psychiatric  detention  in  the  leading  case  of  Winterwerp  v  The 
Netheriands'*51,  and  established  that  to  justify  the  compulsory  detention  of  a  patient  under 
Article  5(l)(e),  the  following  criteria  have  to  be  met: 285 
0  There  must  be  a  true  mental  disorder 
0  The  existence  of  a  mental  disorder  must  be  proved  by  medical  evidence 
0  The  mental  disorder  must  be  of  a  type  and  degree  warranting  compulsory 
detention 
0  The  detention  must  only  continue  for  as  long  as  the  mental  disorder  persists; 
and 
0  There  must  be  regular  reviews  of  the  detention  to  reassess  whether  the 
criteria  justifying  detention  continue  to  exist  (and  which  can  release  the  patient 
if  they  do  not) 
It  was  in  respect  of  the  last  of  these  that  the  Mental  Health  Act  1983  was  impugned'  52 
Afficle  6:  Right  To  A  Fair  MaL 
Article  6,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  used  at  the  outset  of  this  thesis  to  help  identify  the  Core 
Evaluation  Criteda  against  which  the  system  of  medical  regulation  is  being  measured., 
Article  6  has  a  wider  scope  than  might  be  envisaged  because  of  its  applicability  to  civil 
matters  as  well  as  cdminal  ones.  It  covers  all  criminal  and  many  civil  cases,  as  well  as 
cases  heard  by  tribunals  and  some  intemal  hearings  or  regulatory  procedures  (including, 
as  we  have  seen,  those  of  the  GIVIC  153) 
. 
The  additional  safeguards  apply  only  to  criminal 
tdals.  These  additional  safeguards  give  anyone  charged  with  a  criminal  offence  a  number 
of  specific  rights,  including  the  right  to  be  presumed  innocent  until  proven  guilty  and  to  be 
given  adequate  time  and  facilities  to  prepare  their  defence.  The  emphasis  on  a  public  trial 
protects  litigants  against  the  administration  of  justice  in  secret  with  no  public  scrutiny.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  test  of  what  amounts  to  a  criminal  matter  is  an  autonomous  one, 
and  the  European  Court  will  not  necessadly  be  bound  by  domestic  classifications  of  these 
matters"". 
For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  the  more  important  parts  of  Article  6  are  the  non-criminal 
ones.  As  we  can  see,  the  Article  applies  to  the  "determination  of  civil  rights,  and 
obligations.  "  Civil  rights  and  obligations  are  rights  and  obligations  which  exist  under 
private  law,  although  they  may  arise  in  a  public  law  context  where  a  public  authority  is 
involved  with  or  has  affected  private  rights.  The  concept  of  civil  dghts  and  obligations  is 
also  an  autonomous  one  (heavily  influenced  by  the  Civilian  law  tradition),  and  therefore 
the  definition  in  the  Convention  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as  that  in  UK  law.  Thus,  for 
instance,  the  dght  to  stand  for  elected  office  has  been  held  to  be  an  administrative  law 
right,  not  a  civil  right,  and  so  Article  6  was  not  applicablel  55.  On  the  other  hand,  Article  6 
has  been  held  to  cover  matters  including  paternity  prooeedings'56,  commercial  licenCeS157, 286 
Orights  connected  with  land  including  planning  decisions"',  and  certain  social  security 
benefits  which  are  based  on  an  insurance  model'59. 
Article  6  is  engaged  where  there  is  a  dispute  ("contestation"  in  the  French  version  of  the 
Convention)  between  parties  as  to  the  existence  or  extent  of  a  right160  . 
However,  it  also 
applies  when  a  public  authority  makes  a  decision  or  takes  a  course  of  action  which  will 
ultimately  be  determinative  of  or  for  the  civil  right  or  obligation  in  question,  even  if  the 
person  affected  had  no  enforceable  right  to  the  particular  outcome  being  sought161  . 
The 
decision  to  institute  proceedings  will  not  in  itself  engage  Article  6  as  this  is  a  preparatory 
step,  not  a  determinative  one,  and  so  Article  6  does  not  arise  162;  it  would  remain  possible 
to  challenge  the  decision  to  raise  proceedings  by  way  of  judicial  review,  but  this  is  based 
63  on  the  common  law,  not  the  Human  Rights  Act' 
. 
Under  the  convention,  anyone  having  their  civil  rights  or  obligations  determined  is  entitled 
to  the  following  safeguards  (which  also  apply  to  criminal  trials). 
*  the  right  of  access  to  a  body  complying  with  Article  6  164 
. 
The  whole  process  needs  to 
be  considered.  If  the  original  decision  is  taken  by  a  non-compliant  administrative  body 
(for  example,  a  decision  taken  by  an  official  in  his  or  her  office)  the  requirement  is 
satisfied  if  that  decision  can  be  reviewed  by  a  court  or  tribunal  that  does  satisfy  Article 
6  165 
. 
The  right  of  access  to  a  court  or  tribunal  is  not  absolute,  provided  any  restrictions 
on  it  do  not  impair  the  essence  of  the  right,  are  for  a  legitimate  purpose,  and 
proportionate  166 
. 
The  level  of  appellate  scrutiny  required  may vary. 
*  the  right  to  a  fair  hearing,  encapsulated  in  the  notion  that  there  should  be  "equality  of 
arms":  one  party  should  not  be  placed  at  a  procedural  disadvantage  compared  with 
the  other  167 
. 
This  is  particularly  important  in  terms  of  access  to  information  -  both 
sides  should,  as  a  general  rule,  have  access  to  the  same  documents  and  to  everything 
that  will  be  before  the  decision-maker  168 
the  right  to  a  public  hearing.  Again,  this  is  not  necessary  at  the  outset  provided  there 
is  an  appeal  to  a  compliant  body.  While  it  is  possible  to  exclude  the  public  from  some 
or  all  of  the  proceedings,  the  actual  decision  has  to  be  pronounced  in  public. 
9  the  right  to  a  hearing  within  a  reasonable  time. 
9  the  right  to  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal.  Judges  and  tribunal  members  must 
be  free  from  outside  pressures,  and  should  be  independent  of  the  executive  and  of  the 
parties.  Independence  must  be  such  that  a  reasonably  informed  objective  observer 287 
would  not  conclude  that  there  was  any  real  possibility  of  bias.  It  was  due  to  breach  of 
this  principle  that  temporary  sheriffs  were  rendered  unlawful  by  a  decision  of  the  High 
Court  169  (the  temporary  sheriffs  were  appointed  without  security  of  tenure  by  the  Lord 
Advocate,  who  was  also  responsible  for  prosecuting  offences  before  these  same 
temporary  sheriffs). 
In  terms  of  administrative  bodies,  many  if  not  most  operational  decisions  taken  by  the 
various  arms  of  government  (including  the  NHS)  will  rely  on  the  rule  mentioned  above 
which  states  that  Article  6  compliance  can  be  secured  through  the  appeal  mechanism.  To 
satisfy  this  test,  the  appellate  body  must  have  full  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  appeal,  i.  e. 
be  able  to  cure  whatever  it  is  about  the  earlier  administrative  decision  that  is  complained 
about.  However,  often  the  only  real  right  of  appeal  (more  accurately,  right  of  review)  is  for 
the  dissatisfied  individual  to  seek  a  judicial  review  at  common  law  or  under  restricted 
statutory  grounds.  Would  this  provide  sufficient  review  to  satisfy  Article  6? 
The  issue  arose  initially  in  County  Properties  v  The  Scottish  Ministers  170 
, 
but  was 
overtaken  by  the  Alconbury"'  case  leapfrogging  directly  to  the  House  of  Lords.  The 
House  of  Lords  unanimously  upheld  the  Secretary  of  State's  appeal,  holding  that  the 
supervision  of  the  courts  was  sufficient  safeguard.  This  did  not  require  the  courts  to  sit  in 
judgement  over  the  policy  decisions  made  by  those  to  whom  that  responsibility  had  been 
given,  as  to  do  so  would  be  both  unnecessary  and  undemocratiC172  . 
However,  the  House 
did  hold  that  Proportionality  review  had  become  part  of  the  judicial  review  armoury, 
although  this  was  said  not  to  be  as  a  result  of  the  passage  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  but 
merely  another  stage  in  the  ongoing  evolution  of  the  common  law. 
Article  8:  Right  To  Respect  For  Private  And  Family  Life: 
Article  8  is  one  of  the  most  wide-ranging  of  all  the  Convention  articles,  and  covers 
everything  from  the  right  not  to  have  your  phone  tapped  173  to  the  right  not  to  be  subjected 
to  environmental  pollution  174 
. 
Article  8  also  imposes  positive  obligations  on  the  state  175 
. 
In  analysing  Article  8,  it  is  convenient  to  break  it  into  the  four  component  parts  of  private 
life,  family  life,  home,  and  correspondence. 
Private  life  was  interpreted  in  Niernitz  v  Geanany176'  the  European  Court  holding  that  the 
expression  went  beyond  the  "inner  circle"  in  which  the  individual  may  live  his  or  her  own 
life  as  he  or  she  chooses,  but  also  extends  to  the  right  to  establish  and  develop 
relationships  with  other  people.  The  Court  has  also  held  that  the  right  to  privacy 
encompassed  by  Article  8  includes  informational  privacy  such  that  holding  files  on 
someone  which  they  are  unable  to  refute  constitutes  an  interference  with  Article  8  177 
,  and 288 
that  the  right  to  respect  for  privacy  imparts  the  concept  of  allowing  individuals  control  over 
their  personal  details  (and  imposes  a  corresponding  obligation  on  the  state  to  ensure 
there  are  safeguards  in  place)  178  This  overlaps  with  the  Data  Protection  Act,  and  is 
considered  in  more  detail  below. 
The  right  to  respect  for  private  life  includes  protection  of  physical  integrity:  in  Xv 
Austria  179 
, 
the  Commission  held  that 
"a  compulsory  medical  intervention,  even  if  it  is  of  minor  importance,  must  be 
considered  an  interference  with  this  right.  " 
One  area  where  private  life  is  regularly  infringed  by  state  activities  is  the  world  of  covert 
surveillance,  mostly  conducted  by  police  and  intelligence  services.  Such  covert 
surveillance  will  involve  a  clear  infringement  on  the  right  to  privacy  of  the  person  under 
surveillance  180 
,  and  so  requires  to  be  justified  under  Article  8(2).  Such  justification 
requires  that  the  surveillance  have  a  lawful  basis,  something  the  case  of  Khan  v  UK"" 
held  was  lacking  in  the  UK.  With  the  Act  due  to  come  into  force  very  shortly  after  this 
decision  was  issued,  the  Government  rushed  some  emergency  legislation  through 
Parliament  to  ensure  that  a  ulawful  basis"  was  in  place  when  the  Act  came  into  force, 
under  which  covert  surveillance  could  be  lawfully  authorised  182 
. 
Parallel  legislation  was 
also  rushed  through  the  Scottish  Parliament  at  the  same  time'  133 
. 
It  should  be  noted  that 
certain  medical  regulatory  bodies  are  authorised  under  this  legislation  to  carry  out  covert 
surveillance;  the  British  Pharmaceutical  Society  apparently  makes  extensive  use  of  this 
power  in  supervising  the  activities  of  pharmacists'  84 
. 
Finally,  it  would  appear  that  Article  8  has  now  led  to  the  creation  of  a  common  law 
enforceable  right  to  privacy,  something  which  was  never  previously  recognised  by  the 
courts'  135 
. 
This  right  has  recently  been  upheld  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  as  justifying  an 
injunction  preventing  a  newspaper  from  disclosing  the  identity  of  a  health  care  worker  who 
had  volunteered  to  his  health  authority  that  he  was  HIV-positive  (including  potentially- 
identifying  information  including  the  identity  of  his  "employing"  health  authority),  but  did 
not  necessarily  prevent  the  health  authority  from  conducting  a  "look-back"  exercise  to 
ascertain  whether  any  of  the  health  care  worker's  former  patients  required  to  be  offered 
86  an  HIV  test' 
. 
Family  life  is  entitled  to  respect  under  Article  8  irrespective  of  the  legal  status  of  the  family 
-  so  families  classed  as  "illegitimate"  in  domestic  law  are  entitled  to  the  same  degree  of 
protection  as  those  classed  as  legitimate'  87 
. 
The  protection  extends  beyond  the 
traditional  nuclear  family,  and  if  the  hallmarks  of  family  life  can  be  seen,  it  seems  that 289 
even  more  distant  relationships  will  be  classed  as  giving  rise  to  dghts  under  this 
heading'88.  This  clearly  has  a  potential  impact  on  the  rules  concerning  child  protection, 
adoption  and  fostering  and  (possibly)  assisted  fertility,  although  the  dght  to  marry  and 
found  a  family  (contained  in  Article  12  of  the  Convention)  has  been  held  not  to  extend  to  a 
duty  on  the  state  to  assist  in  the  activity.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  state  interference 
in  reproductive  technology  (through  the  HFEA  regulatory  regime)  will  be  able  to  be 
challenged  under  this  heading.  In  Rv  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Authority  ex 
parte  Assisted  Reproduction  and  Gynaecology  Centre  and  989,  the  High  Court  accepted 
that  Articles  8  and  12  were  engaged  in  the  course  of  a  judicial  review  of  the  HFEA's  policy 
on  egg  implantation.  However,  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  the  case'90  doubted  whether  the 
applicants'  convention  dghts  were  engaged  at  all, 
Home,  unsurprisingly,  means  where  you  live  (even  if  your  use  of  the  home  is 
unauthorised"").  It  might  be  thought  to  have  limited  relevance  in  the  medical  sphere,  but 
has  been  used  successfully  in  a  resource-based  case  which  would  probably  have  been 
doomed  at  common  law.  In  Rv  North  East  Devon  HA  ex  parte  Coughlan'92 
, 
it  was 
successfully  argued  that  closing  a  nursing  home  in  which  the  applicant  lived  (and  had 
apparently  been  promised  a  uhome  for  life")  constituted  a  violation  of  her  rights  under 
Article  8,  which  could  not  be  justified  by  reference  to  Article  8(2)193. 
Correspondence  similarly  has  limited  relevance  to  the  subject  of  medical  regulation.  Most 
of  the  issues  debated  in  Strasbourg  have  related  to  interception  of  prisoners'  mail  194 
. 
However,  it  is  recognised  that  the  concept  of  "correspondence"  includes  telephone  calls, 
including  telephone  calls  made  from  the  workplace'95.  This  has  provoked  interest  from 
the  perspective  of  employee  rights,  and  the  practice  of  workplace  telephone  monitoring 
has  also  recently  been  put  on  a  statutory  basis'96. 
Looked  at  in  the  round,  however,  it  is  possible  to  see  in  Article  8a  general  (if  unstated) 
principle  that  says  the  Convention  can  be  used  as  a  means  of  upholding  personal 
97 
autonomy  and  dignity,  and  certainly  it  has  been  used  to  achieve  that  end'  . 
Indeed,  as 
Lord  Bingham  has  recently  commented, 
"Article  8  is  expressed  in  terms  directed  to  protection  of  personal  autonomy... 
"l  98 
The  case  in  which  this  was  stated  was  the  attempt  by  Diane  Pretty  to  use  the  Act  as  a 
means  of  allowing  her  husband  to  assist  in  her  suicide  without  fear  of  criminal 
prosecution.  In  the  event,  the  House  of  Lords  rejected  her  application,  but  the  case  is 
extremely  informative  from  the  perspective  of  how  the  various  convention  rights  asserted 
were  handled  by  the  domestic  court.  The  reasoning  behind  the  decision  is  not  without  its 290 
cn  ics  199,  however,  and  the  assertions  of  respect  for  autonomy  in  the  judgements  were 
not  reflected  in  the  actual  decision,  which  was  upheld  by  Strasbourg". 
III:  Data  Protection  Act  1998: 
A:  Outline  of  the  new  rules: 
The  Data  Protection  Act  1998  (hereafter  "the  Act"  or  "DPA  98")  gives  effect  in  the  UK  to  a 
European  Union  Directive  on  the  free  movement  of  personal  data  201 
. 
It  completely 
replaces  the  Data  Protection  Act  1984  (DPA  84)  and  Access  to  Personal  Files  Act  1987 
(including  the  Social  Work  and  Housing  Regulations  made  under  that  Act),  and  most  of 
the  Access  to  Health  Records  Act  1990  (which  now  only  applies  to  access  requests  made 
in  respect  of  persons  who  are  deceased). 
The  Act  creates  a  highly  detailed  code  for  the  processing  of  personal  data  202 
, 
defined  as 
data,  whether  stored  electronically  or  in  a  relevant  (manual)  filing  system,  which  relates  to 
a  living  individual  who  can  be  identified  from  those  data  and/or  other  information  in  the 
possession  of  (or  likely  to  come  into  the  possession  of)  the  data  controller.  Additional 
03  categories  apply  in  the  public  sector2  . 
Space  precludes  a  full  analysis  of  the  rules204,  but 
two  key  points  to  note  are  that  the  Act  imposes  an  obligation  on  "data  controllers"  (i.  e.  the 
persons  who  determine  the  purposes  for  which  data  are  processed)  to  comply  with  eight 
"data  protection  principles"  in  relation  to  the  processing  of  personal  data.  "Processing"  is 
very  widely  defined  and  covers  almost  everything  -  acquiring,  disclosing,  accessing, 
amending,  deleting  or  even  holding  data.  Stricter  rules  apply  to  "sensitive  personal  data 
, 
i.  e.  information  relating  to  racial/ethnic  origin,  political  opinion,  religious  beliefs,  trade 
union  membership,  physical/mental  health,  sexual  life,  and  data  about  the  commission  or 
alleged  commission  of  an  offence  or  the  disposal  of  criminal  proceedings  against 
someone.  Everyone  who  processes  personal  data  requires  to  have  an  entry  (called  a 
"notification")  in  a  public  register  maintained  by  the  Information  Commissioner  (formerly 
the  Data  Protection  Commissioner/Registrar)205.  Processing  personal  data  without  a 
notification  (if  notification  is  required)  is  a  criminal  offence206. 
The  First  Data  Protection  Principle  requires  processing  to  be  fair  and  lawful,  and  in 
particular  requires  that  at  least  one  "Schedule  2  condition'  (i.  e.  one  of  the  conditions  listed 
in  Schedule  2  to  the  Act)  is  met.  Schedule  2  conditions  include  matters  such  as  where  the 
processing  is  necessary  to  comply  with  legal  obligations  or  to  perform  statutory  functions, 
processing  which  is  in  the  legitimate  interests  of  the  data  controller  or  a  third  party 
(provided  this  does  not  result  in  unwarranted  prejudice  to  the  data  subject),  or  processing 
to  which  the  data  subject  has  consented.  For  "sensitive  personal  data"  it  is  also 291 
necessary  to  satisfy  a  Schedule  3  condition;  these  are  rather  stricter  than  those  in 
Schedule  2.  Thus,  consent  under  Schedule  3  must  be  "explicit  ".  The  Information 
Commissioner's  view  is  that  this  consent  must  be  "informed.  "  Whether  the  courts  which 
have  proved  so  resistant  to  the  concept  of  "informed  consent"  in  the  medical  treatment 
sphere  are  more  receptive  of  it  in  the  data  protection  arena  remains  to  be  seen. 
For  medical  purposes,  paragraph  8  is  relevant.  This  covers  processing  for  medical 
purposes  undertaken  either  by  a  health  professional  or  someone  who,  in  the 
circumstances,  owes  a  duty  of  confidentiality  equivalent  to  that  which  would  be  owed  by  a 
health  professional.  Additional  schedule  3  conditions  have  been  made  by  regulation  207 
- 
Lastly,  the  First  Principle  states  that  data  is  only  to  be  treated  as  having  been  fairly 
obtained  if  certain  particulars  are  made  available  to  the  data  subject  -  what  are  known  as 
Article  10  and  Article  11  notices208.  The  contents  of  these  notices  are  considered  below. 
It  is  necessary  to  comply  with  these  steps  each  time  the  data  are  processed. 
Numerous  exceptions  exist  to  all  of  the  above  processing  rules.  Thus,  Section  35  says 
information  can  be  disclosed  where  this  is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  legal  action. 
Totalise  pic  v  Motley  Fool  Ltd.  and  Another20,9  held  that  Section  35  permitted  disclosure  to 
be  made  irrespective  of  who  the  proceedings  (which  was  held  to  include  prospective 
proceedings)  were  between,  i.  e.  it  covered  release  of  data  in  connection  with  legal 
proceedings  not  involving  the  data  controller  itself.  The  Court  of  Appeal  decision  210 
outlines  when  a  party  is  entitled  to  resist  disclosure  and  insist  on  the  requesting  party 
obtaining  a  court  order  before  disclosure  will  be  made.  These  circumstances  include 
where  the  information  is  confidential  or  where  its  disclosure  might  infringe  a  legitimate 
interest  of  another.  An  additional  complication  arises  because  of  the  volume  of 
subordinate  legislation  made  under  the  Act  -  at  least  20  Sis  have  been  made,  a 
significant  proportion  of  which  actually  effect  amendments  to  the  principal  statute  in 
particular  circumstances2"  . 
It  is  now  necessary  to  provide  information  up-front  to  data  subjects.  This  arises  because 
the  First  Principle  states  that  data  is  only  to  be  treated  as  having  been  obtained  fairly  if  the 
data  subject  has,  is  provided  with,  or  has  made  readily  available,  certain  information 
concerning:  who  the  data  controller  is,  the  nature  of  the  processing  (including  any 
proposed  disclosures  of  the  information)  and  any  other  information  required  in  the 
interests  of  fairness212.  uOther  information"  may  (and  frequently  vAll)  require  a  statement 
advising  the  data  subject  of  their  right  of  access  to  the  data. 
Subject  access  rights  under  DPA  98  are  significantly  enhanced,  and  the  right  now  extends 
to  manual  records.  Under  DPA  84,  the  right  was  essentially  one  of  being  able  to  request 292 
a  copy  of  the  data  held  on  you.  Under  DPA  98,  this  is  extended  to  include  the  right  to  be 
told  why  the  data  is  being  processed,  who  it  will  be  disclosed  to,  and  any  information  held 
as  to  the  source  of  the  data  213 
. 
The  right  is  restdcted  insofar  as  complying  would  disclose 
personal  data  relating  to  someone  else;  data  controllers  receiving  a  subject  access 
request  are  expected  to  carry  out  a  series  of  tests  and  decide  whether  it  is  reasonable  to 
contact  the  other  parties  and  seek  their  consent  (refusal  of  which,  interestingly,  is  not 
decisive  of  whether  this  information  should  be  disclosed)  and  have  to  make  an 
assessment  of  reasonableness.  Even  if  the  decision  is  reached  not  to  disclose  the  third 
party  information,  there  is  still  an  obligation  to  comply  with  as  much  of  the  request  as 
possible  without  disclosing  those  parts  of  it.  There  is  a  tension  between  the  obligation  to 
advise  as  to  the  source  of  the  data  and  the  duty  to  protect  third  party  information.  This 
has  led  the  Commissioner  to  publish  a  guidance  note  on  the  subjece  14 
. 
The  guidance  on 
subject  access,  however,  does  little  more  than  rehearse  the  statutory  tests  and  make 
reference  to  the  ECtHR  case  of  Gaskin  v  UK215  on  how  to  balance  the  conflicting  interests. 
Unlike  the  Access  to  Personal  Files  Act  1987  and  Access  to  Health  Records  Act  1990, 
subject  access  under  DPA  98  is  completely  retrospective  and  applies  irrespective  of  when 
the  record  was  created.  Requests  must  be  complied  with  within  40  days  of  the  latest  of 
the  following:  proof  that  the  person  is,  in  fact,  the  data  subject;  being  given  sufficient 
information  to  allow  you  to  locate  the  data,  and  receipt  of  the  fee,  if  you  decide  to  levy  this. 
The  maximum  permissible  fee  is  E10.00  (E2.00  for  credit  reference  agencieS)216  . 
For 
medical  records,  the  fee  was  E50.00  if  you  wanted  a  copy  of  a  non-automated  record  217 
- 
Practitioners  seeking  copies  of  medical  records  (including  X-rays,  which  are  notoriously 
expensive)  took  especial  note  of  this  point,  and  as  a  result  it  seems  that  health  service 
bodies  were  confronted  with  excessive  numbers  of  speculative  pre-litigation  subject 
access  requests.  As  a  result  of  lobbying  from  these  bodies,  the  government  took  the 
decision  to  extend  indefinitely  the  transitional  measure  whereby  access  requests  to 
medical  records  which  involved  copying  non-automated  records  (such  as  X-ray  pictures) 
p  10.00218.  were  subject  to  a  fee  of  : E50.00  rather  than  _ 
Special  tests  for  non-disclosure 
apply  to  social  work/social  services  files  and  education  records,  and  also  to  health 
records;  the  health  rules  are  discussed  infra 
B:  Interaction  with  Human  Rights: 
Data  Protection  as  a  concept  was  originally  driven  by  the  perception  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  that  personal  privacy  was  threatened  by  ability  of  organisations  in  the  computer 
age  (governmental  or  otherwise)  to  process  and  cross-reference  previously 
unmanageable  amounts  of  data  about  individuals.  Thewhole  thrust  of  data  protection  is 
to  give  the  individual  more  control  over  what  happens  to  their  personal  data  -  this  is 
abundantly  clear  from  the  (very  long)  preamble  to  the  Directive. 293 
The  Human  Rights  implications  of  data  protection  almost  all  arise  in  terms  of  Article  8  of 
the  Convention.  The  right  to  privacy  enshrined  in  Article  8(1)  has,  as  we  have  seen,  been 
held  to  incorporate  the  right  to  informational  privacy,  i.  e.  it  imparts  the  concept  of 
exercising  control  over  the  use  to  which  your  personal  details  are  put,  with  a  requirement 
for  domestic  legal  systems  to  have  adequate  safeguards  in  place  to  protect  informational 
privacy2"'.  The  interaction  between  Article  8  and  DPA  occurs  in  2  ways.  The  first  is  in 
terms  of  the  requirement  that  all  processing  be  "fair  and  lawful".  For  public  authorities, 
processing  of  personal  data  will,  in  many  (if  not  mose2o)  circumstances  engage  Article  8. 
Accordingly  it  is  necessary  for  the  authority  to  justify  its  processing  under  Article  8(2),  or 
else  what  is  being  done  will  be  rendered  unlawful  by  Section  6  of  the  Human  Rights  Act 
1998.  Once  that  happens,  the  processing  itself  will  be  unlawful  and  therefore  in  breach  of 
the  First  Principle.  The  converse  is  also  true:  if  an  authority  is  processing  in  a  way  which 
engages  Article  8,  it  will  seek  to  justify  this  in  terms  of  Article  8(2).  This  requires  that  the 
interference  must  have  a  lawful  basis,  have  a  legitimate  purpose,  and  be  proportionate  to 
the  objective  pursued.  If  the  processing  is  in  breach  of  the  DPA,  then  there  will  be  no 
lawful  basis  for  the  interference  and  consequently  what  is  being  done  will  additionally 
breach  the  Human  Rights  Act.  It  follows  from  this  that  it  is  very  hard  for  a  public  authority 
to  breach  one  of  these  but  not  the  other  -  the  processing/interference  with  privacy  stand  or 
fall  together.  This  could  be  seen  in  the  case  of  Jacklyn  Adeniji22'.  In  an  out-of-court 
settlement,  E5,000  damages  (plus  an  estimated  E50,000  costs)  were  paid  in  respect  of  a 
breach  of  both  the  DPA  98  and  Article  8.  The  damages  were  decided  out  of  court, 
although  the  judge  who  approved  the  award  (Garland  J)  recognised  that  this  was  a  new 
area  for  the  courtS222. 
There  have  been  some  decided  cases  which  consider  this  interaction.  The  reasoning 
outlined  above  has  been  substantially  applied  by  the  courts  in  the  small  number  of  cases 
which  have  come  up  thus  far:  see,  for  example,  the  decision  in  Rv  City  of  Wakefield 
Metropolitan  Council  and  Anor  ex  p.  Robertson  223 
,  which  held  that  commercial  sale  of  the 
electoral  register  without  scope  for  an  opt-out  was  in  breach  of  the  DPA  and  Article  8. 
There  is  also  a  decision  of  the  Information  Tribunal  (National  Security  Appeals)  in  Norman 
Baker  MP  v  Home  Secretary224  holding  that  issuing  blanket  exemptions  to  M15  without  a 
case-by-case  consideration  of  the  merits  breached  both  provisions.  In  essence  the 
tribunal,  following  a  comprehensive  review  of  both  domestic  and  European  authority, 
concluded  that  it  should  apply  proportionality  review  to  the  decision  Home  Secretary's 
decision  to  issue  the  exemption  certificate  being  challenged. 
C:  Implications  for  medical  records  management: 
1:  Information  and  Eegulato!  y  functions: 294 
If  an  organisation  handles  sensitive  personal  data  such  as  medical  records,  it  is  important 
to  consider  the  impact  of  A  Health  Authority  vX  and  Others'5-  The  court  in  that  case 
approached  the  matter  from  the  direction  of  Article  8  ECHR  (right  to  respect  for  private 
and  family  life)  rather  than  DPA  98.  Munby  J  held  that  disclosure  of  the  records  in 
question  could  be  made,  but  only  subject  to  a  binding  and  transmissible  duty  of 
confidentiality  being  imposed  on  the  recipients  (and  any  subsequent  recipients)  thereof. 
This  goes  some  way  beyond  what  DPA  98  requires,  the  Act  principally  being  concerned 
with  the  internal  controls  which  exist  within  an  organisation.  Munby  J's  decision  was 
subsequently  upheld  by  the  Court  of  Appea?  26. 
The  case  lays  down  that  even  where  a  particular  disclosure  is  permissible,  that  does  not 
remove  the  need  for  the  disclosing  body  to  attach  safeguards  to  the  disclosure,  in 
particular  to  ensure  that  the  tests  of  necessity  and  proportionality  are  met,  and  that 
confidentiality  is  safeguarded.  The  case  arose  out  of  care  proceedings  subject  to  specific 
English  legislation,  and  wider  extrapolation  is  problematic,  but  in  many  respects  the  ruling 
goes  to  the  heart  of  medical  regulation.  In  essence,  the  case  involved  a  health  authority 
investigating  allegations  that  GPs  whom  it  "employed"  had  not  complied  with  their  terms 
and  conditions  of  service.  In  order  to  carry  out  this  regulatory  function  properly,  there 
would  have  to  be  a  transfer  of  medical  records  to  the  health  authority  for  investigation 
purposes.  The  doctors  under  investigation  had  sought  the  consent  of  the  patients  whose 
records  were  being  asked  for,  but  two  patients  refused  this  consent.  The  doctors 
accordingly  asserted  their  duty  of  confidentiality  to  these  patients  as  against  the  regulatory 
body. 
Ultimately,  the  Court  ordered  disclosure  but  only  subject  to  appropriate  guarantees  as  to 
continuing  confidentiality.  A  similar  approach  had  been  mandated  for  release  of 
information  to  the  GIVIC  in  the  course  of  its  regulatory  functionS227 
. 
The  test  was 
formulated  by  Thorpe  U  as  follows: 
"There  is  obviously  a  high  public  interest,  analogous  to  the  public  interest  in  the 
due  administration  of  criminal  justice,  in  the  proper  administration  of  professional 
disciplinary  hearings,  particularly  in  the  field  of  medicine...  [I]n  my  opinion  the 
objection  to  production  fell  to  be  decided  in  accordance  with  the  principle... 
whether  the  public  interest  in  effective  disciplinary  procedures  for  the  investigation 
and  eradication  of  medical  malpractice  outweighed  the  confidentiality  of  the 
records...  A  balance  still  had  to  be  struck  between  competing  interests.  The 
balance  came  down  in  favour  of  production  as  it  invadably  does,  save  in 
exceptional  cases.  n228 295 
Accordingly,  it  seems  that  neither  DPA  nor  Article  8  will  prevent  medical  regulators  from 
being  able  to  process  the  information  necessary  for  them  to  carry  out  their  jobs,  provided 
they  attach  appropriate  safeguards  to  confidential  information.  This  is  not  unlike  the 
Schedule  3  condition  whereby  sensitive  personal  data  may  be  processed  for  medical 
purposes  either  by  a  health  professional  or  someone  who,  in  the  circumstances,  owes  a 
duty  of  confidentiality  equivalent  to  that  which  would  be  owed  by  a  health  professionaF29. 
2:  Research  implications: 
Different  considerations  arise  in  relation  to  disclosure  of  personal  data  in  connection  with 
medical  research.  In  Rv  Department  of  Health  ex  parte  Source  Informatics  Ltd.  and 
others",  the  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  the  Directive  (and  by  extension,  DPA  98)  did  not 
have  any  applicability  to  the  use  of  anonymised  data.  However,  the  Commissioner  has 
expressed  doubt  as  to  how  truly  anonymous  some  data  can  ever  be  rendered.  In 
addition,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  process  of  anonymising  data  VAII  in  itself 
constitute  processing  and  will  therefore  have  to  comply  with  the  Act. 
It  is  also  the  case  that  much  medical  research  can  only  be  carried  out  using  actual 
records.  These  may  be  "pseudonymised"  (i.  e.  processed  by  reference  to  a  non-personal 
unique  identifier,  typically  a  reference  number),  but  so  long  as  the  researcher  retains  the 
key  and  is  able  to  connect  the  pseudonymised  record  to  a  named  individual,  this  will  still 
fall  within  the  definition  of  "personal  data"  and  accordingly  any  processing  of  the  records 
(and  in  particular,  disclosure  of  them  by  the  doctor  to  the  researchers)  requires  to  be 
justified  according  to  the  data  protection  principles  and  under  Schedule  2  and  3 
conditions.  One  simple  option  would  be  to  seek  the  explicit  consent  of  the  individuals 
whose  records  are  being  sought,  but  the  problem  with  this  is  that  voluntary  participation 
(particularly  in  relation  to  epidemiological  research)  generates  immense  problems  with 
research  methodology,  and  may  in  fact  render  the  research  statistically  invalid.  This  issue 
has  featured  in  the  pages  of  the  British  Medical  Journal  on  a  number  of  occasionS23',  and 
has  been  of  concern  to  researchers  in  varied  fields  such  as  cancer  registrieS232  and  injury 
surveillance  programmeS233. 
Such  concerns  are  valid  inasmuch  as  proper  conduct  of  research  requires  the  data 
protection  position  to  be  addressed,  and  compliance  with  all  the  rules  will  almost  certainly 
involve  the  creation  of  legally-enforceable  statements  of  the  respective  rights  and  duties  of 
those  involved.  However,  the  concerns  may  be  unfounded  if  they  suggest  that  research 
cannot  take  place  absent  express  consent.  Successfully  conducting  research  otherwise 
than  by  consent  does  requires  different  Schedule  2  and  3  conditions;  in  particular, 
Schedule  3  can  be  satisfied  by  carrying  out  research  only  using  medical  professionals  or 296 
others  bound  by  duties  of  confidentiality  it  is  still  necessary  to  identify  a  Schedule  2 
condition,  but  one  could  rely  on  consent  more  easily  under  this  analysis  since  for 
Schedule  2  consent  may  be  implied  (although  this  may  still  create  methodological 
problems).  Research  can  continue  without  even  an  implied  consent  in  circumstances 
where  it  is  possible  to  identify  an  appropriate  statutory  duty  imposed  on  one  or  other  of  the 
research  partners.  Most  duties  imposed  in  the  health  arena  are  couched  in  extremely 
wide  terms,  and  in  many  cases  it  will  be  possible  to  structure  the  data  sharing  involved  in 
research  so  as  to  be  in  compliance  with  these  statutory  obligations.  Provided  this  is  done 
using  the  minimum  required  datasets,  will  not  cause  any  prejudice  to  the  research 
subjects,  is  accompanied  by  appropriate  safeguards  (particularly  in  relation  to  data  quality 
and  security)  and  is  of  sufficient  potential  benefit  to  represent  a  proportionate  interference 
with  patients'  rights,  there  is  nothing  in  either  DPA  98  or  the  Human  Rights  Act  to  prevent 
the  research  from  taking  place.  This  conclusion  is  backed  by  Section  33  of  the  Act,  which 
provides  that  data  processed  for  research  purposes  are  not  (for  purposes  of  the  Second 
Principle)  to  be  treated  as  being  processed  in  a  manner  incompatible  with  the  purpose  for 
which  they  were  originally  acquired.  However,  the  draft  Guidance  on  Use  and  Disclosure 
of  Medical  Data  234  does  indicate  that  in  the  Commissioners  view  disclosure  to  a  cancer 
registry  should  proceed  on  the  basis  of  implied  consent.  The  situation  may  be  clarified 
when  the  final  version  of  the  guidance  is  published  235 
. 
In  the  meantime,  these  concerns 
led  to  the  inclusion  of  Section  60  in  the  Health  and  Social  Care  Act  2002.  This  measure 
allows  the  Secretary  of  State  to  make  regulations  requiring  persons  to  disclose  patient 
information  to  other  persons  in  certain  circumstances;  the  measure  was  included  at  the 
behest  of  medical  researchers.  However,  since  the  regulations  to  be  made  cannot  require 
236  any  processing  to  be  carded  out  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  DPA  98  it  is  far  from 
clear  that  this  measure  actually  does  much  to  assist  matters. 
3:  Individual  riqhts: 
Health  records  are  subject  to  certain  subject  access  peculiarities,  under  the  Data 
Protection  (Subject  Access  Modification)  (Health)  Order  2000237.  In  essence,  this  Order 
embodies  the  concept  of  "therapeutic  privilege",  accepted  by  the  court  in  Hatcher  v 
Black  238 
,  which  says  that  a  doctor  need  not  tell  the  patient  something  if  in  the  doctor's 
(purely  subjective)  opinion,  it  would  be  harmful  to  the  patient  to  tell  them  it.  Criticism  of 
this  was  noted  in  Chapter  4,  but  the  exemption  is  nonetheless  repeated  in  the  legislation. 
In  the  case  of  health  information  acquired  other  than  from  the  data  subject,  there  is  a 
requirement  to  consult  the  "relevant  health  professional"  on  this  subject  prior  to  releasing 
(or  not  releasing)  the  data.  In  particular,  therapeutic  privilege  cannot  be  claimed  unless  a 
health  professional  agrees.  Interestingly,  however,  the  health  professional's  views  are  not 
binding  and  if  the  health  professional  says  not  to  disclose  (or  fails  to  respond  within  the 297 
forty  days)  the  data  controller  is  still  free  to  make  up  his/her  own  mind  up  on  whether  to 
disclose  the  information  to  the  data  subject  or  not. 
The  second  main  peculiarity  in  relation  to  medical  subject  access  requests  is  that  the 
identity  of  medical  professionals  mentioned  in  an  individual's  records  are  not  regarded  as 
third  party  personal  data.  In  other  words,  provided  the  information  in  an  individual's  file 
identifies  a  member  of  the  health  care  team  whose  presence  there  was  due  to  them  acting 
in  a  professional  capacity,  there  is  no  bar  to  disclosing  that  data  (i.  e.  the  identity  of  the 
health  care  professional)  to  the  data  subject.  This  is  in  response  to  the  case  of  Gaskin  v 
UK  239 
,  where  the  refusal  of  professionals  involved  to  having  their  identities  disclosed  was 
held  to  breach  Article  8  ECHR240. 
D:  Freedom  of  Information: 
Freedom  of  Information  (FOI)  has  been  given  effect  in  the  UK  through  both  a 
(Westminster)  Act  of  Parliament  and  an  Act  of  the  Scottish  Parliament.  While  it  is  easy  to 
think  of  the  (Westminster)  Freedom  of  Information  Act  2000  (FOIA  2000)  as  an  English 
measure,  this  is  not  the  case:  FOIA  2000  applies  to  all  public  authorities  except  those 
operating  purely  in  Scotland.  Thus,  a  request  addressed  to  an  Inland  Revenue  office  in 
Scotland  would  be  handled  under  the  UK  legislation,  not  the  Scottish  version.  FOIA  2000 
included  a  number  of  amendments  to  the  DPA.  Most  of  these  were  purely  in  relation  to 
information  held  by  UK/English  public  bodies,  although  the  most  visible  effect  was  the 
change  of  name  from  Data  Protection  Commissioner  to  Information  Commissioner, 
reflecting  the  fact  that  the  Commissioner  now  has  responsibility  for  policing  FOI  as  well  as 
data  protection. 
In  essence,  FOIA  2000  creates  a  statutory  right  to  information  held  by  a  public  authority, 
although  most  of  the  Act  actually  consists  of  limits  on  and  exemptions  to  the  right  of 
access.  An  additional  duty  imposed  on  public  authorities  is  to  prepare  "publication 
schemes"  listing  the  information  which  the  authority  publishes  voluntarily  (as  opposed  to 
publication  in  response  to  a  request  under  the  legislation).  The  Holyrood  version,  the 
Freedom  of  Information  (Scotland)  Act  2002  (FOISA  2002)  is  structurally  very  similar  to 
the  UK  legislation,  the  differences  really  being  in  relation  to  the  detail  241 
. 
For  example, 
under  FOIA  2000,  information  may  be  withheld  if  it  would  "prejudice"  a  particular  protected 
interest.  Under  FOISA  2002,  the  test  is  one  of  "substantial  prejudice".  There  will  be  a 
separate  Scottish  Information  Commissioner  (dealing  only  with  Scottish  FOI  and  not  with 
data  protection.  Neither  measure  is  fully  in  force  yet,  and  the  right  of  access  to 
documents  is  unlikely  to  come  into  effect  before  2004. 298 
Perhaps  the  main  impact  of  the  FOI  legislation  will  be  that  everyone  in  the  regulatory 
framework  (and  a  large  proportion  of  those  being  regulated)  will  be  under  a  new  statutory 
duty  requiring  them  to  be  more  open  about  their  affairs.  In  Chapter  4,  we  considered 
some  of  the  (unsuccessful)  attempts  to  litigate  in  relation  to  NHS  resource  decisions.  In 
these  cases,  there  was  no  requirement  on  the  NHS  body  being  challenged  to  justify  the 
decision.  However,  FOI  legislation  could  potentially  strengthen  the  hand  of  anyone 
seeking  to  mount  such  a  challenge  in  future  by  giving  them  access  to  internal 
deliberations  (and  financial  details)  which  previously  would  have  been  kept  from  them. 
Thus  informed,  a  challenge  may  be  able  to  be  more  precisely-focused  and  accordingly 
have  a  greater  chance  of  success. 
IV:  Summary  and  Conclusions: 
A:  Purpose: 
As  stated  supra,  there  are  a  number  of  purposes  apparent  in  the  various  statutory 
interventions  which  have  been  considered  in  this  Chapter.  In  terms  of  the  sector-specific 
measures  consider  in  Part  1,  these  appear  to  fall  into  two  broad  categories:  major  pieces 
of  legislation  intended  to  create  a  new  legal  framework  for  the  area  being  legislated  on 
(the  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  and  the  mental  health  legislation  being 
examples  of  this),  and  smaller  and  highly  specialised  pieces  of  legislation  which  have 
typically  been  passed  at  speed  as  a  rapid  legislative  response  to  a  perceived  pressing 
social  problem  which  has  arisen  (the  Human  Reproductive  Cloning  Act  2001  being  a 
good  example). 
In  terms  of  the  two  main  pieces  of  legislation  considered,  these  both  appear  to  fit  into  the 
former  category.  The  Data  Protection  Act  creates  a  self-contained  and  detailed  system  to 
control  all  use  made  of  personal  data.  The  Human  Rights  Act  creates  a  system  to  allow 
an  external  source  of  law  to  permeate  the  entire  legal  system  and  be  directly  effective 
before  the  courts  of  this  country. 
The  purpose  of  the  Data  Protection  Act,  at  least  on  one  level,  is  to  transcribe  the  effects 
of  the  underlying  Directive  into  the  law  of  the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  accordingly 
reasonable  to  consider  the  terms  of  the  Directive  to  get  some  idea  of  the  purpose  of  this 
measure.  The  Directive  certainly  provides  a  lot  of  material,  the  preamble  running  to  some 
79  paragraphs  (rather  more  than  the  Directive  proper).  Running  through  the  whole 
preamble,  however,  it  is  possible  to  discern  a  general  desire  to  enhance  the  autonomy  of 
the  individual  through  a  series  of  mechanisms  designed  to  give  the  individual  more 299 
control  over  his  or  her  own  personal  information.  The  Directive  (and  hence  the  Act)  are 
therefore  driven  by  a  desire  to  increase  the  autonomy  of  the  individual. 
The  Human  Rights  Act  was  intended  by  the  Government  to  "Bring  Rights  Home  "242 
, 
by 
which  it  was  intended  that  anyone  alleging  failure  by  a  public  authority  to  respect  the 
rights  laid  down  in  the  Convenbon  would  be  able  to  gain  a  remedy  in  the  domestic  courts. 
Most  of  the  other  provisions  in  the  Act  are,  arguably,  peripheral  components  intended  to 
secure  and  safeguard  that  the  actions  of  courts,  other  public  authorities,  and  legislators 
were  also  consistent  with  the  rights  conferred.  Again,  one  can  discern  a  motive  to 
increase  the  rights  of  the  individual,  and  the  move  was  expressly  considered  by  the 
Government  to  be  part  of  its  modernising  agenda. 
The  scope  of  these  two  interventions  is  such  that  it  is  reasonable  to  ascribe  all  eight 
regulatory  tasks  to  them,  albeit  in  differing  degrees. 
B:  Mechanism: 
The  mechanisms  in  this  Chapter  are  all  the  same:  passing  legislation  through  Parliament 
(or  the  Scottish  Parliament,  as  the  case  may  be). 
Within  that  statement,  however,  and  again  confining  remarks  to  the  two  main  Acts 
examined,  one  can  see  a  very  different  approach.  With  the  Data  Protection  Act  we  see  a 
detailed  but  self-contained  code  laid  down,  perhaps  best  regarded  as  being  akin  to 
mental  health  legislation.  You  are  given  the  whole  story  in  the  Act  and  related 
subordinate  legislation.  The  end  result  is  large  and  complex,  but  it  has  no  impact  beyond 
its  own  defined  boundaries  (although  in  the  case  of  data  protection,  the  boundary  is  "all 
use  of  identifiable  personal  data"). 
The  Human  Rights  Act,  on  the  other  hand,  is  anything  but  self-contained.  Even  the  Act 
itself  directly  refers  to  two  Articles  of  the  Convention  which  are  not  repeated  in  the  text  of 
the  Act,  and  while  the  "incorporated"  Articles  are  attached  as  a  Schedule,  closer  scrutiny 
of  the  operative  section  reveals  that  you  can  equally  permissibly  refer  to  the  French 
language  version  of  the  Convention,  which  is  not  repeated  in  the  Schedule.  The  Human 
Rights  Act  by  its  very  nature  has  the  effect  of  altering,  at  least  in  theory,  the  entire  legal 
system.  All  legislation  requires  to  be  interpreted  according  to  a  new  rule  of  statutory 
interpretation,  and  the  common  law  is  now  effectively  all  open  to  be  overruled  or 
distinguished  on  the  basis  that  previously-binding  authorities  do  not  take  account  of 
Convention  rights.  The  analogy  to  this  is  the  European  Communifies  Act  1972,  which 
also  required  the  courts  to  take  account  of  a  separate  legal  system  and  set  of  rules. 300 
C:  Effect 
The  effects  of  the  two  main  pieces  of  legislation  included  are  hard  to  assess  if  only 
because  neither  measure  has  been  in  force  for  very  long243. 
The  visible  effects  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  can  be  seen  in  the  court  cases  being  raised 
and  argued.  According  to  research  carried  out  by  the  former  Home  Office  Human  Rights 
Unie",  between  2  October  2000  and  12  March  2001,  some  109  human  rights  cases 
came  before  the  courts  in  England  and  Wales245.  Of  these,  fifteen  claims  were  upheld. 
This  might  be  seen  as  a  small  proportion,  but  what  is  more  interesting  is  that  in  56  of  the 
cases,  the  existence  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  affected  the  outcome,  reasoning  or 
procedure  involved  in  the  case.  This  would  accord  with  the  writers  own  experience:  the 
Act  has  made  a  massive  difference  to  the  activities  of  public  authorities,  but  these 
changes  have  precluded  the  need  for  legal  action  and  therefore  have  not  been  reflected 
in  huge  numbers  of  cases  making  findings  of  human  rights  violations.  One  possible 
reason  for  this  is  that  many  public  authorities  invested  significant  fime  and  energy  in 
ensuring  compliance  before  the  Act  came  into  force  248 
. 
The  Data  Protection  Act  has  also  figured  in  very  few  decided  cases,  but  in  many  ways  its 
effects  have  been  even  more  profound.  In  passing  a  law  regulating  how  all  use  of 
personal  data  was  to  be  carried  out,  Parliament  has  arguably  given  more  power  to  the 
individual  than  ever  before.  In  some  ways,  the  response  of  organisations  to  this  change 
has  been  to  bombard  individuals  with  information  concerning  possible  uses  that  will  be 
made  of  their  personal  details,  possibly  in  the  hope  that  no-one  will  ever  read  it  all,  but  in 
the  knowledge  that  having  told  the  individual  they  can  then  use  the  information  in  the  way 
described,  barring  an  explicit  objection.  This  can  scarcely  be  seen  as  what  Parliament 
had  in  mind,  but  it  is  true  that  the  method  of  enhancing  personal  autonomy  adopted  by 
the  Act  has  the  potential  of  resulting  in  an  exceedingly  bureaucratic  response.  As  with 
the  Human  Rights  Act,  Data  Protection  has  also  been  the  subject  of  extensive  pre- 
commencement  preparatory  work  (this  time  extending  into  the  private  and  voluntary 
sectors);  indeed,  the  transitional  periods  were  intended  specifically  to  allow  records 
management  systems  to  be  brought  into  conformity  with  the  Act  before  it  started  to  bite. 
And  again,  this  means  (for  the  organisations  which  carried  out  preparations  properly)  that 
the  effects  of  the  Act  will  not  be  reflected  in  successful  court  action.  In  terms  of  decided 
cases,  the  only  care  which  has  gone  to  trial  and  awarded  damages  to  a  data  subject 
47  involved  a  national  newspaper  rather  than  a  public  authority'  . 
D:  Comparison  with  Core  Evaluation  Criteria: 301 
In  Chapters  1  and  2,  we  identified  seven  core  criteria  against  which  each  segment  of  the 
medical  regulatory  framework  would  be  measured.  These  will  now  be  assessed  against 
each  of  the  evaluation  criteria  in  turn. 
1:  VisibqjbL 
Both  mechanisms  are  highly  visible  -  the  Human  Rights  Act  enjoying  a  major  publicity 
campaign  and  enjoying  a  high  (if  usually  negative)  profile  in  the  mass  media,  the  Data 
Protection  Act  having  provisions  within  it,  the  whole  point  of  which  is  to  advise  individuals 
of  their  rights  under  the  Act.  Both  measures  are  therefore  deemed  to  be  satisfactory  in 
terms  of  visibility. 
2:  Accountabilit 
Legislation  is  made  by  Parliament,  and  Parliament  is  accountable  directly  to  the 
electorate.  Whether  a  government  is  likely  to  be  voted  out  of  office  as  a  result  of  passing 
a  particular  piece  of  legislation  may  be  doubtful,  but  since  in  theory  the  electorate  could 
do  this,  this  test  is  deemed  to  be  satisfied  in  relation  to  primary  legislation  243.  However,  it 
is  less  clear  that  this  is  necessarily  true  in  relation  to  subordinate  legislation,  particularly 
where  this  takes  effect  before  it  has  been  approved  by  Parliament.  However,  none  of  the 
legislation  we  are  considering  falls  into  that  category. 
One  final  complication  in  relation  to  accountability  arises  with  respect  to  the  DPA.  This 
implements  a  European  Directive;  if  Parliament  had  failed  to  legislate  so  as  to  give 
domestic  effect  to  it,  the  Directive  would  have  been  directly  effective  against  "emanations 
of  the  state".  It  is  also  directly  effective  to  the  extent  that  the  Act  does  not  fully  reflect  the 
Directive  249 
. 
This  raises  the  issue  of  the  accountability  of  the  organs  of  the  European 
Union,  but  that  question  is  outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
3:  Overall  Fairness: 
As  explained  in  Chapter  2,  the  category  of  overall  fairness  incorporates  a  number  of 
aspects  including  impartiality,  accessibility,  and  speed  of  decision-making.  In  applying 
these  criteda,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  differences  in  approach  mentioned  above. 
The  DPA,  for  instance,  has  a  mixture  of  internal  controls  (through  the  activities  of  the 
Information  Commissioner)  and  external  controls  (by  creating  individual  rights  to  seek  a 
remedy  through  the  normal  civil  courts).  The  extemal  enforcement  machinery  is  subject 
to  the  same  comments  regarding  overall  fairness  as  the  civil  courts  generally,  save  that 302 
unlike  the  courts'  approach  to  medical  law,  there  is  no  established  tradftion  of  deference 
to  either  party  in  disputes  concerning  data  protedion 
250 
-  The  internal  regulation  is  also 
accompanied  by  safeguards  allowing  the  targets  of  enforcement  proceedings  to  appeal  to 
the  courts  or  the  Information  Tribunal.  These  mechanisms  are  deemed  fair. 
As  far  as  the  Human  Rights  Act  is  concerned,  the  only  enforcement  mechanism  is 
recourse  to  the  ordinary  civil  courts,  again  carrying  over  the  comments  made  in  Chapter 
5,  but  also  with  the  same  caveat  concerning  lack  of  established  deference  in  human 
rights  cases.  In  the  event,  the  courts  have  been  criticised  for  adopting  a  very 
conservative  approach  to  the  AcP.  However,  there  appears  to  be  nothing  inherently 
unfair  in  the  courts  applying  a  cautious  attitude  when  dealing  with  this  new  area,  and 
there  have  certainly  been  a  number  of  cases  representing  major  inroads  into  traditional 
legal  attitudes  and  rules.  Accordingly,  external  regulation  of  these  measures  by  the 
courts  is  deemed  to  satisfy  the  criterion  of  overall  fairness. 
4:  Effectiveness: 
At  this  stage,  it  is  difficult  to  assess  effectiveness.  For  the  same  reason  it  is  hard  to 
assess  impact.  In  relation  to  the  Human  Rights  Act,  we  have  already  considered 
whether  the  courts  were  obliged  to  provide  an  effective  remedy  where  someone's  rights 
were  violated.  It  appears  that  the  courts  will  do  so,  although  the  rule  stating  that 
compliance  with  primary  legislation  counts  as  a  defence  to  a  human  rights  claim  does 
represent  a  dilution  of  the  courts'  power  to  guarantee  the  effectiveness  of  the  remedy  in 
all  cases.  Likewise,  the  fact  that  a  declaration  of  incompatibility  under  Section  4  has  no 
effect  on  the  proceedings  in  which  it  is  made  can  be  criticised  as  leaving  someone  without 
a  remedy  in  the  domestic  courts  (but  probably  a  sure-fire  winner  in  Strasbourg,  if  they  can 
wait  three  years  for  a  decision).  Another  weakness  has  been  the  government's  approach 
to  Section  19.  This  section  requires  all  legislation  placed  before  Parliament  to  have  a 
declaration  of  compatibility  with  Convention  Rights.  These  have  consisted  of  bland  one- 
line  comments  saying,  in  essence,  1,  the  minister,  think  this  complies".  Again,  this  has 
been  criticised  as  lacking  rigour  or  transparenCy252.  On  the  other  hand,  these  comments 
are  all  in  relation  to  aspects  of  the  Act  peripheral  to  giving  the  individual  a  remedy  in  the 
domestic  courts  for  a  breach  of  convention  rights.  For  most  people,  the  limitations  just 
referred  to  will  not  preclude  them  from  obtaining  such  a  remedy,  and  so  the  Act  is 
deemed  to  be  effective  (but  capable  of  improvement). 
With  respect  to  the  DPA,  however,  there  is  one  major  problem  which  leads  to  the 
opposite  conclusion.  There  appears  to  be  little  in  the  Act  to  prevent  a  data  controller  from 
systematically  abusing  the  data  protection  principles  and  then  taking  steps  to  comply  only 303 
at  the  point  when  an  enforcement  notice  is  about  to  take  effect.  Provided  the 
unscrupulous  data  controller  has  duly  notified  (thereby  avoiding  committing  a  criminal 
offence),  and  provided  their  activities  do  not  cause  quantifiable  loss  to  anyone 
(irrespective  of  how  much  inconvenience  or  distress  they  cause  along  the  way),  there  is 
nothing  either  the  Commissioner  or  the  data  subject  can  do.  This  major  defect  leads  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  DPA,  for  all  that  it  provides  a  framework  built  around  individual 
informational  autonomy,  fails  to  provide  fully  effective  tools  for  protecting  this  right. 
5:  Efficiencv: 
As  a  regulatory  tool  in  its  own  right,  legislation  is  very  efficient:  Parliament  passes  an  Act, 
which  then  rests  on  the  statute  book  until  Parliament  takes  it  off  again.  Very  efficient  from 
Parliament's  perspective. 
However,  we  are  more  concerned  with  whether  the  legislation  is  efficient  in  terms  of  the 
impact  it  has  on  those  affected  versus  the  value  of  the  rights  supposedly  enhanced  by  the 
legislation.  Could  the  rights  conferred  have  been  given  equivalent  protection  in  a  less 
resource-intensive  way? 
The  answer  to  this  is  that,  so  far  as  the  HRA  is  concerned,  the  Act  is  probably  the  least 
intensive  way  of  securing  the  rights  in  question.  This  is  not  to  understate  the  amount  of 
work  that  has  had  to  be  done  to  prepare  for  the  Act,  merely  to  point  out  that  a  change  in 
the  legal  landscape  of  this  size  could  not  possibly  have  been  done  without  a  major 
investment  in  effort  across  the  public  sector.  And  ultimately  if  someone's  rights  have 
been  violated,  it  is  plainly  more  efficient  to  have  this  decided  by  the  domestic  courts  rather 
than,  as  previously,  requiring  the  victim  to  "exhaust  domestic  remedies"  by  going  to  court 
in  this  country  and  losing,  and  then  going  to  Strasbourg.  The  HRA  is  therefore  deemed  to 
be  efficient. 
The  DPA,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a  number  of  features  which  arguably  impose 
bureaucratic  burdens  on  data  controllers  but  which  confer  no  appreciable  rights  on 
anyone.  The  requirement  to  notify  is  an  example:  the  entry  which  appears  in  the  public 
register  of  data  controllers  is  intended  to  allow  data  subjects  to  see  what  sort  of  things  a 
data  controller  does  with  personal  data.  But  the  statements  are  necessarily  high  level 
and  generalised  comments  which  will  provide  the  individual  with  very  little  idea  of  what 
will  happen  to  their  particular  details.  Particularly  for  large  public  sector  bodies,  the  entry 
will  cover  so  many  possible  activities  as  to  be  meaningless.  The  enforcement  systems 
also  have  a  huge  number  of  potential  notices  which  can  be  served  on  data  controllers,  yet 
these  all  seem  to  achieve  objectives  so  similar  that  the  system  could  have  been 304 
significantly  streamlined  with  no  loss  of  effect.  And  the  overall  complexity  of  the  Act  itself 
requires  such  an  investment  of  time  to  make  sense  as  to  be  inefficient  in  itself.  The  fact 
that  operational  observance  of  these  rules  requires  organisations  to  familiarise  a  very 
large  proportion  of  their  staff  with  the  rules  simply  underscores  this  problem.  The  DPA  is 
therefore  deemed  to  be  inefficient. 
6:  Avoidance  of  undue  influence  with  good  medical  practice: 
As  we  have  seen,  neither  Act  interferes  with  good  medical  practice,  and  both  of  them  may 
actually  enhance  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  DPA  raises  potential  barriers  to  research 
which  may  be  a  problem,  but  given  the  definition  of  "good  medical  practice"  which  we 
adopted  in  Chapter  2,  it  is  unlikely  that  research  of  this  type  would  count.  However,  it  is 
worth  pointing  out  the  potential  difficulties,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  in  accordance 
with  the  general  methodology  of  this  thesis  both  statutes  are  deemed  to  satisfy  this 
criterion. 
7:  Respect  for  patient  autonomy: 
We  have  seen  that  both  these  measures  have  concern  for  individual  autonomy  at  their 
heart.  It  is  therefore  easy  to  conclude  that  both  satisfy  this  criterion,  although  certain 
(generally  minor  or  peripheral)  issues  have  arisen  where  one  could  take  issue  with  the 
outcome.  Overall,  however,  both  measures  comply  with  this  requirement. 
E:  Conclusions: 
It  can  be  seen  that  Parliament  has  not  been  slow  to  use  its  powers  to  legislate  both  for  the 
little  issues  and  for  the  biggest  issues  of  all.  On  a  practical  level,  the  legislative  timetable 
is  inevitably  full  or  overcrowded,  and  there  is  a  clear  political  element  in  determining  which 
Bills  actually  go  forward.  The  system  of  private  members'  bills  democratises  the  process 
a  little  253 
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but  in  large  measure  legislation  is  something  proposed  by  the  government  of  the 
day,  and  voted  through  by  that  government's  parliamentary  majority254. 
In  terms  of  the  measures  we  have  considered  briefly,  the  more  thought-out  and  extensive 
measures  appear  to  work  well  but  are  subject  to  ongoing  refinement.  The  Acts  which 
could  be  seen  as  "emergency  responses"  are  more  commonly  found  wanting,  but  given 
their  typically-limited  scope,  this  is  seldom  a  major  issue. 
In  terms  of  the  two  major  pieces  of  legislation  considered,  both  are  measures  which 
accord  fully  with  the  philosophical  approach  spelled  out  in  Chapter  2  and  to  a  large  degree 305 
satisfy  the  evaluation  criteria.  However,  the  mechanisms  adopted  to  protect  these  rights 
are  somewhat  clumsy  and  may  be  ineffective,  particularly  in  the  case  of  the  DPA.  The 
government  is  currently  reviewing  the  workings  of  the  DPA,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that 
some  of  the  more  obvious  deficiencies  can  be  rectified. 306 
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Chapter  7:  Summary  and  Conclusions: 
1:  Introduction: 
Chapter  2  outlined  how  this  thesis  would  seek  to  analyse  the  regulatory  structures 
applicable  to  medical  practice  in  Britain. 
We  have  seen,  in  Chapters  3  to  6,  how  the  four  main  regulatory  mechanisms  (criminal 
law,  civil  law,  statutory  regulatory  body  and  direct  statutory  intervention)  have  actually 
worked  out  in  practice.  Each  of  these  systems  has  been  measured  against  the  core 
evaluation  criteria  set  out  in  Chapter  2,  and  various  shortcomings  (as  well  as  a  number 
of  desirable  features  and  strengths)  have  been  highlighted  through  this  comparison. 
However,  at  this  point  all  we  have  are  a  series  of  analyses  which  are  sector-specific  and 
(aside  from  areas  of  overlapping  concern)  there  is  no  cross-referencing  between  the 
different  regulatory  mechanisms.  The  working  hypothesis  set  out  in  Chapter  1  was 
designed  to  test  the  possibility  that  the  objectives  pursued  by  the  different  regulatory 
mechanisms  might,  in  some  respects,  be  mutually  incompatible.  This  Chapter  sets  out 
to  answer  that  question. 
This  Chapter  will  revisit  the  regulatory  tasks  which  were  identified  in  Chapter  2,  and, 
against  the  detailed  examinations  just  considered,  will  seek  to  draw  together  the 
disparate  strands  of  regulation  in  order  to  identify  overlaps  in  jurisdiction  as  well  as  any 
regulatory  gaps  in  the  current  system.  It  will  then  proceed  to  compare  this  broader 
picture  against  the  core  evaluation  criteria,  to  see  which  of  these  are  satisfied  by  the 
overall  regulatory  system,  and  which  are  not.  Finally,  it  will  answer  the  question  posed 
at  the  outset  in  the  working  hypothesis-  does  the  present  system  of  regulation  of 
medical  practice  in  Great  Britain  provide  adequate  safeguards  for  the  interests  of 
patients,  doctors  and  the  State? 
11:  The  requlatory  tasks  revisited: 
For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  "regulation"  was  defined  in  terms  of  eight  activities 
covering  the  setting  and  maintaining  of  standards,  facilitation  of  medical  practice, 
provision  of  systems  for  redress,  airing  of  grievances  and  investigation,  punishment  of 
malefactors  and  regulation  of  the  system  itself. 315 
Setting  of  standards  of  medical  practice  was  done  by  means  of  all  four  regulatory 
approaches,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.  For  present  purposes,  we  are  mainly 
concerned  with  standards  of  clinical  behaviour.  The  criminal  law  sets  the  baseline  for 
acceptable  behaviour  in  a  non-clinical  environment.  However,  before  conduct  could 
reach  this  level  it  required  firstly  to  be  below  the  level  of  conduct  deemed  acceptable  in 
terms  of  civil  liability.  This  in  turn  leads  to  consideration  of  how  the  civil  standard  is 
reached,  and  it  is  here  that  the  first  real  regulatory  gap  can  be  found.  As  demonstrated 
in  Chapter  4,  the  civil  courts  have,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  delegated  determination 
of  the  standard  of  medical  practice  to  the  medical  profession.  However,  in  contrast  to 
the  delegation  of  functions  to  the  GIVIC  by  Parliament,  this  de  facto  delegation  of  the 
standard-setting  function  has  taken  place  under  the  scope  of  judicial  development  of  the 
common  law.  Since  judges  are,  almost  by  definition,  unaccountable,  the  practical 
upshot  of  this  is  that  the  delegation  has  taken  place  in  a  way  which  results  in  neither  the 
courts  nor  the  medical  profession  being  accountable  for  the  decision.  Academic 
commentators  in  particular  have  been  vociferous  in  their  criticisms  of  medical  law  as 
developed  by  the  courts  (particularly  the  "Bolam"  test,  and  its  uncritical  application  to 
judicial  scrutiny  of  a  wide  range  of  medical  activities).  The  main  thrust  of  the  criticism  is 
that  what  should  be  a  legal  decision  is  instead  treated  by  the  courts  as  a  medical  one  2. 
The  nature  of  the  test  is  that  if  a  body  of  medical  opinion  regards  something  as 
acceptable,  then  the  courts  will  follow  suit  -  even  if  those  holding  this  opinion  are  an 
unpopular  minority.  This  amounts  to  standard  setting  by  lowest  common  denominator. 
Regulation  by  direct  statutory  intervention  has  really  only  been  to  legalise  or,  more 
commonly,  to  criminalise,  particular  specified  interventions  and  as  such  has  done 
nothing  to  reverse  this  state  of  affairs.  The  GIVIC's  approach  to  stand  a  rd-setting  has 
been  constrained  historically  by  its  reluctance  to  intervene  in  matters  of  clinical 
judgement  unless  the  standard  fell  so  far  below  the  standard  set  by  the  civil  courts  as  to 
amount  to  professional  misconduct.  Recent  legislative  changes  have  given  the  GIVIC 
powers  in  relation  to  standard  setting,  through  the  creation  of  the  professional 
performance  procedureS3  . 
However,  even  these  procedures  are  based  on  a  preceding 
breach  of  the  civil  standard.  The  GIVIC's  own  guidance  refers  to  conduct  "repeatedly  or 
persistently  not  meeting  the  professional  standards  appropriate  to  the  work  you  are 
doing",  a  formulation  referring  to  "professional  standards"  which  sounds  very  much  like 
the  Bolam  test.  The  GIVIC  powers  in  this  area  are  also  principally  reactive,  something 
which  tends  to  militate  against  a  standard-setting  role,  but  this  is  true  of  most  standard- 
setting  interventions.  Indeed,  the  GIVIC's  own  guidance  on  various  subjects  represents 
one  of  the  few  proactive  attempts  at  setting  standards  emerging  from  the  formal 
regulatory  machinery.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  standards  are  set,  not  by  the  formal 
systems  of  regulation,  but  by  bodies  and  mechanisms  which  are  outwith  (or  on  the 316 
periphery  of)  the  formal  regulatory  machinery:  the  BMA,  the  Royal  Colleges,  ultimately 
the  developing  practice  of  medicine  itself.  As  these  new  practices  and  approaches 
become  widespread,  or  as  old  practices  become  discredited,  the  changes  are  ultimately 
reflected  in  the  formal  regulatory  machinerY5  . 
But  in  general,  it  appears  that  the  formal 
system  does  little  in  itself  to  set  the  standards  of  acceptable  medical  practice  in  the  first 
place. 
in  terms  of  upholding  standards,  three  out  of  the  four  regulatory  approaches  contribute 
something.  In  this  respect,  the  criminal  law  has  at  once  the  most  important  and  least 
important  role:  it  is  the  most  important  because  the  jurisdiction  of  other  regulators  (and 
in  particular,  the  requirement  for  doctors  to  register  with  the  GMC)  is  safeguarded  by 
attaching  criminal  sanctions  to  non-compliance.  It  is  the  least  important  because  the 
standards  of  other  mechanisms  (notably  those  of  the  GIVIC  and/or  the  civil  courts)  have 
been  breached  already  before  malpractice  becomes  a  criminal  matter.  Direct  statutory 
regulation  has  very  little  to  do  with  upholding  standards.  Parliamentary  intervention  in 
this  area  has  tended  towards  extending  the  powers  of  other  regulators  rather  than 
intervening  directly,  although  as  has  been  seen  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  could 
theoretically  be  used  as  a  vehicle  for  driving  up  standards  in  certain  circumstances.  The 
civil  law's  role  is  similarly  limited,  the  professional  standards  test  meaning  that  the  civil 
courts  are,  in  effect,  upholding  the  standards  set  (informally)  by  the  profession  itself. 
The  civil  law  is  also  useful  (if  somewhat  flawed)  in  being  able  to  force  decision-makers  in 
the  public  sector  to  act  reasonably  and  stay  within  their  allotted  responsibilities;  it  is  less 
useful  in  determining  between  conflicting  professional  views  as  to  the  merits  or  demerits 
of  something,  and  (in  general)  refuses  to  do  so.  While  the  civil  law  may  well  exercise 
the  function  of  upholding  standards,  it  lacks  any  formal  mechanism  to  enable  it  to  do  so 
systematically.  The  GIVIC,  particularly  since  it  was  given  power  to  review  professional 
competence,  has  an  explicit  role  in  upholding  standards  of  medical  practice.  The 
reactive  nature  of  this  power,  while  it  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  role  of  the  GIVIC  in 
setting  standards,  is  appropriate  to  the  function  of  upholding  standards  since  it  is  an 
allegation  of  deficient  performance  which  triggers  the  performance  procedures. 
However,  since  the  GIVIC  will  only  act  under  its  performance  procedures  in  respect  of 
conduct  which  is  "seriously  deficient"6,  this  leaves  medical  performance  which  is  deficient 
(but  not  seriously  so)  effectively  unregulated.  It  is  possible  that  the  GIVIC's  proposed 
[I  revalidation  procedureS,,  7  Will  redress  this  regulatory  deficit,  although  it  is  also  fair  to  say 
that  these  proposals  appear  simply  to  be  a  formalisation  of  the  system  of  medical  aud  it8. 
As  such,  it  would  appear  that  the  standards  of  medical  practice  are  upheld  by  informal 
mechanisms  (medical  audit,  informal  peer  review  and  peer  pressure,  and  the  general 
cultural  norms  which  imbue  the  medical  profession)  rather  than  by  any  formal 317 
mechanism.  It  is  too  early  to  say  whether  formalising  aspects  of  this  under  the 
revaliclation  system  will  plug  the  regulatory  gap,  but  for  the  present  it  appears  that  there 
is  a  clear  regulatory  gap  in  this  area. 
Facilitation  of  medical  practice  is  mostly  done  through  the  legislation  under  which  the 
National  Health  Service  is  established  and  funded  which,  while  of  immense  importance 
to  the  provision  of  heath  care  in  Britain,  is  not  part  of  the  regulatory  machinery  being 
assessed  by  this  thesis.  Nor  can  the  passage  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  be  said  to 
have  altered  this  much,  although  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998  has  the  potential  to 
revolutionise  aspects  of  medical  care  through  the  positive  requirement  to  inform  the 
"data  subject"  (i.  e.  the  patient)  of  the  purposes  for  which  their  personal  data  are  to  be 
processed.  The  criminal  law  has  an  even  smaller  role  in  this  area,  being  restricted  to 
ensuring  that  those  who  lack  formal  medical  qualifications  require  to  advise  their 
prospective  patients  of  this  fact.  The  civil  law  does  facilitate  good  medical  practice  in 
certain  limited  areas,  by  providing  a  framework  under  which  those  who  wish  to  undertake 
interventions  which  are  beneficial  but  difficult  to  justify  on  conventional  grounds  can 
seek  approval  from  the  court  prior  to  the  intervention  proceeding.  In  Scotland,  of  course, 
the  legislative  framework  created  by  the  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000 
creates  an  alternative  framework  by  means  of  direct  statutory  regulation,  although  the 
courts  retain  a  role  in  adjudicating  in  cases  of  difficulty.  Again,  however,  the  court's 
function  is  essentially  the  negative  one  of  not  interfering  with  good  medical  practice  (and 
arguably  not  interfering  enough  with  less  good  medical  practice).  The  GIVIC's  positive 
facilitation  of  good  medical  practice  comes  in  the  form  of  its  role  in  supervising  medical 
education.  By  creating  a  framework  under  which  an  adequate  number  of  educated  and 
trained  professionals  are  able  to  come  through  the  system,  the  GIVIC  clearly  has  a  vital 
role  to  play.  Another  positive  aspect  of  the  GIVIC's  work  can  be  seen  in  the  health  and 
performance  procedures  whereby  a  doctor  having  difficulties  is,  in  effect,  mentored  and 
may  be  required  to  undertake  re-training  in  a  particular  area  before  being  allowed  to 
resume  practice  in  that  specialisation.  However,  in  relation  to  the  majority  of  doctors  it  is 
fair  to  say  that  the  formal  regulatory  machinery  ceases  to  have  any  role  in  facilitating 
good  medical  practice  the  moment  the  doctor  becomes  fully  registered  and  another 
regulatory  gap  appears  to  exist. 
The  provision  of  systems  to  allow  redress  for  those  who  suffer  due  to  a  failure  to  adhere 
to  standards  is  an  easier  regulatory  task  to  identify  since  the  only  part  of  the  regulatory 
machine  concerned  with  compensation  is  civil  litigation'O.  The  shortcomings  of  the  civil 
courts  in  addressing  this  matter  were  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  4.  only  around  13% 
of  medical  negligence  claims  actually  succeed".  What  is  not  clear  from  this  bald 318 
statistic  is  the  reason  the  other  87%  of  cases  fail.  It  is  entirely  possible  that  the  reason 
for  failure  is  attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  claim  was  unmeritorious  to  start  with,  or  was 
due  to  poor  legal  representation.  However,  there  do  appear  to  be  a  number  of  aspects 
to  civil  litigation  which  make  the  medical  claimant's  task  more  difficult  than  that  of  the 
person  suing  in  respect  of  any  other  form  of  personal  injury.  There  are  in  addition 
barriers  to  access  to  the  courts  which  may  well  mean  that  there  is  a  volume  of 
meritorious  claims  which  do  not  even  get  to  court,  although  this  may  well  be  offset 
against  the  number  of  claims  which  are  settled  before  court  proceedings  are 
commenced  and  so  do  not  show  up  in  the  statistics.  Paradoxically,  however,  the  fact 
that  some  13%  of  people  who  go  to  court  come  away  with  damages  of  some  sort 
indicates  that  this  regulatory  task  is  being  fulfilled,  albeit  it  is  being  fulfilled  imperfectly 
and  there  is  significant  scope  for  improvement. 
The  foregoing  analyses  have  indicated  that  there  are  numerous  channels  which  the 
aggrieved  patient  can  potentially  choose  to  pursue,  although  the  outcomes  vary  widely. 
The  Human  Rights  Act  1998  has  seen  Parliament  create  a  large  number  of  new  rights  in 
relation  to  which  persons  can  raise  proceedings.  However,  as  the  channel  for  pursuing 
such  claims  is  through  the  ordinary  civil  courts,  no  new  channel  for  pursuing  complains 
has  been  created.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998,  which  allows 
anyone  who  feels  their  rights  under  the  Act  have  been  breached  to  request  the 
information  Commissioner  to  make  an  "assessment"  of  the  processing  complained  ofl  2. 




In  terms  of  the  criminal  law,  the  individual's  right  to  complain  is  largely 
restricted  to  making  a  complaint  to  the  police,  with  the  decision  to  institute  proceedings 
being  taken  by  an  external  agency  (as  a  rule  in  Scotland  and  a  practical  upshot  of  the 
procedures  in  England  and  Wales).  The  criminal  law's  role  as  a  channel  for  complaint 
and  dispute  resolution  is  therefore  highly  circumscribed;  rules  on  admissibility  of 
evidence  and  the  burden  of  proof  underscore  these  limitations  in  respect  of  this  function. 
The  same  is  true,  albeit  to  a  lesser  extent  (given  the  broader  jurisdiction)  of  complaints 
to  the  GIVIC:  decisions  to  take  proceedings  or  not  are  taken  by  the  GIVIC,  not  the 
aggrieved  individual.  The  confidential  nature  of  the  health  or  performance  procedures 
removes  the  complaining  patient  from  the  frame  altogether.  The  GIVIC  cannot  therefore 
be  seen  as  an  adequate  channel  for  complaint  and  dispute  resolution.  Lastly,  the  civil 
courts  have  been  subject  to  widely  diffedng  views  on  whether  patients  resort  to  civil 
litigation  as  a  means  of  getting  at  the  truth  of  an  incident  and  getting  an  apology,  or 
whether  the  motive  is  really  (as  it  purports  to  be)  to  get  financial  compensation  for  the 
adverse  outcome.  Certainly,  Goldrein  and  de  Haas  14  have  observed  the  drawbacks  of 
using  civil  litigation  for  this  purpose.  However,  this  observation  has  to  be  considered 319 
against  the  fact  that  we  have  identified  the  lack  of  alternative  avenues  for  such  a 
complaint  to  go  down.  While  Goldrein  and  de  Haas  themselves  recommend  that 
U 
...  more  vigorous  use  of  the  hospital  complaints  procedure  is  a  more  compelling  route" 
15,  it  should  be  noted  that  this  is  an  NHS-specific  mechanism  and  therefore  not 
applicable  to  medical  complaints  more  generally.  While  civil  litigation  can  be  used  as  a 
mechanism  to  make  complaints  and  investigate  allegations  of  failure  to  attain  standards 
of  care  (both  pre-trial  discovery  and  the  fact  that  in  a  defended  case  the  defending 
health  authority  or  doctor  will  seek  to  adduce  evidence  that  what  happened  was  in 
conformity  with  a  responsible  body  of  medical  opinion  will  result  in  airing  of  facts  and 
circumstances  which  might  not  otherwise  have  come  to  light),  the  onus  of  proof  remains 
on  the  pursuer/plaintiff  and  the  adversarial  nature  of  proceedings  severely  restrict  the 
possibilities  of  using  civil  litigation  as  a  truth-finding  exercise.  It  does,  however,  fare 
better  as  a  complaints  mechanism  in  circumstances  where  a  person  is  challenging  the 
decision  of  a  public  body.  In  these  cases,  particularly  with  the  addition  of  the  Human 
Rights  Act,  the  judicial  review  courts  are  increasingly  requiring  public  bodies  to  provide 
proper  explanations  for  their  decisions,  and  are  also  increasingly  prepared  to  scrutinise 
the  merits  of  those  decisions.  At  present,  however,  it  appears  that  the  formal  regulatory 
machinery  fails  to  provide  any  truly  adequate  channels  for  airing  grievances  and 
resolving  disputes. 
At  first  blush,  the  provision  of  systems  of  investigation  might  appear  to  be  the  same 
function  as  the  provision  of  channels  for  airing  grievances  and  resolving  disputes. 
However,  there  is  an  important  distinction  here  in  that  this  regulatory  function  does  not 
require  the  input  of  the  person  making  the  complaint  but  can  be  an  abstract  system  of 
quality  monitoring.  The  Data  Protection  Act  1998  allows  the  Information  Commissioner 
to  carry  out  assessments  of  data  processing  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  whether  the 
provisions  of  that  Act  are  being  adhered  to.  The  Commissioner  has  the  power  to  initiate 
an  assessment  of  her  own  volition,  but  staffing  shortages  mean  that  in  practical  terms 
her  remit  is  a  purely  reactive  one.  This  only  slightly  diminishes  the  importance  of  this 
part  of  her  functions.  The  civil  law  can  (in  theory  at  least)  be  used  by  anyone  asserting  a 
civil  claim,  but  its  usefulness  as  an  investigatory  system  is  also  severely  restricted  by  the 
adversarial  nature  of  the  proceedings.  While  the  court  Gan  order  disclosure  of 
documents  and  other  evidence  in  the  course  of  civil  proceedings,  it  cannot  (in  general) 
require  a  party  to  appear  instead  of  conceding  the  case  and  has  no  independent 
jurisdiction  to  make  inquiry  into  matters  of  its  own  volition.  The  main  value  of  the  civil 
courts  in  this  context  is  in  relation  to  ensuring  that  the  other  statutory  regulators  carry  out 
their  allotted  functions  and  exercise  the  discretion  vested  in  them  in  a  responsible  and 
informed  manner.  Most  of  the  system  of  investigation,  however,  falls  to  be  done  by  the 320 
other  two  regulators,  the  criminal  courts  and  GIVIC  (for  purposes  of  this  thesis  the  police 
are  treated  as  adjuncts  of  the  criminal  courts  in  terms  of  their  investigatory  powers). 
Clearly,  a  full  police  investigation  into  allegations  of  crime  (particularly  serious  crime)  has 
immense  power  to  uncover  evidence  even  in  the  face  of  uncooperative  witnesses  and 
issues  such  as  patient  confidentiality.  While  these  powers  are  (rightly)  subject  to  a 
number  of  checks  and  balances,  the  overall  effect  of  the  crime  detection  community  is  to 
provide  a  highly  effective  system  of  investigation  into  allegations  of  conduct  falling  foul 
of  the  standards  of  the  criminal  law.  For  present  purposes,  however,  the  practical 
effects  of  this  are  diminished  by  the  extremely  limited  scope  for  criminal  investigations 
into  clinical  activity.  This  is  not  to  advocate  more  police  scrutiny  of  doctors,  but  rather  to 
make  the  point  that  for  more  routine  investigations  into  sub-standard  treatment,  we  have 
to  look  elsewhere  for  an  effective  mechanism.  This  takes  us  to  the  GIVIC.  On  this  issue, 
the  GIVIC  scores  fairly  well.  While  the  GIVIC  may  not  enjoy  statutory  rights  to  require 
records  to  be  produced  to  it  (unlike  many  other  regulators),  it  has  the  jurisdictional 
advantage  of  being  able  to  take  effective  action  against  a  doctor  who  does  not 
voluntarily  provide  the  information  sought  or  who  refuses,  for  example,  to  submit  to  a 
medical  examination.  The  practical  upshot  of  this  is  that  while  the  GIVIC  may  not  be  able 
to  get  to  the  bottom  of  an  allegation  of  misconduct,  it  is  able  to  protect  the  public 
anyway.  While  on  a  theoretical  level  we  might  prefer  to  find  the  truth  of  a  situation,  on  a 
practical  level  the  upshot  of  such  an  investigation  is  to  determine  what  further  steps  are 
necessary  to  fulfil  one  or  more  of  the  other  regulatory  tasks.  Discovering  the  truth  is  not, 
in  general,  an  end  in  itself  for  the  regulatory  machinery. 
Moving  to  the  punishment  of  malefactors,  it  is  possible  to  take  a  broader  or  narrower 
view  of  what  "punishment"  means.  On  the  narrow  view,  it  could  be  taken  to  refer  purely 
to  those  measures  which  are  specifically  intended  to  be  punitive  in  nature.  However, 
this  analysis  will  adopt  a  broader  approach  by  considering  measures  which,  from  the 
subjective  view  of  the  recipient,  appear  to  have  a  punitive  effect.  The  distinction  is 
clearly  seen  when  considering  the  effects  of  civil  litigation.  In  Britain,  there  is  no  scope 
for  awarding  punitive  or  exemplary  damages  and  damages  are  supposed  to  be  purely 
for  purposes  of  restitution  or  compensation.  However,  the  entire  theory  of  the  deterrent 
effect  which  civil  litigation  has  on  standards  of  practice  presupposes  that  an  adverse 
outcome  for  the  doctor  being  sued  also  has  a  punitive  effect.  But  while  being  sued  is  a 
very  unpleasant  expedence  for  a  doctor,  this  is  true  irrespective  of  the  outcome  of  the 
litigation,  so  it  is  very  hard  to  classify  this  as  being  an  appropriate  regulatory  function. 
Statutory  interventions  are  never  targeted  specifically  against  particular  malefactors,  and 
so  as  a  regulatory  tool  legislation  does  not  in  itself  punish  those  who  fall  to  meet 
standards.  It  is,  however,  possible  to  consider  specific  cdminalisation  statutes  (such  as 321 
the  Human  Reproductive  Cloning  Act  2001)  as  being  aimed  at  the  punishment  of  those 
who  embark  on  the  conduct  in  question  once  the  statute  in  question  has  come  into 
force.  The  GIVIC's  disciplinary  procedures  are,  as  we  saw,  principally  intended  to  protect 
the  public.  However,  in  many  cases  where  the  serious  professional  misconduct  is 
completely  unrelated  to  the  doctor's  medical  activities,  it  is  the  reputation  of  the  medical 
profession  rather  than  the  well-being  of  patients  which  appears  to  be  being  protected.  In 
such  circumstances  where  there  is  no  suggestion  that  there  is  any  issue  of  public  safety 
involved,  what  is  happening  is  clearly  a  punitive  process.  This  is  explicitly  recognised  in 
the  Privy  Council's  review  of  GIVIC  sanctions,  which  must  be  proportionate  to  the 
seriousness  of  the  offence  rather  than  (for  example)  being  the  sanction  required  to 
protect  the  publiC16  . 
The  GIVIC  therefore  fulfils  the  regulatory  function  of  punishing  those 
who  do  not  adhere  to  the  relevant  standards  of  behaviour.  Lastly,  punishment  is  the 
stock  in  trade  of  the  criminal  law.  The  criminal  courts  also  therefore  fulfil  this  function, 
albeit  to  a  lesser  extent  given  how  significantly  (in  the  clinical  context)  a  doctors  conduct 
has  to  depart  from  the  norm  before  it  will  amount  to  criminal  behaviour.  However,  given 
that  conviction  may  trigger  the  GIVICs  disciplinary  mechanisms,  the  combination  of 
factors  means  that  this  regulatory  task  is  adequately  fulfilled. 
The  foregoing  analysis  of  regulatory  tasks  has  identified  that  of  the  preceding  seven 
tasks,  there  is  a  regulatory  gap  in  four  of  them.  This  in  itself  would  tend  to  suggest  that 
there  is  a  failure  in  the  regulation  of  the  regulatory  system.  However,  it  remains 
important  to  consider  the  cause  of  this  apparent  failure:  is  there  a  complete  regulatory 
void,  or  is  the  failure  due  to  imperfect  performance  of  one  of  the  regulators? 
Some  of  the  regulators  are  easily  removed  from  the  frame.  Thus,  the  GIVIC  has 
absolutely  no  jurisdiction  over  anyone  but  its  own  members,  and  so  cannot  play  a  part  in 
the  wider  regulation  of  the  system.  Legislative  intervention,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
arguably  driven  by  Parliament's  perception  that  the  existing  regulatory  framework  is  in 
some  way  deficient,  with  the  ensuing  legislation  being  intended  to  remedy  the  defect  or 
omission.  In  this  respect,  Parliament  is  the  ultimate  guarantor  of  the  regulatory  system. 
However,  in  operational  terms  what  tends  to  happen  is  not  so  much  ensuring  that  the 
regulatory  system  is  fulfilling  its  allotted  functions  (although  parliamentary  inquiries  may 
do  this  on  an  ad-hoc  basis)  but  rather  consists  of  redefining  the  functions  and  roles  of 
the  other  regulators  (or  indeed,  of  establishing  or  abolishing  a  particular  regulatory 
mechanism).  There  are  exceptions,  such  as  the  National  Health  Service  Reform  and 
Health  Care  Professions  Act  2002.  This  includes,  in  Part  2,  the  establishment  of  a  new 
body,  the  Council  for  the  Regulation  of  Health  Care  Professionals,  which  (once 
established)  will  have  a  clearly-defined  role  in  ensuring  that  the  GIVIC  is  carrying  out  its 322 
functions  adequately.  Such  a  body  would  fulfil  the  task  of  regulating  the  regulatory 
machinery,  viz.  the  GIVIC  and  other  statutory  regulatory  bodies,  but  the  mechanism 
adopted  would  be  another  statutory  regulatory  body  rather  than  direct  statutory 
regulation  per  se.  The  specific  legislation  considered  in  Chapter  6  may  have  the 
incidental  effect  of  making  the  other  regulatory  mechanisms  more  open  to  scrutiny,  but 
this  is  (in  general)  not  an  end  in  itself.  In  this  regard,  none  of  these  recent  legislative 
innovations  fulfils  this  regulatory  task.  The  criminal  law  performs  a  limited  role  in  this 
area,  mostly  in  relation  to  offences  such  as  wilful  neglect  of  duty  for  officers  employed  in 
other  regulatory  mechanisms.  The  criminal  law  is  also,  as  we  have  seen,  used  as  the 
mechanism  to  give  other  regulators  teeth.  However,  most  regulatory  failures  take  place 
without  any  criminal  offence  being  committed,  and  the  criminal  law  cannot  be  seen  as 
fulfilling  the  function  of  policing  the  regulatory  machinery.  This  leaves  the  civil  courts. 
As  was  shown  in  Chapter  4,  the  civil  courts  (through  the  judicial  review  jurisdiction  17) 
have  the  power  to  scrutinise  the  activities  of  those  who  perform  public  functions.  Mostly, 
however,  this  is  the  supreme  courts'  jurisdiction  to  ensure  that  those  to  whom  Parliament 
has  entrusted  a  discretion  are  exercising  that  discretion  in  the  way  which  the  courts 
presume  Parliament  intended.  The  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  over  Parliament"',  and  so 
any  failures  in  regulatory  activity  flowing  from  primary  legislation  (or  the  lack  of 
legislation,  if  there  be  a  regulatory  void)  are  beyond  the  ability  of  the  civil  courts  to 
rectify.  The  courts  have  also  traditionally  taken  the  view  that  if  Parliament  has  entrusted 
a  discretionary  judgement  to  someone,  it  is  not  for  the  courts  to  impose  their  own  views 
in  place  of  the  proper  decision-maker.  While  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  has  either 
caused  or  been  co-incidental  with  an  expansion  of  the  judicial  review  jurisdiction  to  the 
extent  that  some  inroads  have  been  made  into  this  principle1g,  this  expansion  has  been 
cautious  and  the  courts  remain  highly  reluctant  to  interfere  with  the  views  of 
administrative  decision-makers.  This,  of  course,  does  not  excuse  the  civil  courts  for  their 
own  regulatory  failings  in  relation  to  the  other  tasks,  but  it  is  convenient  for  present 
purposes  to  separate  out  the  supervisory  jurisdiction  from  the  adjudicatory  jurisdiction. 
The  supervisory  jurisdiction  is  incapable  of  fashioning  a  regulatory  mechanism  where 
none  exists,  and  it  would  be  unfair  to  criticise  the  civil  courts  on  this  basis.  Conversely, 
however,  where  there  is  a  regulatory  mechanism,  the  civil  courts  have  provided  a  means 
of  holding  that  regulator  to  account.  The  main  problem  is  that  given  the  limited  nature  of 
the  regulatory  system  being  considered  in  this  thesis,  the  only  part  of  the  regulatory 
machinery  being  supervised  is  the  GIVIC.  No  other  part  of  the  regulatory  machinery 
considered  within  this  thesis  is  subject  to  any  real  mechanism  intended  to  ensure  that 
the  mechanism  is  doing  its  job.  This  has  to  be  regarded  as  a  major  regulatory  failure. 
The  core  evaluation  criteria: 323 
In  this  section,  the  different  analyses  of  the  regulatory  mechanisms  will  be  pulled 
together,  and  an  assessment  will  be  made  as  to  how  well  they  match  up  to  the  core 
evaluation  criteria.  However,  in  order  to  continue  with  the  cross-sectional  analysis  being 
utilised  in  this  chapter,  each  criterion  will  be  considered  in  turn  to  evaluate  how  well  the 
system  as  a  whole  matches  up  to  it.  This  will  provide  the  information  based  on  which 
the  final  section  of  this  Chapter  will  reconsider  the  working  hypothesis. 
When  visibility  is  considered,  the  overall  pattern  seems  to  be  that  the  regulatory  systems 
themselves  are  adequately  visible.  The  lack  of  visibility  arises  only  in  relation  to  the 
decisions  as  to  whether  formal  proceedings  (within  the  GIVIC  or  under  the  criminal  law) 
are  to  proceed.  There  is,  in  particular,  scope  for  improvement  in  terms  of  the  openness 
of  investigating  and  prosecuting  authorities  and  why  they  reach  decisions  on 
investigation  and  prosecution. 
In  terms  of  accountability,  at  the  highest  level,  responsibility  for  the  passing  of 
legislation,  legislation  which  affects  civil  or  criminal  liability  or  which  creates  or  removes  a 
regulatory  body,  lies  with  Parliament.  This  is  accountable  to  the  general  public  through 
the  normal  mechanism  of  the  general  election,  but  this  form  of  accountability  is  too 
remote  to  provide  adequate  safeguards  in  relation  to  a  regulatory  mechanism.  The 
judicial  aspects  of  the  system  are  adequately  (if  poorly)  accountable;  however,  the  other 
aspects  of  the  system  are  regarded  as  being  deficient  in  this  respect.  The  rights  of 
victims  are,  however,  not  similarly  protected,  and  while  it  is  accepted  that  any  move  in 
the  direction  of  victims'  rights  can  impact  adversely  on  the  accused,  it  is  suggested  that 
adequate  safeguards  could  be  devised  and  improvements  could  be  made  in  relation  to 
victims'  rights.  The  GIVIC,  with  its  majority  of  elected  members,  would  appear  to  be 
accountable  to  its  own  membership.  It  is,  however,  in  terms  of  accountability  to  the 
general  public  that  the  GIVIC  scores  poorly.  Too  many  things  happen  which  are  done 
away  from  public  scrutiny,  and  even  accepting  that  there  are  legitimate  grounds  for 
protecting  confidentiality  in  some  circumstances,  there  appears  to  be  no  good  reason  for 
not  requiring  these  secret  procedures  to  produce  appropriately  anonymised  accounts  of 
what  they  have  done  or  to  provide  feedback  to  the  complainant.  The  GIVIC  fails  to 
satisfy  the  criterion  of  accountability.  Drawing  these  threads  together,  accountability 
fails  in  relation  to  the  same  invisible  decision-makers  criticised  in  the  previous 
paragraph,  coupled  with  a  failure  in  accountability  caused  by  lack  of  adequate  feedback 
mechanisms  keeping  the  complainant  informed  as  to  outcomes  (and  allowing  them  to 
challenge  those  responsible).  Given  that  ultimately  the  only  truly  accountable  part  of  the 
system  is  accountable  only  weakly,  through  parliamentary  democracy,  coupled  with  the 324 
fact  that  so  many  functions  are  exercised  by  judges  who  are  (in  effect)  necessarily 
unaccountable,  it  therefore  appears  that  the  system  fails  on  this  score. 
Turning  to  overall  fairness,  it  will  be  recalled  that  this  incorporates  a  number  of  aspects 
including  impartiality,  accessibility,  and  speed  of  decision-making.  A  number  of 
shortcomings  were  identified  in  relation  to  each  of  these  aspects:  the  unduly  biased 
approach  of  the  civil  courts,  coupled  with  problems  relating  to  costs,  accessibility  and 
delay  were  particular  cause  for  concern,  and  there  were  some  failings  in  relation  to  those 
who  make  complaints  to  the  GIVIC  about  a  doctor,  although  these  were  not  so  serious  as 
to  cause  us  to  depart  from  the  conclusion  that  the  GIVIC  does  satisfy  the  test  of  overall 
fairness.  When  we  look  at  these  comments  together,  we  find  that  the  regulatory  system 
as  a  whole  is  fair  to  those  using  it  -  but  only  just  -  and  the  unfairness  is  in  relation  to  the 
only  part  of  the  system  which  the  dissatisfied  person  can  have  resort  to  as  of  right 
(rather  than  at  the  will  of  a  third  party  decision-maker).  Indeed,  the  worst  incidence  of 
unfairness  relates  to  the  cost,  delay  and  apparent  evidential  bias  visible  within  the 
system  of  civil  litigation.  Any  attempt  to  improve  the  impartiality,  accessibility,  speed  of 
decision-making  and  overall  fairness  of  the  regulatory  system  would  accordingly  be  well 
advised  to  focus  its  attention  on  the  system  of  civil  litigation. 
It  has  already  been  seen  that  the  practical  effects  of  many  regulatory  interventions  are, 
in  some  respects,  unquantifiable  and  we  are  therefore  concerned  only  with  the 
quantifiable  effects.  From  what  can  be  observed,  do  the  various  regulatory  mechanisms 
do  what  they  set  out  to  achieve?  Certainly  the  criminal  law  appears  to  do  its  job,  and  for 
a  reactive  system  the  GIVIC  is  also  tolerably  effective.  The  legislative  innovations 
considered  are  also,  on  the  whole,  effective  subject  to  a  caveat  in  relation  to  the 
defective  enforcement  provisions  of  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998.  The  effectiveness  of 
the  civil  courts,  however,  can  be  considered  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  As  between 
the  parties  to  the  litigation,  the  courts  are  very  effective  (even  if  one  might  quibble  with 
the  way  in  which  that  effectiveness  is  actually  applied  in  particular  cases).  As  has  been 
seen,  assuming  the  (many)  problems  caused  by  shortcomings  falling  within  other  criteria 
are  overcome,  then  the  civil  courts  will,  with  a  high  degree  of  effectiveness,  award 
compensation  -  but  only  in  a  very  small  proportion  of  cases.  Overall,  the  courts  are 
effective  at  all  the  main  regulatory  functions  they  are  tasked  with,  with  the  notable 
exceptions  of  setting  and  upholding  standards  of  medical  practice.  There  is  room  for 
significant  improvement  in  the  functions  of  investigating  mishaps  and  regulating  other 
regulators,  and  the  compensation  function  is  rendered  ineffectual  by  other  failures. 
Overall,  It  appears  that  the  regulatory  system  is  tolerably  effective,  although  there  are 
significant  shortcomings  in  relation  to  all  of  its  component  parts.  It  should  also  be  noted 325 
that  this  assessment  of  effectiveness  is  in  relation  to  the  regulatory  tasks  undertaken  by 
the  constituent  parts  of  the  system.  There  is  no  attempt  at  assessing  the  regulatory 
gaps  which  this  section  is  identifying.  Where  there  is  a  clearly-identified  regulatory  gap, 
then  the  system  as  a  whole  is  ineffective  in  relation  to  that  failure,  even  if  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  localise  the  problem  to  one  of  our  regulatory  mechanisms.  It  may  be  that 
such  a  discovery  points  to  the  need  for  additional  regulators  to  be  created,  or  the 
jurisdiction  or  rules  of  an  existing  regulator  to  be  changed  in  a  way  which  that 
mechanism  is  incapable  of  doing  unilaterally. 
In  assessing  the  efficiency  of  any  regulatory  mechanism,  it  is  important  to  note  that 
"most  efficient"  does  not  equate  to  "cheapest".  What  we  are  concerned  with  here  is  the 
0  concept  of  productive  efficiency'  ,a  concept  used  by  economists  which  explicitly  relates 
the  costs  of  a  service  to  the  quantity  and  quality  of  service  provision.  Thus,  for  a 
measure  to  satisfy  this  criterion,  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  be  the  cheapest  option,  so 
long  as  higher  costs  are  reflected  in  some  form  of  improved  performance.  On  this  basis, 
both  civil  and  criminal  court  organisation  would  appear  inefficient  and  the  fact  that  an 
estimated  85%  of  the  sums  awarded  in  compensation  is  taken  up  in  CoStS21  (131  %  in 
claims  under  E500022)  is  itself  a  strong  indicator  of  inefficiency  on  the  civil  courts'  part. 
The  GIVIC's  use  of  informal  processes  is  efficient,  and  it  additionally  makes  no  drain  on 
the  public  purse.  The  Data  Protection  Act,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a  number  of  features 
which  arguably  impose  bureaucratic  burdens  on  data  controllers  but  which  confer  no 
appreciable  rights  on  anyone.  This  Act  is  therefore  deemed  to  be  inefficient. 
Considering  the  overall  effect  of  this,  it  would  appear  that,  in  the  round,  the  regulatory 
system  is  not  efficient  and  that  much  could  be  done  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the 
system.  The  role  of  the  courts  in  particular  requires  to  be  addressed. 
Does  the  system  interfere  unduly  with  good  medical  practice?  It  is  necessary  to  consider 
the  definition  of  this  adopted  in  Chapter  2:  it  means  medical  activity  which  is 
demonstrably  of  clinical  benefit  to  the  patient,  and  which  is  the  course  of  treatment 
which,  if  the  patient  could  be  brought  up  to  the  level  of  knowledge  concerning  potential 
risks,  benefits,  alternatives  and  inherent  uncertainties  as  the  doctor  treating  him  or  her 
(or  alternatively,  of  a  "reasonable"  doctor),  the  patient  would  have  chosen  for  him-  or 
herself.  The  criminal  law  patently  does  not,  and  the  civil  law  (by  relying  so  heavily  on 
medical  professional  standards)  does  not  either,  although  the  stress  of  litigation  on 
medical  personnel  being  sued,  and  the  diversion  of  resources  from  patient  care  into 
litigation  expenses,  are  areas  where  there  is  scope  for  significant  improvement.  The 
(self-regulating)  GIVIC,  unsurprisingly,  shows  no  signs  of  interfering  unduly  with  its  own 
members'  practice  of  medicine,  nor  do  either  the  Human  Rights  Act  or  the  Data 326 
Protection  Act.  Overall,  therefore,  it  would  appear  that  nothing  in  the  current  regulatory 
framework  unduly  interferes  with  good  medical  practice  (as  we  have  defined  that  term), 
although  there  are  some  improvements  which  could  be  made  in  relation  to  civil  litigation. 
Both  the  Human  Rights  Act  and  the  Data  Protection  Act  have  concern  for  individual 
autonomy  at  their  heart.  It  is  therefore  easy  to  conclude  that  both  satisfy  this  criterion. 
On  the  other  hand,  both  the  civil  and  criminal  law  uphold  the  principle  of  physical 
autonomy  through  the  law  of  assault,  but  do  so  only  poorly  in  the  medical  context.  In 
terms  of  patients  as  victims  of  crime,  the  system  substantially  disempowers  the  victim, 
and  this  also  shows  a  clear  disregard  of  respect  for  patient  autonomy.  The  civil  law 
additionally  protects  individual  personal  autonomy  through  the  law  relating  to  consent  to 
treatment,  but  this  law  is  highly  defective  in  allowing  the  medical  profession  to  determine 
how  much  information  the  patient  receives.  The  civil  law  also  allows  the  refusal  of 
treatment  of  autonomous  individuals  to  be  overridden  in  some  instances,  most  notably  in 
the  case  of  pregnant  women.  Any  shortcomings  on  the  part  of  the  GIVIC  (which  issues 
guidance  on  the  subject  of  consent  and  autonomy)  are  better  seen  as  a  failure 
provoked  by  the  preceding  failures  in  accountability  and  visibility.  But  does  the  system 
overall  respect  patient  autonomy  adequately?  The  answer  would  seem  to  be  no.  Too 
many  parts  of  the  system  fail  to  provide  adequate  protection  for  the  rights  of  the 
individual,  and  even  those  that  provide  protection  do  so  subject  to  caveats  as  to  the 
extent  of  that  protection.  Procedural  criminal  law  and  substantive  civil  law  would  require 
amendment,  and  if  we  are  serious  about  patient  autonomy  we  would  also  want  to  look  at 
the  GIVIC's  procedures. 
IV:  Solution  to  Workinq  Hypothesis: 
To  recap  Chapter  1,  the  working  question  underpinning  this  thesis  is  as  follows: 
"Does  the  present  system  of  regulation  of  medical  practice  in  Great  Britain 
provide  adequate  safeguards  for  the  interests  of  patients,  doctors  and  the  State?  " 
To  answer  this,  it  is  necessary  to  provide  a  very  brief  summary  of  the  two  preceding 
sections  of  this  Chapter,  which  between  them  have  assessed  the  overall  workings  of  the 
regulatory  system  across  four  mechanisms,  eight  regulatory  functions  and  seven 
evaluation  criteria. 
The  following  things  about  the  regulatory  system  as  it  currently  stands  have  been 
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e  Standards  of  medical  practice  are  not  set  by  any  of  the  formal  regulators,  and  are 
only  gradually  reflected  by  them 
e  These  standards  are  only  upheld  by  the  formal  regulators  in  the  event  of  serious 
breaches,  and  then  only  on  a  reactive  basis 
*  The  regulatory  system  ceases  to  have  any  formal  role  in  facilitating  medical 
practice  in  accordance  with  these  standards  once  a  doctor  is  fully  registered, 
except  in  relation  to  borderline  cases 
*  The  system  for  providing  redress  for  those  who  suffer  due  to  a  failure  to  adhere 
to  standards  is deeply  flawed 
9  There  are  very  few  channels  which  permit  grievances  to  be  aired  and  disputes 
resolved;  most  of  those  which  do  exist  require  an  official  to  determine  whether  a 
complaint  will  be  acted  on  or  not  or  are  expensive  and/or  hard  to  access 
o  Effective  systems  of  investigation  to  inquire  into  whether  standards  are  being 
adhered  to  or  not  only  seem  to  exist  in  relation  to  allegations  of  serious  criminal 
conduct,  although  this  shortcoming  does  not  necessarily  prevent  all  regulators 
from  being  able  to  take  action 
9  There  are  adequate  systems  for  the  punishment  of  those  who  fail  to  adhere  to 
the  standards,  and 
*  There  is  virtually  no  regulation  of  the  regulatory  system  itself  to  ensure  that  the 
above  tasks  are  being  carried  out. 
This  is  considering  the  current  system  against  a  hypothetical  list  of  what  a  regulatory 
system  might  do  (although  this  list  is  also  arguably  a  description  of  that  the  system 
should  do).  In  terms  of  assessing  what  the  current  system  actually  does,  it  is  helpful  to 
turn  to  the  core  evaluation  criteria.  The  analysis  here  indicates  that: 
0  Formal  regulatory  mechanisms  are  highly  visible,  although  there  are  hidden 
preliminary  stages 
0  Accountability  for  the  system  is  largely  confined  to  the  electoral  accountability  of 
Parliament 
0  Most  of  the  system  is  fair  to  those  who  are  affected  by  it,  with  the  exception  of  the 
system  of  civil  litigation  which  is  the  only  part  the  dissatisfied  individual  can 
access  as  of  right. 
The  system  overall  is  effective  at  carrying  out  those  regulatory  tasks  which  it 
actually  undertakes,  although  there  are  some  exceptions 
The  system  is  inefficient,  although  much  of  the  inefficiency  stems  from  the 
inefficiencies  of  the  civil  and  criminal  courts 328 
Nothing  in  the  current  regulatory  system  unduly  interferes  with  good  medical 
practice 
a  The  system  fails  to  accord  proper  respect  to  the  autonomy  of  individual  patients, 
particularly  aggrieved  ones. 
Against  this,  the  answer  to  the  working  hypothesis  can  only  be  given  in  the  negative. 
Regulatory  tasks  are  left  undone,  the  overall  regulatory  system  is  unpoliced  and  scarcely 
accountable,  the  system  is  inefficient.  From  detailed  analyses,  it  would  appear  that  no- 
one's  interests  -  those  of  doctors,  patients,  the  wider  public  or  the  state  -  are  well-served 
by  this  situation. 
There  are,  of  course,  a  number  of  positive  aspects  to  these  findings.  Thus,  while  much 
of  the  process  is  not  formalised  (in  particular,  the  setting  and  upholding  of  medical 
standards),  this  does  not  appear  to  have  reflected  adversely  on  those  standards 
(although  comparative  study  is  impossible).  None  of  the  evaluation  criteria  are 
systematically  ignored,  and  even  those  criteria  which  were  not  satisfied  were  not 
satisfied  as  a  result  of  specific  flaws  rather  than  because  the  values  reflected  in  those 
criteria  are  not  respected  by  the  system.  And  where  it  was  possible  to  detect  changes 
within  the  system,  actual  or  pending,  the  trend  of  those  changes  was  universally  in  a 
direction  more  in  compliance  with  the  evaluation  criteria. 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  given  the  disjointed  and  incrementalist  approach  which  appears  to 
have  underlain  all  the  changes  to  the  system  over  the  years,  this  thesis  has  not  identified 
any  instances  of  regulatory  overlap.  Where  an  incident  or  event  can  potentially  attract 
the  attentions  of  one  or  more  regulator,  this  is  because  the  attention  is  driven  by  a 
different  regulatory  function  and  does  not  represent  any  inefficient  and  unnecessary 
duplication  of  effort.  The  problem  is  not  one  of  too  much  regulation.  Neither,  to  be  fair, 
is  it  one  of  too  little  regulation  and  it  is  not  suggested  that  we  immediately  legislate  to  fill 
all  the  regulatory  gaps  just  identified.  The  problem  is  more  one  of  quality  of  regulation. 
The  gaps  which  have  emerged  have  done  so  because  there  appears  to  be  no 
overarching  theory  of  what  we  are  trying  to  achieve.  Ad-hoc  solutions  are  proposed  to 
particular  problems.  Regulatory  systems  are  amended  in  ways  which  fail  to  consider  the 
wider  impact,  and  without  any  real  thought  as  to  the  appropriate  regulatory  strategy.  The 
effects  of  the  measures  adopted  on  the  wider  groups  affected  are  not  considered. 
To  conclude,  therefore,  it  is  worth  briefly  considering  what  factors  would  most  easily 
improve  the  system  so  that  the  interests  of  doctors,  patients  and  the  state  can  be 
reconciled  and  adequately  safeguarded. 329 
Firstly,  in  terms  of  the  regulatory  gaps  identified,  there  is  a  policy  question  to  be 
addressed  as  to  which  of  the  unfulfilled  regulatory  tasks  it  would  be  desirable  to 
formalise  within  the  state  apparatus.  As  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  formal  mechanism  for 
setting  or  (in  the  normal  run  of  things)  for  upholding  standards  of  medical  treatment. 
This  does  not  appear  to  have  prevented  the  profession  from  setting  its  own  standards 
quite  successfully,  and  some  at  least  would  question  the  justification  for  imposing  state 
regulation  on  medical  practice.  This  has,  however,  increasingly  happened  within  the 
confines  of  the  NHS23  which  tends  to  remove  any  objection  in  principle  to  the  state  taking 
a  hand  in  setting  standards.  In  any  case,  the  current  revalidation  proposals  from  the 
GIVIC  may  fill  this  regulatory  gap  without  any  further  action  being  necessary. 
Staying  with  the  GIVIC  for  a  moment,  the  Council  for  the  Regulation  of  Health  Care 
Professionals  will  at  least  have  the  potential  of  opening  up  certain  internal  procedures  to 
external  and  independent  scrutiny,  which  potentially  removes  some  of  the  problems 
identified. 
The  biggest  single  improvement  to  the  system,  however,  would  be  the  removal  of  the 
civil  courts  from  the  system.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  problems  uncovered  in  the 
course  of  this  thesis  relate  to  difficulties  in  accessing  the  courts,  the  costs  involved,  delay 
in  reaching  a  conclusion,  and  the  fact  that  the  forensic  lottery  is  both  unpleasant  for 
doctors  and  loaded  against  patients.  From  the  state's  perspective  it  is  an  inefficient  way 
of  distributing  resources  to  those  who  have  a  need  for  them,  and  the  impact  of  litigation 
in  diverting  resources  away  from  clinical  care  cannot  be  ignored.  Some  form  of  "no-fault" 
compensation  system  would  appear  to  be  a  far  more  satisfactory  approach.  While  some 
advocates  of  this  argue  that  it  would  need  to  be  accompanied  by  systems  to  maintain 
standards  in  the  absence  of  litigation's  deterrent  effect,  a  quick  glance  at  the  foregoing 
summary  shows  that  this  is  unnecessary.  Civil  litigation  does  not  currently  fulfil  that 
regulatory  task,  and  establishing  a  new  body  to  do  so  once  a  "no-fault"  system  is 
established  could  in  itself  represent  a  regulatory  duplication  of  the  GIVIC's  performance 
monitoring  powers.  The  compensation-awarding  body  could  in  itself  provide  an  outlet  for 
certain  grievances,  and  the  activities  of  other  regulators  might  become  easier  because 
the  prospect  of  inadvertently  prejudicing  a  civil  court  action  would  be  removed.  No-fault 
compensation  is  far  from  being  a  panacea;  there  are  other,  more  deep-rooted  problems 
in  the  current  system.  But  this  at  least  would  be  a  tremendous  step  forward  in  removing 
the  worst  failings  of  the  system  as  it  stands. 330 
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